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Abstract 
Progress in neuroscience over the last half-century casts doubt on the religious 
intuition that the mind is a non-material entity. Without some dialogue between 
religion and science in order to resolve differences of fact and value, the dilemma of 
the competing plausibility of scientific and religious mind-theories may diminish the 
social acceptance of science and the social relevance of religion. 
In order to identify whether meaningful discussion about neuroscience is taking 
place in the 'convert' British Buddhist community, I conducted qualitative interviews 
with ten people who have leadership responsibilities. Little formal discussion was 
reported within organisations, but there was some response to neuroscience at the 
level of personal attitude. Briefly, that response is of resistance to the neuroscientific 
view, and a corresponding prioritisation of subjective experience, which is felt to be 
more reliable than theoretical explanations that can only be believed, or findings that 
can only be empirically known. The existential certainty of experience is preferred to 
the uncertainty of explanation. 
Interpreting the interview findings, I argue that explanation forms an 
unavoidable part of experience, providing guidance from the past for the creation of 
anticipated futures, but that incautious spatial modelling in linguistic explanation 
reinforces the notion an internal objective self by treating the mind as a containing 
entity. From the standpoint of the Buddhist attitude of 'right view', the scientific 
assertion of the materiality of mind is immaterial in two senses. Firstly, there can be 
no right motivation for schism over views as opposed to acts. Secondly, minds 
depend upon both physical and abstract property-relations across the brain-world 
barrier. The mind is constituted as a relationally holistic process, and is preoccupied 
by approximation to real and ideal homeostasis. Realisation of the relationally 
holistic origination of mind depends on the adoption of a meditative attitude of 
attention to the world, and is likely to motivate a contemporary Buddhist attitude of 
social engagement with the world. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Introduction 
Neuroscience has discovered correlations between some types of brain 
functioning and some types of mental event. These correlations provide inductive 
support for the hypothesis that the brain is the cause of the mind, or is identical to the 
mind. Some contemporary Buddhist response to that hypothesis might be expected, 
because statements about the nature and proper functioning of the mind form a 
significant part of the Buddhist tradition. This study was intended to discover 
whether British 'convert' Buddhists consider that neuroscientific explanations of 
mind are compatible with Buddhist explanations; that is to say, whether both 
discourses refer to the 'way things really are' (yatha-bhfitam) in a single, coherent 
world-system, or whether Buddhist and neuroscientific modes of explanation are 
incommensurable because they refer to events so ontologically distinct that they 
inhabit different philosophical worlds. 
In pursuit of that intention, ten leading British Buddhists were interviewed. The 
findings were inconclusive, for participants in qualitative, dialogic interviews are free 
to respond in the way they see fit, and these participants saw fit to respond to explicit 
questions about the nature of mind in a way that was often ambiguous or tangential. 
They were more interested in the establishment of effective Buddhist practice than 
debate about doctrinal niceties. Several were of the view that faith in traditional 
Buddhist explanation is the most appropriate attitude for a practitioner, because from 
a soteriological perspective time spent an academic search for compatibility between 
discourses is a waste of time that could be spent on practice. Another considered that 
neuroscientific findings remained too inconclusive to support a mind/brain identity 
theory. Another transcended the question by arguing that neither mind not matter are 
as they seem. Yet another thought that the philosophical struggle to understand the 
nature (ontology) of mind is motivated by a desire for certainty, which is an 
inappropriate attitude from a Buddhist point of view. When the participants did touch 
upon the ontological question, two of them clearly expressed the traditional Buddhist, 
and perhaps pan-religious, view that the mind is a non-material entity. Of six 
participants who avoided ontological discussion, three subscribed to doctrines, such 
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as rebirth, which are dependent on a non-material basis for the mind, and three others 
made statements that were ambiguous. One participant admitted that they did not 
know if the mind could continue without material support, but not only did they 
conceive of that possibility, but it was their preference. Only one participant thought 
that the mind was causally dependent on the functioning of the embodied brain. All 
of the interview participants laid great stress on the importance of Personal experience 
as the final source of validation for both scientific knowledge and religious meaning. 
It was clear from the interviews as a whole that individual attitudes towards the 
nature of the mind were reliant upon a balance struck between the significance of 
explanatory information and the significance of experience. 
In the light of the importance attached to personal experience the ambiguity of 
many of the participant's responses is understandable, for none claimed special 
access to knowledge that could determine, once and for all, the problematic issue of 
the material or non-material nature of mind. But in advance of confirmation by 
experience the majority were not persuaded by their layperson's understanding of 
neuroscientific theory and evidence. Attitudes and opinions were influenced by the 
obvious difference between the non-material appearance of mental events and the 
material appearance of brain events, and by traditional Buddhist explanations. The 
ambiguous or tangential approach to the matter displayed by most of the participants 
could be taken to represent a transitional stage of uncertainty, which may or may not 
be resolved in the future as more neuroscientific evidence becomes available. 
Although some of the participant's opinions were ambiguous, tangential, or 
uncertain, these uncertainties were expressed with clarity and personal authority. In 
the absence of information about motivations, any analysis of those expressions 
would be little more than systematic repetition. Instead, I surnmarise the interview 
material with as much direct quotation as possible, in order to accurately represent the 
participant's views, then I utilise the ideas and attitudes expressed in the interviews as 
the basis for the construction of an interpretation that is overtly hermeneutic. I 
characterise the interpretation as henneneutic because, while it draws on information 
from the interview dialogues, it also draws infon-nation from the context, which in 
this case includes inforination from neuroscience and from Buddhist tradition. The 
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outcome of this hermeneutic process is a set of arguments for which I alone am 
responsible. 
The hermeneutic methodology determines the sequence and structure of the thesis. 
After a discussion of that methodology in Chapter 2, and a presentation of the 
relevant neuroscience in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 the interviews are summansed with 
quotations, and also presented briefly in synopsis. Chapter 5 describes the attitudes 
that subtend the participant's opinions, and establishes a modification of David 
Lewis's (1979) analysis of the priority of experience (de se) over explanation (de 
dicto), as a useful model of the functioning of the mind in the formation of attitudes, 
and as a theoretical framework for the interpretation in subsequent chapters, whereby 
the four-fold categories of experience and explanation, subject and self are 
investigated. 
In Chapter 61 argue that despite the priority of experience over explanation these 
two categories are not completely separable, for immediate experience is a non- 
linguistic mode of explanation of those features of the world that are salient for the 
organism. This experiential mode of explanation has evolved phylogenetically to 
contribute indirect, 'homomorphic' representations of the world to consciousness in 
order to facilitate response to complex scenarios (Llinas 200 1). More communicable, 
symbolic and normally linguistic forms of overt explanation are the result of further 
evolution of the complexity of cognitive organisation, rather than the development of 
ontologically separate processes. 
The relationship between 'subject' and 'self is discussed in Chapter 7, and I 
argue on Buddhist and neuroscientific grounds that the temporal difference between 
these two modes of immediate (subject) and subsequent (self) personal reference 
confirms the role of subjective experience as the guarantor of overt explanations 
made by and for the self, and by and for other selves. I remark on the confusion 
caused by the ubiquitous Augustinian metaphor of the mind as a container for internal 
psychological contents, such as discrete souls and selves (Augustine 2002, 
Wittgenstein 1992, Johnston 1993, Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
Having asserted the epistemological priority of experience over explanation, and 
the prior externalism of immediate relations with the world over the internalism of 
temporal I y- extended imaginative processes, I note in Chapter 8 that attention to 
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immediate experience compresses sensory, cognitive and affective information into 
one swift temporal process. Meditative attention to that swift process can subvert 
ingrained intentional strategies that are motivated by attachment to an illusory self 
with an illusory freedom of choice. The anticipated outcome of greater attention to 
immediate experience is an affective sense of freedom in a determinate world (Crook 
1992, Brazier 2003). Freedom develops from the ease that is associated with 
homeostasis. By extension, this physiological term can refer to the psychological 
maintenance of equilibrium in relation to external events and other persons. Long- 
term approximation to psychological equilibrium is a gradual achievement of regular 
practice, and is considered by the Buddhist tradition to aid the relinquishment of 
ingrained habits of mind resulting from attachment to the notion of a soul-like 
internal self The relational experience of psychological approximation to 
homeostasis bears comparison to religious notions of 'the sacred' and to the Buddhist 
ideal of enlightenment. 
In Chapter 91 suggest that an attentional, rather than an intentional attitude is the 
basis for insight into 'the way things really are' (yathd-bhfitam) and the gradual 
achievement of Buddhist 'right view' (samma-dýyhi). Right view is not so much a 
belief or opinion with respect to a particular dogma, as an underlying attitude of 
equanimity and non-attachment with respect to all views (Fuller 2005). From the 
point of view of 'right view', no opposing view ought to be traduced, for there is no 
right motivation for schism over doctrinal disputes. 
On the basis of the importance of experience and the explanatory correspondence 
between features of experience and features of the world, I argue for an 'externalist' 
view of the mind as a relationall holistic process occurring between an embodied Y 
brain and a real world. This view of the mind is not the same as the 'standard' 
scientific view of mind-brain identity, not is it the same as the pan-religious view that 
the mind is capable of causal disassociation from its physical embodiment in the 
world; nor does it entirely differ from those two points of view. With respect to 
neuroscientific explanation, the brain is indeed a necessary cause of the mind, but not 
a sufficient cause. With respect to Buddhist explanation, the mind is indeed a non- 
material property, for it is not identical to neuronal activity, but is manifested by the 
functional patterning of that activity when 'structurally coupled' sensonmotor 
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relations occur between neuronal systems and external things. The mind is the 
totality of external brain/world relations, and of internal relations between 
interconnected neuronal ensembles acting in synchronicity: the mind is a nexus of 
structural relations in the world. Although the brain has no afferent neurons by which 
the internal, neuronal relations can be experienced, relations between the embodied 
brain and the world are the object of experience, and such relations can be considered 
to constitute the whole of experience, once it is realised that imaginative experiences 
are 'as if explanations that are reliant on information from past experience. The 
relational holism that constitutes the mind is open to experiential confirmation. Such 
a confirmation relies upon the cultivation of an attentional attitude, in order that 
attachment to the restrictive notion of an ontologically separate self, soul or mind can 
be overcome. 
The relationally holistic view of the mind is, I suggest, compatible with the 
foundational Buddhist doctrines of the Four Noble Truths, of dependent origination 
(prafitya-samutpdda), 1 and of the lack of inherent existence of all things (S'i7nyatd). 
But relational holism will not resolve the issue of the nature of mind to the 
satisfaction of all parties, for it can be objected that the mind is an emergent property 
of brain/world relations. The notion of emergence is a variation on the fundamental 
metaphor of the mind as a container (Lakoff and Johnson 1980,1999). The container 
and emergence metaphors are rhetorical tropes, which inappropriately transfer the 
properties of movement in space from the source of the metaphor in the world to the 
target of the metaphor in the mind, as if the mind was a discrete entity with the 
capacity for mobility. It is not always clear whether discussions of mental emergence 
refer to higher-level effects that causally depend on lower-level property relations 
(epistemological emergence), or refer to the appearance of higher-level properties that 
are independent of causal determination by lower-level micro-properties (ontological 
emergence) (Girill 1976, Silberstein and McGeever 1999). Ontological emergence 
arguments are persuasive because they sustain the notion of individual agency, which 
is central to 'folk' psychological explanation. Mind/brain identity is less intuitively 
persuasive precisely because it is a lower-level causal theory, which lacks the 
resources to unite meaningfully with higher-level explanations of psychological 
significance. The relationally holistic view of mind is an intermediate -level 
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unification of lower-level neuroscience and higher-level psychological explanations 
of meaning. The theory is not value-neutral because it casts doubt on the common- 
sense reification of human agency as if the term referred to an objective entity, such 
as a soul, self, or mind, rather than a fairly habitual structural nexus of brain/world 
causal relations. 
Relational holism may be compatible with foundational Buddhist doctrines, but it 
does not support the meaningful truth-values traditionally ascribed to mythological 
teachings, which are susceptible to reinterpretation as psychological works of the 
imagination. For that reason it is natural that those contemporary Buddhists who take 
a literal approach to the interface between mythology and doctrine should conclude 
that the mind is not relationally holistic, but is an ontologically emergent entity 
capable of transcending its causal basis. This divergence of opinion marks an 
exemplary case where the cultivation of the 'right view' attitude of equanimity is 
required with respect to opposing views, and with respect to one's own attachment to 
an opinion. After all, the truth/fictional status of any theory is always indeterminate 
(Cartwright 1994, Teller 2004) since theory is explanation, and explanation is an 'as 
if imaginative combination on the basis of past experience, always standing in need 
of future corrective verification on the anvil of present experience. 
Motivation for the study 
Reconciling explanations of mind 
This study was initially motivated by my own search for meaning. Like any 
other human being at any other time, I have encountered suffering (dukkha). Like 
any other literate 20th -2l't century person I have had the opportunity to encounter 
Buddhist practice according to the Four Noble Truths: the Buddhist diagnosis and 
prescription that existential suffering has causes that can be eliminated by the means 
of the Eight-fold Path. Thanks to the popular dissemination of scientific findings, I 
have also had the opportunity to acquire a layperson's understanding of the human 
nervous system, and to appreciate the brain's functional capacity to bind together the 
disparate features of consciousness into a single, evanescent stream of awareness. 
The opportunity to understand both Buddhism and neuroscience has only become 
available since the Second World War: my generation is the first to face the task of 
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combining both modes of explanation in order to maintain a unified understanding of 
the world that accords with the way things are felt to be experientially, and known to 
be experimentally. The desire for such a unified understanding is the principal 
motivation for this study. 
At the outset, I thought it likely that Buddhism would eventually undergo 
doctrinal change in the light of neuroscientific findings. In the course of the study I 
realised that my opinion was naIve. Firstly, the metaphysical beliefs underlying 
Buddhism and science are opinions held in the absence of certainty; secondly, the 
'standard' scientific view of mind/brain identity remains a hypothesis, although it is a 
coherent hypothesis with considerable evidential support; and thirdly, neuroscientific 
theory lacks the resources to adequately account for mental events that require a 
psychological explanation. Because the interpretation presented in the latter half of 
the thesis is hermeneutic, its conclusions represent my current, more considered 
opinion. I now hold that the mind is not identical to the brain, but is a relational 
nexus constituted by the entirety of structural relations between brain and world. 
With some hesitation, I also want to say that the mind is an epistemologically 
emergent property of the world, rather than an ontologically emergent property that is 
capable of transcending, or becoming not of the world. But I might be wrong, and 
those contemporary Buddhists who subscribe to the latter view might be right. 
If Buddhist and neuroscientific modes of explanation turn out to be incompatible 
in the long run, then one or the other ought to be modified or rejected, or else the 
world-view of a contemporary Buddhist who takes science seriously would be 
inconsistent. That is a grave charge, for the compartmentalisation necessary for the 
maintenance of mental inconsistency places severe limitations on the activity of 
thought. From a Socratic point of view, inconsistency within persons is worse than 
inconsistency between persons, for a person who cannot think about their own 
prejudices, or whose thinking is out of harmony with itself, may be sufficiently 
deluded to be incapable of separating right from wrong (Arendt 1978: 179-183 ). 2 
Social consequences 
Socratic consistency of thought may not bother most people, for lives are not 
invariably guided by reason, but by habitual social practice, imagination, and the 
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common lore of 'ethical know-how' gleaned from countless everyday situations 
(Varela 1999a). Irrational attitudes affect the consistency of rational opinions, but it 
is patronising to assume in -advance that someone is incapable of adjusting their 
opinions on the basis of available information in order to eliminate inconsistency in 
their reasoning. Despite the complex forces that shape collective social 
representations (Moscovici 2001, Potter and Litton 1985), by virtue of its explanatory 
successes science tends to enjoy high status in contemporary society, in comparison 
to the declining status of religion. This is particularly the case for sciences associated 
with medicine, as the popular image of hospitals has changed from association with 
suffering and death to association with the alleviation of suffering and the hope of 
survival. In an era when doctors are priests and nurses are angels, the status of 
science in general and neuroscience in particular provides additional, non-rational 
support for the 'standard' view of mind/brain identity, and may limit the attraction 
and influence of forms of Buddhism that advocate an opposing view of the mind. 
Such a hypothetical limitation is not immediately apparent, for the available 
statistics suggest that Buddhism in Britain grew exponentially between the 1960s and 
the beginning of the 21 St century. 3 But that growth was supported by immigration, 
the arrival of new traditions, and by the missionary activities undertaken by the three 
largest 'convert' Buddhist groups: the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order, the 
New Kadampa Tradition, and S6ka Gakkai. Mission may not be a major factor in the 
future, for the inability of organisations to attract a significant proportion of those 
registered as Buddhists in the 2001 Census could be taken to indicate that interest in 
Buddhism may be approaching a natural ceiling (Bluck 2006: 17). According to the 
2001 census, 0.26% of the British population are Buddhist (Buck 2006: 15). 
Buddhism may exert a disproportionate influence through the popularization of its 
compassionate teachings, but so long as it remains such a niche activity it is unlikely 
to make inroads into the levels and consequences of geed, hatred and delusion. My 
contention is that, unlike Buddhism, neuroscience has a natural connection with the 
'reified universe' of specialist discourse and the 'consensual universe' of social 
discourse (Moscovici 2001), by virtue of the high status attached to the medical 
sciences. I do not suggest that Buddhism should come to an accommodation with the 
findings of neuroscience for venal reasons of social acceptability, but I do suggest, 
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firstly, that the location of Buddhism as an exotic alternative for those who find 
scientific empiricism unpalatable will limit Buddhist adherence to a niche interest in 
secularised, multicultural, western societies; and secondly, that something similar 
may happen in the Buddhist heartlands, for 21't century science is now a worldwide, 
pursuit. The second motivation for this study, therefore, is an interest in the extent to 
which compatibility with neuroscience might release Buddhism from the exotic niche 
label it has acquired as an alternative lifestyle brand for those who, temporarily or 
permanently and for a mixture of reasons, are moved to reject the mainstream 
consensus of their social situation. Despite the salience of such considerations, I am 
motivated more by the question of whether or not Buddhist and neuroscientific mind- 
theories can be unified, than I am by the applied and thus far hypothetical social 
consequences. In consequence, the thesis takes the form of a philosophical inquiry 
into the relationship between certain theoretical ideas and certain empirical findings, 
rather than an anthropological inquiry into the social consequences of doctrinal 
positions advanced by particular Buddhist organisations. Because the issue addressed 
by this thesis may have future social consequences, the greater part of the infon-nation 
for the study is collected from contemporary sources. 
Design of the study 
Interaction between experience and tradition 
Because this thesis goes in search of contemporary understanding, the main 
source of data is the testimony of living Buddhist practitioners. Correspondingly less 
attention is paid to the guidance that is preserved in traditional texts. Filtering the 
tradition through the views of practitioners escapes the 'orientalist' charge that the 
western study of Buddhism is biased towards the normative significance of texts. 
The data collection method of a study influences the possible conclusions. If this 
study were a comparison between, for example, neuroscience and the Pdli 
Abhidhamma, which largely treats of the mind under systematic lists (mdtikd) of 
possible mental states, it could map the similarities and differences between the two 
sorts of explanation but could not achieve the its goal: a unified interpretation that is 
applicable to the contemporary social circumstances from which it is derived. Across 
the tradition as a whole, Abhidhamma (Skt. Abhidharn7a) commentaries, are 
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exegetical works intended to exhaust the range of interpretations that can be derived 
from the early Buddhist suttas and dgamas, and the Mahdydna si7tras and s'dstas- It 
is precisely because a practitioner's understanding of the meaning of doctrine is not 
exhaustive until it is experienced, that continuing personal insight keeps open the 
possibility of the development of tradition. 
Tradition is a temporal chain of guidance for action, descending from a common 
origin in the past down to the present, but there are doctrinal and practical innovations 
along the way. There is a combination of elements, some of which may be 
considered essential because they 'persist' throughout the chain, whereas other 
elements undergo change or do not persist. The prototypical coherence and 
continuity of the whole must be sufficient to warrant affiliation to the tradition by 
practitioners, and recognition of the identity of the tradition by outsiders (Shils 1981: 
12-14). Rather than a chain, the analogy of a braid better expresses the combination 
of elements, the continuity of some elements and the evolution of others. The 
survival of original or early texts is an important strand, but the accumulating 
interpretation of those texts is of equal importance. Pelikan remarks that 'every 
tradition, old and new, offers a variety of responses' (1984: 49). Such openness to 
possibility depends on the apprehension that tradition takes the form of guidance, or a 
model for action, rather than the kind of coercive prescription that is characteristic of 
traditionalism. 
Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith 
of the living. And ... it is traditionalism that gives tradition such a 
bad 
name. (Pelikan 1984: 69). 
There is inevitably some tension between the design and the execution of a 
traditional model: between the nonnativity of the model and the creativity of the 
experiential insights generated as the model is implemented. Vibrant tradition is 
distinguished from moribund traditionalism by its ability to act as 'a source of depth 
and power for the creative impulse' (Pelikan 1984: 71,78). The creativity of a living 
tradition relies in part upon the insufficiency of the social transmission of meaning. 
Language, pedagogy and mimetic practice are insufficient because they are no more 
than approximate indicators of meaning, which has to be located individually by 
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personal experience in the current social context . 
II 
The importance of current experience as the completion of explanatory 
insufficiency has been noted in both western and Abhidhanna philosophy, although 
with a difference of emphasis. From a western perspective, Burge notes that 'partial 
understanding is common or even normal in the case of a large number of expressions 
in our vocabularies'l therefore: 
it is plausible that our well-understood propositional attitudes depend 
partly for their content on social factors independent of the 
individual ... This argument suggests that communal practice is a factor 
... in 
fixing the contents of my attitudes, even in cases where I 
fully understand the content (Burge 1979: 85). 
As a consequence of partial understanding there is room for social and contextual 
influences on attitudes and on meaning (Burge 1979: 73-84), therefore room for 
contemporary social influence on tradition. From an Abhidharma perspective it is the 
priority of individual rather than social experience that is asserted, in the form of a 
movement from wisdom based on study, to wisdom based on thought and finally 
wisdom based on meditation (Adam 2006: 82-84). According to Kamalas"Ila, wisdom 
based on meditation (bhavand) is a discernment of reality (bhu-ta-prat aveksa) by Y 
means of non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpajfidna) (Adam 2006: 73). 
In the Buddhist context, direct experience possesses an 
epistemologically privileged position; it is considered indubitable in 
the way that conclusions reached through reasoning alone are not. 
Here two forms of wisdom may be considered as 'thinking through' 
what one has studied (cintdmayT prajfid) versus actually 'going 
through' or concentratedly 'experiencing' the reality of what one has 
already thought through. (Adam 2006: 85). 
Despite the assertion that 'innovation is one of the great sins of Buddhist letters' 
(Lopez 1996: 244), the epistemological privilege granted to direct experience opens a 
way for re-interpretation of the textual tradition, on the hermeneutic principle that 
'whatever is well spoken is spoken by the Buddha' (Lopez 1995: 27,44 n 15). 
Because insight into reality is not transmitted by the textual tradition, only indicated, 
it remains open for tradition to be augmented by contemporary understanding that is 
grounded in a sequence of study, reflection, and meditative experience. 5 
This study is based on four sorts of information: from interview testimony, from 
Buddhist tradition, from neuroscience and from western philosophy. The discussion 
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of neuroscience in Chapter 3 is gathered from 'secondary' sources, in that I make use 
of theoretical texts by authors who examine the implications of neuroscience as a 
whole, as well as reporting the implications of individual experiments. In the same 
manner I mainly, but not exclusively, make use of secondary interpretations of 
primary Buddhist sources, and for the same practical reason: my expertise lies in the 
study of contemporary Buddhism in its social and philosophical context, not in the 
comparative study of raw neuroscientific data or the comparative assessment of 
conflicting Abhidharma texts. 
The conclusions of the study may not be compatible with some Abhidhanna 
codifications of tradition, or with all of the suttas (which may themselves be 
codifying interpretations of earlier passages), but the conclusions are compatible with 
the contemporary context, which now includes neuroscientific information. As with 
the hypothetical social consequences of the Buddhist/neuroscientific dialogue, a 
comparative investigation of the relationally holistic view of mind in the light of the 
Abhidhan-na tradition must be left for a further study. According to Chappell in 
Lopez (1987) the continuity of tradition is maintained in response to new 
interpretations by hermeneutic processes of initial 'individualization', followed by 
'reintegration' and finally 'control'. It is too soon to identify the range of these 
processes with respect to contemporary Buddhist views of the nature of mind. This 
study engages with the first stage of the process, at the point when new interpretations 
emerge. Future comparisons with Abhidhan-na texts will be more concerned with the 
outcome of Chappell's second and third stages. 
Neuroscience in dialogue with religion and philosophy 
Scientific methodology restricts the scope of explanation to the causal relations 
between the objects and forces that are observed or inferred to be operational in the 
universe. Traditional religious explanations are less metaphysically conservative, 
commonly including reference to objects and forces not ordinarily observed or 
inferred on the basis of ordinary observations, yet religion and science are not 
opposed by definition. 6 The distinction between the two disciplines is a difference of 
method and purpose rather than of different objects of investigation. The objects of 
religious investigation are not all immaterial, for religion also investigates and 
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regulates embodied human behaviour, and the objects of scientific study are not all 
physical, for virtual or hypothetical objects are the focus of methodical enquiry in 
quantum physics, in cognitive science and in the human sciences of sociology, 
psychology and economics. 
Differences of method, the explanatory success of scientific models and the high 
status enjoyed by science in modem society, predisposes dialogue between science 
and religion to become confrontational when divergent conclusions are reached in 
similar fields of enquiry. The obvious examples are Galileo's confirmation of a 
heliocentric solar system (Brooke 1991: 37,87), and the geological extension of the 
earth's history (Himmelfarb 1969: 194, Rudwick 2005: 18 1). The former case led to 
a temporary disengagement with scientific explanation, the latter to re-interpretation 
of creation accounts as symbolic and metaphorical rather than literal. 
Disengagement is no longer a viable option, and over the course of the last fifty 
years neuroscientific research has been accompanied by much expectation, much 
philosophical theorising, some progress in understanding the neurobiological 
mechanisms that appear to be causally associated with mental events, and has raised 
the tantalising possibility that the link between mind-events and brain-events will 
prove amenable to empirically-verifiable explanation. 7 In the community of ideas 
the context for traditional Buddhist mind-theory now includes the 'standard' 
scientific theory that the mind is identical to the brain (Baker 2001: 17-1 8). 8 This 
view has evidential support, for specific mental functions are obliterated by localised 
trauma (Penfield 1950: 6-7,157-159) and neuro-chemical activity in the brainstem 
initiates or suppresses mental activity (Parvici and Damasio 2001: 136). However, 
scientific research does not provide conclusive evidence for the 'standard' theory, 
which remains counter-intuitive in the face of the 'hard problem' of relating the 
subjectivity of first-person experience to the objectivity of the embodied brain 
(Chalmers 1995: 201, Levine 1997: 102). It seems impossible for individuals to gain 
sufficient acquaintance of relations between their mental continuum and their neurons 
to confirm the adequacy of explanations of that relation. It is this insufficiency of 
acquaintance that sets up the 'hard problem' of the explanatory gap between third- 
person objective descriptions of the brain and first- person subjective descriptions of 
twhat it is like' to be conscious (Nagel 1974: 435-443). This insufficiency results in 
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part from the complete absence of afferent connections contributing sensory 
information from the brain to conscious experience. Although the brain creates what 
Locke calls the 'world of appearances' out of sensori-motor information (Arendt 
1978: 31), the brain only becomes apparent during surgical operations, as an 
anatomical pro-section, or through imaging techniques. The sensory sequestration of 
the brain is in marked contrast to the heart, which, although also short of sensory 
connections, is experienced through the modulation of its activity by the autonomic 
nervous and endocrine systems, which prepare the body for significant events. 
Unlike the heart, the brain is completely absent from life's sensori-motor feast and in 
consequence was rarely implicated in mind-explanations before the advent of 
neuroscience. 9 Scientists tend to ignore the 'hard problem', of the phenomenon of 
consciousness as a metaphysical question with few consequences (Jackendoff 1987: 
14). They are more concerned with the empirical question as to whether the 
evolution of synchronous electro-chemical activity between interconnected neurons is 
sufficient for the explanation of mental processes (Llinas 2001: ix, 120-123, Crick 
1994: 243-246). Once the complexity and functional integration of the brain is 
understood, mind/brain identity becomes a comprehensible possibility, rather than a 
counterintuitive combination of opposites. ' 0 Chapter 3 provides a brief description of 
that complexity, in order to make apparent the kind of information which underpins 
the 'standard' scientific theory. 
Dialogue between neuroscience and religion began inauspiciously with a riot 
during Gall's lectures on phrenology in 1802 (Freeman 2003: 27). The exchange is 
now more civilised, as scientific theorising has become grounded in anatomy and 
physiology, as well as brain imaging, stimulation and clinical trauma studies. 
Although the mind/brain correlation has not been demonstrated beyond all reasonable 
doubt, " the hypothesis that the two terms have identical reference has percolated 
beyond the 'reified universe' of specialist interest, where 'all things ... are the measure 
of man', into the 'consensual universe' of general lay discourse, where 'man is the 
measure of all things' (Moscovici 2001: 33-36). Since the relation between the mind 
and the brain is a 'live' issue in informed public debate, I anticipated that religions 
laying claim to relevance would wish to join that debate. 
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Amongst the religions, Buddhism is chosen as a case study on the insubstantial 
ground of my own interest as a Buddhist practitioner, and the substantial ground of 
the expectation that brain research will generate insights into issues of personality, 
personal continuity and psychological change, which Buddhism has hitherto 
explained in proto-scientific and metaphorical terms. This congruence of 
psychological interest between science and Buddhism might be expected to kindle 
debate within the Buddhist community in particular about appropriate inter- 
translations of psychological explanations of mind. 
Differences of paradigm and terminology obscure any obvious fit between 
Buddhist and neuroscientific discourse, yet there is merit in dialogue, because each 
side can ask interesting questions about the presuppositions of the other, to the 
philosophical benefit of both. The two discourses may only ever achieve partial 
compatibility if mind is held by Buddhism to be a brute fact about the world, but that 
cannot be presupposed to be the only view held by a diverse cultural tradition, which 
exhibits a complex hermeneutic dynamic between authorship, textuality and orality, 
and between succinct doctrinal expression, detailed exposition and contextual 
interpretation (Lopez 1995: 23-28). Despite intimations that Buddhist and western 
worldviews are fundamentally incompatible (Willson 1984: 7, Green 1989: 278, 
Dumont 1986: 44), Buddhism has often found it necessary to deploy skilful means to 
'assimilate' the traditional terms of Buddhist teaching to new cultural contexts 
(Matsunaga 1969: 283). The status of science presents Buddhism with yet another 
cultural and a philosophical challenge. 
Science has high status in contemporary societies by virtue of its explanatory 
success and of the utility of technology, but scientific theories are not magically 
supported by empirical findings; they begin as 'myths', 'uncertain stories', 
cassumptions', 'a woven web of guesses', and as a 'method of conjecture', until the 
presupposed consequences are explored and tested (Popper 1998: 115-116,243-247). 
The 'standard' scientific theory of mind carries a conjectural overhang, for the 
mind/brain relation is difficult to explore by virtue of the duality of first-person and 
third-person access. So long as the mind/brain relation is not fully verified it is 
methodologically appropriate to suspend belief and disbelief on both sides and to 
identify compatible features within both discourses, which might indicate that 
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Buddhist teaching and scientific theory seek to explain 'the way things really are' 
(yatha-bhfitam) in the same world. 
Literature review: Buddhism and neuroscience 
There are numerous studies which examine traditional Buddhist mind-theory, 
including theories of self, from philosophical, comparative and historical perspectives. 
There are numerous studies examining the relationship between Buddhism, 
psychology and psychotherapy. There are innumerable studies that examine the 
nature and functioning of mind from the variety of academic disciplines. Such a 
plethora of resources is too extensive for a brief review, so the following discussion is 
restricted to works that directly address the relationship between Buddhism and 
neuroscience. 
Over the course of the twentieth century it has become apparent that the brain 
possesses the connective and organisational capacity necessary for the 
implementation of mental functions and for the maintenance of consciousness. 
Eccles speculates that this necessary capacity is insufficient without some form of 
'interactive liaison' between the separate 'worlds' of a material brain and an 
immaterial mind (1979: 214-217,223-224). His dualist view of mind/brain 
interaction has not prevailed in the scientific community as a whole, for the non-dual 
or monist idea of mind/brain identity has become the 'standard scientific view' 
(Baker 2001: 17-18). Of the scientists who have written about the encounter between 
Buddhism and neuroscience, Austin (1998: 294) and Varela (Depraz, Varela and 
Vermersch 2003: 118) both hold to some version of the standard view, with the 
important caveat that the significance of conscious experience is not thereby 
diminished (Austin 1998: 295) 12 (Depraz, Varela and Vermersch 2003: 119). 13 
Mind/brain identity theory, in combination with methodological problems 
encountered by attempts to establish objective standards for assessment of first- 
person reporting of psychological states, has been responsible over much of the 
twentieth-century for a diversion of scientific interest away from the study of 
consciousness, towards a third-person approach that restricts the study of mind to 
observation of overt behaviour. The methodological rigor of the behavioural 
approach places severe limitations on the scope of research, since behaviour is 
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normally accompanied by reportable conscious experiences, including sensations of 
pain and suffering, which cry out for scientific explanation. Apart from the 
expansion of human understanding and clinical applications in the treatment of 
disease, it is arguable that neuroscience is of little practical use unless its findings can 
be correlated with first-person reports of the complex mental events that constitute 
the mind. 
Because Buddhism is concerned with the transformation of the mind in order to 
eliminate suffering (Gyatso 2003a, 2003b: 92), 14 Buddhism has a natural interest in 
studying consciousness and a natural interest in the epistemological status of first- 
person reporting of consciousness. On these topics there is a congvergence of interest 
between Buddhism and neuroscience, which is most manifest in the work of a 
loosely-associated group of neuroscientists, philosophers, and psychologists who are 
both commentators and practitioners of Buddhism, and commentators or practitioners 
of science. For twenty years Francisco Varela was the de facto facilitator of this 
group, which developed out of his cross-disciplinary research collaborations and his 
active participation in conference dialogues with the Dalai Lama organised by the 
Mind-Life Institute. 15 
The Mind and Life conferences were designed to facilitate dialogue in an 
atmosphere of goodwill, but that atmosphere is not necessarily conducive to the 
resolution of intractable issues of the kind that, in the Dalai Lama's keynote phrase, 
'call for further investigation' (Gyatso 2003b: 95,96). In reviewing the major trends 
in the discussion between Buddhism and neuroscience, I concentrate on those issues 
that call for further investigation: metaphysical arguments about the relationship 
between mind and brain, and phenomenological attempts to close the third- 
person/second person 'explanatory gap', which makes the question of identity or 
difference between mind and brain so intractable. 
With the notable exceptions of Austin (1999) and Wallace (1996,1999,2001, 
2002,2003) and also of deCharms (1998) and Kurak (2001), the Buddhist- 
neuroscientific debate thus far is a legacy of Varela's ability to motivate and facilitate 
interdisciplinary work. Varela died in 2001, but his cooperative projects were 
completed and published by his collaborators up to 2003. His collaborators include 
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the philosophers Evan Thompson and Natalie Depraz, and the psychologists Eleanor 
Rosch and Pierre Vermersch. 
Although he is also a participant in the Mind and Life conferences, Alan Wallace 
can be distinguished from Varela's group by virtue of his training in physics and in 
religious studies, and his concern for fundamental metaphysical issues. He represents 
the Dalai Lama's side of the dialogues, as his occasional translator and as a former 
Gelug-pa Buddhist monk, and his position on the nature of mind is the same as that 
expressed by the Dalai Lama (Gyatso 2003a, Flanagan 2006: 32,37) There is, 
therefore, an evident apologetic strand in Wallace's writings. While Varela attempts 
a convergence of neuroscientific and phenomenological research with relevant 
Buddhist teachings, Wallace mounts a vigorous defence of 'Indo-Tibetan' Buddhist 
doctrine. 
Wallace 
Wallace characterises the non-dualism of mind/brain identity theory as an 
unverifiable metaphysical belief His own 'Two Truths' position is not compatible 
with the standard scientific view because he considers mind to have a dual relation to 
its worldly embodiment at a 'conventional' level of explanation, whereas at an 
(-ultimate' level of understanding mind/world dualism resolves into a more 
encompassing monism, which represents both world and ordinary mind as a 'creative 
display' of the 'very subtle energy mind (Tib. shin tu phra ba'i Hung sems), which is 
a primordial reality having both physical and cognitive attributes' (Wallace 1999: 182 
n. 13, see also Gyatso in Varela 1997: 123,165). He criticises scientific and religious 
studies approaches to Buddhist mind-theory on the grounds that they are not 
supported by sustained meditative practice, which is the only method for verifying the 
existence of subtle forms of mind. 
Wallace stresses the explanatory gap between first-person access to mental events 
and third-person access to neuronal events, and argues that correlation between 
mental and neuronal events does not entail identity. 
... what neuroscientists actually 
know is that specific neural events (N) 
are correlated to specific mental events (M), such that if N occurs, M 
occurs; if M occurs, N occurs-, if N doesn't occur, M doesn't occur; 
and if M doesn't occur, N doesn't occur. Such a correlation could 
imply that the occurrence of N has a causal role in the production of 
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M, or vice versa; or it could imply that N and M are actually the same 
phenomenon viewed from different perspectives. There is not enough 
scientific knowledge at this point to determine which of these types of 
correlation is the correct one. But Damasio seems to overlook this 
ambiguity and simply decrees the equivalence of mental and neural 
processes, without any logical or empirical justification. In other 
words, this equivalence is simply a metaphysical belief (Wallace 2002: 
19). 
The standard scientific view of mind, which Wallace takes to be exemplified by 
Damasio (Damasio 2002: 1-7), is not a random metaphysical belief without inductive 
support: it treats the mind as category relative to scientific interest in ontology, that is, 
to an interest in understanding the way things really are. The way things are, for 
scientists, is defined by the 'joining behaviours' of one thing in relation to another 
(Westerhoff 2004: 616-61 9), 16 with 'mind' as a covering term for consciousness and 
the collection of joining behaviours that give rise to consciousness. Wallace's 
Madhyamaka view is also a metaphysical belief, but is distinguished by deductive 
and experiential support, rather than inductive support. Wallace treats mind as a 
category relative to his Buddhist interest in understanding the way things really are, 
and he also defines the mind according to its behaviours, but he is persuaded by 
traditional deductive inferences from the experiences of Buddhist 'contemplatives', 
to admit the possibility that the category of mind is capable of a wider range of 
behaviours than are ordinarily observed (1996: 196-197), including collective 
origination of the world (1996: 184,1999: 182 n. 13) 
With regards to their interests, both Damasio's scientific and Wallace's Buddhist 
views are religious in the simple connective sense of that term, for they explain how 
the world is put together and therefore what it is. Wallace's theory is also religious 
in the conventional usage of the term, because it explains how the world ought to be. 
According to the theory this is no mere anthropocentric bias, because contemplative 
experience of subtle levels of consciousness reveals that the mind naturally exhibits 
the quality of loving-kindness (metta) (Wallace 2001: 213, Harvey 1995: 167). This 
conclusion entails that a stable understanding of the mind, which is wisdom, and of 
the ethical consequences of mind, which are compassionate, naturally constitutes a 
unified attitude. 
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To briefly characterise the key difference between Damasio and Wallace: either 
mind originates causally as a property of exogenous relations between material 
things, or the mind and the world originate from the endogenous relations of an 
underlying essence that can exhibit both physical and mental properties. Wallace 
supports his endogenous explanation by a division of causation into the actions of 
'substantial' and 'cooperative' causes, and the specific Gelug-pa view that 'prior 
mental events act as the substantial causes for subsequent mental events' (1996: 183, 
1999: 162, see also Gyatso in Varela 1997: 119-120). He suggests that neural events 
are cooperative causes, but that mental events are the most significant causes of their 
own succession. 17 This presentation chimes with the argument that like causes have 
like effects, expressed in the 'circular' Gelug-pa view that the properties of an effect 
are inherent in their causal ground (Rosch 1994: 52-53). 18 To my mind these 
arguments sit uncomfortably with the Madhyamaka s'z7nyatd teaching that all 
phenomena exist in virtue of their relation of dependence on other phenomena. This 
teaching casts doubt on the atomic notion of a part-less material particle (Cabezon 
2003: 60), but also casts doubt on the notion of mind as a fundamental element. 19 
Wallace asserts a Buddhist phenomenological theory of causation without any 
requirement for mechanical explanation, such that 'A can be regarded as a cause of B 
if and only if (1) A precedes B, and (2) were the occurrence of A to have been 
averted, the occurrence of B would have been averted' (1996: 16 1). The first point is 
idle if the mental/neural relation is one of identity, for causal relations must be 
temporally sequential (Ryan 2003). The second point requires a causal example; 
otherwise no explanation is forthcoming. It is precisely because clinical and trauma 
studies in neuroscience demonstrate that the suppression of neural events averts the 
occurrence of particular mental events, whereas particular neural excitation leads to 
particular mental events (Penfield 1950, Afraz et al 2006), that the identity theory of 
mind is inductively persuasive. 
Wallace mounts an attack on scientific reductionism in the light of the evident 
phenomenal reality of mental events. The reductionist view, popularised by Wilson, 
(1998) is that all scientific theories can be incorporated within a foundational, 
physical explanation of everything (Wallace 1996: 161-162,2003: 2-3). Wallace's 
point is already widely accepted, for the critique of naýfve reductionism is an accepted 
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theme in the philosophy of science (Fodor 1974, Kitcher 1976, Kitcher and Salmon 
1980, Cartwright 1983,1993, Teller 2004), but Wallace fails to observe a crucial 
distinction between the reduction and the unification of scientific theories. Under 
theory reduction the more foundational theory eliminates its competitor and takes 
over responsibility for all explanatory tasks in the terms of the reducing theory. 
Under theory unification the two theories are causally associated, but the 'higher- 
level' theory (say, psychology) is not eliminated by the 'lower-level' theory (say, 
neuroscience) because it retains the unique ability to fulfil particular explanatory 
duties. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapter 6 but the upshot, in this 
context, is that mind/brain identity can be restated as a 'union theory': a refined form 
that allows for the phenomenal ubiquity of mental events, but maintains their 
'intimate' and 'nomic' correlation with neural events (Honderich1993: 25). That 
refinement does not answer the question as to whether mental events (reasons) can be 
causesl or whether they exist in a co-temporal, epiphenomenal relation of 
'supervenience' with the brain (Kim 1993). This unification revision of mind/brain 
identity theory is probably not acceptable to Wallace: it takes no account of the 
possibility of mental events that have no correlation to brain events, of the sort 
implied by the traditional entailments of Buddhist theories of mind, such as rebirth or 
the superknowledges (abhTfifia) (Wallace 2001: 212,1996: 141). 
It is vital to warranted belief in the entailments of Wallace's Buddhist 
presentation that there should be experiential support for his explanation, and that the 
explanation should indicate experiences with sufficient accuracy to facilitate 
meditative access. His explanation depends on an isolated sutta reference to purified 
or 'brightly shining' consciousness (pabhassara citta) (AN 1.10) which he associates 
with the Abhidhamma notion of a basic continuum of consciousness between 
lifetimes (bhavaýga) (Harvey 1995: 155-179, Wallace 2001: 212-213), with the 
Tibetan notion of a temporally-extended transitional state between rebirths (bardo), 
and with the Gelug-pa and Dzogchen concept of the 'clear light nature of the mind' 
(Wallace 2001: 212,226). Harvey adds the notions of store-house consciousness 
(j1qya-vijfidna) and of Buddha-nature (Buddha-dhdtu) or enlightenment-potential 
(tathdgata-garbha) to this genealogy of concepts that bestow continuity on mental 
states (Harvey 1995: 174-176). Harvey's analysis broadly supports Wallace's 
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association of pabhassara citta with bhavahga, but also unearths some 
inconsistencies. Firstly, analogical notions of the latency or potential existence of 
fundamental elements, which support bhavanga as an assurance for the continuity of 
cittas, originate in the UpaniS'ads and the ancient Indian cultural background, rather 
than being specifically Buddhist insights (Harvey 1995: 155-159). Secondly, in the 
Abhidhamma bhavanga is a causal link that only arises between cognitive events, for 
example during dreamless sleep, between 'perceptual cycles' and between rebirths, 
but not during the meditative cessation of consciousness (Harvey 1995: 159-160). 
Thus, although Abhidhamma texts do associate the latent but discontinuous bhavanga 
with the undefiled but continuous pabhassara citta, this association is an exegetical 
feat. That said, the origin and conceptual variation of a family of analogical terms are 
of less significance than their status as indicators of real meditative experience. 
This is why Wallace worries that insufficient credence is given to the experiences 
of 'Buddhist contemplatives' that are preserved in the 'Indo-Tibetan' Buddhist 
tradition (2001: 209-230,2002: 24,26). He admits some distinction between 
(empirical' reports of contemplative experience and normative scholastic exegesis of 
those reports (2002: 26) but does not indicate how that distinction is to be 
maintained. 20 If traditional Buddhist contemplative accounts are to be taken as valid 
evidence the exegesis ought to be subjected to philosophical interrogation, yet when 
that happens Wallace adopts a strong apologetic stance. For instance, he criticises 
Griffiths' examination of the Buddhist meditative category of the attainment of 
complete cessation of consciousness (Griffiths 1999, Wallace 2003: 7), on the 
grounds that the only way to examine contemplative experience is by personal 
replication. Griffith's historical-philosophical, Buddhist- studies approach is 
dismissed as 'unscientific' 'absurd', 'Orientalist', 'non-empirical', 'dogmatic', and 
'scholastic'(Wal lace 2003: 7), yet Wallace does not question, equably, whether 
elements of the tradition might also be unscientific, philosophical, historically- 
motivated, non-empirical, dogmatic or scholastic. This case is an example of the 
wider problem, considered in Chapter 6 of this thesis, of how explanation (de dicto) 
might affect experience (de se) as much as experience affects explanation. The 
narrower issue is whether meditative cessation of consciousness requires an 
underlying basis or substratum capable of reactivating intentional mental events. if 
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such cessation is truly complete and longer than momentary, that basis must be 
physical or else some sort of object-less consciousness that carries causal efficiency 
across temporal extension. 21 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of separating reports of experience from the 
influence of prior explanation, the cognitive scientific project of correlating neural 
events with mental events relies on first-person report. Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
share Wallace's view that such testimony ought to include Buddhist meditative 
accounts (1991: 31-32), and Varela (1996) argues for the use of phenomenological 
methods to increase their reliability as evidence. Unlike Wallace, there is no 
suggestion in Varela's writings that testimony can transcend natural limitations to 
provide evidence for either mind/brain dualism or 'ultimate' non-dualism of mind and 
world. Instead he develops a neuroscientific theory of mind as an emergence from a 
basis of material embodiment, but since it is a metaphor, rather than an agreed 
technical term, there is scope for disagreement about the meaning of 'emergence' as it 
is applied to the mind. 
Varela: the emergence of mind 
Varela advocates the incorporation of phenomenology into scientific 
methodology, to create a combined 'neuroPhenomenology' that could 'bridge the gap 
between cognition and experience', which bedevils understanding of the mindibrain 
relationship (Varela 1996: 331). Characterising his position with respect to other 
views, he rules out: 
... On the one 
hand views that take a traditional dualistic stance (d la J. 
C. Eccles). On the other hand calls for new foundations from the 
quantum mechanics proponents. These views seem extreme, and we 
concentrate on current neuroscience and cognitive science in some 
explicit manner. (Varela 2002: 118) 
Among the positions that he does countenance, (but not support) he locates the 
eliminativists, for whom conscious experience is an irrelevance, to the right of an 
'imaginary map'. At the centre he locates the functionalists who rely solely on third- 
person data to 'assimilate' experience to the categories of 'cognitive behaviour, 
propositional attitude, or functional role'. He locates himself to the left, amongst 
those who allow '... an explicit and central role to first person accounts and to the 
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irreducible nature of experience, while at the same time refusing ... a dualistic 
concession... ' (Varela 2002: 119). Varela, therefore, differs markedly from Wallace, 
who is willing to countenance mind/brain dualism at the conventional level. 
Varela argues that mental events are 'enactions' 'emerging' from the global 
dissemination of the 'phase-locked' synchronous firing of neuronal 'ensembles'. He 
holds that the central and peripheral nervous system as a whole is 'autopoetic'. By 
this he means that the nervous system constitutes an 'operationally-closed' system. 
Although 'structurally-coupled' by sensori-motor contact to embodiment in an 
environment external to the system, the autopoetic neural system does not 'mirror' or 
represent that environment, but enacts or 'brings forth' a world of experience from 
its own endogenous resources. The notions of autopoesis, structural coupling, 
enaction and emergence save Varela's theory from being just a cognitive scientific 
argument for mind/brain identity, for they support a theory of mental events that are 
not instantiated by neurons as such, but by their particular mode of activation as a 
dynamical system coupled to an environment. It might be objected that the 
difference between neuronal instantiation and dynamic neuronal activity amounts to 
not much more than the quickening of the life of the organism. But the notion that 
mental events have some sort of emergent autonomy is supported by Varela's 
argument that neuronal ensemble synchronicity gives rise to event organisation at a 
second structural level, which becomes capable of exerting 'downward' causal 
effects. The notion of downward causation carries the implication that emergent 
mental events somehow transcend their causal determination at the level of neuronal 
ensemble synchronicity. 
Since its first presentation (1991), Varela, Thompson and Rosch's neuronal 
enaction theory has been developed and refined in work with other collaborators. 
The theory is persuasive as a rhetorical whole, but the precise meaning of some of 
the details is obscure. 
Enaction versus representation 
A significant element of Varela's theory is the argument that perception of the 
phenomenal world is not constituted from representations with a 'mirror' or 
correspondence relation to an external world, but is an autopoetic enactment 
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emerging from the endogenous abilities of an operationally-closed, embodied neural 
network (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991: 172-174) This theory is a 
neuroscientifically-informed rejection of the computational model of the mind as a 
dual process, whereby symbolic mental content is processed by the 'wetware' of the 
brain. According to Varela, neural activity enacts the function of both content and 
vehicle (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991: 98-100, Varela 1992: 238-250). 
Unfortunately, the theory runs into philosophical difficulties with respect to the 
epistemological relationship of representational correspondence between mental 
events and the external Kantian world of 'hyletic' things-in-themselves (Ding-an- 
sich). Together with its supporting evidence, mainly from the neuroscience of visual 
perception, autopoetic enaction theory demolishes the nalve idea that the senses 
represent real qualitative features of the environment, such as colour, sound, or taste 
(Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991: 165-171). But that demolition does not exhaust 
the likelihood of a systematic correspondence between qualitative features of 
neuronally-enacted experience and structural features of the environment. Thus 
autopoetic neural enaction may not be an isomorphic representation but may be a 
'homomorphic' presentation capable of supporting a correspondence relation that is 
good enough for the evolved epistemological interests of the organism (Linas 2001: 
65). Varela, Thompson and Rosch cite research that demonstrates that the 
relationship between light wavelengths and qualitative colour perception is indirect 
and variable by affect and by other perceptual modalities, but that does not rule out a 
relatively invariable correspondence relation that is phylogenetically-determined, as 
when the ascription of three-dimensional shapes to objects is continually verified by 
embodied behaviour. Issues of homomorphism and representation are discussed 
further in Chapter 6, but the upshot is that Varela, Thompson and Rosch's arguments 
for the autonomous enactment of perception have to be weighed against the 
phylogenetic ubiquity of the organism's 'structural coupling' to an external 
environment. Varela, Thompson and Rosch are right to argue that perception is not a 
direct 'mirror of nature' (1991: 14 1), and that there is no discrete self in the mind that 
is capable of subjection to a cinematic sort of representational display (1991: 123- 
129). Yet the combination of structural coupling and neural autopoesis enacts a 
phenomenal world that corresponds to natural kinds in the 'hyletic' external world, 
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with sufficient reliability for the needs and interests of the organism to be satisfied, 
as if the enactment was epistemologically representational. 
Internalism 
Varela Thompson and Rosch (199 1) emphasise exogenous structural coupling to 
the environment as much as endogenous enaction by neural networks, but their 
explanation of autonomous natural and artificial neural networks can create the 
impression of a philosophically internalist, or even an idealist view of the mind, 
especially if the operational closure of the neural system is misunderstood to imply 
causal closure (Maturana and Varela 1998: 163-166). Such a misconception of 
Varela Thompson and Rosch's argument could be reinforced by their rather 
confusing transfer of the ten-ninology of enaction from the endogeny of neural 
networks to the exogamous evolutionary effects exerted by organisms on their 
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external environments. The theory then becomes entangled in the converse of the 
'hard problem' of the nature of consciousness, for not only does the dual/non-dual 
ontology of the mind become open to question, but so does the real/ideal ontology of 
the world. Varela was perhaps aware of the possibility of an internalist misreading, 
for the importance of the organism's history of structural coupling is re-emphasised 
in Varela (1999b). In Varela and Thompson (2003) an overtly externalist 
interpretation of the mind is presented, and was to have been depicted once again in a 
23 book entitled 'Why the Mind Isn't in the Head' . 
Emergence and downward causation 
The notions of 'emergent' properties appear in Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
(1991: 99-103), and are further developed in Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) 
and Varela and Thompson (2003) as giving rise to 'downward' or 'reciprocal' 
causation. It is far from clear if this metaphorically spatial and directionally mobile 
rhetoric of 'emergence' points to unique causal valences at different levels within 
one system, or if interactions between different systems come into play. The notion 
of emergence has important consequences for Buddhism because it bears on the issue 
of freedom and determinism. It is discussed on pages 272 and 281 in Chapter 8 of 
this thesis, and in the conclusions in Chapter 10. Depraz, Varela and Vermersch do 
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not clarify whether or in what way mental emergence is of such a 'radical kind' that 
'the macro parts of the whole reach down and alter the course of events at the micro 
level from what they would be if determined entirely by the properties and laws of 
the micro level' (van Gulick 2001: 18-19). My view is that that the mental events are 
not 'radical kind' or 'ontological' emergences between different levels of a single 
system (Silberstein and McGeever 1999), but they are feedback interactions 
dependent upon structural coupling between two or more different systems: the 
operationally-autopoetic brain and the activity of the body in the 'hyletic' external 
environment. Varela says something similar in a late remark on the origin of 
intentionality: 
Like a jam session, the environment inspires the neural 'music' of the 
cognitive system. Indeed, the cognitive system cannot live without 
this constant coupling with and the constant emerging regularities 
provided by its environment; without the possibility of coupled 
activity the system would become like a ghost (Varela 1999a: 56). 
Thompson stresses the role of empathy and inter- subjectivity in the emergence of 
consciousness, with the implication that emergence is not an entirely endogenous 
property of autopoetic enaction, but is a combination of endogenous and exogamous 
(processes that span and interconnect the brain, body and environment' (2001: 3). 
The upshot is that the definition of mind needs to be redrawn to include the 
relationship between the embodied brain and the world, with the ethical entailment 
that Buddhism ought to concentrate as much on collective salvation as on individual 
salvation. 
Phenomenology 
In Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) Varela (1997), and Depraz, Varela and 
Vermersch (2003), the practice of phenomenology is presented, firstly, as a scientific 
method for gathering reliable first-person evidence; secondly, as an engagement with 
the phenomenological accounts developed by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the 
basis of their own introspection of embodied mental events; and thirdly, as a 
characterisation of the traditional Buddhist meditative techniques of ýamatha- 
Opaswina. 
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With regard to the use of phenomenology as a scientific method, there are 
problems in treating introspection as a verifiable form of observation, problems of 
consistent terminology in the reliable reporting of introspection, and restrictions on 
the scope of the conclusions that may be drawn when metaphysical beliefs are 
'bracketed out' under 'eidetic reduction'. Notwithstanding Varela's argument that 
phenomenological eidetic reduction is a specialised, disciplinary form that differs 
from the 'natural attitude' of introspection (1997: 334-5), the phenomenology of 
mind does depend upon private reflection, which according to Wittgenstein (1992: 7, 
10) can never be evidence in a scientific sense, because, ex hypothesi, observational 
evidence must be verifiable publicly by others. It might be objected that in the final 
analysis all observations are subjective events. That misses the point, for there can 
be mutual observation of a public image such as an x-ray but not mutual observation 
of an imaginary recollection of the same x-ray. In the case of mutual observation 
there can be doubt about the interpretation but not about the objective evidence, 
whereas with introspection there is doubt about both the evidence and the 
interpretation. 
Such considerations are methodological ideals intended to guide practical 
applications in real situations. Because introspections are the only direct means of 
access to mental events, whether they are acceptable as 'good enough' scientific 
evidence must be a matter of case-by-case judgements that achieve a balance 
between methodological ideals, sensitivity to confirmatory behaviours, and the 
pragmatic utility of conclusions. 24 Neurophenomenology is a correlation between 
introspection and scientific observation, and it is methodologically reasonable that 
the consilient information from two different sources should be more acceptable than 
from a single source. Flanagan argues that cooperation between first and third 
person viewpoints is already standard practice in the cognitive neuroscientific search 
for neuronal correlates for mental states (2006: 32-34), but subjective reports in the 
studies he cites are either tightly controlled by study design protocols, or inferred 
from behavioural evidence. 25 Varela is arguing for a more enterprising approach to 
the reporting of qualitative mental states, which would permit cooperation between 
neuroscientific techniques and the kind of testimony found in the Buddhist 
meditative tradition (Depraz, Varela and Vermersch 2003: 22,32-34). 
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On the basis of an interview with Kamtrul Rinpoche, deChanns (1998) presents 
a view of Buddhist tradition that depends on the intuitions of more enlightened 
beings, which are subsequently 'expanded using a detailed system of internally 
coherent logic' (1998: 47,48-49). It cannot be assumed that this inferential logic is 
commensurate with the logic of Husserlian phenomenology, therefore the problem of 
reliable descriptive terminology for mental events may be exacerbated by translation 
issues between logical discourses and specialist terms. There remains the ob ection 
that no introspection is free from the cognitive interference of language, to which 
Depraz, Varela and Vermersch admit they can offer no response other than proposing 
ca pragmatic spirit' and an intention to pursue a 'prudent but daring middle ground' 
between the supposed ineffability of cognition and its supposed linguistic subversion 
(2003: 10). 
Despite pointing to methodological problems, I consider that Varela's neuro- 
phenomenological project is worth the attempt, and can provide 'good enough' 
testimony for a widening field of correlations between mental events and neuronal 
activations. But the difficulties attending the 'bracketing out' of de dicto linguistic 
explanations of traditional metaphysical beliefs, either under western epoche or 
Buddhist s'amatha-vipas'yand descriptions (Depraz, Varela and Vermersch 2003: 22, 
30-34), suggests that the resulting intuitive reports (Depraz, Varela and Vermersch 
2003: 43-44, Varela 1997: 337) are unlikely to provide strong support for 
metaphysical theorising about the nature (ontology) of mind. Whether or not 
Buddhist phenomenological intuitions and neurophenomenological correlations 
produce warranted conclusions about the mind/brain relation is a matter for peer 
agreement, and as with the meaning of words, it is the generality of peer agreement 
that matters: specialist views about the nature of mind must not only be tested in the 
laboratory, the meditation hall, and the interdisciplinary conference, but judged in the 
court of popular opinion. 
The qualitative interview method 
There are problems of method in the assessment of any syncretic and synchronic 
Buddhist point of view. Buddhism is not a unitary category, but a 'polythetic' 
complex of religious manifestations of various sorts (Gombrich 2004: 18), 
26 including 
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traditional sets of social forms, practices, and doctrines, utilised for a variety of 
purposes (Harris 2000a: 128-131). Not only is Buddhism diachronic, and both 
doctrinally and culturally disparate, but it has no unified hierarchy, central 
administration, or single authoritative spokesperson. In the disparate case of 
Buddhism, any syncretic statement will only have the validity of a contextual 
interpretation from a particular standpoint, and not necessarily be characteristic of the 
tradition as a whole. 27 Nevertheless, syncretic statements are commonly made, 
difficult to avoid, and occasionally made in this study when they constitute 
meaningful generalities. 
It follows from the ascription of polythetism that any interpretation of the 
contemporary Buddhist response to neuroscience should be grounded in the views of 
the Buddhist community, for although dialogue is notionally between propositions it 
actually occurs between proponents. In order to provide the theoretical interpretation 
in Chapters 5-9 with more grounding than one scholar's view of the meaning of 
historical texts for the contemporary context, current opinions were sought from a 
selection of British Buddhists with the aim of discovering if inforination from 
contexts external to Buddhism's traditional resources was conducive to hermeneutic 
reinterpretation of Buddhist mind-theory. 
The method deployed, justified in Chapter 3, is philosophically hermeneutic: it 
involves the collection of a set of dialogues about the possibility of 
Buddhist/scientific dialogue, followed by interpretation of the interpretations 
retrieved from those dialogues. No hermeneutic statement can have the status of a 
final conclusion, for ex hypothesi it is modifiable by future responses in the dialogue. 
In this study the dialogue has been transposed from oral interview to written text, but 
with the expectation that this procedure will lead to continued dialogue rather than 
conclusion. The method for gathering data was qualitative, in the form of interviews 
lasting from one and a half to three hours, which were tape-recorded and 
subsequently transcribed. The ten participants had the opportunity to check and edit a 
summary of their interview transcript, which provided the material summarised in 
Chapter 4 before being brought into notional dialogue with scientific and 
philosophical accounts in subsequent chapters. 
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Mainly for reasons of logistics and consistency, the collection of data was 
restricted to the opinions and attitudes of British residents who were 'convert' 
28 Buddhists. This restriction does not imply that new directions in science and 
philosophy do not also elicit a response amongst 'ethnic' Buddhists in Britain or in 
any other location. It would equally be 'orientalist' to assume that 'eastern' as 
opposed to 'western' Buddhists are not interested in science, are not informed about 
science, may not be scientists, and are not party to debates about neuroscience. 
Themes in the interviews 
The schedule of interview questions addressed four themes: awareness of the 
historicity of traditional accounts of mind; whether dialogue is occurring with respect 
to mind-theory in the Buddhist community; responses to psychology and science; and 
responses to issues in the philosophy of mind. The participants do not idealise 
tradition in a wholly uncritical fashion; they are aware that accounts of notable 
individuals, including the Buddha, are historically equivocal, and aware of some 
historical succession of doctrine, but this awareness is conditioned by a devotional 
rather than a historical attitude, and by a henneneutic of skilful means (upaya- 
kaus'alya) (Pye 1978), which treats tradition uncritically, as a useful resource. 
Despite a lack of organisational dialogue on the implications of neuroscience, 
there is some reflection on this issue by individuals. The combination of a 'skilful 
means' usage of tradition and reflection at an individual level may be conducive to 
contextual re-interpretation of doctrine over the long term. Two of the participants 
are scientists by training, with an insider's understanding of scientific method and 
motivation. They have both published work that attempts to situate Buddhist practice 
in relation to the evolution of consciousness and self-consciousness (Crook 1980, 
Cooper 2003) and they present a more nuanced response to science than the other 
participants, but they share in the majority view that Buddhist soteriological methods 
are scientific forms of self-investigation, although science and religion address 
different concerns in different domains. 
Responses to questions related to the philosophy of mind are muted by preference 
for Buddhist terminology, and by ambiguity about the meaning of key terms, not least 
the meaning of 'mind'. It is not always appropriate to translate the serendipity of 
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interview dialogue into consistent philosophical positions, but with that caveat, there 
are divergences of opinion about the mind's relation to embodiment in the world. 
The majority of the participants are realists, but with some precautionary ambiguity. 
All express some degree of psychological idealism: they consider that, as the 
gatekeeper to phenomenal experience, the mind plays a significant modulating role in 
the constitution of the knowable world. Psychological idealism offers a 'bridge' 
between naive realism and philosophical idealism for some participants, with the 
tempting prospect that an equation between psychology and ontology might 
eventually permit the constraints of physical embodiment to be relinquished. 
It is not just the unequivocal realists, however, who agree that the (syncretic) 
Buddhist view of the mind/world relation has some affinities with 'externalism' in the 
philosophy of mind . 
29 This dependence on the external world seems to be one of the 
reasons why mind/brain identity is not completely acceptable to any participant. 
Other objections are phenomenally based on the manifest immateriality of subjective 
awareness, or counterfactually based, on the meaninglessness of life without the 
moral opportunity for 'just deserts' across lifetimes. It is also felt that neuroscientific 
explanations are congenitally unsuited to the characterisation of ethical questions, 
with the implication that incomplete explanations are wrong explanations. 
Interview findings 
The findings of the interview component of the study are negative, in that the 
initial expectation that there would be evidence of discussion about the nature of 
mind in the light of neuroscience at an organisational. level was not confirmed. This 
expectation was either misguided, too broadly drawn to characterise individual 
responses, or it may be that neuroscientific endeavours have not yet been sufficiently 
assimilated into ordinary discourse for considered Buddhist responses to be 
forthcoming. 
The participants are more concerned with the psychology of mental functioning; 
they prefer not to discuss the ontology of the mind in the context of neuroscientific 
research. This lack of interest is only paradoxical if ontological security is taken to 
be foundational for other types of explanation. On the contrary, the participants 
generally feel that focus on underlying ontology, rather than on psychological and 
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ethical aspects of experience, is a grasping after certainty where certainty cannot be 
found. There is no feeling that lack of response to scientific findings might lead to 
loss of relevance for Buddhism, for it is felt that scientific interests are often 
antithetical to human concerns. Even those participants with scientific training prefer 
to explain mental phenomena in metaphorical and 'folk' psychological terins. This 
preference raises the issue of appropriate relations between levels of causal 
explanation, a question much discussed in the philosophy of science, (Fodor1980, 
Cartwright 1983,1994, Sklar 2003, Teller 2004), which also has relevance for 
religious explanation. Despite their preference for Buddhist terminology, most 
participants felt that any explanation, including Buddhist explanation, is provisional 
and derivative because it is only indicative of subjective experience. The participants 
generally consider that the Buddhist community, at least in Britain, is not yet 
disposed to reinterpret doctrine radically for the contemporary context. They are 
more disposed to question the tendency for science to run ahead of verification by 
making unwarranted claims on inductive bases, as they are to question Buddhist 
mind-theory or the limitations of meditative introspection. There is some evidence of 
doctrinal re-emphasis in the course of the 'transplantation' of Buddhism into the 
contemporary context (Pye 1969). The participants' reliance on subjective 
experience means that rebirth, merit-making, and sympathetic or magical practices 
are not emphasised. It is not clear whether that change of emphasis constitutes 
doctrinal reappraisal, or whether the mind-sciences have influenced that change. 
Interpretation 30 
There is no easy conclusion to be drawn from the participant's a-historical 
approach to traditional Buddhist mind-theory, their reluctant engagement in dialogue 
about the nature of mind, their critique of the 'standard' scientific view of mind/brain 
identity, their variety of views (under philosophical re-expression) about the 
mind/world relation, and their marked preference for subjective experience of mental 
events as opposed to scientific or doctrinal explanations of the nature of mind. To 
hazard an impression of the motivations underlying their views would be ethically 
inappropriate and evidentially uninfon-ned, but on the basis of the interviews, 
summarised in Chapter 4,1 attempt to charactense their attitudes in Chapter 5. 
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Attitudes are the tacit background without which logical statements are 
incomprehensible, and are indicated by the expressions of opinion that they inform. I 
identify the participant's attitudes of resistance, faith, equanimity, speculation, and 
acceptance. There is general resistance to the reductive tenor of scientific 
explanation, which in various combinations takes the forms of faith in traditional 
explanation, equanimity with respect to the ontological explanation of mind on the 
grounds of the epistemic priority of experience, speculation about a transcendent 
form of mind that encompasses ordinary reality, and a measured acceptance of some 
neuroscientific hypotheses, but not of the 'standard theory' in its entirety. 
I suggest that the preference for psychological experience over ontological 
explanation reflects the priority of self-determination over determination by others 
with respect to the formation of an attitude such as a belief. This is despite the fact 
that explanation by others forms a natural part of 'suitable acquaintance' with the 
object of an attitude (Lewis 1979). When Lewis's account of attitude-formation is 
applied in Chapter 5 as a model of the activity of the mind, two shortcomings become 
apparent. Firstly, it is the subject, not the self, which engages with phenomenal 
experience in the immediacy of experiential awareness. On this basis, an alteration of 
emphasis from self-detennination to the more fundamental form of subject- 
detennination may characterise some types of religious experience. Secondly, in 
linguistic beings explanation often forms a major component of 'acquaintance' with 
the object of an attitude. This priority of theoretical explanation happens in science 
when the object of an attitude (say, belief in the synchronous firing of interneurons) 
can only be observed instrumentally and in Buddhist mind-theory when the object of 
the attitude (say, belief in the dlaya-vijhana or store-consciousness) can only be 
inferred or accepted ad hominem 31 to be trustworthy testimony. The influence 
exerted on attitudes by explanation and by experience probably takes no fixed 
proportion, but in Buddhism the notion of 'realisation' seems to indicate that self- 
location of an attitude is made under the guidance of an explanation, but that subject- 
location constitutes the personal verification of that explanation. 
Explanation, a term partially synonymous with theory, teaching and doctrine, is a 
combination of knowledge and fiction for the purpose of prediction. Explanation 
cannot be said to demonstrate the plain truth, because 'truth' depends on yet another 
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explanatory discourse having the same structure of knowledge, fiction, and prediction. 
Knowledge approximates to truth empirically, fiction evaluates truth by idealistic 
resemblance (Jauss 1989: 5), and prediction characterises truth with respect to the 
context and interests of a person, group or society. During the reflexive dynamic of 
mentat functioning, explanation contributes to the constitution of experience, is part 
of experience, yet may be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience. Experience is 
not indubitably true, for it is reflexively constituted in tandem with explanation as a 
model of the world. Experience may be an illusion, yet it comes with a reliable sense 
of certainty or 'facticity'. 
Spatio-temporal experience is (relatively) immediate, and accumulates in memory 
as personal history. Over duration, experience is the domain of the self, with 
immediacy, experience is the domain of the subject, but the former domain exerts 
some feedback effect on the latter. If realism about the external world is meaningful, 
from a third person perspective experience is spatially-constituted to the extent that 
mental events consist of, or are supervenient upon, physical events at various 
locations within the brain. But from a first-person perspective experience is a 
spaceless temporal continuum that happens to be capable of exhibiting spatial 
characteristics. In other words, experience as such occupies no additional space and 
is only conceptually differentiated from its contents as a kind of vehicle. 
Explanations of mind take the form of spatial models. They are fictional 
constructs, using features from the external world to explain what is otherwise 
inaccessible. The first premise guiding spatial constructs of mind is the assumption 
that external spatial experience must necessarily be produced by minds with a 
corresponding internal structure. The second premise is that the 'folk' psychological 
categories of mental functioning, such as the subject, the self, the imagination and 
memory, are virtual spatial objects sequestered within this internal spatial world. 
This is only metaphorically so, for the ascription of space to mind is an imaginative 
fiction for the purposes of prediction, valid within the context of the explanation, but 
not apparent to immediate experience. 32 
The ascription of space to mind is a useful model because it allows for first and 
third-person discussion of selfhood and personal responsibility, but it can be 
misleading, because it is only a metaphorical charactensation of the real state of 
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affairs (Arendt 1978: 102-110, Wittgenstein 1992: 61-88, Johnston 1993: 198, Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999: 266) . 
33 The closest approximation to understanding 'the way 
things really are'(yatha-bhfitam) is not achieved by metaphorical explanation alone, 
but by self-location that leads to subject-location: by some duration of intentional 
attitude, which includes but is not overwhelmed by the predictive component of 
explanation, leading finally to full attention to immediate or subjective or 'primary' 
experience. In Buddhism this is a sequential move from doctrine to ritual practice, 
from intention to attention, from deliberation to spontaneity (Kennedy 2004: 151-152) 
and, in theory, from gradual to sudden enlightenment. 
If the variable truth-value of explanations is granted, religious explanation has no 
other criteria than soteriological efficiency when the philosophical function of 
religion is under consideration, rather than the social-anthropological function. 34 If a 
religious explanation is inefficient it will merely other-locate the individual 
practitioner: they will not pass beyond the explanation to instantiate the relevant 
experience. In pathological occasions the explanation might determine the entirety of 
an experience, but in ordinary circumstances explanation and experience may be 
compartmentalised, with the theoretical risk of Socratic inconsistency and 
unconscionable action. If a religious explanation is partially effective the practitioner 
will self-locate to a cognitive understanding of experience over time, structured 
according to a self-assessment of who they are and how they are in relation to the 
social standards of behaviour (Duval, Silvia and Lalwani 2001: 31-40). If fully 
effective, religious explanation becomes a minor part of the subjective experience it 
has facilitated. On this account it is subject-location that matters most; religious 
identity, practice and doctrine being initially important because they are provisionally 
indicative, but playing a minor role in immediate experience and subsequent 
attitudes. 35 
From the standpoint of cognitive science, explanation is produced by top-down, 
higher-cognitive, logical sequences of brain events. Experience is also modulated by 
top-down cognitive processes, but is more closely matched to the occurrence of basic 
self-consciousness as a reaction to bottom-up, senson-motor events that are 
propagated throughout the brain via the thalamo-cortical system (Llinas 2001, Parvizi 
and Damasio 2001, Panksepp 1998, Crick 1994), and via the claustrum (Crick and 
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Koch 2005). Top-down processes in particular require temporal delay in order to 
enable neuronal synchronicity. It is this delay that 'affords opportunity for 
computational complexity' or 'extended brain events' (Pibram 1999,22,27). Delay 
makes the cognitive enrichment of consciousness possible by allowing time for the 
coordination of the multiple feedback mechanisms that facilitate prediction (Llinas 
2001: 21-29, Grush 2003: 565 81-87), as consciousness is constructed out of cognitive 
representations of the external world, which impute spatiality, object-aspect and 
object-identity to the reliable characteristics of the continual influx of percepts. 
Explanation is a subsequent linguistic form of representation, which develops to 
enable the comparative description of 'one thing in terms of another' (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980: 5). 
In the absence of any other resources, space, object, aspect and identity metaphors 
tend to be deployed in this comparative manner to describe the mind. Yet mind, 
unlike brain, is not a spatial object, has no space for contents, has no sensory aspect, 
and the enduring identity of individual minds is a historical construct based on 
memories of embodiment. Mind is seemingly just the totality of the sensori-motor 
relationship between embodied brain and world. There are grounds for asserting that 
this relationship is certain, for otherwise experience would be senseless (Wittgenstein 
1974, Stroll 1994). In addition, Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' 
demonstrates that communication without certainty about the existence of other 
people would be senseless (Wittgenstein 2001: 80-82 [PI. 1.256-280], Hacker1990: 
96-97). Although, on a questionable interpretation, Yogdcdra Buddhism denies the 
existence of a world external to the mind, it does not deny the existence of other 
minds (Wood 1991: 171-173). Aside from such disputes about realism, idealism and 
solipsism, the mind is a holistic relationship between relating entities, and whatever 
the ontology of the entities, it is the relationship rather than the entities that 
constitutes the ontology of mind. The reliability of relationships grants a sense of 
epistemological certainty in the form of the 'facticity' of immediate experience. 
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This relational view entails firstly, that it is reasonable to hold that there is no 
such physically objective thing as a mind; secondly, that mind is as much externally- 
constituted as neuronally-constituted; thirdly, that the mind is not precisely identical 
to, or supervenient upon the brain; and fourthly, that comprehending or grasping 
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mind, soul or self as any sort of object (physical, virtual or metaphorical) is not to see 
things as they really are (yatha-bhi7tam). 
From a syncretic Buddhist standpoint, believing in the mind as an abstract 
metaphorical object is just the adoption of a provisional attitude towards an 
explanation that is anticipated to be useful. It is not the belief, but the underlying 
motivation for the belief-attitude that matters, because it is intentional motivation that 
is karmically-efficient. If a belief is conditioned by unconscious mental concomitants 
(cetasika) of craving or desire, then awareness is unconsciously ruled by that belief- 
attitude: it becomes self-addicted. The Buddhist attitude of 'right-view' is the 
antithesis of this addictive state of mind (Fuller 2005: 1,11, Brazier 2003: 97). Right 
view may incorporate particular beliefs but is not overwhelmed by addiction to those 
beliefs. Achievement of this interested-yet-disinterested standpoint facilitates a 
precautionary attitude to the influence of explanation on experience. From a 
neuroscientific viewpoint, experience is not a direct presentation, but an indirect 
representation, a succession of cognitive and sensori-motor 'enactions' of the 
relationship between the individual and the world (Varela Thompson and Rosch 
1991). 
In principle, a model can be constructed that accounts for all views of the mind's 
external relations without prejudice to the possibility that some of those relations 
advert to a second, mental continuum, in other words, to the possibility that 
intersections in mental relations constitute virtual objects called minds, which operate 
with metaphorical likeness to physical objects in a metaphorical likeness to space. 
However, to call something an object, abstract or otherwise is merely a manner of 
speaking that diverts attention from the structural relations that constitute that thing 
(Ladyman 1998: 422, Chakravarty 2003: 869). Disagreements about a relational 
model either reflect conceptual problems that emerge when inappropriate objective 
spatial modelling of structural relationships is attempted, or reflect a refusal to allow 
room in the model for the possibility of other kinds of structural relation. 
A more charitable perspective (Davidson 1984: 197), which accommodates 
heterodoxy by 'complementary' syncretism, rather than by conflict, is more 
characteristic of eastern than western procedures (Dumont 1970a: 36-38,1970b: 193). 
This complementary approach seems to be a dialogic rather than a combative route to 
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understanding, to be compatible with the Buddhist attitude of 'right view', and to 
correspond to the human epistemological circumstance, which depends upon the 
aggregation of information from childhood, as a foundational 'hinge' on which any 
theoretical understanding must turn (Wittgenstein 1979: 44 [OC. 341]). 1 think that 
this charitable approach to epistemic justification underlies the interview participants' 
instinctive response to the current transitional state of global culture, where the nature 
of mind is no longer normatively defined for society as a whole. The participants 
resist the scientific 'standard view' of mind-brain identity because it is totalising and 
hegemonic, but rather than confidently asserting a confrontational theoretical 
alternative they prefer to rely on subjective experience as the ultimate source of 
evidence that may eventually resolve disputes about knowledge and meaning. 
The relational holism view advanced in this thesis will not be universally 
acceptable, for there are transcendental Buddhist alternatives that entail an ideal or 
absolute 'Platonic residue' (Jauss 1989: 5, [AN 1.10]), or hold to be literally true 
what others hold to be mythological. Neither truth nor fiction are absolute ideals, and 
their division under modernity mirrors the separation between what is and what ought 
to be the case (MacIntyre 197 1: 111). 'Is' and 'ought' were not divided in ancient 
India (Fuller 2005: 9), and truth and fiction, which were entwined in European culture 
until the late medieval period (Jauss 1989: 4-10), may never be fully disentangled. 
The neuroscience of perceptual cognition, and theories of explanation in the 
philosophy of science, indicate that all explanations and all perceptual cognitions are 
partially fictional. The mind/brain has been characterised as a machine that has 
evolved for the generation of prediction (Llinas 2001), and it is the reliability and 
efficacy of action in the world that verifies predictions constructed out of empirical 
fact and imaginative fiction. If Llinas is right, fiction is necessary to the 
understanding of experience, and therefore unlikely to be extricated from fact. When 
an individual switches attention from partially-fictive explanation to partially- fictive 
experience, the change is from a mode of mental sequestration to a mode of being 
manifest in the world . 
37 This is subject-location, not self-location; a simple process 
that is apparently hard to maintain over the long term. According to the KdIama 
Sutta (Woodward 1932: 170 [AN 111.7.65]), it marks a turn from explanation to 
intuition. 
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Notes to Chapter I 
1 Relational holism may not be compatible with the traditional interpretation of 
prafftya-samutpdda as the twelve-fold niddna-chain that establishes a karmic 
association between lifetimes, although it is compatible with Buddhadasa's 
contemporary reinterpretation of that teaching, which stresses moment-by-moment 
rebirth in order to emphasise the constant need to guard against egocentricity and 
maintain ethical responsibility (Bucknell. and Stuart-Fox 1983: 104-106, Gabaude 
1990: 223). 
2 Arendt applied the Socratic point that evil thrives on inconsistency of thought to the 
case of Adolf Eichmann. (1964). 
3 See the discussion, at the beginning of Chapter 4, of the figures cited by Bluck 
(2006). 
4 See the discussion in of explanation and experience in Chapter 6, including Chapter 
6 note 1. 
5 Sharf argues against the very idea of religious experience as a separate category, 
particularly mystical experience, on the grounds that experience is not necessarily as 
it is academically described (1988: 94-116). That is just a reversal of the point about 
the inadequacy of explanation. The emphasis on experience in this thesis does not 
conflict with his argument, however, for the concern here is only with the relationship 
between given explanations, (which may be empirically true or may be imaginative 
predictions), as reported experiences. 
6 According to Rosch, categories are not initially defined by boundaries but by an 
'internal structure' of approximation to a 'core meaning', 'prototype' or 'focal 
example'. Such a structural approach to categorisation is better suited to cross- 
cultural research than reliance on formal definitions (1973: 140,142-3). 
7 Some philosophers argue, on the contrary, that the problem of the relation between 
mental and neural events is constitutionally insolvable by the human mind (McGinn 
1989: 349) 
8 The philosophical arguments for variations of the standard view extend beyond the 
scope of the thesis (Lowe 2000: 48-5 1), which concentrates on a hybrid of the 'type- 
type' and the 'type-token' view, such that mental events are identical to or 
supervenient upon neuronal events, but a particular type of mental event is not 
necessarily tokened by precisely the same type of neuronal event. On this hybrid 
view there is room for variation in the correlation between mental and neural events, 
but not so much latitude that a mental event could be correlated or tokened by, say, a 
computational event. 
9 Aristotle and the Abhidhaninia commentators identified the heart as the seat of 
consciousness, whereas no location was specified in the Pdli suttas (Sugnasiri 1995: 
409,412-413). 
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10 Mind/brain identity is the conventional designation, although Honderich considers 
it more accurate to speak of 'one event with two kinds of properties', or the 'union' of 
a (psychoneural pair' (1993: 19-30) 
II The correlates of particular sensory contents of consciousness have been located by 
brain imaging in stimulation studies, but it is argued that the correlates of 
consciousness as a grand vehicle have yet to be found (Me and Thompson 2004). 
The problem may be resolvable by the view that vehicle-content distinctions are 
aspects of one phenomenon (Metzinger 2003: 4). A consciousness may be just the 
sum total of its contents, and the sum of many neuronal events. 
12 1 respond to Varela's work rather than Austin's for a number of reasons: 
i) Austin's work is encapsulated in Zen and the Brain, a single encyclopaedic 
presentation of neuroscientific issues of relevance to Zen Buddhism, a work that 
merits a monograph in its own right. Austin incorporates more anatomical and 
physiological information than the lay commentator can assimilate (Metcalf 2001: 
35 1), whereas Varela is selective in his use of examples. I attempt a more simplified 
presentation of the relevant neuroscientific issues, retrieved from theoretical 
commentary by a selection of neuroscientists, in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
ii) Austin is particularly concerned to relate neuroscientific knowledge to the process 
and language of enlightenment in the Ch'an/Zen tradition. I am concerned with the 
Buddhism as a whole and with theoretical problems in the apperception and 
explanation of experience. 
iii) Austin is a staunch non-dualist with regard to the mind (Rosch 1999: 222). 
Varela's perspective is more nuanced by virtue of his dialogic engagement with the 
Dalai Lama (Varela 1997)and by his theorising on phenomenological methodology 
and on emergent properties. 
13 In his earlier work (Varela Thompson and Rosch 1991) discussion of the 
'groundlessness' implied by world-enaction in neural networks makes it possible to 
lose sight of the fact that Varela bases mental events on the materiality of the 
embodied mind. In his later work (Varela and Thompson 2003) the rhetoric of 
emergence could be interpreted as reopening the question of mind-brain duality, yet 
his presentation in Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003: 118-119) appears to rule 
that possibility out of court. 
14 'Dalai Lama' (Ocean of Wisdom) is an honorific and a job title, so I cite the 
fourteenth post-holder, Tenzin Gyatso, by his personal name, although most 
publications and bibliographies do not follow this reasoning. 
15 The Mind and Life Conferences were constituted as a forum for regular dialogue 
between the Dalai Lama and western scientists (Wallace 2003: 417-421). The work 
of the Mind and Life Institute is currently the subject of doctoral study by Rob 
Hogendoorn at the University of Leiden, with the provisional title: Probing "Mind 
And Life ". - A Foundational Inquitýý Into A Cross-Cultural Meeting of Indo-Tibetan 
Buddhisni and the Sciences. 
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16 1 am indebted to Westerhoff for my understanding of ontological categories. He 
does not discuss science as a specific example. 
17 The main purpose of causal theory is to identify, from out of a network of 
conditions, those preceding events which provide a significant explanation for the 
occurrence in question. Strevens cites the example of drowning as the most 
significant amongst possible causes of the death of Rasputin (Strevens 2004: 154-56). 
To assert one moment in an immaterial mental sequence as the cause of the next may 
indeed be as relevant as drowning, bludgeoning, or poisoning in the Rasputin case, 
but that is only an introduction to the task of demonstrating that an endogenous cause 
has greater significance than the exogenous causal claim asserted for neuronal 
activity in cooperation with environmental influences. 
18 See Chapter 8 of this thesis for a 'Democritean' view of properties that contradicts 
Rosch's 'Empedoclean' model of causation. 
19 There has been speculation that the significance of observational participation in 
quantum theory implies that the mind is present at all levels of the natural order 
(Bohm and Peat 2000). My argument is that this reffies the mind as a fundamental 
property thereby contradicting the s'u-nyatd negation of all intrinsic nature. 
20 The distinction cannot be absolute, for any verbal report of an experience is an 
explanation indicative of the experience, not the experience in itself. The point is that 
normative scholastic exegesis places the explanation at a further remove from the 
experience. This is one of the reasons why this thesis relies on the accounts of 
contemporary Buddhists as much as on textual tradition. 
21 Harvey disputes Griffiths' view that a mental event could not have a physical basis: 
In fact, Theravddin Abhidhamma is not so dualistic as Griffiths claims. 
While conception and conceptional-discernment normally arise 
conditioned by other mental states, they also have an unspecified form 
of matter (ri7pa) as 'support condition' and 'basis' (Harvey 1995: 165). 
22 It is a short step from viewing the 'enactive' evolutionary effect of an organism on 
its environment as a naturalised or 'tame' form of karmic causation, to viewing 
collective enaction by sentient beings as a form of 'untame' karmic causation that 
literally creates a world. (Flanagan 2006: 17- 29). Varela does not take that step in his 
published work. 
23 This externalist re-emphasis on the parallel importance of structural coupling for 
the constitution of mind will be presented in Thompson (2007) (personal 
communication). 
24 Since practical scientific method is a matter of judgement, the common law 
juridical example may be of assistance. A judge may decide to admit or a jury to 
believe subjective testimony of mental states without any supporting evidence, but 
normally supporting external factors are considered, such as the testimony of an 
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expert, which in itself may be subjective testimony, but usually includes reference to 
a disciplinary tradition with a history of combining first-person reports with 
behavioural observations. For example, in the case of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: 
There is greater diagnostic uncertainty in psychiatric cases than in 
physical injury cases (White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire - 
Lord Justice Steyn: 33). 
The courts have developed sufficient confidence in medical expertise 
to be willing to award damages for mental disturbances which 
manifest in bodily symptoms ... such as "recognised psychiatric illness" (White V. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire - Lord Hoffinan: 40) 
Thus, where subjective testimony is concerned the law applies a weaker standard of 
evidence than the ideal scientific method; particularly where there is supporting 
expertise or corroborating testimony, relying either on the balance of probabilities or 
on determination beyond reasonable doubt. 
25 Flanagan (2006: 33) mentions a study by Logothetis and Schall on binocular rivalry 
in rhesus macaque monkeys, but makes it clear that the subjective reporting in that 
case was not a linguistic expression, but an inference from lever-pressing behaviour. 
26 By 'polythetic' Gombrich is referring to a multiplicity of purposes, rather than a 
multiplicity of gods. 
27 Different traditions arise from different causal moments in the diachronic series of 
Buddhism's history, yet all refer back to the historical Buddha; thus, to develop 
Hervieu-Leger's metaphor of 'religion as a chain of memory' (2000: 123-127), there 
are distinct strands of memory braided into a single chain. 
28 In an article reporting the findings of M. A. research into the experiences of 
Buddhists in Leeds (Kennedy 2004), 1 suggest that, under globalized circumstances, 
religious identity can be as much a matter of discovery as of a choice or conversion: 
The interview subjects, bereft of overarching (theo)logical 
explanations, were brought by crises to reflexively examine their own 
biographies. In this conscious process of discovering self-identity they 
also discovered, sometimes inadvertently, that Buddhism provided the 
label and the behavioural routines most appropriate to those identities. 
They were then in a position to begin to make lifestyle choices 
involving engagement with particular Buddhist traditions, and so to 
create social identities as Buddhists of Western origin. 
The privileging of the notion of discovery over the notion of choice, 
made on the basis of interview testimonies, amounts to a reduced 
emphasis on autonomous acts of free-will in the creation of self- 
identity, and an increased awareness of the influence of relationships 
and the environment. While it may be methodologically appropriate to 
talk about 'choices' with regard to the creation of social identity, and 
with regard to the effects of consumption at the structural level of 
society, the term 'choice' obscures more than it illuminates when 
applied to significant events in the lives of individuals. In the case of 
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the adoption of Buddhism, the psychological determinants tend to 
have occurred long before the gradual hermeneutic process by which 
individuals come to understand that their self-identity includes 
characteristics, such as suffering and dissatisfaction, existential 
uncertainty and an opaque sense of self, which are specifically 
addressed by Buddhist discourse and practice (Kennedy 2004: 147). 
29 Externalism is the view that meaning is not determined by the psychological state 
of individuals but by the way things are in the world (Putnam 1975: 222, Burge 1979: 
85). 
30 In this brief summary of Chapter 5-10 there is no room to mention the numerous 
instances, cited in the text, where the ideas and attitudes of the interview participants 
provide the material and the impetus for the construction of my interpretation. 
31 By ad hominem I mean that an argument is assessed on the basis of the merits of its 
author rather than on its own merit. 
32 As an example, retrieval from memory is news from nowhere, other than from past 
time, when time is treated metaphorically as a location. 
33 1 owe to Arendt (1978) my understanding that the ascription of an 'inner' mental 
life to persons is metaphorical. My understanding that this ascription is 
metaphysically uncertain, but a fictional convention that is socially useful, I owe to 
Johnston's retrieval of this theme from throughout Wittgenstein's note-works 
(Johnston 1993). 
34 Harris points out that while elite institutional Buddhism has been concerned with 
scholasticism and the transcendence of nature, there is a parallel strand of practice 
concerned with the 'magical manipulation of the natural world'; he associates the 
fon-ner tendency with Sdriputta, and the latter with Moggalldna (Harris 2000a: 129- 
130). 
35 See note 5. 
36 Augustine says that the activity of mind is combination (coactu) (2002: 66-67). 
That combination may rely upon the properties of subject and object, but the 
combination itself, and therefore the mind, is neither: it is consciousness of the 
relation between the two. 
37 Arendt notes that to think is to live in hiding, and is the philosophic mode, whereas 
to become manifest by action in the world is the heroic mode (1978: 7 1). 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology and Method 
Introduction 
It is difficult to constrain an examination of contemporary Buddhist ideas about 
the nature of mind to manageable proportions, firstly, because philosophy of mind 
informs many other areas of enquiry (McGinn 1996: 163), and secondly, because 
Buddhism is sufficiently 'polythetic' for divergent views to be contained within a 
broad tradition (Gombrich 2004: 18). A philosophically hermeneutic methodology 
was chosen to guide the research process because it is cross-culturally applicable, 
because it facilitates access to a range of views by virtue of its dialogic method, and 
because the hermeneutic imperative to contribute a contextual interpretation to a 
continuing dialogic process acts as an encouragement to restraint amidst a welter of 
explanatory discourses about the mind. 
Aims determine methodology 
Religious studies use inductive methods from the human sciences when 
considering social manifestations, but tends to adopt a humanities approach when 
considering ideas and ideals. In neither case is theoretical methodology, 'the logic of 
justification of scientific statements' (da Silva 1982: 15-16) as separable from the 
research method or the research object as is the case for the natural sciences 
(Moustakas 1990: 11). A rigidly structured methodology cannot be specified, by 
means of which data about personal opinions collected in a religious context can be 
analysed into scientifically verifiable statements for interpretation from a wholly 
disinterested point of view. This is particularly so for this study, which aims to 
interpret Buddhist views on the nature of mind in the contemporary context, yet by 
doing so participates in the same category as those views, the category of 
interpretations of previous interpretations of Buddhist mind-theory. The aim of the 
study therefore determines that the underlying methodology should be hermeneutic, 
but how that methodology is justified depends on what sort of mind is envisaged to be 
perfon-ning the interpretation, and consequently, in what way minds are believed to 
receive and manipulate information. Since these issues cannot be determined in 
advance of the study, data collection must happen in advance of theoretical discussion, 
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and be used to inform theoretical discussion about how mental acts of understanding 
and interpretation take place. Such a cautious approach has the advantage of 
parsimony and cross-cultural equality, although the western literature on 
hermeneutics is more extensive than in the East, where only exegesis is overtly 
theorised. The difference is unsurprising, for hermeneutics is a western term, 
although it refers to a natural linguistic process. ' 
Hermeneutics is the identification and explanation of meanings that are 'veiled' 
or obscured by their indicative signs (Ferraris 1996: 2), but that basic definition 
frames an experience that is too general to constitute a methodology. Descombes 
suggests that hermeneutics is derived from the special case of priestly communication 
of divine intentions that are communicated within the sacred boundary of the temple 
(Descombes 1986: 25), yet hermeneutics is also a necessary component of profane 
juridical and literary practice (Ferraris 1996: 2). If the western philosophical 
exposition clarifies anything, it is that hermeneutics is implicated in all discourses as 
a technique of human understanding (Ferraris 1996: 2,19-39,285). According to 
Gadamer this technique is universal and is not performed by any interpreter in 
isolation, but by participation in some sort of dialogic context (Gadamer 1976: 56-57, 
1998, Jauss 1989: 213,, Grondin 1994: 118). Priestly dialogue with the divine is just a 
special application of a general human ability. Prototypically, dialogue is two-way 
communication with another person, but since communication is always by means of 
a sign (object, event, gesture, word or text), by extension dialogue can take place 
between a person and a sign, so long as the underlying two-way structure of question 
and answer is maintained. It is the capacity of the human dialogic experience to give 
rise to an interpretation as the second stage in its dialectic that turns hermeneutics 
from a characterisation of experience in general into a characterisation of a particular 
kind of experience, which can be used as a methodology. The universality of this 
capacity, applied with suitable attention to detail and context, makes hermeneutics an 
appropriate methodology for a cross-cultural religious study. 
If Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue is granted, there is only one hermeneutic 
structure, which western tradition invests with theoretical hypotheses about precisely 
who communicates, who interprets, what is interpreted, the relation between sign and 
meaning, and why, how and where an interpretation takes place. Gadamer's dialogic 
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structure justifies the expenditure of research effort on the establishment of dialogic 
partnerships required for the collection of expressed, rather than notional, infon-nation 
on contemporary Buddhist opinions about the mind, justifies attention to the 
'horizons' or boundaries of historical context and foundational presupposition that are 
anticipated to be operative for the participants in this study, and justifies application 
cross-culturally by virtue of the natural origin of hermeneutic possibility in ordinary 
human communication. It is for these reasons that philosophical hermeneutics is the 
methodology that guides the data collection method, and constrains the subsequent 
interpretation. 
Philosophical hermeneutics 
Eighteenth and nineteenth century methodological hermeneutics attempted to 
provide the humanities with the same objective foundation that had brought success 
to the sciences (Grondin 1994: 18-20,69,79,88). As reformulated by Gadamer on 
the basis of Heidegger's critique of phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics 
marks a turn away from that methodological model of scientific objectivity, and an 
attempt to justify valid interpretation in the absence of transcendental foundations or 
limitation by rules other than those inherent to the dialogic context. Gadamer's 
theory does contain one presupposition that should be treated with caution in a cross- 
cultural study of the nature of mind. Behind the external dialogue of linguistic 
communication with others, Gadamer suggests that there is a 'verbum interius' or 
'inner word' of dialogic communication between consciousness and the rest of 
experience (Gadamer 1998: 418-428), and he identifies this internalised 
communication as a 'universal dimension' of hermeneutics. Rather than the intuitive 
understanding of the 'transcendental subject' of Husserl's phenomenology, the 'inner 
word' is a continual endeavour to understand, which can never be wholly captured by 
propositional language. The inner dialogue is motivated by human facticity and 
finitude, and by the necessity for engagement across the boundary between self and 
world, and self and other, in order to ascertain meaning and acquire understanding 
(Grondin 1994: 121-124). So far so good, but inner dialogue should not be mis- 
conceived as a secularisation of the Augustinian notion of inner communion with 
divinely-ordained Platonic ideas, rather than a characterisation of the problematic 
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outward relation between a notional self, a mental experience and its object. If the 
study of the contemporary Buddhist understanding of mind is to be open to cross- 
cultural dialogue, it cannot begin with an assumption that mental events are organised 
in the form of an interior dialogue, any more than it can presume the 'fictional' 
transcendental subject of phenomenology (Carr 1999: 92-94). In order to facilitate a 
cross-cultural study, the universal dimension of hermeneutics must be provisionally 
assumed to be the external dialogue, not the inner conversation, since an 
unobservable mental event cannot be presupposed, when it clearly forms part of the 
object of the investigation. 
It is the refusal to elevate assumptions to the objective status of rules, and 
interpreters to the status of authorities, which individuates philosophical from 
religious hen-neneutics. There is no priestly authority, no priestly rules of 
interpretation and the only sacred space is the embodiment of participants in a 
dialogic context, where constraints are established inherently by the embedding of 
dialogue in the contemporary horizon of understanding. For Gadamer, any search for 
objectivity is an attempt to escape the finitude of existence in time and space by 
means of access to disembodied absolute truths. The sole truth-criterion that he 
admits is that of 'historicity', which indicates that complete objectivity cannot be 
attained from a particular and finite situation (Grondin 1994: 107-112), for historical 
spatio-temporal situation imposes a 'horizon' on understanding (Gadamer 1998: 300, 
Grondin 1994: 114). 
In the absence of transcendental, objective or mentally-internal foundations, 
hermeneutics relies on the historical 'facticity' of human existence with others 
(Gadamer 1998: 256-257, Philipse 1998: 53, Grondin 1994: 2,11). Heidegger 
discerned a 'fore- structure' or interpretative disposition towards that facticity, which 
he referred to as 'care' (Sorge): a readiness to be and do in the world (Philipse 1998: 
28,148,176), including the being and doing of understanding and interpretation. The 
practice of hermeneutics is a matter of bringing this interpretative disposition to 
consciousness, and thereby dispelling individual self-alienation from the finititude of 
being (Grondin 1994: 93-94). Behind every statement and its logical content lies the 
pre-understanding of Sorge towards self and world, which is prior to the self- 
conscious use of language, yet is articulated in the unselfconsciously meaningful use 
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of language. Hermeneutics is thus seen not as a methodology for the interpretation of 
a 'Platonic residue' (Jauss 1989: 5) of transcendental, essential or internal meanings, 
but as a situated response to finite being. 
Like the 'verbus interius', the notion of Sorge must be treated with caution, as a 
western characterisation of another internal mental event, and thus part of the object 
of study, but the observation that understanding always has a 'fore- structure' serves 
as a useful corrective to the tendency to assume that all knowledge can be reduced to 
propositions, for methodological ordering tends to ignore the implicit and favour the 
explicit by restricting the scope of investigation to what can be formulated in logical 
propositions. Gadamer observes that the objects of propositional statements tend to 
be shorn of the rich texture and variety of meanings made available by context and by 
tradition. On the contrary, propositions can always be interpreted as answers to 
questions, and the prior dia-logic of question and answer indicates that the 
understanding of meaning abstracted into logical propositions with a determinate 
truth-value depends on participation in shared language and traditional practice 
(Gadamer 1998: 369-379, Grondin 1994: 118-119). 
Since this religious study is inter-disciplinary, it will naturally include logical 
propositions about empirical objects justified by scientific methods, but religious 
study must also engage with unverifiable abstract objects such as subjective 
experiences, metaphysical ideas and soteriological ideals. Buddhism encapsulates 
such experiences ideas and ideals, and any study that treats Buddhism holistically 
must attempt to interpret counterintuitive statements about non-empirical objects with 
logical consistency, yet with due regard for context. 2 Informally, logic refers to non- 
contradiction or consistency. It is on the practice of consistency that justification in 
the humanities, as the validation of non-contradictory explanation, extends through 
dialogue to the hermeneutic clarification of statements that appear to be inconsistent 
when the intended meaning is implicit in the fore-structure but not explicit in 
propositional statements. 
In sum, philosophical hermeneutics claims no transcendental reference, is 
grounded in the finitude and historicity of human existence, and takes note of the 
dialogical formation of understanding, which is a neglected prerequisite for 
propositional statements. Notwithstanding Gadamer's critique of scientific 
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methodology (1976: 107-112), hermeneutics can be used as a methodology in the 
examination of the cultural impact of science in its relation to objects of study in the 
human sciences and the humanities. So long as the culturally- specific hypotheses of 
the 'transcendental subject', the 'inner conversation' and the 'fore-structure' of 'care' 
are temporarily set aside as more properly part of the research object, hermeneutics is 
a valid cross-cultural methodology for the study of explanations of mind. Above all, 
philosophical hermeneutics prioritises the external dialogue between persons: 'the 
possibility that the other person may be right is the soul of hermeneutics' (Gadamer 
in Grondin 1994: 124). Initial openness to equitable dialogue, rather than an attitude 
of appropriation and domination, makes an equitable encounter possible between 
explanations, traditions and cultures, and continual dialogic openness prevents 
reductive closure. 
Method 
A suitable method enables the production of a theory by ensuring the collection 
of the most useful data (Glaser and Strauss1967: 3,28-29). Since the methodology is 
grounded in interpersonal dialogue, it is appropriate that the main data collection 
method for this study should be the qualitative interview, and that analysis of those 
interviews should take account of context, including the contemporary conjunction of 
scientific findings and theories with philosophical and Buddhist mind-theories. The 
resulting interpretation is a further step in dialogic engagement, rather than a 
disinterested evaluation or a completed theory: it is the expression of my opinion, 
after extensive modification by dialogues, summarised in Chapter 4, with the ten 
British Buddhists who agreed to be interviewed. My interpretation is not intended to 
be conclusive, but to contribute to continuing dialogue on the contemporary Buddhist 
view of the mind. 
An inevitable hiatus occurs in the dialogue, when the interviewer takes control 
of the transcription of oral interview into written record and the production of 
interpretative text. There is a movement from spontaneity to rumination and from the 
real-time ebb and flow of dialogic power relations in an interview, to a transitional 
reliance on the good faith of the interpreter. This hiatus is a change of method from 
spoken word to written text rather than a change of methodology, for the dialogic 
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process is not concluded and authority only attaches to a communicator for the 
duration of their communication, after which it is assumed by any person who is 
3 inclined to respond . 
Qualitative interviews 
In order to discover whether infonnation external to Buddhist tradition was 
leading to hermeneutic reconsideration of Buddhist mind-theory, qualitative rather 
than quantitative information was required. The method for gathering this data took 
the form of interviews lasting from one and a half to three hours, which were tape- 
recorded and subsequently transcribed. The participants were asked to check and edit 
a summary of their interview, which then provided the material for subsequent 
description, quotation and interpretation. 
Quantitative methods would have enabled the collection of data about the 
prevalence of pre-detennined opinions, but would not have been a viable method for 
collecting opinions without presumption as to what those opinions might be. 
Quantitative means such as questionnaires face practical restrictions on the detail of 
the questions asked, compromise the freedom of the interview participants to respond 
to questions as they see fit, and make it difficult to ensure that the participants fully 
understand the aims and scope of the study (Pawson 1996: 297-299). Quantitative 
methods based on scientific methodology would require the cooperation of a 
statistically-representative sample of British Buddhists, but access to such a sample is 
not available, for the 2001 Census indicates that the majority of people in Britain who 
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call themselves Buddhists are not members of Buddhist organisations (Bluck 2004). 
This study did not aim to quantify opinions, or to collect all the opinions there 
may be, but to collect a sample of contemporary opinions without restraining their 
expression. By writing to organisations with a request for participants, an attempt 
was made to gain participants who reflect the diversity of 'convert' Buddhist opinion 
in organisations active in Britain, but there was no expectation that the sample would 
be quantitatively significant. In the event, representative capture of opinion across 
organisations was not achieved, because requests to some organisations produced no 
agreement to participate. For example, there was no participation from members of 
the New Kadampa Tradition, Karma Kagyu (Samye Ling), Sharpham College, The 
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Order of Buddhist Contemplatives (Throssel Hole), or from S6ka Gakkai. The 
reasons why participation was declined were various: lack of interest, lack of time, 
and the view that research was soteriologically pointless. Nothing can be inferred 
from this reluctance to nominate participants and, in any event, individuals were 
interviewed as much to ascertain personal views as to ascertain organisational 
positions, since that information is obtainable through textual research and participant 
observation. 5 
The data collection method included the initiation of dialogue before the 
interview with each participant, by initial mailing of a detailed list of questions 
intended to elicit prior consideration that might enable a more focussed interview. A 
pilot mailing established that this procedure would not succeed. The participants 
were willing to be interviewed but not prepared spend time answering a detailed 
preliminary questionnaire. All participants were therefore sent a concise schedule of 
optional questions, to which most responded by e-mail, and one by audio-tape. 
The schedule of interview questions was modified to engage with the initially- 
expressed views of each participant, but in order achieve some consistency across the 
interviews, and to understand influences on particular views, an attempt was made to 
cover four broad areas of. 
1) Relation to traditional views of the nature of mind. 
2) Opportunities for dialogue about the nature of mind. 
3) The impact of science, including neuroscience and psychology. 
4) Responses to western philosophy of mind. 
The intention was to discover individual attitudes towards traditional Buddhist 
mind-theory, how those attitudes affect present interpretation, to gauge opinions 
about the possibility of dialogue between Buddhist and contemporary explanatory 
systems, and to ascertain attitudes towards current scientific theories. 
Although the participants were offered a guarantee of anonymity and 
confidentiality, all who agreed to take part chose to be cited. The naming of 
interview participants is unusual in social research, but has the advantage of enabling 
the interviews and the subsequent interpretation to include reference to published 
work, for six of the participants are authors. Naming also makes the interview record 
verifiable and opens the opportunity for further public dialogue. The disadvantage is 
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that participants could be dismayed if they felt that their views had been 
misrepresented, and gross misrepresentation might harm reputations; there are 
therefore issues of consent of the kind that occur in medical research. Following the 
medical example of continuing informed consent, all participants were eventually 
sent an interview transcript, a summary of the thesis, and given a second opportunity 
to opt for anonymity. 
As much as possible, the summary of the interviews in Chapter 4 includes 
quotations referring to key points: those quotations are mainly of speech in an 
extempore and interactive dialogic setting. Although the responses were initiated by 
questions, they were not necessarily directed by those questions: by virtue of the 
egalitarian nature of dialogue, the participants responded as they saw fit. By so doing 
they could redirect the emphasis of their interview, as supplementary questions were 
put in reaction to initial answers. Because the participant's opinions were 
spontaneously expressed in the context of an interview process, they may not 
represent final views of the kind that might be deployed in fully considered published 
work. However, it was an advantage of the interview method that participants took 
the opportunity to comment on their publications. I take it as a confirmation of the 
hermeneutic methodology that some participants offered reinterpretations of their past 
work: this provides some indication that a written text becomes independent of its 
author as views are changed by continuing opportunities for dialogue and reflection. 
Hermeneutic interpretation can only be from within a context rather than 
determined from a spuriously exterior 'God's eye' perspective, but any matter 
relevant to the context of this study can properly be taken into account in the 
interpretation, so long as it was introduced into discussion during the interviews. 
Questions concerning Buddhist tradition and western philosophical tradition, 
neuroscience, psychology and psychotherapy were put in most interviews; even if 
some participants did not choose to pursue those issues, their prior introduction 
allows them to form part of the subsequent interpretation. Because questions about 
the personal motivations for particular views were rarely discussed in the interviews, 
those issues could not properly be introduced at the stage of interpretation. 6 
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Interpretation as translation 
Any communication would be a translation, in a broad sense of the term, if 
meanings were transitive from one person to another, but that is not an accurate 
description of communication. Firstly, communication is the signification, not the 
transference of meaning, for language is not a metaphorical 'conduit' for the passage 
of meanings from one person to another, but a shorthand indicator of meanings to be 
discovered in context (Reddy 1979: 286-292). Secondly, Putnam's 'twin earth' 
thought experiment suggests that the meanings of terms are not determined by 
'intension', 'in the head', but by their external reference to the world (1975: 216-217, 
223-226). Thirdly, in the absence of divine intervention, nothing can be taught by 
language without personal observation of the meaning of words in connection with 
things and events in the world (Wittgenstein 2001: 2 [PI. 1: 1], Bumyeat 1999: 299- 
300). 
Problems of translation are more acute when communication is between 
languages, discourses and cultures, rather than between individuals. The combination 
of scientific disciplines with philosophical and Buddhist mind-theory in this study 
introduces issues of translation between discourses, which are additional to problems 
in the translation of Asian Buddhist texts into English, and to the cultural translation 
of Buddhist praxis into contemporary globalised social circumstances. Difficulties 
occur with individual terms, but also with the wider implications of a discourse, and 
with the cultural understanding of the social utility of the tradition. Thus, there are 
three applications of the word 'translation': philologically between languages, 
interpretatively between discourses, and culturally between religious and secular 
traditions. 
I am not proficient in any Asian language, and therefore discussion in this study 
of the translations of Buddhist terms is either derivative of other work, 7 or depends on 
the usage of the interview participants. Naturally, mistranslation of terins will affect 
understanding of a language or a discourse, but it is a working principle of Buddhist 
exegesis that terms should be understood with some reference to intention of the 
whole discourse (Bond 1980: 19), the implication being that the accuracy of 
translation improves with increased understanding of the whole discourse. 
55 
It has been argued, to the contrary, that terms are 'underdeten-nined', given the 
multiplicity of possible empirical observations of the extension of those terms, and 
'inscrutable', in the absence of a prior translation manual (Quine 1960: 275 52-54, 
1970: 182-183). 8 Davidson's response is that relative indeterminacy is acceptable, 
therefore translation remains possible, if there is broad agreement or overlap between 
the reference of two discourses which refer to the same world, and if it can be 
charitably assumed that the proponents of each discourse mean what they say 
(Davidson 1984: 197). 9 He argues that there is indeed sufficient overlap between 
linguistic systems referring to experience of the same world, and that people can 
generally be trusted to believe that what they say is true (Davidson 1984: 191,195). 
It is a reasonable supposition that Buddhist mind-theory, having survived 
transmission across several cultures, is worthy of translation, and Davidson's 
(agreement', 'charity' and 'belief arguments for the possibility of translation 
between discourses offers a basic defence for the continuing relevance of religious 
discourse against scientific polemics, and of the relevance of scientific discourse 
against religious indifference. In either case, translation fails without the charitable 
acceptance that the proponents of other discourses mean what they say, and without 
initial search for broad agreement, prior to identification of cases where translation is 
problematic. 
The presence of Buddhism in western societies indicates that globalisation is not 
a one-way process, but since this study is concerned with the consequences of 
translation between eastern and western discourses, it is susceptible to the charge of 
corientalism'. Orientalism is, firstly 'a style of thought ... based on an ontological and 
epistemological distinction between "the Orient"... and "the Occident"; secondly 'a 
certain will or intention towards what is a manifestly different (or alternative and 
novel) world'; and thirdly, orientalism is an academic bias towards philosophical 
discourse rather than cultural praxis (Said 1978: 2-3,12). 10 
Orientalism: bias in cultural translation 
In response to the orientalist charge I contend that Buddhism is a combination of 
both philosophical theory and religious cultural praxis, and that concentration on the 
theory does not entail denigration of the practice. This study is more susceptible to 
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the opposing criticism that it is insufficiently attentive to the cultural difference 
between East and West, by virtue its assumption that, despite cultural conditioning, 
human brains and human nature are the same the world over. Although human genes 
continue to evolve (Bustamente et al 2005: 1153), the effects on the brain are unlikely 
to have been significant since the time of the Buddha; much more significant is the 
possibility that cultural influences may determine that ancient and modem minds 
embark on soteriological. paths from different baseline psychological states. " 
The most troubling orientalist charge, however, is not whether mental functioning 
is culturally determined, but whether the western study of Buddhism is influenced by 
a culturally imperialist attitude, which values origin and written text over the oral 
testimony of the native interpreter (Lopez 1995: 3). Cultural imperialism cuts both 
ways, and to deprecate western influence on Buddhism is to ignore the reciprocal 
influence of Buddhism on the West (Clausen 1975, Scott 1986,2000, Batchelor 1994, 
Sharf 1998), and the long-term influence of eastern ideas and technologies on the 
formation of European civilization (Edwardes 1971). A more invidious effect of 
over-extensive application of the orientalist hypothesis of cultural imperialism is that 
if Buddhism must only be studied anthropologically, philosophical inconsistency 
becomes immune from critique. Such an outcome would be a perverse form of 
orientalism, with the implication that Buddhists are incapable of justifying their 
cultural and soteriological practice. It could lead to the patronising presumption that 
study participants are influenced by collective representations that they do not 
understand, and indifferent to the logical coherence of the associated ideas. 
Buddhists may have surprising views about facts and their logical organisation, but 
they also have access to a scholarly tradition that justifies those views. Some defence 
other than the orientalist thesis would be required, if contemporary Buddhists were to 
be excused from the dialogue of ideas. 
This study presents an ambiguous target for the orientalist rebuke, for the 
authority of the interview participant as 'native' interpreter is valued on a par with the 
authority of texts - but the 'native' interpreters, selected on the practical 
basis of 
accessibility, happen to be Buddhists of western ethnic origin. I accept that a study of 
(convert' Buddhists admits some cultural bias, but deflect the orientalist charge with 
the aspiration for the replication of the study with the participation of culturally- 
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ethnic Buddhists resident in Britain, or in a predominately Buddhist society. 
Participants with a 'first' cultural allegiance to Buddhism might be expected to 
express some differences of opinion in comparison to the present sample, but how far 
globalisation may attenuate or enhance that effect is unknown, not least because 
science discourse has become as much an eastern as a western project. 
How the mind is explained may be culturally differentiated, yet discussions of the 
mind, as the object of investigation over a brief period of the evolutionary timescale, 
warrants translation between discourses, the identification of cultural and ideological 
difference, and the identification of occasions when one discourse is to be preferred in 
a particular context because it has more explanatory power than another. It cannot be 
presupposed that one discourse about the mind is better than any other in all 
circumstances, or that a single synthetic discourse will be useful for all human 
purposes: it might turn out that the nearest approximation to a full explanation of the 
mind will be a combination of many discourses building bridges and finding out 
together. (Metzinger 2003: 2) 
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Notes to Chapter 2 
I The search for tacit hermeneutics amongst overtly conservative Buddhist exegesis is 
an etic or 'outsider' activity, which must be justified by the truth-value of its 
conclusions. The standard Pdli treatise on interpretation is the Nettippakaratia (trans. 
&dpamoli 1962), which gives exegetical examples of the contextual re-wording of 
Buddhist teaching without loss of the traditional meaning (1962: viii). Later exegesis, 
such as the Chinese P'an Chiao system, attempts to integrate the teachings of schools 
and si7tras by hierarchical doctrinal classification, 'highlighting the distinctive 
characteristics ... as well as reconciling the apparent disparities between them' (Ming- Wood 1993: 105). There is work for tacit hermeneutics in this dynamic of 
differentiation and reconciliation, which Chappell characterises by a tripartite 
sequence, proceeding from 'individualization' when a 'pioneering' thinker produces a 
new interpretation, through 'integration' when the new teaching is interpreted 
traditionally, and 'control', when the new interpretation is accepted without question 
as being a 'gloss' on the old teaching (Chappell in Lopez 1987: 82). 
Pye points out the hermeneutic possibilities inherent in the doctrine of skilful 
means (Pye 1980: 29-30). There was much scope for tacit hermeneutics in the 
Mahdydna assumption that 'that which is well-spoken ... is spoken by the Buddha' (Lopez 1995: 27), and in the composition of new si7tras, which attempt 'to maintain 
the pretence of speech' as an ostensible record of having heard the Buddha's words, 
(Lopez 1995: 40-42). 'Innovation is one of the great sins of Buddhist letters', yet 
meanings for new contexts are discovered by the examination of texts for hidden 
allusions. These contextual meanings are often found by etymological association 
between the authorial words and the desired interpretation (Lopez 1996: 8,239-246). 
2 Religion cannot be distinguished from science on the ground that it supports 
propositions that are 'counterintuitive' (Pyysidinen 2001: 18-23), because many 
scientific explanations, including hellocentricity, the embedding of evolutionary 
succession in geological series and quantum indeterminacy are equally 
counterintuitive. It is a plain fact that things are not always as they seem, therefore 
causal explanations that delve beneath appearances often produce counterintuitive 
conclusions. 
3 According to Adorno and Horkheimer, a concluded discourse would be totalising, 
making reality and fiction indistinguishable and obliterating time by condemning the 
understanding of the present to be a repetitious analogy of the past (1997: 5,7, Van 
Reijan 1988: 418-422). If time is a property external to minds, time could not be 
utterly obliterated by misunderstanding, but the affective quality of its perception 
might be erased. 
4A tentative typology of organisationally-unattached American Buddhists has been 
elaborated by Tweed (2002: 28-29). 
5 This study could not determine the extent to which organisations influenced the 
formation of individual opinions but my impression is that in the course of lively 
dialogues the interview participants abandoned the precautionary attitude generated 
by their organisational role, to give genuinely held opinions. 
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6 My caution with regard to factors that can be brought into the interpretation, and 
with regard to methodological issues of consent, is a response to difficulties 
encountered by a previous study (Mellor 1989), which suggested that the 
contemporary practice of Buddhism is a translation of an eastern religious form into 
an individualistic, western Protestant style of religiosity. That study carried the 
implication that contemporary western Buddhists misperceived their own practice of 
Buddhism, in a way that paid too much attention to the importance of the individual 
and to the notion of essential Buddhist ideas. The salient problem discussed by 
Mellor is whether the guest discourse is compromised subliminally by translation into 
the host discourse, and the thrust of his argument is correct, for the fashioning of a 
contextual (although not necessarily Protestant or individualistic) form of Buddhism 
is an inevitable hermeneutic event (Pye 1969: 236), and as such represents a creative 
rather than a repetitive expression of tradition. The methodologically-objective 
stance of Mellor's interpretation, and the interpretation itself, was famously resented 
by one of his interviewees (Sangharakshita 1992). 
71 have relied upon the dictionaries of MacDonnell (1929) Nydpatiloka (1980), and 
Keown (2003). 
' Yudkin deprecates Quine's 'passion for exactness', on the grounds that 'any 
translation is only as good as the translator's understanding' (1979: 93-95). 
9 The importance of the principle of charity in comparative religious studies is noted 
by Payne (2004: 196-197 n. 5) 
10 See Mellor (2004) for strong criticism of Said's thesis. 
11 Jaynes' (1976) argument that integrated consciousness is a post-Homeric invention 
is hypothetical and controversial. I prefer the view that the 'preoccupations of 
contemporary human beings with autonomy, self-development and conscious 
intentionality' are already in place in the Indian city-states at the time of the Buddha 
(Crook 1980: 275-276). 
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Chapter 3 
Brain Structure and Function 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the basic neuroscience that informs 
both the 'standard' view of mind-brain identity, and the more conservative 
philosophical view of mind-brain supervenience. Such an overview is necessary for 
without some appreciation of brain complexity it is counter-intuitive to imagine that a 
corrugated lump of flesh could correlate to the conscious functions that are norinally 
ascribed to the mind. 
Since the discovery of neuronal architecture by Golgi and synaptic connectivity 
by Ramon y Cajal in the 1880s (Mazzarello 1999: 220-226, Ramon y Cajal 1995: 
xxiii-xxv), it has become increasingly evident that the brain controls the body and 
responds to the world, using an evolved structure that reflects the entire history of 
embodied animal being and doing. As a minor branch of its investigative activity 
neuroscience establishes correlations between, on one hand, first-person reports and 
third-person behavioural observations of mental events, and on the other hand, the 
structural organisation and electro-chemical activity of the cells that constitute the 
brain. It is then a matter of conjecture, as to whether such correlations demonstrate 
an identity or a supervenience-relation between mind and brain. Theories explaining 
how the organisation of brain activity might lead to the emergence of consciousness 
are undergoing development, rather than nearing completion, but are supported by 
accumulating evidence. Contributions to the field by Damasio, Panksepp, Llinas and 
Crick are examined here. I 
Basic consciousness does not originate in 'top-down', rational forms of cognition, 
but in 'bottom-up' processes in evolutionarily ancient parts of the brain, as a response 
to variations in body/environment homeostasis. The purpose of consciousness is the 
generation of anticipatory prediction, enabling rapid responses to complex scenarios 
that tend to destabilise homeostatic balance. Consciousness depends upon pathways 
to and from the brainstem and the sensorimotor cortex via the thalamus, and also 
upon limbic cortical forebrain structures responsible for the emotional mediation of 
cognition and action. The organisation of emotional and cognitive pathways is 
developmental as well as ontogenetic, and may therefore be capable of some 
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psychological modification (Damasio 1995, Panksepp 1998, Lazar 2005). Detailed or 
'extended' forms of consciousness are a global property of the brain (Damasio 1999), 
but the neural correlates that globally disseminate, functionally integrate and 
temporally bind the information that appears in or as consciousness, have not hitherto 
been located (N6e and Thompson 2004), although Crick and Koch (2005) have 
recently argued that the claustrum is the most likely anatomical candidate. Further 
research is required to test their theory. 
Neuron structure and function 
The brain and spinal cord (the central nervous system) is a system of specialised 
cells called neurons. The human central nervous system comprises billions of neurons, 
conditioned and chemically maintained by their surrounding environment. There are 
approximately thirty billion neurons, with an estimated 1013 synaptic connections, 
with most neurons maintaining connections to thousands of other neurons (Martini 
1998: 409, Panksepp 1998: 74). The sum of all possible variations in brain 
connectivity may exceed the number of atoms in the universe, and 'any comparison 
between the nervous system and a computer is misleading, because even the most 
sophisticated computer lacks the versatility and adaptability of a single neuron' 
(Martini 1998: 368). 
The most common neurons are multipolar cells, having two types of extension: 
dendrites and axons. Each multipolar neuron has several multiply-branching 
dendrites, which are contacted and electro-chemically influenced by the axons of 
other neurons. Each neuron has one axon, which transports chemicals synthesized in 
the cell body, and is able to contact and influence other neurons via collateral 
branches from the main axon and the multiple synapses or terminuses at the end of 
the main and collateral branches, which locate at, but do not fuse to the dendrites and 
bodies of other cells (Martini 1998: 370-373). 
When chemical ion imbalances across the cellular membranes of neurons reach 
critical levels or threshold potentials, they cause the neuron to depolarize or 'fire', 
allowing waves of electrical activity known as action potentials to travel rapidly 
along axons. At the synapse (the terminus) of axons, the arrival of the electrical 
charge causes a release of chemicals (neurotransmitters), which cross the synaptic gap 
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to influence the target neurons (Martini 1998: 388,402-405). Depending upon the 
particular neurotransmitter released and its interaction with hormones and other 
neurotransmitters in the local environment of the synapse (Thagard 2002,434), the 
electro-chemical state of the receiving neuron will be inhibited or reinforced. These 
individual events combine to propagate or suppress activity throughout the neural 
networks that constitute the brain. 
As well as being the initiating cause of electro-chemical transmission across the 
synapses between neurons, action potentials are peaks in rhythmic oscillations of 
electrical potentials within neurons. The oscillations in groups of associated neurons 
can achieve synchronicity with each other, creating a local 'field potential'; this 
temporal integration of action potentials across particular fields of neurons has been 
associated with particular mental events (Gray, et. al. 1989, Crick 1994: 243-245). 
Neurons in the human nervous system are functionally categorised as afferent, 
efferent of associative. The afferent neurons deliver signals from the peripheral 
nervous system and the bodily senses, while the efferent neurons send signals to 
initiate and modulate the motor activity of the body (Martini 1998: 369). The 
associative 'intemeurons', which are in the majority, are engaged in the spinal cord's 
rapid processing of sensorimotor reflexes, and in the brain's multiple connectivity, 
delay and feedback processes, which mediate between sensory input and motor 
output. In the main, it is interneuronal connection and interaction that is considered 
to achieve sufficient complexity to give rise to consciousness (Martini 1998: 375), for 
'these neurons are where we think' (Llinas 2001: 8 1). 
Neurons can become more or less liable to 'fire' and can lose or grow 
connections in response to frequency of excitation or inhibition; in consequence the 
healthy brain exhibits plasticity and adaptability in response to changing functional 
requirements (Hebb 1949: 69). Local interconnectivity can enable some parts of the 
brain to replicate the role of other parts in the event of trauma, but the scope of this 
adaptive plasticity has limits. Firstly, the brain's anatomical structure, although 
widely interconnected, is organised into parts that have specific functions, which are 
delineated by their connections to specific sensory and motor pathways. Secondly, 
adaptation is eventually overwhelmed by age-related degradation, as blood flow 
reduces, as abnormal deposits occur inside and outside neurons, as dendritic branches 
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and synaptic connections decrease, as neurotransmitter production declines, and as 
the total number of neurons markedly declines (Martini 1998: 509). 
Anatomical structure and function 2 
The anatomy of the sentient brain is organised hierarchically in a manner that is 
indicative of evolutionary origins, as earlier versions became augmented in order to 
enable and control more complex physical capacities and activities (MacLean 1989). 
In humans as in other animals, some rapid sensorimotor reflexes are initiated at the 
spinal cord before signals have time to reach the brain. Above the spinal cord, the 
brain has been theoretically differentiated three evolutionary parts (MacLean 1989). 
Firstly, the brainstem and the 'striatal complex' of associated nuclei at the base of the 
brain are of ancient 'reptilian' origin; they are involved in motor control and routine 
behaviour (MacLean 1989: 35,62,161-2,167,189). Secondly, the 
'-paleomammalian' brain, incorporating the reptilian brainstern but with the additional 
development of most of the limbic system, is involved in self-realisation and self- 
preservation, food seeking, procreation, maternal instinct and play, initiates some 
reflex responses, modulates the experience of emotion (affect) and its expression, and 
facilitates short-term memory (Maclean 1989: 325,410,465,514-516). 3 Thirdly, the 
more recently-evolved 'neo-mammalian' forebrain includes some parts of the limbic 
system, but most notably consists of the twin cerebral hemispheres, which are 
particularly involved in complex sensorimotor information processing and cognitive 
activity, including empathy, creativity, prediction and linguistic capability (MacLean 
1989: 531-534,552). These evolutionarily-differentiated areas of the brain operate as 
a unified whole, for functional groups of neurons situated in discrete parts of each of 
these divisions are interconnected, via their axons, with neuronal groups in other parts. 
Figure I- Medial view of brain 
cerebellum 
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Figure 2- Lateral view of brain 
sensonmotor cortex 
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Figure 3- Medial view of brain 
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Figure 4- medial view of right hemisphere showing limbic cortex (shaded area), 
brainstern removed. 
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Figure 5- Coronal section through cerebral hemispheres 
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In comparison to other animals, the two hemispheres of the cerebral cortex are 
greatly enlarged in humans. It might be assumed that these structures are solely 
responsible for the development of consciousness, yet the explanation of 
consciousness presented by contemporary neuroscience is not a 'top-down' model 
focussed on the complex cognitive abilities of the cerebral cortices, but a 'bottom-up' 
theory based on the regulation of bodily homeostasis by the brainstem. 
... emotion, feeling, and consciousness - depend for their execution on 
the representations of the organism. Their shared essence is the body 
(Damasio 1999: 289). 
Although consciousness is a unified experience, it is integrated from many parts: 
thought, types of recall to memory, attention, self-awareness, feeling, emotion, and so 
forth. Many parts of the brain may be involved in the production of consciousness, 
but trauma to the reticular formation, which runs through the core of the brainstem up 
to the midbrain , is 
known to cause loss of consciousness. Damasio hypothesizes that 
ascending pathways from reticular nuclei not only inhibit and activate consciousness, 
but that other nuclei in the brainstem have a vital role to play in the constitution of 
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consciousness by modulating the activity of interconnected neuronal processes 
occurring in the thalamus, hypothalamus, basal ganglia and somato-sensory cortex 
(Damasio 1999: 149-156). The reticular formation and the brainstem Perform these 
functions by passing on basic sensory information about bodily states, which enables 
the cerebral regions to continuously map 'neural patterns' of the organism, so 
constituting a 'proto-self. In turn, this proto-self is continuously affected by 
information from other nuclei in the brainstem about 'objects' that affect the state of 
the organism (Damasio 1999: 159-161, Parvici and Damasio 2001: 37-38). The 
interaction of the pattern related to the organism state and the pattern related to 
influences on that state results in another neural pattern, a 'second-order map' of the 
organism-object relationship. Like the 'first-order' map of the 'proto-self, this 
second-order map becomes an act of 'core-consciousness' in the form of a 'non- 
verbal image'. 
... the essence of consciousness is a continuously generated 
image of 
the act of knowing relative to the mental image of the object to be 
known. The image of knowing is accompanied by an enhancement of 
the images of the object. And because the image of knowing 
originates in neural structures fundamentally associated with the 
representation of bodily states, the image of knowing is a feeling. 
In its normal and optimal operation, core-consciousness is the 
process of achieving an all-encompassing imagetic pattern which 
brings together the pattern for the object, the pattern for the organism, 
and the pattern for the relationship between the two ... the 
functions 
hypothesized here are not located in one brain region or set of regions, 
but are, rather, a product of the interaction of neural and chemical 
signals among a set of regions (Parvizi & Damasio 2001: 139-140). 
There are three main elements to Damasio's hypothesis. Firstly, the creation of 
consciousness is an event which requires cooperation between the brainstem, the 
thalamus and other basal parts of the forebrain, and the sensorimotor regions of the 
cerebral cortex. Secondly, occurrence of consciousness begins with generalised 
awareness of the state of the body, and an awareness of effects on the body by 
external 'objects Thirdly, consciousness is not just a result of higher-level, 
neocortical processes. In this scheme, the neural patterning of awareness of the body 
constitutes the 'proto-self, and the combination of that pattern with object-relation 
neural patterns constitutes 'core-consciousness'. It is on the basis of this awareness 
of bodily (somatic) feeling that consciousness is enriched by emotion through the 
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mediation of limbic structures, and enriched by cognitive manipulatlon of sensory 
information and logico-linguistic capability through the operation of neo-cortical 
structures. This cognitive enrichment constitutes human 'extended consciousnesses', 
which utilises enhanced powers of recall from memory to constitute an 
autobiographical self. Damasio's theory is a 'bottom-up' characterisation of the 
arising of consciousness, which emphasises the necessary role of the brainstem as 
conveyor of the bodily bases of feeling. 
Panksepp's explanation of the arising of self-consciousness is broadly in 
agreement with Damasio's, but places more stress on the motivating and modulating 
role of emotion. Instead of the 'proto-self, Panksepp refers to the 'SELF' as the 
'Simple Ego-type Life-Form'. This simple form of self depends on primordial sub- 
cortical neural circuitry, which '... "bind[s]" many other brain processes' and 
constitutes 'the mother of all higher forms of consciousness' (Panksepp 1998: 311, 
308). While not denying the relevance of sensorimotor connections between the 
thalamus and the neocortex, Panksepp is interested in the enrichment of these 
connections via input from forebrain and limbic nuclei responsible for the motivation 
and expression of feeling and emotion. Like Damasio, Panksepp's approach to 
consciousness is 'bottom-up', reversing the emphasis of 'top-down' theories that 
portray emotion as arising either cognitively, out of conscious awareness of changes 
in the body subsequent to the initiation of reactive behaviour, or socially, out of 
external imitative learning of emotional behaviours (Panksepp 1998: 56). None of 
these theories are exclusive, for sufficient feedback mechanisms occur in the human 
brain to provide each with some support (Panksepp 1998: 44-45), but the bottom-up 
neuro-scientific approach provides greater insight into the evolution of consciousness. 
Neuroscience identifies a functional role for emotion in the neurological processes 
occurring prior to further emotional interaction in response to cognitive processes, 
and prior to the learning of socially appropriate responses. 
Overpowering emotions tend to be categorised according to the feelings invoked, 
but these feelings are conscious expressions of the underlying functional role of 
emotion in the motivation of basic behaviours. Panksepp identifies 'seeking', 'rage', 
'fear' and 'panic' as the basic emotional repertoire in all mammals, including humans. 
Seeking is a reward reinforcement system, rage is a response to frustration, fear and 
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panic assist in avoidance of pain and threat to life, and also initiate signals of distress 
to the social group. At some time in mammalian evolution motivations also 
developed of lust, sorrow, care for others, and an impetus to play (Panksepp 1998: 
52-54). 
Neurotransmitter interaction is as important as functional anatomy to the 
modulation of emotions (Thagard 2002: 429-446), but is too specialised a topic for 
brief description here. Motivational seeking systems are complex, dependent upon 
arousal-based 'doparnine circuits arising from the midbrain nuclei', and the 
reinforcement of 'consummatory behaviours', mediated by circuits passing through 
the lateral hypothalamus (Panksepp 1998: 144-146). Rage circuits pass through the 
amygdala and the hypothalamus. Fear and panic systems relate to areas in the 
brainstem associated with pain responses, but have differentiated during evolution to 
include limbic areas also involved in sexuality and matemal instinct. The anatomy of 
social bonding and sexuality is complicated by structural differences between male 
and female brains, but again nuclei in the hypothalamus are involved (Panksepp 1998: 
236). Rough play, which is predominately somato-sensory, involves the thalamus 
and the somato-sensory cortex more than do other emotional urges, but also involves 
the hippocampus and associated nuclei (Panksepp 1998: 29 1). In sum, many areas of 
the brainstem, midbrain and limbic system are activated during heightened emotion 
(Panksepp 1998: 291), but with the particular involvement of the amygdala and the 
hypothalamus in the limbic system and the peri-aqueductal gray (PAG) in the 
brainstem (Panksepp 1998: 144,195,208). The PAG receives emotional inputs from 
the limbic system and inputs from the bodily viscera, and is located close to the 
reticular formation. That Damasio should stress the reticular formation, while 
Panksepp refers to the PAG, does not constitute a significant difference in their 
theories of consciousness, for many of the brainstem regions close to the reticular 
formation are cooperative in homeostatic monitoring (Parvizi and Damasio (2001: 
137,151-153). Parvici and Damasio have reassessed the anatomy of the 'centro- 
medial' brainstem, and conclude that all the anatomical I y-di fferentiated nuclei therein 
play a role in the generation of the 'proto-self (Parvizi and Damasio 2001: 147-153). 
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The remarkable overlap of brainstem functions revealed by Parvici and Damasio 
might be a fortuitous combination of anatomical units, or might indicate a useful 
anatomical and functional integration engendered by evolution. In fact, these 
functions - wakefulness, basic attention, and emotion - are interrelated and all aim, in 
one way or another, at achieving homeostatic balance (Parvizi and Damasio 200 1: 
152). 
To summarise, consciousness does not begin with thought but with feeling, as a 
prototypical awareness of self constituted from variations in feeling tone produced by 
approximation to bodily homeostasis. Core consciousness becomes extended and 
enriched in the course of evolution by emotionally driven action responses and by 
increases in the cognitive complexity required to co-ordinate complex behaviours. 
Qualities of consciousness 
To locate the origins of the sense of self in awareness of bodily sensory 
information relayed from nuclei in the brainstem does not amount to a full 
explanation of the processes underlying consciousness. In particular, Parvizi and 
Damasio's explanation that in the mechanism of 'core consciousness' the 
`-continuously generated image of knowing ... is a 
feeling', stands in need of 
justification as to why knowledge of information should need to take a conscious 
qualitative form. Llinas (2001) attempts to answer that question. He rejects the 
contention that the phenomenal 'qualia' of subjective conscious experience are of 
comparatively recent origin, or that consciousness is an emergent accident that is 
pointlessly epiphenomenal, and only properly a matter for psychological and 
philosophical inquiry (Llinas 2001: 201-202). 4 
On the contrary, he explicitly adopts the mindibrain identity view that 'neuronal 
activity and sensation are one and the same event' (2001: 218). He therefore 
embraces the implication that qualia must be an 'intrinsic aspect' of the brain: 
... qualia are 
functional electrobiological events supported by 
particular sets of neuronal circuits and related to the activation of some 
neurons and the silence of others within a network (Llinas 2001: 2 10). 
Qualia facilitate the operation of the nervous system by providing 
well-defined networks, the simplifying patterns that implement and 
increase the speed of decision and allow such decisions to re-enter (the 
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system) and become part of the landscape of perception (Llinas 2001: 
221). 
Llinas bases his theorising on an evolutionary perspective, which envisages 
neuronal systems evolving to enable multi-cellular creatures to coordinate the 
'irritability' and 'motricity' (mobility) of individual cells (Llinas 2001: 58-59,212). 
In the course of single to multi-cellular evolution, creatures handed over the control 
of motricity from individual cells to specialist nerve cells, which developed 
specialised sensory sensitivity to the 'universal' properties of the world, and ability to 
coordinate reflex responses to harmful or beneficial events (Llinas 2001: 60-64). 
Despite the importance of the reflex response, Llinas argues that complex 
nervous systems developed for predictive, not reflexive purposes, for otherwise such 
systems would be incapable of responding to scenarios with sufficient speed to ensure 
survival (Llinas 2001: 21-29). Complex brains respond to sensory information with 
motor commands that must be fine-tuned to real-time changes in circumstances 
(Llinas 2001: 26). In many situations of defence and attack, decisions made by the 
brain could prove fruitless, as motor signals to muscles would be too slow to ensure 
survival or success (Llinas 2001: 24). The brain therefore gains time by predicting 
events, and having at its disposal a reflexive repertoire of prior planning, a 'reality 
emulator' in order to expedite response by simplifying processes of assessment 
(Llinas 2001: 39). Damasio's 'extended consciousness' is for Llinas the self as the 
(centralization of prediction'; at its disposal are a suite of reflexive assessments of 
reality, expressed in 'premotor' emotional patterns which release a suite of motor 
responses, which Llinas calls 'fixed action patterns', or 'FAPs' (Llinas 2001: 134). 
Llinas's view does not diverge from Damasio and Panksepp with regard to the 
anatomical causes of consciousness, but his fixed-emotion-initiating-fixed-action 
account provides a functional explanation of the emotional mediation of the activity 
of the main sensorimotor pathways. Emotions are pre-determined 'neurobiological a 
priori' (Llinas 2001: 58), which speed the selection and initiation of FAPs. Emotions 
arise in response to sensory input, mainly in the cingulate cortex and hippocampus, in 
the amygdala, and under the control of the hypothalamus. Emotions trigger FAPs via 
connections between the hypothalamus and the basal ganglia. The basal ganglia 
maintain FAPs in a state of inhibition, awaiting immediate release into the thalamo- 
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cortical system in response to emotions, and in synchronicity with hypothalamic- 
induced endocrine alterations to bodily preparedness for action (Llinas 2001: 155- 
164). 
Qualitative emotional feelings are the conscious expression of the unconscious 
simplification and initiation of fixed motor responses to sensory input. 5 Feelings are 
events 'intrinsic' to nervous systems, usually occurring after sensory initiation, but 
also occurring without direct external cause. An exemplary case is long-term 
physical and psychological pain, for both of these sensations are typically generated 
in the cingulate cortex, and it is possible for both sorts of pain to be felt without any 
direct causal event at a bodily location (Llinas 2001: 159). Llinas' argues that 
sensations are intrinsic, demonstrably isolable from peripheral bodily causes, and 
capable of separate occurrence in dreams, for 'the sensations we feel during the 
course of a dream are a complete fabulation on the part of our brain' (Llinas 2001: 
160). Thus, while FAPs are momentary neuronal initiations of external motor events, 
their initiating emotions are entirely intrinsic to the brain, but are consciously sensed 
during the self-monitoring of bodily homeostasis. 6 
In sum, in broad agreement with Damasio and Panksepp, Llinas suggests that 
fully developed consciousness arises from the 'radial communication' of the thalamo- 
cortical system to the cerebral hemispheres (Llinas 2001: 126), but adds the 
interpretation that the function of consciousness is to provide predictions that are 
necessary for rapid choice amongst a plethora of possibilities: 
Given the complexity of the decisions and the speed at which the 
nervous system must implement a given global strategy, the only 
solution that will work is one in which the animal is conscious of the 
particular emotional state. Why? Because consciousness has the great 
ability to focus - this is why consciousness is necessary. It is 
necessary because it underlies our ability to choose (Llinas 2001: 168). 
Emotional pathways facilitate rapid comparison between external sensorimotor 
information and the internal state of the organism, choice amongst a FAPs and fine- 
tuning to circumstances. Llinas thinks that the expression of emotions as feelings, 
that is, as components of qualia, is functionally purposive and is the origin of 
consciousness, which focusses attention on matters vital to assessment and prediction. 
Llinas argues that the neuronal bases of qualia are functional groups of neurons 
oscillating together. Qualia are evanescent, systematic, cooperative communications 
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between certain groups of neurons. Studies during brain operations (Penfield 1950: 
6-75 157-159) have established that such groups can be inhibited or activated by 
direct electrical stimulus to the neo-cortex. Such group communications can be 
anaesthetized (Llinas 2001: 204); they cease during deep sleep but they re-occur in 
dreaming during REM (rapid-eye-movement) sleep, and upon awakening (Llinas 
2001: 218). Llinas identifies qualia with the frequency of oscillatory firing of 
neurons. During deep sleep, the brain as a whole electrically oscillates at . 5-4Hz 
(Llinas 2001: 207), but in waking, neurons in the visual neocortex oscillate at around 
40hz, and propagate the synchronicity of this frequency between nuclei in disparate 
regions (Gray et al 1989: 334-337, Crick 1994: 243-246, Llinas 2001: 122). Such 
simultaneity over distance is apparently enabled by a capacity for the speed of 
transmission of electrical signals along axons to be fine-tuned to accommodate delay 
along cognitive pathways (Pribram 1999: 22,27). 7 
Other functional neuronal systems have different frequencies. In particular, the 
inferior oliviary nucleus in the brainstem oscillates at 6-12 Hz, and imparts this 
frequency to the cerebellum, which co-ordinates movement and fine motor control. 
This frequency appears externally as the 'physiological tremor' of muscles at rest 
(Llinas 2001: 48). If such a tremor were not present the brain would be defeated by 
the task of integrating and controlling muscle activity. Only by simplifying the task 
into a discontinuous sequence of commands, synchronised to the physiological tremor, 
does the combination of conscious and unconscious fine control of multi-muscular 
limbs become possible; Llinas hypothesises that this requirement to control motor 
timing by oscillatory tuning 'gave birth to the generation and nature of the mind' 
(2001: 50). 
Llinas argues 1) that functional neuronal group simultaneity adds an intrinsic 
temporal dimension to the internal mapping of the external world. 2) That despite 
sensory input and motor output, spatio-temporal neuronal integration forms a closed 
system. 3) That 'global temporal mapping' generates cognition. 4) That the 
thalamo-cortical system conducts the generation of 'dynamic oscillatory states' in 
response to sensory stimuli: 
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The thalamo-cortical system is a close to isochronic sphere that 
synchronously relates the sensory-referred properties of the external 
world to internally generated motivations and memories. This 
temporally coherent event that binds, in the time domain, thefractured 
components of external and internal reality into a single construct is 
what we call the "seýr'(Llinas 2001: 126, his italics). 
Llinas, Panksepp and Damasio agree on the 'bottom-up' approach to 
understanding consciousness and on role of emotion in modulating the generation of 
a thalamo-cortical self, which has its foundation in the sensorimotor integrating 
functions of the brainstem. Llinas adds an oscillatory-synchrony theory of 
consciousness and conscious qualia, and embeds that theory in evolutionary processes 
that have facilitated the development of an intrinsically closed system that emulates 
'universal' features of the external world. Conscious qualia, in his account, are 
necessary simplifications of sensorimotor information, which, like fixed action 
patterns (FAPs), are intrinsic and vital to effective brain function. This is because, in 
a welter of information and possibility, qualia organise and reduce the available input 
options, enabling swift prediction and so making survival possible. 
Emotional controls 
Llinas notes that emotions trigger fixed action patterns, and that the feeling-tone 
of emotions in sensory qualia helps to give rise to consciousness, but does not explain 
how emotional pathways can influence the cognitive detailing of conscious events. 
Panksepp notes that emotion and cognition are two different systems in the brain, 
which enrich the basic sensorimotor responses of the 'SELF'. As a gross 
simplification, the emotional system is limbic and the cognitive system is neocortical, 
and 'the goal of cognitive processes is to provide more subtle solutions to problems 
posed by states of emotional arousal' (Panksepp 1998: 318-319), yet the subtlety of 
cognitive processes seems to be no match for the ability of emotional systems to exert 
diffuse control over all brain and bodily systems: 
... one can ask whether the 
downward cognitive controls or the upward 
emotional controls are stronger. If one looks at the question 
anatomically and neurochemically, the evidence seems overwhelming. 
The upward controls are more abundant and electrophysiologically 
more insistent; hence, one would expect them to prevail if push comes 
to shove (Panksepp 1998: 319). 
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It might seem that the two systems work in opposition, if heightened emotion is 
capable of prevailing over more reasoned cognition. In his 'somatic marker 
hypothesis', Damasio (1995) argues that this is not normally the case. Although 
emotional arousal can overwhelm cognition, emotional pathways normally operate 
interactively with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in order to constrain complicated 
cognition to a reduced set of logical either-or option judgements, so speeding up 
decision-making and enhancing survival prospects (1995: 1415-1416). Damasio 
deduces, on the basis of observations that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex leads to impaired experience of feelings, expression of emotions, and decision- 
making ability, that cognition and emotion are interactive at this location (1995: 
1414). The range of cognitive choice in the face of complex external and social 
scenarios is constrained to dualistic decisions between good (appetitive or attractive) 
or bad (repulsive) by means of a somatic marker - an affective or bodily state - 
associated with similar past situations. The job of the prefrontal cortex is therefore 
associative and dispositional; it associates a new situation with memories of previous 
instances, and on the basis of that memory is disposed to initiate a somatic marker in 
the form of a real state of the body, or a 'vicarious' or 'as if state (Damasio 1995: 
1414). The somatic marker initiation is, therefore, an actual reactivation or an 
approximate reconstruction of a previous set of emotional linkages between the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the amygdala and the insula (Damasio 1995: 1415). 
If a real affective body state is initiated, the result may be sufficient to appear in 
consciousness with enough force to override cognitive decision processes. An 'as if 
body state may or may not appear in consciousness; either way, it will function to 
constrain the alternatives presented for cognitive decision-making. 
Damasio's hypothesis has considerable explanatory scope. Firstly, it explains 
that emotional control functions to minimise cognitive delay by constraining choice. 
Secondly, it identifies one instance (there may be more) of the interactive 
organisation of top-down cognitive and bottom-up somatic or body-state information. 
Thirdly, it explains the use of 'as if recall of past situations in the generation of 
predictive decision-making. Fourthly, because of the involvement of memory, 
Damasio's hypothesis identifies cognitive and emotional processes that are not just 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic, but are developmentally aquired over the lifetime of 
76 
the individual, and may therefore be amenable to educational modification by psycho- 
therapeutic techniques. Panksepp notes that emotional episodes linked to appraisal of 
learning converge on the amygdala (1998: 317), which Damasio implicates in his 
hypothesis (1995: 1415). This developmental cooperation between emotion and 
cognition may turn out to include other structures associated with the ventromedial 
area of the prefrontal cortex, and associated with the amygdala in the limbic system, 
for Lazar et al (2005) have observed increased cortical thickness in the prefrontal area 
and in the right anterior insula, in a study of practitioners of insight meditation 
(vipas'yana). 
It has been hypothesized that by becoming increasingly more aware of 
sensory stimuli during formal practice, the meditation practitioner is 
gradually able to use this self-awareness to more successfully navigate 
through potentially stressful encounters that arise throughout the day. 
This eastern philosophy of emotion dovetails with Damasio's theory 
that connections between sensory cortices and emotion cortices play a 
crucial role in processing of salient material and adaptive decision 
making (Lazar et al 2005: 1896) 
Lazar et al observed alterations to the cortical anatomy of meditators who have 
practiced on average for no more than ten years and for no more than six hours per 
week. Their findings support Darnasio's hypothesis, show 'cortical plasticity' as a 
result of psycho-educational practices over time, and observe cortical thickening 
when cortical thinning is expected as a result of age-related degeneration (Lazar et al 
2005: 1895). Although these findings are statistically significant, they represent 
infori-nation from only 20 participants, and require further confirmation and further 
studies to determine the proximate causes, for increased cortical thickness and 
efficiency may be due to several factors, including 'greater arborisation per neuron, 
glial volume or increased regional vasculature' (Lazar et al 2005: 1895). 
Neural correlates of consciousness 
There has been much discussion of the implications of research into the temporal 
binding of distant neuronal groups by oscillatory synchrony (Click 1994, Llinas 2001, 
Engels 2003). One criticism is that the temporal binding of neural synchrony may be 
a necessary but not sufficient cause of consciousness (Engel 2003: 137,146-147), 
another is that postulating the cause of consciousness in third-person scientific terrns 
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does not close the philosophical 'explanatory gap': it is not yet an explanation of the 
inherently private, first-person, subjective experience of 'what it is like' to be 
conscious (Nagel 1974, McGinn 1989, Levine 1997). 
The first criticism, acceptance of necessity but doubt about sufficiency, has force. 
Synchrony alone cannot produce consciousness without the 'bottom-up' functional 
brain organisation described by Damasio and Panksepp. It appears that there must be 
both mode of operation and dedicated functional structure. Llinas' speculative 
intuition, that where there is temporal binding by neuronal synchrony there are likely 
to be rudimentary qualia, is not supported by his own evolutionary example. The 
subcortical synchronicity between the inferior oliviary nucleus and the cerebellum 
only contributes qualia to consciousness when it is externally expressed and 
externally sensed as the physiological tremor in a muscular system (Linas 2001: 29- 
35,42-51). It is counter-intuitive to imagine that qualia could become conscious 
events before the evolution of a thalamocortical 'proto-self capable of initiating 
'wakefulness, basic attention and emotion'. 8 
The second criticism, the explanatory gap, refers to the existential block on direct 
experimental access to consciousness. For the believer in mind-brain identity this 
block is just a duality of access (Dempsey 2004: 234-240), which is not scientifically 
significant given the observation that some of the contents of consciousness can be 
manipulated by stimulation experiments (Penfield 1950), so demonstrating 
correlation between parts of consciousness and their neural substrate. Against that 
view, Me & Thompson argue that precise 'neural correlates of consciousness' 
(NCCs) cannot be found (2004). They dictate that neural correlation requires an 
isomorphic, one-to-one match between the content of a conscious experience and its 
neural correlate: this is their 'matching content doctrine'. They further dictate that 
neural correlation implies that a perceptual input must have a neural substrate, which 
is sufficient in itself to give rise to the phenomenal experience: this is their 'minimum 
substrate thesis. " Asserting that there are 'no known examples of the right sort of 
content match', they argue that the matching content doctrine and the minimum 
substrate thesis cannot be fulfilled, and they further argue that the idea of NCCs 
depends on an 'intemalist' view of the mind that is now philosophically challenged. 
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It is not clear that neural correlation of content must depend upon isomorphic 
one-to-one matching between a percept and the 'receptive field' of one particular 
group of neurons. Baynes suggests that while perception has content, the receptive 
field of any one group of relevant neurons is a vehicle, so the isomorphism demand is 
inapplicable (2004: 32-37). Against Baynes, the content/vehicle distinction is itself 
inapplicable if Llinas is correct in asserting that 'qualia are simplified constructs on 
the part of the intrinsic properties of the neuronal circuits of our brains' (Llinas 2001: 
222). If consciousness depends on a multiplicity of feedback systems it would be 
naYve to expect a particular consciousness to be isomorphic with the activity of a 
localised group of neurons, and nalve to expect a specifically isolable neural correlate 
or a specifically isolable conscious quale. It is not that NCCs do not exist, but that 
they may not exist at discrete locations with respect to discrete percepts. 9 It is in this 
regard that Llinas cryptically suggests that the doubly-disjunctive world-percept-brain 
correlation is not isomorphic, but homomorphic (2001: 65). Homomorphism means 
'resemblance of form, without structural affinity' (OED). Llinas's point appears to 
be that although there is correspondence between the world and its neuronal 
representation, groups of neurons are implicated in many different spatial and 
temporal 'coordinate system reference frames' (2001: 64-67), which thereby conceal 
the isomorphism that underlies correspondence. Homomorphic processes are 
therefore analogous to encryption. 10 
I interpret Llinas to mean that sensory signals are highly amended by 'top- 
down' cognitive systems before they reach the 'global workspace' of the neocortex 
(Dahearne and Naccache 2001: 26-29), where many of the experimental correlations 
between experience and neuronal activity have so far been observed. It would appear 
that current qualia are constituted as much by feedback operations of stereotypical 
fixed actions, emotions, and past qualia, as they are from the initiating information 
from the senses. The sensed properties of the world are extensively modulated and 
transformed, as they are encoded to spatially, temporally and functionally separate 
sites in the neocortex (Varela Thompson and Rosch 1991: 93-98). Once infori-nation 
from all the senses is combined, processed and synch-ronised into the emotionally- 
mediated qualia of consciousness, explicit isomorphism may be rendered 
undetectable in practice, having been homomorphically rearranged in the creation of 
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6 extended' consciousness as a global property of the whole neuronal system. It is by 
virtue of this global dispersal of interconnected feedback processes that, as Me & 
Thompson suggest, precise 'neural correlates of consciousness, ' have not been found. 
Notwithstanding Me & Thompson's strictures about 'matching content' and 
'minimum substrate', it can be argued that imprecise neural correlates of 
consciousness have been found for the genesis of consciousness in the monitoring of 
bodily homeostasis (Damasio 1999), and for gross alterations to aspects of 
consciousness, in clinical trauma and stimulation studies (Penfield 1950). What 
neuroscience has yet to identify are not precise correlates, which can be deferred for 
investigation after future improvements in real-time imaging techniques, but enabling 
mechanisms for the qualitative enrichment of experience that Damasio refers to as 
'extended consciousness'. These mechanisms are likely to be multiple 
interconnections between neuronal pathways, otherwise there could be no 
homomorphic dispersal of sensorimotor information, and no synchronous binding of 
disparate information into a unified consciousness that is capable of 'first-person' 
subjective appearances in the form of integrated successions of phenomenal events. 
Dehaene and Naccache argue that phenomenal consciousness depends on massive 
intemeuronal connectivity, creating a 'global neuronal workspace' (2001: 1,26). 
Crick and Koch characterise such a hypothetical connectivity as: 
... a 
large array of unconscious specialized processors running in 
parallel from a unified, limited capacity 'workspace' that allows the 
local processors to exchange information (Crick and Koch 2005: 2). 
Crick and Koch argue that the most likely anatomical structure responsible for 
such exchange and integration of consciousness is the claustrum, because of its 
overlapping connectivity to and from most cortical and many non-cortical regions: 
... the claustrum may contain specialized mechanisms 
that permit 
information to travel widely within its anterior-posterior and ventral- 
dorsal extent to synchronize different perceptual, cognitive and motor 
structures. This postulated intra-claustrum mixing of information 
would make it quite different from the thalamus, a subcortical 
structure that also enjoys widespread and reciprocal connections with 
most cortical regions, but that does not possess any obvious 
mechanism to directly link its various constitutive nuclei (Crick and 
Koch 2005: 6). 
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... the neuroanatomy of the claustrum 
is compatible with a global role 
in integrating information at the fast time-scale. This should be further 
experimentally investigated, in particular if this structure plays a key 
role in consciousness. What could be more important? So why wait? 
(Crick and Koch 2005: 7). 
The posthumous publication of Crick's hypothesis that the claustrum facilitates 
consciousness is his final contribution to the understanding of human biology. He 
indicates an area for future research, not just for neuronal correlations, but for 
necessary proximate causes of consciousness. 
Summary 
The brain has sufficient capacity to control and guide the course of embodiment 
in the world over a lifetime. Researchers referred to in this chapter have been 
selected because they all comment on the wider implications of basic neuroscientific 
research. They are interested in explaining consciousness by reference to associations 
between brain functioning and conscious events. They hypothesise that when a brain 
event becomes globally-available across the majority of the neuronal system it 
becomes 'overt', or 'minded' (Damasio 1995: 1414). Thus consciousness is a 
synonym for mind in neuroscientific discourse. These neuroscientists attempt to 
explain why consciousness has arisen, how qualia can model or represent the world, 
and how specific sensory, emotional and cognitive modalities become unified into 
conscious events fon-ning ongoing experience. There is agreement that consciousness 
originates in the requirement to maintain bodily homeostasis, and that the 
development of consciousness depends on the evolution of brainstem-thalamo- 
cortical pathways. Basic maintenance of bodily homeostasis is an unconscious 
process, but homeostasis could not be maintained over the orderly pursuance of life in 
an external world without the rapid predictive capacity provided by the conscious 
focussing of sensorimotor information. Possible neural mechanisms for the 
experiential integration of consciousness are now the object of active research 
investigation. 
Several issues emerge from this neuroscientific investigation of the origin of the 
self and of consciousness, which will be compared with other points of view in the 
course of the thesis: 
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I- Synchronised electro-chemical events along the neuronal structures of the central 
nervous system are sufficiently complex and functionally ordered to correlate with 
mental events. 
2. By virtue of its origin in synchronisation, consciousness is an inherently temporal 
process. 
3. Neural events form a 'closed' system. Sensations are intrinsic to that system. As a 
property of the system, pain is only representative of its proximate cause. 
4. Self-consciousness originates in the requirement to modulate bodily homeostasis in 
the presence of external destabilisation. The nervous system is, therefore, only 
4closed' with respect to mechanism, not with respect to function: self-consciousness 
is a response to embodiment under the influence of an external world. 
5. Basic self-consciousness is a middle-level event, that is to say, it arises as a result 
of the interrelation of incoming sensory and outgoing motor information along 
brainstem-thalamo-cortical pathways (Jackendoff 1987: 286-301, Crick 1994: 205- 
207). Self-consciousness is not an intrinsically 'higher-level' or 'top-down' property 
of the computational complexity of the neocortex. 
6. Extended consciousness is facilitated by the complex interconnectivity that allows 
infon-nation to be 'globalised' across neuronal ensembles throughout the brain. The 
most recent hypothesis, yet to be verified, is that the neccesary connective functions 
for extended consciousness are located in the claustrum. 
7. Consciousness functions to focus attention, whereupon its qualitative nature 
facilitates the rapid integration of many modes of representation, allowing the 
external world to be assessed for the purposes of rapid prediction and response. 
8. The assessment of conscious and unconscious cognitive information is controlled 
by 'somatic markers', which are either real activations or 'vicarious' 'as if 
reactivations of affective pathways in the limbic system. 
9. From the above points it can be inferred that human consciousness is a qualitative 
form of a functional property that is not uniquely human. Even for less complex 
brains, basic conscious feelings are likely to represent the presence of homeostatic 
options. The increasing qualitative differentiation of those representations 
corresponds to the increasing neocortical complexity in higher mammals (Crook 
1983). 
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10. The neuroscientific findings presented in this chapter reinvigorate the 
philosophical discussion of the nature of the self. In particular, there may be a 
parallel between Damasio's distinction between 'core' and 'extended' consciousness, 
and the distinction made by linguists between the 'subject' that attends to immediate 
experience and the 'self that is historically constituted (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 
262-280). 
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Notes to Chapter 3 
I Sources in this chapter are restricted to functional anatomy rather than to physiology, 
and to a selection from amongst neuroscientists who are interested in the nature of 
consciousness. In consequence, no information is presented about the sort of 
neurochernical imbalances that are implicated in mental illness, or about the internal 
and external chemistry of the cellular environment (Thagard 2002). 
For location of anatomical features see Figures 1-5 on pages 39-41. 
' Broca observed the 'limbic lobe' bordering the medial surface of the cerebral 
hemispheres in 1878. In 1937 Papez suggested that these structures formed circuits 
that were responsible for the expression of feeling and emotion. Maclean coined the 
term 'limbic system' in 1952 (Maclean 1989: 247,257) 
4 The philosophical term 'qualia' refers to the subjective qualities of conscious 
experience, rather than to the qualities of any other thing. Llinds suggests that even 
single nerve cells are capable of 'proto-qualia' (Llinas 2001: 28) and mistakenly cites 
Crook (1983) as asserting that only higher mammals have qualitative experience. In 
fact Crook, who is one of the interview participants in this thesis, largely restricts his 
discussion to the conceptual difficulties attending the attribution of consciousness to 
animals (Crook 1983: 11-14). There is disagreement about the levels of complexity 
of a biological system at which the property of consciousness emerges, to be 
explicated later in the thesis with the aid of notions of 'Empedoclean' and 
'Democritean' properties. It should be noted that qualia are theoretical constructs. 
Metzinger considers that qualia do not exist (2003: 69-86). They probably do not 
exist as quantifiable objects, but the term is useful for the description of dynamic 
combinations of phenomenal properties. 
5, Emotion' refers to conscious awareness of the autonomic effects generated by 
electro chemical events along certain functional interconnections. 
6 Emotions are intrinsic because they are expressions of a neurobiologically closed 
system. Llinas implies that, within biological closure, the interconnected activity of 
intemeurons forms another enclosure, distinct from the activity of afferent and 
efferent neurons that carry sensory and motor information with respect to the world 
(2001: 80-81). Varela Thompson and Rosch (1991), whose work is discussed later 
in the thesis, think that the totality of the central and peripheral nervous system marks 
the significant boundary of closure. I will be arguing, on the contrary, that although 
the neuronal system is biologically closed, it is not functionally or causally closed, for 
it forms part of a more encompassing, 'holistic' system of correspondence relations 
with the external world. 
7 Rapid neuronal events terminate before they can be sufficiently distributed 
throughout the brain to coordinate with awareness. For Pribram, conscious awareness 
is a monitoring process which works 'by inducing the delay in processing necessary 
for the signals in a circuit to engage extended parts of the synaptodendritic web' 
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(1999: 36). Thus, habit is rapid and unconscious whereas monitoring is delayed and 
conscious. 
8 Panksepp asserts that 'the indirect evidence seems overwhelming that other 
mammals do have basic forms of affective consciousness ... but they do not seem to be 
able to reflect upon such feelings as we do' (1998: 300-301). 
9 The hypothesis of a particular 'grandmother' neuron that fires in response to each 
particular percept is a nalve response to dynamic complexity. If neuronal systems 
work in parallel there may be no direct correlation between a neuron and a concept 
that identifies a percept, for any percept may be the result of relations between many 
neurons and many systems (Freeman 2003: 47-53). 
10 Pribram. makes a similar point to Llinas's homomorphism when he suggests that 
memories are 'encoded' in the hippocampus by hologaphic-like processes that are 
patterned in space and time, so allowing individual neurons to participate usefully in 
many different 'frames of reference' (Pribram 1999: 32-33). 
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Chapter 4 
The Interviews 
Introduction 
This chapter consists of summaries of interview testimony provided by ten 
Buddhists of British ethnic origin. The interviews were undertaken in order to gather 
a range, rather than a quantitatively representative sample, of contemporary Buddhist 
ideas about the nature of mind, with the intention of subjecting those ideas to 
hermeneutic, philosophical interpretation. The inclusion of opinions representative of 
all Buddhist organisations active in Britain was not the intention and turned out not to 
be a practical possibility because several organisations declined to nominate 
interview participants. There was therefore no necessity to check the process of 
qualitative information retrieval against statistics generated from questionnaires or 
structured participant observation. I have, however, been a participant observer of the 
British Buddhist scene for 15 years, and am not aware of any Buddhist views of the 
nature of mind that are neglected in the course of the interviews. 
The interviews are prefaced by some brief information about Buddhism in Britain 
and a review of some of the relevant literature, which serves to place the subsequent 
interview summaries in historical and geographical context, and to indicate some 
areas of academic contention. In the course of that review I note some caution 
amongst Buddhist practitioners about the utility of academic research, and agree with 
Morgan (1996) that the testimony of believers is an essential part of the overall 
picture generated by religious studies. I promote Pye's tripartite theory of the 
dynamics of religious change as a better alternative in the case of studies of British 
Buddhism to the more commonly used but rather static 'spectrum of adaptation' 
schema. Although Mellor (1998,1991) demonstrates that the colonial encounter 
Buddhism encouraged a Protestant form of British Buddhist religiosity, I note some 
flaws in the 'Protestant Buddhism' thesis, and contend that such monolithic 
comparative theories are no longer capable of encapsulating the diversity of 
contemporary Buddhism in Britain or elsewhere. I expand on Gombrich and 
Obeyesekere's remark that 'the integrity of the Sangha is conceived to rest not so 
much on its orthodoxy as on its orthopraxy'(1998: 446), to speculate that it will be 
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possible for a diversity of views about the nature of mind to co-exist in contemporary 
Buddhism. 
The participants and their interviews 
The schedule of interview questions was designed to explore opinions about the 
historicity of traditional views of the nature of mind, the current opportunities for 
dialogue within Buddhist organisations about the nature of mind, the impact of 
neuroscientific and psychological accounts of mind, and about the philosophy of 
mind. No evidence is retrieved from the interviews to suggest that a significant level 
of discussion is occurring in British Buddhist organisations about neuroscientific 
explanations of the nature of mind. The only evidence of substantive discussion 
found during the data collection for this thesis was a debate about mind in the journal 
of the Western Ch'an Fellowship (Lyne 2004), a transcript on the New Kadampa 
Tradition website, now deleted, of a formal debate on mind at their Pocklington 
retreat centre (Madhyamaka Centre and Gyatso n. d. ), and brief attention given to the 
issue by Sangharakshita (I 998a) in a review of Batchelor's Buddhism Without Beliefs 
(1997). 
The participants generally display a devotional attitude to tradition, and utilise 
tradition as a guiding resource in the acquisition of the transmissible craft skill of 
Buddhist practice, rather than treating tradition as a set of explanations amenable to 
historical and analytical critique. Tradition, therefore, is seen as requiring practical 
interpretation in daily life rather than cognitive reassessment on the basis of new 
information. There is some interest in the affinities and the differences between 
Buddhism and psychology, and two participants have investigated the relationship 
between Buddhism and evolutionary theory. These scientific interests do not extend 
to neuroscience, which is felt either to present 'bottom-up' explanation where 'top- 
down' cognitive explanation is more relevant, ' or to be a completely separate, 
empirical discourse, relatively unconnected to more meaningful discourses about 
social, ethical and soteriological practice. Attitudes to the western philosophy of 
mind are various, depending on interest and knowledge, but there is a marked 
preference for the use of traditional Buddhist terminology. When that tenninology is 
translated into western philosophical alternatives the participants could be 
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characterised as holding a range of opinions from realism to idealism. The meaning 
of key terms used in the interviews was not defined at the outset, to permit the 
emergence of meaning in the dialogue. The key term appearing in the dialogues is 
'mind' rather than 'consciousness', although the two are roughly synonymous. The 
participants use the term spontaneously, without prompting, but they are not 
necessarily referring to a particular reified 'thing'. They only rarely discuss 
unconscious mental functioning, but consider mind in sense of the primary 
(immediate) and secondary (remembered) awareness of conscious experience. They 
generally consider the subjective experience of awareness to be foundational for any 
other meaning for 'mind', and foundational for any conclusions based on observation, 
including scientific observation. They appear to be speaking in accordance with the 
common-sense view that the mind is qualitatively different from other phenomena, 
and the view that the difference is constituted by awareness itself: that mind seems to 
be some sort of 'vehicle' for phenomenal contents. 
The participants display facility in the terminology used by their respective 
Buddhist traditions to refer to the mind, and a natural facility with western 'folk' 
psychological terms, but they are not completely conversant with the neuroscientific 
evidence that is presented in this study. None of the participants, myself included, 
have a full understanding of the electro-chemical and anatomical details of neuronal 
functioning, but all have the general understanding that is expected of a well-educated 
and informed lay person in a modem society with multiple communication media. 
There is some unavoidable interpretation involved in the summarising of the 
interviews, but an attempt has been made to present responses to the most important 
issues discussed as quotations, and to restrict interpretative commentary to 
subsequent chapters. 
The interview participants, most of whom fulfil leadership roles or are senior 
members of Buddhist organisations, are as follows: Caroline Brazier, whose Buddhist 
name is Prasada, and David Brazier, whose Buddhist name is Dhan-navidya (Order of 
Amida Buddha); John Crook (Western Ch'an Fellowship: WCF); Ken Jones 
(Engaged Buddhism, Kanzeon Sangha, and the Western Ch'an Fellowship); Jim Pym 
(Pure Land); Robin Cooper, whose Buddhist name is Ratnaprabha (Friends of the 
Western Buddhist Order: FWBO); Jonathan Shaw (Awakened Heart Sangha)-, 
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Bhikkhu Vajiro and Bhikkhu Gavesako (Theravdda: Amaravati Forest Sangha); and 
Andy Wistreich (Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition: FPMT). 
Caroline and David Brazier are hereafter referred to by their Buddhist names for ease 
of differentiation. Robin Cooper is also referred to by his Buddhist name, by which 
he is most widely known. Bhikkhu Vajiro and Bhlkkhu Gavesako's original names 
were not ascertained. Bhikkhu Vajiro holds the status of an Ajaan (teacher). 
Contemporary British Buddhism 
History 
Substantial European Buddhist scholarship was inaugurated in the 1830s by 
Burnouf, and begun in Britain in the 1860's by Miller. British scholarship was given 
significant structure by T. W. Rhys Davids' foundation of the Pdli Text Society in 
1881 (Welborn 1968: 54,101,223). British Buddhist religious practice begins with 
the foundation of the Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland in 1907 (Bluck 
2006: 7), but member's interest in practice was peripheral to their interest in 
scholarship until Christmas Humphreys re-founded the Buddhist Society in 1924, 
initially as a 'lodge' of the Theosophical Society. The Buddhist Society was at the 
heart of a gradual development of interest, mainly in Theravdda Buddhism, up until 
the Second World War, after which its range of courses and 'Summer Schools' 
expanded to encompass Tibetan and Zen traditions, notably lectures given in 1953 by 
the influential lay Rinzai Zen Buddhist D. T. Suzuki. Following the Chinese invasion 
of Tibet, the Buddhist Society assisted in the formation of the Tibet Society, which 
continues to represent the political and cultural interests of the Tibetan Government- 
in-exile. During the 1960s the Buddhist Society's culturally conservative atmosphere 
became unrepresentative of the growing interest in Buddhism among the denizens of 
the burgeoning counter-culture. By the 1980s the Society had lost its central 
significance, as individual traditions consolidated in their main centres, retreat centres 
and urban groups, and as a greater variety of independent lineage variations began to 
appear. But the seeds of this late diversity were sown and encouraged by the 
typically English welcome offered by Buddhist Society under the judicious guidance 
of Christmas Humphreys (Oliver 1979: 49-64, Bluck 2006: 6-10). 
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Anagdrika Dhammapdla established an indigenous Sri Lankan Buddhist Whara in 
London in 1928, and the indigenous Thai Buddhist Buddhapadipa Temple was 
established in 1966. The western bhikkhu Kapilavaddho formed the English Sangha 
Trust in 1956, which eventually established a monastery (Whara) for westerners in 
the Thai Forest tradition of Ajaan Chah in 1977, with the American bhikkhu Ajaan 
Sumedho as Abbot. The FWBO was founded in 1967 by Sangharakshita, as a new 
form of Buddhist Sangha that was 'neither monastic nor lay' (Oliver 1979: 64-73). 2 
In 1967 Akong Rinpoche and Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche founded Samye Ling, the 
Tibetan Karma-Kagyu monastery in Eskdalemuir. S6ka Gakkai practice in the 
Japanese community became a convert pursuit after Richard Causton became leader 
in 1975, and expanded rapidly thereafter (Bluck 2006: 90). 
This enumeration of historical milestones cannot capture the exponential growth 
of traditions and adherents during the 1980s and 1990s, such that British Buddhism 
now reflects the diversity of the wider Buddhist world in miniature. Most of the 
significant traditions have established a presence within this fairly small island nation, 
and several have affiliated groups operating in most major cities. 3 This state of 
affairs is an indication of 'globalisation' in practice. The long-tenn consequences 
remain to be seen of this cohabitation of schools, which had become culturally and 
geographically distinct over the centuries. The location of religious traditions in close 
proximity within a pluralist society, where there is an open marketplace of 
philosophical ideas and cultural practices, might be expected to initiate rapid change 
on an evolutionary model as an aid to social relevance. Conversely, evolutionary 
processes might encourage retrenchment of traditional doctrine and practice as an aid 
to low-level, 'niche' survival as a romantic reaction to modernity. Particular views of 
the nature of mind may influence whether Buddhism, which encourages 
transformations of mind, will change or retrench in response to the globalized context. 
Of course, the globalized context is itself not static. The comfortable state of western 
societies may prove to be transitory as economic and environmental forces influence 
the development of India and China, and political interactions between nominally 
Christian and largely Islamic societies. 
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Buddhist affiliation 
According to the questions on religious affiliation and ethnicity in the United 
Kingdom 2001 census, there are 152,000 Buddhists in the United Kingdom, 
constituting 0.26% of the population. This proportion is slightly lower than the case 
of Buddhism in America, where there are estimated to be 1.5 million Buddhists 
(Lampman 2006), or 0.68% of the population. Again according to the 2001 Census, 
59,000 British Buddhists are of 'white' ethnic origin, 35,000 are Chinese, 15,000 are 
Asian, 5,000 are of 'mixed ethnicity', and 2,000 are 'black'. (Kennedy 2004: 155 n2, 
Bluck 2004,2006: 13-15). 4 
The Buddhist organisations that are active in Britain today are broadly divisible 
into those that mainly attract support from the 'white' or 'convert' Buddhists who 
constitute 40% of the total number of Buddhists in the UK, and those that mainly 
support the cultural and religious practice of indigenously Buddhist immigrant 
communities. Although this division is evident it is permeable, and fraternal relations 
generally obtain. For example, the monks and lay supporters of the Forest Sangha at 
Amaravati Monastery near Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire are mainly convert 
Buddhists, yet the monastery has links with the immigrant Thai and Cambodian 
communities, and depended for its establishment on financial support from the Thai 
community. There is a marked difference in practice between 'convert' and 'ethnic' 
lay Buddhists, in that the fon-ner (with the exception of S6ka Gakkai members) have a 
tendency to engage in meditation practice, whereas the latter tend to be concerned 
with devotional and supportive relations with the monastic Sangha (Bluck 2006, Bell 
1991: 197). In the case of ethnic organisations, Buddhism continues to be an integral 
part of cultural life and communal identity of immigrant communities. In the case of 
convert organisations, Buddhism may be an integral part of the personal identity of 
individual lay practitioners, but is not necessarily an integral part of their identity as 
members of secular society. Convert Buddhist organisations attract supporters who 
are higher-educated, middle-class, and in the 20-40 age range, although that 
demographic may be a temporary effect of the burgeoning of interest since the 1960's 
(Wilson and Dobbeleare 1973: 122-123), Kennedy 2004, Bluck 2006). 
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Group Affiliation 
Waterhouse (1997: 16) notes that estimates based on the number of traditional 
organisations and their affiliated local groups have to suffice in the absence of 
accurate membership information. Three convert Buddhist organisations stand out 
from the rest by virtue of their greater size, tendency to proselytize, tendency to claim 
some degree of exclusivity as the most appropriate Buddhist path, and also by virtue 
of controversy surrounding the lineage legitimacy of their teachers. 5 Although all 
three are estimated to have about 5,000 members each, S6ka Gakkai has the largest 
organisational structure, claiming 300 affiliated local groups. This international lay 
tradition, established in Japan in the 1930's and in Britain by the early 1960's, 
follows the example of the 12 th century Japanese monk Nichiren by eschewing 
meditation in favour of chanting in homage to the Lotus Siltra. Next in size is the 
New Kadampa Tradition (NKT), which claims 183 affiliated groups. This 
organisation has expanded rapidly since its foundation in 1991 by Geshe Kelsang 
Gyatso in a schismatic separation from the mainstream Tibetan Gelugpa tradition. 
Regrettably, neither S6ka Gakkai nor the NKT nominated a participant in this 
research. The Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (FWBO) is a syncretic or 'all 
schools' tradition, with teachings and practices that reflect the religious career and 
insights of its founder, Sangharakshita (Dennis Lingwood), who claims both 
Theravdda ordination and Mahdydna empowerments. The FWBO has 78 groups in 
Britain, as well as affiliated centres in India, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, and 
America. Although the FWBO has fewer groups than Saka Gakkai or the NKT, 
FWBO groups are well established in cities throughout the UK. Many Buddhists 
who eventually find a home with other traditions, or none, are first introduced to 
meditation by well-advertised and well-organised FWBO beginner's classes. 
It is ironic that, as a result of the NKT schism, the Gelug-pa tradition that was 
dominant in Tibet should be eclipsed in Britain by the Karma Kagyu tradition, which 
has a large monastic institution at Samye Ling, near Langholm in the Scottish 
Borders, and is developing Holy Island off the coast of Arran as a centre for interfaith 
events, including psychotherapeutic courses associated with 'New Age' spiritualities, 
but has the primary purpose of facilitating traditional long-term solitary retreats. 
Again, this organisation did not nominate a participant in this study, but the 
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participant from the Awakened Heart Sangha does represent a combined Kagyu- 
Nyingma lineage. 
Although Bluck records III Zen and 21 Ch'an groups they fall into many 
different lineages as an effect of association with individual indigenous teachers. 
They are generally small or even single-group organisations. The largest is the 
Serene Reflection Meditation tradition, a Rinzai Zen transmission through the 
westerner Peggy Jiyu Kennett, which is centred on Throssel Hole Priory near 
Carrshields in Northumberland, and has 32 affiliated groups. Thich Nhat Hanh's 
Community of Interbeing is located in France, presumably because of French colonial 
connection with his native Vietnam, but has 28 local groups in Britain. Although 
neither the Serene Reflection tradition nor the Community of Interbeing are 
represented in this study, smaller Zen/Ch'an groups are represented by Ken Jones, a 
leading advocate of engaged Buddhism, who chooses to practice eclectically, and by 
John Crook, who received transmission from the Taiwanese Ch'an abbot Master 
Sheng-yen and pennission to found the Western Ch'an Fellowship in Britain. The 
Amida Trust, which nominated two interview participants, may represent a new form 
of Buddhist organisation. It is a socially engaged, dynamic, Pure Land group, which 
remains small enough to function by personal contact. It includes an ordained 
Sangha but does not emphasise hierarchy. It is trans-national, with four groups in 
Britain but six around the globe, and is transparent to outside observation by virtue of 
its open webpage and 'weblogs'. The Awakened Heart Sangha is more reserved in its 
dissemination of information, with barriers to entry on parts of their website, but it 
carries the transnational model even further, for it mainly functions by internet 
connection with the centre, rather than by the establishment of local support groups. 
The most significant omission in this study is not the lack of representation from 
any particular organisation, but the lack of any representative from the cohort of self- 
certifying Buddhists who do not attend organisations. The existence of this cohort is 
inferred by Bluck from the discrepancy between the 2001 Census figures and 
estimates of organisation memberships. He concludes that 'many Buddhists in 
Britain have little fonnal contact with Buddhist groups, practising instead on their 
own... ' (Bluck 2004: 3,2006: 16-17). If Bluck's conclusion is valid, the normal 
academic practice of studying Buddhists according to their allegiance to organisations 
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is a practical convenience, which cannot be guaranteed to representative of 'convert' 
British Buddhists (Bluck 2004: 3). Amongst the interview participants Jim Pym 
pursues a fairly solitary religious practice in retirement, which may be quite close to 
the norm for the unaffiliated cohort, but his role as an author, his nominal ordination 
for funeral purposes, his editorship of 'Pure Land Notes', and his long history of 
engagement with Zen and Pure Land traditions mean that he is not a typical 
representative of those who are sequestered from their peers and therefore 
inaccessible to research. 
Research into British Buddhism 
It was an interesting finding of this research that, despite or perhaps because of 
the higher education qualifications of the participants, there was a current of feeling 
that the academic study of Buddhism is not a worthwhile enterprise. This is 
naturally the case from a soteriological perspective, but the stress some participants 
place on the point gives pause for thought, for it implies unease about the relationship 
between Buddhist practice and Buddhist scholarship. It may, of course, be 
discomforting for practitioners to discover that philologists have a more 
comprehensive knowledge of foundational texts. It may be discomforting that the 
research standpoint of academic disinterest is not invariably accompanied by a clear 
statement about the religious affiliation of the researcher. Simply being treated as an 
object of study may be discomforting, especially there is little negotiation about the 
meaning and purposes of the research (Pawson 1996: 313). The participant's caution 
about the utility of academic study has some justification in the case of the study of 
the transmission of Buddhism to the West, for the complexity of interactions between 
an old religion and a new context have proved difficult to characterise conclusively. 
It is salutary that Bluck reviews previous research and examines seven of the larger 
Buddhist organisations in great detail, yet concludes that 'only tentative suggestions 
can be made about Buddhism's specific appeal in Britain' and that 'an overall picture 
remains elusive' (Bluck 2006: 190,191). The lack of an overall picture might be 
remedied by a critical review of the field and the establishment of compatibility 
between different research methodologies and their terminologies, but that task 
cannot be undertaken here. Because the methodological compatibility of previous 
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work is a peripheral question for this study, which is focussed on the very particular 
example of Buddhist responses to the standard scientific view of the nature of mind, I 
can only provide a brief review and make some brief suggestions as to why the 
characterisation of contemporary Buddhism in the West has proved elusive. 
Pye notes a distinction between the broad reach of the historical method in the 
study of religion, which is liable to 'obscure the complexities of things', and the more 
localised application of abstract categories under 'phenomenological' theories that try 
to account for the dynamics of religious change (1969: 235 ). 6 He accepts that in 
practice it may be difficult to distinguish between the two approaches, since 
phenomenological theories inevitably refer to historical data, but still he attempts to 
sketch the outlines of a phenomenological theory of the transplantation of religions. 
Under his tripartite theory, analysis is separated into the study of forms of contact 
between the religion and the new context, into forms of ambiguity resulting from 'a 
degree of acceptance of factors prevailing in the new situation', and finally into forms 
of recoupment. 
[Recoupment] ... will involve the reassertion or reclarification of that 
which was being transplanted in some adequate way. On the one hand 
the new expression of the religion will have a reasonable claim to 
identity with that which gave the impulse to the transplantation; but on 
the other hand it will not be simply identical to the older forms since it 
has expressed itself in terms of the factors of the situation which it has 
entered. The recoupment aspect is the most difficult to evaluate 
because it involves some sorting out of heresy and orthodoxy (or 
similar), that is, some attempt to elucidate the essential characteristics 
or content of the religion concerned, which is frequently a theological 
problem (or similar) for the adherents of the religion themselves (Pye 
1969: 237-238). 
The ambiguity involved in the dynamics of transitional processes is one reason 
why overall characterisations may prove elusive: analysis may indicate 'the 
unresolved coexistence of elements belonging to the transplanting tradition and to the 
situation which is being entered' (Pye 1969: 237), but conclusions must await firm 
evidence of recoupment, for example the appearance of clear Buddhist statements 
about the nature of mind in the light of neuroscience. It is interesting that Pye 
considers the essential characteristics of a religion to be a matter for the adherent 
rather than the analyst to decide. The study of religion should be as much a 
hermeneutic dialogue as a phenomenological analysis, for: the religious practitioner is 
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not just a thing-in-itself or phenomenal object, but a human thIng-In-itself possessing 
the personal authority of an interlocutor. 
Morgan (1996) notes that explanations of religion based on the authority of 
scholarship can appear overly descriptive and monolithic when contrasted with the 
more diversified and experiential accounts that are commonly provided by 'believers'. 
She cites the work of W. B. Kristensen in support of her contention that, 'as a 
principle', the testimony of believers should always be considered authoritative 'as a 
constant check on and challenge to the data we collect and the ways we present it' 
(1996: 3). The authority of believers is particularly liable to be discounted when 
reference is made to unobservable features of personal experience. The reason for 
this behaviourist bias is the inherent difficulty in verifying phenomenological 
accounts, which has already been discussed with respect to Wallace and Varela in 
Chapter 1. The countervailing difficulty is that when the testimony of religious 
experience is ignored then Morgan's principled attention to the authority of believers 
becomes a rather shallow exercise. 
Not all testimony should be sacrosanct (Morgan 1996: 3). In particular, Sharf 
(1998) argues against unthinking acceptance of testimony about mystical experience, 
on the ground that such experiences are subject to prior influence by religious 
terminology and may even be motivated by the language of religious explanation. 
But mystical experience is an extra-ordinary case at the limits of communicability, 
whereas much religious testimony is concerned with fairly ordinary psychological 
changes to personal experience, which are commonly indicated by everyday 
terminology (Kennedy 2004: 152-154). Ordinary interpersonal human behaviour, 
including facial expression, gesture and language, developed in order to communicate 
experiences and intentions with varying degrees of honesty or deception. A valuable 
source of data is neglected, if scholars of religion exempt themselves from the 
pragmatic, 'folk' phenomenological interplay of interpersonal communication about 
experience, on the grounds that the probity of testimony cannot be verified. When 
the authority of 'believers' is elided by the authority of the scholar, an appropriate 
characterisation of a religion in the course of dynamic change is likely to prove 
elusive. 
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Pye's tripartite framework, with the caveat about the outsider (scholarly) 
usurpation of insider (practitioner) authority, can be illustrated with respect to studies 
of the introduction and growth of Buddhism in Britain. Pye imagined contact to be 'a 
very simple matter involving the means of communication ... these means bear some 
relation to the factors of the situation into which the religion is being transplanted'. 
Contact between Buddhism and western civilisation was not at all simple, for the 
salient situational factors were complex colonial power-relations. Post-colonial 
studies, taking their lead from Said's critique of 'Orientalism' (1978), argue that 
colonisation was not only a geographical, but an ideological forin of imperialism, 
which has led to the reconstitution of Buddhism in a western form (Almond 1988: 33, 
140, King 1999: 148). Colonialism facilitated the expropriation of artefacts and texts 
for collections in the West, where oriental scholarship could study Buddhism as a 
purely historical, rational textual tradition (King 1999: 62,145-146). This portability 
made Buddhism amenable to translation and interpretation at home, without the 
inconvenience attending the study of a living social practice attuned to the needs of 
an alien agrarian society under the influence of animism and Hindu polytheism. 
The post-colonial critique of 'past masters' is slightly churlish, for the early 
translators had no option but to work within the horizon of their time, yet several, 
such as Burnouf and T. W. Rhys Davids, responded with enough academic disinterest 
to place the continuing philological study of Buddhism on a sound footing. Welborn 
makes it clear that the interpretations of these early translators were situated 
responses. Although their own views intruded into their interpretations they were not 
blinded by self-interest, as the colonialist and Orientalist labels suggest (1968: 53-57, 
223-226). However, King notes a tendency for textualists to interpret Buddhism as a 
Protestant form of eastern religiosity (1999: 145), and Almond notes a Victorian 
antipathy to similarities between Mahdydna monasticism and Catholicism (1968: 123). 
Such comparative metaphorical seeing of one religion in terms of another may be 
illuminating but may also obscure the essential features of the religion in question. 
With respect to Pye's scheme, studies may inaccurately represent processes of 
ambiguity and recoupment if the urge to generallsed comparison means that 
insufficient attention is paid to the object of study. That does not happen in 
Gombrich and Obeyesekere's study of religious change in Sri Lanka (1988), where 
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comparison is a feature of their object of study, rather than a major characteristic of 
their analysis. They find that the colonial example of efficient administration, 
economic reform and Christian missionary activity created an indigenous middle 
class that actively participated in a western transmogrification of the Dhamma. The 
outcome was a mimetic form of Buddhism (King 1999: 143), which was 'Protestant' 
in its rejection of the ritualised social roles and merit-making practices that maintain 
the relationship between Sangha and laity, and 'protestant' in its anti-colonial 
nationalism. The consequent devaluation of the authority of the Sangha gave 
encouragement, mainly among the lower class, to an emotionally-charged 
involvement with spirit cults, spirit possession, and bhakti devotional attitudes 
towards deities derived from Hinduism. These practices were quite the reverse of the 
Protestant attitude (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988: 445-456). 
Mellor's study of The Cultural Translation of Buddhism (1989,1991), 
demonstrates a clear genealogical link between the Protestant style of middle class 
religiosity in Sri Lanka and the establishment of an individualistic, Protestant style of 
Buddhist practice in England, via reciprocal Theosophical influences operating 
through the seminal figure of Anagdrika Dhammapdla in Sri Lanka and through the 
early history of the Buddhism in England. This influence extends to include the 
constitution of the FWBO by Sangharakshita, who had previously been associated 
with Dhammapdla's Mahabodhi Society in India. The case for a similar influence on 
the Thai Forest Sangha is not so persuasive and nor is it certain, as Mellor contends, 
that British Buddhism as a whole is a western Noncomformist fonn of religiosity in 
Buddhist guise (1991: 89). Because he looks for similarities between eastern and 
western religious forms and, rather than the usual phenomenology, deploys a 
methodology of 'Foucauldian' discourse analysis (Mellor 1989: 10-11,59-65), 
Mellor places less emphasis on the parallel translation of devotional, liturgical and 
hierarchical aspects of Buddhism, all of which are more reminiscent of Catholic than 
Protestant styles of religiosity, but which originate in practice rather than discourse. 
Mellor argues that Ajahn Sumedho's Thai Forest Sangha and Sangharakshita's 
FWBO are Protestant forms, because they cut away significant cultural accretions in 
search of the essence of Buddhism. That analysis produced a polemical refutation 
from Sangharakshita (1992). The Mellor/Sangharakshita disagreement turns on 
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confusion about the difference between a Platonic essence and an essential 
characteristic. As Bluck remarks, it would be paradoxical for a religion purporting to 
uphold the selflessness of things to assert a Buddhist essence (2006: 185-186), but it 
seems reasonable that the adherents of a religion should talk about essence in the 
more metaphysically innocuous sense of a list of characteristics that define or 
redefine its prototypical identity (Pye 1969: 238). This is precisely the sort of 
'theological problem (or similar)' that Pye envisages when translation of a religion to 
a new situation moves from the stage of ambiguity to that of recoupment. Referring 
to Troeltsch's maxim that 'to define a religion is to shape it afresh', Pye suggests that 
in Buddhist terms redefinition is 'skilful means', and in western terms it is 
hermeneutics (Pye 1980: 25-30) . Recoupment is therefore an attempt to understand 
the 'cardinal meaning' of a religious tradition in the context and the time, and is far 
from being an exclusively western pursuit. Citing the example of the Platform Sdtra, 
Pye argues that 'the question about the 'essence' of Buddhism is not just a western 
importation, but is a thoroughly Buddhist and Asian question' (Pye 1980: 29). 
Waterhouse worries about the lack of attention to fieldwork in Mellor's 
methodology (1997: 24-25) but she accepts parts of his argument as 'axiomatic', and 
describes the Protestant label as 'a useful analytical tool not a suggestion that British 
Buddhism is inauthentic' (1997: 24 n67). I agree that parts of Mellor's analysis are 
apposite, but do not agree that it is invariably useful to characterise the features of 
one religion by comparison to the features of another. Firstly, the similarities Mellor 
identifies between British Buddhism and Protestantism are not all genealogical 
continuities; secondly, Mellor's location of English Buddhism 'in a liberal Protestant 
trend, albeit one of a 'pan-religious' kind' (1991: 77) does confer the negative 
implication of inauthenticity. That negative association is compounded by the wider 
implication that Protestantism is to blame for the social ills of the modem West, 
which hangs on the Weberian thesis that western modem individualism originated in 
Calvinist 'this-worldly asceticism'. I prefer a more causally balanced view, under 
which Catholicism is responsible for inaugurating the moral separation of individual 
selfhood, but its development has been influenced by both Protestant and secular 
forces. The western discourse on individuality originates in Augustine's reversal of 
the neo-platonic location of person and world within the compass of Divinity, a 
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reversal that isolates the previously theologically-embedded personality within an 
individual, internal state of mind, separate from the impurity of the material world, 
yet still liable to contamination (Cary 2000: 31-44, Augustine 2002). From this 
Augustinian perspective the seeds of contemporary individuality are have a Catholic 
origin. The secular influence arises prior to the appearance of Protestant religiosity, 
out of modernising forces unleashed by the technological conquest of the ocean on 
the eastern seaboard of Europe joynbee 1954: 114). On this account, the 
individualism inherent in western modernity has a secular origin in the seafaring 
mercantilism that also enabled the expansion of European colonialism. I incline to 
the view that the potential for the individualisation of personality is inherent in human 
embodiment and therefore likely occur in all cultures, including feudal cultures, but 
that the subtle manifestations of individuality in other cultures may be unobservable 
without close ethnographic examination. 7 
Whoever is to blame for the modem individual, Mellor rightly indicates the 
inconsistency between the western psychological discourse on individual selfhood, 
which is prevalent in the FWBO, and the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. Theories of self 
are a short metaphysical step away from theories of soul, and Sangharakshita's 
evolutionary notion of the 'true' individual, which he acquired from Nydnaponika, a 
German Theravdda monk (Bell 1991: 200), can be misinterpreted without much strain 
to represent a soul-theory rather than an account of psychological achievement. 8 
Until that metaphysical interpretation is explicit, the FWBO's evolutionary discourse 
remains a case of ambiguity rather than recoupment, and only marginally detracts, by 
implication, from their general orthodoxy. Although there is no requirement for clear 
expressions of orthodox belief in the FWBO, provisional acceptance of traditional 
doctrine is advocated, is a tacit prerequisite for group assimilation, and is 
subliminally inculcated by shared participation in the devotional language of the 
'sevenfold pfija' (Tejananda 1987). It is notable that Sangharakshita mounts a 
defence of what he considers to be traditional orthodoxy in his review of Batchelor's 
Buddhisn7 it, ithout beliefs (Batchelor 1997, Sangharakshita 1998). 
9 
Sangharakshita's rational, polemical prose style reflects his sense of significance 
as a Buddhist of importance, but is not indicative of the FWBO style of religiosity. 
The FWBO engages with ritual in a devotional, even an emotional manner that is as 
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more reminiscent of Catholic than of Protestant behaviour. Far from being 
intellectually-oriented, FWBO practice offers lapsed Catholics and agnostic 
Protestants access to vivid imaginative, ritual and devotional opportunities that have 
been foreclosed by their Christian apostasy. 
Mellor (1989) accurately traces the genealogy of British Buddhism in the first 
half of the 20th century, but he does not account for the arrival of diverse traditions, 
beginning in the 1950s but occurring mainly in the 1970s and 1980s as a consequence 
post-war recovery in the world economy, the growth of air travel, and the attention 
directed onto the Buddhist world by conflict in Tibet, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, 
and Sri Lanka. Since the 1960s these factors have precipitated a direct rather than a 
genealogical engagement with eastern religious traditions, as the Grand Tour to the 
East became a 20th century rite of passage and as indigenous teachers came West as 
refugees from conflict, or on a mission to spread their variety of the Dharma. 
To summarize, Mellor's 'Protestant Buddhism' thesis is an important theoretical 
contribution to the study of Buddhism in Britain, but is too monolithic a 
characterisation to function as a useful analytical tool. The theory depends on the 
questionable notion that Protestantism was mainly responsible for the development of 
modem western individualism, without the aid of Augustinian Catholic initiation and 
secular mercantile sustenance. If Catholicism and secular mercantilism did play a 
part in the development of the modem individual, then western influence on 
contemporary British Buddhism cannot be characterised solely by comparative 
reference to Protestantism. Mellor's argument that the doctrine of anaud is 
incompatible with the western psychology of the self is apposite, but his wider theory 
now stands in need of reassessment. Contemporary Buddhism is a global set of 
religious phenomena that needs to be studied with methodical attention to all its 
manifestations, if the meaningful lineaments of ambiguity and recoupment are to be 
clearly identified in each tradition and in each cultural situation. 
That task is work in progress, with notable examinations, in the British case, by 
Green (1989), Bell (1991,1997) Batchelor (1994), Waterhouse (1997), Henry (2006), 
and Bluck (2006). 10 Following Green (1989), the field is normally described as the 
study of a 'spectrum of adaptation' to western circumstances (Batchelor 1994: 338- 
340, Waterhouse 1997: 25-27). Adaptation is a blunt reference to the same 
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phenomena indicated by 'contact' 'ambiguity' and 'recoupment', but Pye's terms 
throw more light on the process of change. 'Contact' can be used to indicate the 
conditions pertaining at the start of the process, 'ambiguity' more accurately 
describes intermediate situations where issues have yet to be fully articulated and 
where the final outcome is unresolved. 'Recoupment' more accurately indicates the 
recursive process of initial change and subsequent incorporation of change within 
tradition in a hermeneutic sequence of reparation. " 
In his analysis of socially-engaged Buddhism in Britain, Henry (2004)argues that 
the study of 'globalized western Buddhism' is now a distinct sub-discipline of 
Buddhist Studies, alongside the philological approach to the translation and 
interpretation of traditional texts. He notes that the issue lurking behind the study of 
adaptation is still the monolithic question of definition: '... at what point is Buddhist 
tradition stretched beyond recognition by institutional and conceptual change? ' (2004: 
10). That there is disagreement about the location of particular traditions along a 
spectrum of acceptable adaptation may indicate that traditions can be orthodox on 
some measures and heterodox on others, or that the factors determining the location 
of a tradition are dependant on the commentator's prejudices. If Buddhism is indeed 
polythetic, in that it fulfils a variety of social functions and satisfies a variety of needs, 
then a variety of interactions are likely to occur between contextual influences and 
issues of doctrine and practice. That being so, the study of Buddhism, West or East, 
is not so much a matter of formulating a monolithic theory, of locating 'essential 
features', or of locating traditions along a spectrum of adaptation: the task is to study 
the continual operation of factors influencing the turning movements of contact, 
ambiguity and recoupment that represent the initiation of religious change, the 
indeten-ninacy of change and the incorporation of change. It is a matter for Buddhist 
individuals and traditions, rather than academic commentators, to tolerate or oppose 
internal diversity with respect to a prototype, just as they can choose to ignore or 
engage with the implications of the evident diversity of secular and religious doctrine 
in a globalized world. 
Pye's tripartite theory does not address the role played by authority in the 
management of religious change. Waterhouse takes up this issue in her study of 
Buddhisni in Bath, noting that 'one of the circumstances in which religious authority 
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is most consciously invoked is when changes need to be made". Discussing the 
ambiguous remarks on authority ascribed to the Buddha in the Kalama Sutta 
(Waterhouse 1997: 33-34,222-223), she observes that the text advocates both the 
authority of personal experience and the authority of 'wise' persons. 
The [experiential] validation of the truth of Buddhism is preserved as 
an ideal within all traditions but until a state of Buddhahood has been 
realized 'internal' personal experience cannot be the sole authority for 
practice (Waterhouse 1997: 223). 
Despite Sharf s criticism of the authority of 'private' experience in Buddhism, 
Waterhouse notes that '... authority has to be recognised as well as claimed'. That 
being so, the continuing authority of the tradition ultimately depends on personal 
experience, though the experience in question is likely to be a conscious or 
unconscious assessment of the qualities and expertise of the claimant to religious 
authority. 
The meticulous fieldwork in Bluck (2006) provides a wealth of information for 
further theorising, but because he orders that information under Smart's 'dimensional 
analysis of world views', he struggles to interpret the temporal dynamics of change 
within dimensional categories. Bluck does not attempt to negotiate the problems of 
method associated with analysis of the 'experiential dimension', beyond remarking 
that: 'It is almost impossible to discern any meaningful adaptation in the important 
but problematic experiential dimension, due to its highly personal nature and the wide 
variety of emotional responses shown by individuals' (Bluck 2006: 182-183). 1 hope 
that the discussion of experience in Kennedy (2004) and in this thesis demonstrates 
that the task of analysing the testimony of personal experience is not insuperable. 
Apart from the difficulty of analysing experience, and the diversity of Buddhist 
traditions practicing in Britain today, the accelerating dynamism of social change 
under globalized modernity is the contextual reason why an overall characterisation 
of British Buddhism may prove elusive. If Buddhist doctrine and practice continues 
to respond to context under the influence of authoritative individuals in the diverse 
way that has happened over the 20th century, then no monolithic theory is likely to 
account for the diversity of western Buddhism. I have in mind the very different 
expressions of the Dharma represented by the life of the Pure land Buddhist, 
Dharmavidya (David Brazier), who is socially active in the world and at large on the 
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internet, in comparison to that of the late Luang Phor Pannavaddho (Peter Morgan) 
who spent the greater part of his life as a Bhikkhu in monastic sequestration in 
Thailand. 
Theories can, however, account for discrete factors that are present to varying 
degrees throughout diversity, for example the use of ritual. Bell (1997) presents an 
application of Tambiah's performance theory of ritual practice to the particular case 
of the Thai Forest Sangha monastery at Amaravati (Tambiah 1981). 12 The life of the 
monastery is characterised as an on-going symbolic performance, 'which exists solely 
for the performers' (Bell 1997: 3), within which participants act out ideal moral 
relationships, 'as if they exemplified the axiomatic intentional attitudes advocated in 
the vinaya. Bell notes that: 
The performance analogy actually articulates a fundamental 
assumption of Buddhism that the moral transfon-nation of outward 
interpersonal behaviour can purify the mind of the 
individual ... Behaving 'as if something is the case is quite pennissible in Buddhism and does not lead to questions about authenticity as it 
can in Judeo-Christian moral theory (Bell 1997: 16). 
Bell's paper is exemplary in the account taken of the insider's perspective, and as an 
interpretation of the dynamics of discrete changes to practice injudicious response to 
context. 
Discretion in the alteration of practice is necessary because, as Gombrich and 
Obeyesekere remark: 'the integrity of the Sangha is conceived to rest not so much on 
its orthodoxy as on its orthopraxy' (1988: 446, see also Bell 1991: 285-289). It is not 
invariably possible to divorce doctrine from practice, for much doctrine is concerned 
with the meaning and guidance of practice. But the central point, that institutional 
Buddhism attaches greater importance to the observance of practice than to doctrinal 
inquisition, rings true with respect to the Forest Sangha. It can be derived from the 
suttas, 13 can be applied to the continuing integrity in diversity of the Buddhist 
tradition as a whole, and ought to temper intemperate attitudes towards doctrinal 
innovation in British Buddhism. Crook notes that: 
... when 
disagreement arises and cannot be resolved in assembly, then 
the Sangha is to split with each party going its own way and 
developing its own view without rancour. This "Law of Schism" 
(sangha-bheda) was the device that maintained the structural unity of 
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local communities of monks through a mechanism of splitting (Crook 
1990: 388). 
It can be argued that schismatic disputes are rarely about heterodoxy, but employ 
heterodoxy as a surrogate in order to disguise the 'greed, hatred and delusion' of 
worldly ambition. Thus schism becomes more likely when economic, political and 
associated psychological factors come into play, whereupon heterodoxy becomes a 
handy charge against the opposing side. The controversies over Sudden and Gradual 
Paths at the Council of Samye in Tibet and between Northern and Southern Ch'an 
schools in China are prime examples. In Britain the English Sangha Trust's apparent 
rejection of Sangharakshita, as a future leader was probably based on an assessment of 
his fitness to practice, rather than an assessment of his beliefs. The NKT's secession 
from the mainstream Gelug-pa tradition is more like a genuine schism, but is an 
anomalous example, because it represents a personal response by Geshe Kelsang 
Gyatso to a 20th century continuation of ancient Tibetan political, religious and 
mythological disputes. 14 The outcome of this schism is that the NKT has 
relinquished its allegiance to the mainstream Gelug-pa FPMT (Bluck 2006: 131-132). 
These examples suggest that, as a consequence of the globalization of gossip, it is no 
longer possible to hide the mercenary reasons behind schismatic arguments that are 
ostensibly about orthodoxy. That fact alone might prevail against human nature to 
reduce schismatic tendencies in contemporary Buddhism. 
In sum, there have been disputes in Buddhism about orthopraxy, and disputes 
where orthodoxy is used as a surrogate to disguise the politics of power relations. 
Preference for the avoidance of schism allows room for a divergence of views, and 
may allow ambiguity and recoupment with respect to traditional doctrine, including 
doctrine concerning the nature of the mind, as Buddhism encounters change in the 
context of globalization. In search of these factors of change, but with a minimum of 
commentary, the interview summaries that follow will present a range of attitudes 
towards the issue of the nature of the mind, and a range of views about the nature of 
the mind. Subsequent chapters will present a hermeneutic interpretation in response 
to those views and attitudes. 
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Prasada and Dharmavidya 
Dharrnavidya is the leader and principal teacher of the Order of Amida Buddha, a 
socially-engaged Buddhist organisation in the Pure Land tradition, comprising twelve 
ordained members, a community near Leicester, and an affiliated network of 
supporters and groups in London, Newcastle, Antwerp and Hawaii. As part of their 
orientation towards compassionate practice, the community runs courses on 
Buddhism and Buddhist psychotherapy, and offers individual psychotherapy. The 
community responds with active pacifism to international political events. 
Dhannavidya has a PhD. in Buddhist Psychology and is a registered psychotherapist. 
He has published several works on psychotherapy and on contemporary Buddhism 
(Brazier 1995,1997,2001). Although he is cited as the 'spiritual' head of the Amida 
organisation, the movement is egalitarian and cooperative, allowing the ordained 
members and supporters to utilise their talents and develop their interests without 
restriction. 
Prasada, also a member of the Order of Amida Buddha, was Chair of the (British) 
Network of Buddhist Organisations from September 2002 to March 2006. She is a 
practising psychotherapist, and has published a detailed therapeutic interpretation of 
the traditional Buddhist psychological typology of mental events (Brazier 2003). 
Prasada and Dharmavidya chose to be interviewed together, although it turned out 
that discussion of Prasada's work occupied the first section of the interview, after 
which she was called away, and Dharmavidya was interviewed in the second section. 
Prasada - Interview Summaty (with contributions from Dharmavidya) 
Prasada. considers that since Buddhism is about training the mind, the conduct of 
life, and ways of perceiving the world, there is not that much difference between 
Buddhist psychology and the practice of Buddhism itself 
... I think perception 
is particularly important in Buddhism, but it is 
also the roots of how happy we are, the kind of relationships we have, 
the way that we live our lives in practical ways. That is the stuff of 
therapy as well, so I do not make a great distinction, but obviously 
[there is] the distinction of form: a therapist is not going to be 
preaching sfitras at their clients, I hope (Prasada). 
The normal therapeutic form is the one-to-one interview, whereas Buddhism 
tends to involve communal practice, but these are formal rather than absolute 
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differences. The significant difference is that Buddhist psychology has a particular 
concern to examine reactions to the external world. 
... even in a Buddhist community, 
having periods of intensive one-to- 
one interview - like the spiritual interview - is an important part of the 
process because it does pin you down, and it makes you actually think 
about what you are doing in a way that maybe you don't when you are 
just going about life in the community. On the other hand I think that 
Buddhist psychology is very much about the way that the conditions 
that we live amongst affect our mental states... (Prasada). 
Buddhist psychology is concerned with the process, the encounter, the 
meeting. It is very much concerned with what is other, not so much 
with what is self .. 
it is just a reflection of the paradigm, rather than the 
need to apply it in this, that, or the other way (Dhannavidya). 
There are difficulties with the translation of 'self between Buddhist and western 
contexts, for while Buddhism denies a fixed, soul-like self, it does not deny self in 
terms of the momentary awareness of embodied experience. 
I think one has to be careful about these terms. You can bandy about 
terms like the 'self , but there are many different definitions of the 'self. The way that I tend to use it is for that accumulation of habit- 
energy that we think of as a self. I do not think that Buddhism denies 
the embodied experience; in fact it is the opposite; that is something 
that is very much valued ... but that is really perceived as other - this is 
not-self. There are many s; atras in which the Buddha says: 'This is my 
arm. It is not me, it is not my self. So I think the experience of 
feeling our bodies is actually the experience of feeling something 
which is not-self in Buddhist theory. The self is that 
accumulation ... of often quite negative things. I think this is where 
people quite often get bogged down ... actually they have a very strong 
sense of self, but it is a negative sense of self. So Buddhist 
psychology is really about getting beyond that sense of self which is 
negative into a proper relationship with the world [and] with 
experience, including bodily experience (Prasada). 
Like 'Self (attd), 'body' (r - a) is a term with several meanings. The correct UP 
translation largely depends on context in which the term is used. Prasada and 
Dharmavidya consider that the proper translation of ri7pa in a psychological context 
refers to phenomenal object-perception, rather than embodiment. This yields a 
wholly psychological interpretation of the khandhas rather than an ontologically- 
dappled psycho-physical interpretation. 
I think it sits very well-, the idea [ofl the form that we see being the 
thing that is coloured by the mind. This is really what Buddhism is 
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n, k about, and people have really not gasped that, and have taken the 
khandhas to be the constituents of the person, and then said ru-. Pa must 
be the person's body in the physical sense. There is a perfectly good 
other Sanskrit word for the body: kaya. When you look at the 
skandhas as a process and you understand ri7pa as being like the 
perception of the object: you perceive the object, then you react to it 
and build up mental formations (Prasada). 
It does give a coherence to the teachings [that] are often presented as: 
'Buddha had a teaching about the khandhas and he also had a teaching 
about dependent origination and he also had a teaching about the Four 
Noble Truths. ' If you take them the way they are taken in [Prasada's] 
book, they are ... different packagings of one theory and that is rather intellectually satisfying... The Buddha does tend to say; 'I only teach 
one thing' (Dharmavidya). 
Prasada's unifying interpretation of the 'different packagings of one theory' in 
Buddhist Psychology (Brazier 2003) describes attitudes in ordinary life as a 
'psychology of addiction'. On her account, the khandhas are not merely a 
description of a person, but a description of an addictive process of attraction, self- 
formation, and self-alienation, which, according to Buddhism, can be voluntarily 
relinquished. 
... Basically I would see the three 
key teachings: the Four Noble Truths, 
the khandhas, and dependent origination, as all mapping onto each 
other. So, one encounters dukkha and then samudaya [response], the 
Second Noble Truth, and I would see that as the choice point. Either 
one has the choice of running off into the khandha process, because 
things come up in response to ... (dukkha) at the point of samudaya and 
at that point there is the temptation to hook into the sensory attachment 
and the self-formation and the destructive patterns - and this is really 
like going round the khandha-cycle. So, at that point of samudaya one 
sees the object and one hooks onto it through reaction and building up 
constructions that lead you to continue to see the ob ect in that way j 
and to continue to build it up. So, at the samudaya point you can hook 
onto the objects that become the r- as that keep the khandha-cycle UP 
going. That's the unenlightened track; that's what most of us are 
doing all the time in response to the original dukkha ... 
but at that 
samudaya point there is also the choice of unhooking from the object. 
That is what the Buddha tells us to do; to unhook from the object, and 
then one goes down the other track, which is to go (from) samudaya 
[to the Third Noble Truth] nirodha, which is like the containment of 
the (habit) energy that comes up (Prasada). 
By 'hook', Prasada seems to be refemng to 'attachment'. It is difficult to 
imagine how, of the 'three poisons, ' confusion (or delusion) can be an attachment. 
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I think it is preoccupation we are talking about. Attachment is again a 
western word. I think it is a kind of 'involvement with': fascination, 
obsession. Basically the three poisons are three different valences of 
[involvement] ... There are positive, negative, and alternating 
['ambivalent': Dharmavidya]. I think it is quite neat[ly illustrated] in 
terms of eating disorders, and it is an area that I have worked in. 
You've got the hate ambience, which is anorexia: 'I will not eat'. 
You've got the compulsive eating - greed: 'I will eat', and you've got 
the bulimic response, which is the ambivalent or confusion response: 
'I will/I won't, I will/I won't'. And that is the one that hooks people in 
most, so ambivalence is on that knife edge (Prasada). 
Prasada's psychological interpretation of r-a implies that 'leaving the khandhas UP 
behind' does not refer to enlightem-nent as extinction or removal from this world. 
She refers to peak experiences in her writings, but is unsure of their relation to 
enlightenment. 
Trying to define ... enlightenment ... is beyond me. I am not that 
enlightened to know what it is. To me its usefulness is as a direction. 
To me the concept of enlightenment is about sight that is not clouded 
by the kind of self-investment that we usually go round looking at the 
world through, so I tend to think of more or less filters between the 
person and the environment they are inhabiting. So I think these [peak] 
experiences can be of that nature - but not necessarily: we can also 
delude ourselves - the kind of experience where the scales suddenly 
drop away from our eyes and one is suddenly there in an environment. 
That does have something in conunon with what we think of as 
enlightenment (Prasada). 
Dharmavidya points out that the teacher or therapist has a more pragmatic goal of 
helping to remove the blockages that are preventing a worthwhile life and spiritual 
progression 
Restoring people's trust, in the world around them, in the bigger 
picture, the longer-term perspective of their lives. If people can restore 
faith in that way, then they will find their own enlightenment. It is 
about the quality of encounter - what is other - and that requires trust 
or faith. So the business (we) are in is restoring that faith, or finding 
out where it was lost, and what delusions arose at that point, and what 
unhelpful vows were made implicitly by the person, that continue to 
dog them. Or, in a different language, consonant with [Prasada's] 
book, [finding out] what samskdras were created at that point, that 
have been distorting everything ever since ... If you think too much 
about enlightenment then there is a great danger that you can set up a 
kind of spiritual pride, and this is then counterproductive. A great deal 
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of Buddhist literature is written in the superlative and in the absolute, 
and most of us are not dwelling there (Dharmavidya). 
He agrees that talk about encounter with the 'other' is reminiscent of the work of 
the Jewish theologian Martin Buber, although the similarity is inadvertent. 
There certainly are points of parallelism between Christianity and Pure 
Land, for instance, and I suppose our interpretation of Pure Land 
Buddhism is fairly existential, so ... we probably have a lot in common (Dharmavidya). 
Dharmavidya - Interview Summary 
Dharmavidya's approach to Buddhism emphasises the practical use of devotion, 
community values, and active social engagement against injustice and suffering. 
From that perspective the nature of the mind is not a salient issue, and when 
presented with view that the mind has a physical basis in the brain, Dhannavidya 
does not accept it. He considers it to be 'a very metaphysical sort of statement... ', 
and objects to the use of the word 'basis'. He is more content if it is clear that the 
notion of emergence entails that the mind is not reducible to the brain. 
I can take that, but then you would not use words like basis ... You are 
saying it is a symmetrical relationship; you can not use a word that 
implies that one is primary and the other is derivative at the same time 
(Dharmavidya). 
Certainly [that is] the way many westerners look at it, but that isn't a 
symmetrical relationship. That is giving the brain and brain chemistry, 
and so on, the primary position, but whether that is true absolutely or 
not, from a practical point of view, at the very least it is going to be an 
extremely long time before we know enough about brain chemistry to 
explain thereby the plot of a Shakespeare play... The point is that to 
understand a Shakespeare play is a completely different discipline 
from understanding the brain. That is an illustration why, in the 
present state of knowledge, it is completely impossible to reduce one 
to the other (Dhan-navidya). 
It can be a condition, in a Buddhist sense, that some things can not 
happen without something else happening. But then, Shakespeare 
getting a decent dinner is a condition for him writing the play. There 
is a great difference between a condition, and a cause or a basis 
(Dhannavidya). 
It is mystery. Clearly when people think there are changes in their 
brain activity, but what causes what, and what is exactly the 
110 
relationship between these different things, is a mystery, and if you 
want to understand what we usually call mind - like Shakespeare's 
mind, for example, at the moment It is a completely separate discipline 
from understanding the brain. (Dharrnavidya) 
In 'Buddhist Psychology' (Brazier 2003), Prasada mentions that in the Buddha's 
time people may have had a more 'externalist' picture of the mind. 
... I'm quite chary of using terms like 'inner' because it plays into what I said earlier is the Western consensus. Buddhism is not primarily just 
an introspective turn. I just think the whole idea of 'inner' and 
'introspection' has been carried too far in western Buddhism ... so in 
my own writings I have become increasingly wary of using the sort of 
language that supports that trend (Dharmavidya). 
The modem view of the mind, not the brain and stuff, the mind, [and] 
owing a lot to Freud of course, has a sense of the mind as a container 
with lots of contents. But I do not think that was anything like so 
much so in the Buddha's day, and it is not so much so in a lot of 
cultures ... Being modem people, we will tend to talk about dreams and 
we will say that a dream happens in your mind, but you do not 
experience a dream as happening in your mind, you experience 
yourself as being inside the dream, and you do not experience the 
characters who appear in your dream as being inside you. You 
experience them as visitations ... The majority of cultures that have 
existed on the earth regarded them as visitations - they regarded them 
as outside ... So, that kind of existentialist way of thinking of the mind 
- the mind not particularly having contents, but having an environment, 
and that environment being vivid, and related in some ways to what 
modem people think of as a spirit world and talk about rather 
condescendingly. But nonetheless for a lot of cultures what the 
modem thinks of as the content of the mind was the environment of 
the mind. It was what visited the mind; what appeared to the mind 
(Dhan-navidya). 
In The New Buddhism, Dhannavidya presents an interpretation of Buddhist 
history, which emphasises the 'this-worldly' character of the Buddha's message 
(Brazier 1997). Without 'the comforting rhetorical gloss', and once 'through the fat 
of religiosity down to the bone of the Buddha's intention for this world', Buddhism's 
revolutionary social message is revealed (Brazier 1997: 61). 
... my main purpose 
in that book was to counteract some of what I saw 
as a growing consensus in western Buddhism that I felt did not do the 
Buddha justice-that has led to a sense of Buddhism that I think is 
quite a distance from what old Sdkyamuni was talking about 
(Dharmavidya). 
III 
A quietist Buddhism has its place as a sub-plot, but it is certainly not 
the primary thing that the Buddha intended. There will always be a 
place for hermits and contemplatives, but that's not the be all and end 
all of what Buddhism's about, and it is not consonant with what is 
going on in the Far East, where there is plenty of engaged Buddhism. 
So the book was intended to balance things up a bit (Dharmavidya). 
Emphasis on the power of Buddhism to change social circumstances in this 
world does not mean that transcendental or metaphysical schemata have no purpose. 
I am not against metaphysics, but I think it should be in its right 
place ... metaphysics is often presented as some kind of absolute, which it can not be if it is some kind of human construct. As a human 
construct it can be very useful, rather in the way that a scientific theory 
can be very useful. A lot of people treat scientific theory as though it 
was some sort of absolute, but it's not. It is a useful thing and 
metaphysics is much the same; it occupies the same sort of level of 
significance. So I am not against metaphysics; I am in favour of it 
being put at the right level of significance. A lot of people nowadays 
think that they live without metaphysics, but they don't. There is just 
as much metaphysics wrapped up in modernism ... than any other creed (Dharmavidya). 
Dhannavidya argues for the development of a new, 'Liberation Buddhism' that 
encompasses both western and eastern Enlightenments (Brazier 1997: 54,78-79). 
For that to happen, the purpose of both modernity and nirva? za must be properly 
understood. Any attempt to understand Buddhist Enlightenment is complicated by 
the simultaneous availability of differing interpretations from a multiplicity of 
traditions. In The New Buddhism, Dharmavidya describes and criticises eight 
different versions of the Buddha's original Enlightenment. 
In a way, they [the eight enlightenments] point out that there is 
metaphysics in Buddhism, there is no pretending we can have 
Buddhism without metaphysics. Not only is there metaphysics in 
Buddhism, there is a whole load of different metaphysics in Buddhism, 
and logically they do not fit together ... it does not matter that they don't all fit together. They are skilful means. They are there for a 
purpose ... to orientate you in a way suitable to the practice, and a 
particular school will have its metaphysics to help orientate people in a 
particular way. But what is happening at the moment is that all this 
stuff comes into Europe from America; because of our Christian 
background we tend to assume this is teaching of the same type of 
validity as Christian teaching, so then you get into silly discussions 
about the absolutist dimensions of it (Dhannavidya). 
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Dharmavidya's interest is in this-worldly rather than other-worldly or absolutist 
dimensions of the Buddhist message. He therefore considers that for normal purposes, 
the physical world can be taken to be real, and our relation to the world as dual. 
A lot of western books on Buddhism take non-dualism to be what 
Buddhism is all about, and it is one of those 'can mean anything'- 
depending on who wants it to mean something - type teachings, which 
is very unscientific in a sense: I mean non-demonstrable. What does it 
mean? It means all things to all people [and] some absurd derivative 
ideas have gained some hold in the western Buddhist world, some of 
which are pernicious, because they lead to you not being able to make 
a choice, because a choice is always between dualistic options. So it is 
quite corrosive and undermining of ethics, and I do not think anybody 
who reads the Buddha can have any hesitation in thinking he was 
concerned about ethics (Dharmavidya). 
Prasada and Dharmavidya - synopsis 
Prasada's Buddhist psychology takes a purist view of the self, as a negative 
accumulation of habit energy. She interprets the skandhas, including ru-pa, as a cyc e 
of distorting perceptions motivated by obsessive preoccupation with their object: 
Buddhism thus advances a 'psychology of addiction'. She sees enlightenirnent as 
more a direction than a goal, involving the progressive removal of these 
preoccupations, so allowing a more direct encounter with the world. 
Dharmavidya criticises the scientific imperative to reduce mind to brain 
chemistry. The relation between brain and mind remains mysterious. One may be a 
condition for the other, but neither is evidently the cause or basis of the other. Brain 
explanations contribute nothing to the complexity of human concerns. He takes issue 
with the western view of the mind as being a container for 'Inner' mental contents, in 
contrast to the ancient and eastern view of the mind as a point-instant within an 
environment which is both real and psychologically inhabited. An intemalist, quietist 
view of the mind can lead to other-worldly, introspective non-dualism, which he 
argues was far from the Buddha's intention, for Buddhism balances introspection 
with social engagement in the external world. The logically incompatible 
metaphysics to be found in different Buddhist traditions are skilful means intended to 
orient towards practice. 
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John Crook 
Dr. John Crook is a biologist by training, but a polymath by achievement, for 
although his research has been foundational for the academic discipline of social 
ethology (the study of the social behaviour of animals in natural environments) he has 
also made contributions in psychology (2002 a, b), and the study of Drukpa Kagyu 
and Nyingma Buddhism (1997). His fifty-year interest in Buddhism has informed his 
academic work, both in his fieldwork study of peasant farming communities in 
Buddhist Ladakh (Crook and Osmaston 1994), and in his evolutionary study of 
consciousness (1980), which examines the development, out of social behaviour and 
organisation, of human minds distinguished by self-processes and occupied in a 
search for meaning and purpose. 
Crook is only 'retired' in the sense that he is no longer in full-time academic 
employment. He continues to reflect and to publish on ethological issues, and to lead 
trekking expeditions into China and the Himalayan region. After receiving dharma 
transmission from Master Sheng-Yen (Sheng-yen et al 2002: 28-34), he established 
and became the principal teacher of the Western Ch'an Fellowship in the U. K., and 
has assumed responsibility for the well-being of some Buddhist groups in Poland and 
in Norway. 
Crook described the Buddhist project succinctly as 'trying to understand the mind 
in order to go beyond suffering'. As such, it is a 'soteriological phenomenology'. In 
a restricted, special sense, he considers Buddhist methods to be scientific. He 
characterises the 'hard problem' of the relation between subjective experience and 
objective brain functioning as a paradox or as a k5an, which is irresolvable by means 
of discriminatory analysis. Crook is aware of difficulties in the interpretation of 
subjective experience, and in the interpretation of a, synchronic 'Buddhist point of 
view'. However, in the case of tathdgata-garbha doctrine, he does advance a 
synchronic interpretation, which unifies Madhyamaka and Yogdcdra perspectives that 
might be otherwise be antithetical. He directs questions about the embodied basis of 
mind to the exposition in his book on The Evolution of Consciousness (1980). 
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Interview summary 
Crook describes Buddhist methodology as a form of 'subjective empiricism'. He 
considers Buddhist meditation methods to be experiments that are not replicable in a 
strict scientific sense, because 'in subjective empiricism n is always 1: the individual 
is unique'. Yet some experimental replicability is possible, based on the mutual 
acknowledgement by teacher and pupil of the meditative experiential attainment. 
... it does seem ... that the 
human mind is very much similar from one 
person to another. Of course, I have to be careful about that, but there 
is probably a basic human characteristic of mind, which enables it 
under certain conditions to replicate the experiences of others, and it is 
on this basis that one could say that the meditations we do now and the 
results that are achieved are probably the same as 2,000 years ago 
(Crook). 
As a biologist by training, Crook is used to scientific paradigms that portray 
experience as contingent, not just upon brain mechanisms but upon all the 
mechanisms of embodiment, and upon contact with the outside world. Given that 
experience is an integration of the subjective and the objective, he suggests that it 
might be better to think of mind and world as continuity, rather than set up a firm 
division between the two. 
... my interpretation of recent evolutionary theory 
is that we have to 
get away from this strict dualism of mind and matter towards 
something that is more holistic. For example, we are sitting here now 
and it appears that we are looking out of this window, and 'I' this 
object in here, and my brain, interprets the picture out there: there is 
this 'in here' and that 'out there'. A more holistic view would notice 
that actually there is a continuum ... Of course there are 
different levels 
going on here. Like going up and down stairs there are different levels 
but the whole process is one thing... The problem with a holistic 
vision is that you cannot do an experiment on the whole ... thing at 
once! You have to take it apart and identify units and identify 
experiments; to do part experiments. But if one does that in 
forgetfulness of the continuity of the whole thing, I think one is selling 
science short, actually. You are making it into Cartesian reductionism, 
which is getting 'old hat' (Crook). 
Crook is conversant with the philosophical 'hard problem' of the relation 
between subjective and objective brain events: 'what is called qualia, the quality of 
experience, and how these arise from the activity and chemistry of neurons'. One 
approach to the problem, suggested to him by Rom Harre, is to treat talk about 
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experience and talk about brains as different Wittgensteinian language games. 
Attempts to 'cross' from one game to the other establish 'a paradox or a k5an'. 
However, appreciation that the problem involves incommensurability between 
discourses does not lead to an automatic resolution. 
[It is] easy to say all that but we still have the 'hard problem', we still 
don't know. My own intuition is that there is one phenomenon going 
on in the brain, and this phenomenon gives rise to a situation, which is 
objectified by the mind in some sense, so that the mind can create an 
image: it is a process of image production (Crook). 
Crook arrives at an understanding of the problem of incommensurability 
between discourses through an examination of the process of meaning formation and 
modulation. He cites Saussure and Derrida, in his description of what the mind does 
with language. As a first step, Saussure shows that words have meaning by marking 
the difference between things and kinds of things. Derrida takes another step, 
showing that the meaning of words is arrived at by a process of deferral (diffýrance) 
that allows time, not for independent analysis, but for mutual negotiation in a play of 
signification with others, until the meaning of a word is agreed as part of an 
evolutionary process of meaning creation, which in turn contributes to the evolution 
of cultures and discourses. Thus, meaning is determined by negotiation about the 
reference of language and the extension of words, not by a definitive relation 
between certain words and certain parts of the world. 
With reference to Buddhist tradition, Crook wonders to what extent expenence 
affects interpretation, and interpretation affects experience. He implies that difficulty 
arises when doctrinal interpretations become overly analytical. He suggests, firstly, 
that there are difficulties in representing how Buddhism as a whole analyses 
anything, let alone the mindibrain dilemma, because Buddhist psychology has 
undergone considerable historical development between, for example, the 
Abhidhamma and the Avatamsaka Sfitra. Secondly, analysis cannot encompass 
experience, if experience is a negotiation with the world, rather than analysis of the 
world; thirdly, analysis cannot satisfy the Buddhist imperative 'to understand the 
mind in order to go beyond suffering', for discriminatory analysis has a markedly 
different motivation: 
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It implies a desire for certainty. What does a desire for certainty imply? 
It implies that we are missing God ... as post-Christians, as David Loy has argued very effectively, we have lost our point of reference: God, 
and so when we are faced with a religion, which by and large does not 
bother about these things, namely Buddhism, people will say 'ah but, 
A but, ah but', and they'll query it because they are trying to push that 
religion to some place of certainty, which Buddhism never claims 
(Crook). 
Why is certainty unobtainable? Crook responds with a Kantian interpretation of 
the Heart Sfitra dictum that 'form is emptiness and emptiness is form': 
What it means is that every form we look at, whatever the nature of that 
form, it is empty in the sense that whatever appears to us is not the actual 
form; it is an appearance to us. Being an appearance to us, it is empty of 
any imputed reality. We cannot impute a reality to it; it is empty of that. 
But at the same time this empty unknown reality is appearing as a form 
(Crook). 
Crook reverses the internalist emphasis of the 'hard problem' of the difference 
between third-person and first-person access to the mind: it is the world, not just the 
mind, which can only be experienced subjectively. This is an unsurprising reversal if 
mind and world are indeed to be thought of as a continuum. Because the world can 
only be experienced subjectively, through human powers of perception and innate 
categories of mind, the Kantian things-in-themselves (Ding-an-sich) must remain 
mysterious and therefore uncertain. 
He suggests that the Ch'an response to questions about the paradox of the nature 
of mind with respect to its material embodiment, and to the inaccessibility to 
experience of anything beyond appearances, is exemplified in Hui-Neng's 
enlightenment line: 'let the mind arise, but don't attach to anything', and in the 
Buddha's and KdS'yapa's mutual understanding of the significance of the flower. If 
persons are not attached to a need for an analytical explanation of the meaning of the 
universe (world and mind), the meaning then becomes apparent: 'the meaning is 
given to you' as the continuity of the human relationship with the world. 
It might seem paradoxical that Crook should argue that Buddhism never claims 
certainty, and that Buddhist psychology has undergone too much historical 
development to be expressible synchronically, yet he also begins some statements 
with: 'Buddhism says... '. His position is defensible in three ways. Firstly, his 
remarks were locutions in the course of an interview, to be qualified on reflection. 
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Secondly, there may be some synchronic statements that can be made about 
Buddhism. For example, if the desire for certainty is a prime cause of suffering, any 
form of Buddhism that affirmed certainty would itself be a cause of suffering. It 
therefore can at least be said that Buddhism holds, synchronically, the view that 
certainty is not to be desired because it cannot be found. Thirdly, Crook speaks for 
Ch'an Buddhism, which is a broadly syncretic tradition, with roots in Madhyamaka, 
Yogacara and tathdgata-garbha thought. Crook is aware that Ch'an synthesises 
these ideologies, alongside influences from Taoism, and his discussion of suchness 
and emptiness in the context of tathigata-garbha gathers the philosophical strands 
underlying Mahdydna practice together in a single interpretation. 
I have thought a lot about tathdgata-garbha... It is part of the 
Cittamdtra [Yogdcdra] idea that psychologically we have a basis of 
mind which is pure. It is a psychological view. Whereas the opposing 
Madhyamaka view is about emptiness, the Lankdvatdra and this 
school argues for there being a basis in mind ... It is a ground, and the fact that there is an assertion that there is a ground has been the origin 
of a number of criticisms ... Westerners have argued, as well, that this looks like harking back to Hinduism. But I think that is quite wrong. 
Take the word tathdgata-garbha and take it apart: garbha means 
either womb or embryo, so what this basis of mind is, is the womb or 
embryo of what? The Tathagata, and what is the Tathdgata? It is 
tathita-gata. Gata is going-going of tathdta. What is tathdta? 
Suchness. So it is the womb of the coming and going of suchness. 
What is suchness? Emptiness. So it turns out that what we have as the 
basis of our being is the embryo of the mobility of suchness: 
awareness. 
Nothing absolutist about that, in fact from that line of thought 
you find that Cittamdtra and Madhyamaka come back to the same 
point of origin. Why have they diverged? The Madhyamaka is a very 
philosophical line of thinking; the Cittamdtra is very much more 
psychological, it builds up a psychological model of mind and uses 
that as a basis of meditation, whereas the other one leads to Hui-neng; 
direct cutting, direct seeing: let the mind arise but don't put it 
anywhere. No philosophy about that, but ... it is 
based on the 
emptiness philosophy (Crook). 
The remark that suchness is emptiness can be understood by noting that suchness 
is part of psychological discourse, while emptiness is part of philosophical discourse, 
but in Crook's exposition the two discourses are commensurable. Suchness denotes 
an experience-, emptiness denotes an explanation of that experience. The simplicity of 
Crook's exposition belles the scope for misplaced influence between experience and 
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interpretation, for a mis-identified experience will affect understanding of a particular 
explanation, and an erroneous explanation may foreclose access to an experience. 
Crook's preference is for experience over analysis, yet in this case his analysis both 
takes account of experience and offers a resolution to two opposing tendencies, either 
to take tathagata-garbha and s'i7nyatd as incommensurable explanations, or to equate 
them as one inherent absolute. Tathdgata-garbha designates an experience 
psychologically, s'z7nyatd designates it ontologically; since they are both indicative 
explanations, neither is the process-in-itself 
The Evolution ofHuman Consciousness 
In the interview, Crook referred questions about the mind/brain relation to the 
explanations given in The Evolution of Human Consciousness (1980). There he 
identifies the increasing complexity of cognitive capabilities as the factor which 
allows the evolution of vertebrates to be described as directional, rather than purely 
the product of chance in natural selection. Cognitive development begins in lower 
vertebrates with the identification and rectification of dissonance between internal 
metabolism and environmental fluctuations, proceeds to the development of leaming 
and recall of past coping strategies, and then gives rise to the development of 
representation and symbolic communication (Crook 1980: 384). In parallel with a 
graduated development of cognitive functions describable as forms of objective or 
task-oriented consciousness, the socio-biological processes of reciprocal altruism 
between individuals in groups facilitates the development of autonomous personal 
expression during interaction with others, giving rise to developed forms of 
subjective consciousness which become increasingly apparent in social mammals 
such as monkeys, baboons and apes (Crook 1983: 11-14), until, in hominids and 
tribal humans, consciousness acquires characteristics similar to contemporary self- 
awareness, yet not wholly identical, for human personality evolves in relation to 
cultural context, and in tandem with cultural complexity (Crook 1980: 389). 
Crook reviews the twentieth-century research which has 'exploded' the 
European philosophical concept of mind as an entity existing in disjunctive relation 
to its embodiment (1980: 14). He describes the exploded concept as the 'Cartesian 
dogma' that mind and body are 'two... distinct properties and function as discrete 
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entities'. He also observes that, after the behaviourist attempt to refer only to 
externally-observable stimulus and response, 'mind' has undergone rehabilitation as 
a useful collective term for a variety of embodied cognitive functions that process 
information from and for external relations to the social and natural environment 
(Crook 1980: 20,27). He concludes that: 
There is no doubt that information is held and manipulated in 
cytochernically encoded structures. Information is physically 
represented. The mind is thus materially present in the world. The 
problem of dualism seems to arise from the way in which we 
experience ourselves... Consciousness ... comes into being when information is represented to a monitoring faculty under deliberative 
attention ... Only as attending proceeds, however, does it become 
possible to describe the immediately antecedent experience of a 
conscious episode. In fact mental experience can be consulted only 
retrospectively and such experience, as evidence for the existence of 
mind, can appear only as an introspective report of past events. 
By contrast, if one seeks in the present continuum for 'that which 
exists', nothing is to be found ... It is because the attender is 
unobservable and can only be inferred from retrospective description 
that mental experiencing includes a strong tendency to dichotomize the 
'F (attender) from the 'me' (self-description) ... which, on analysis, 
simply appear as inherent properties of the human cognitive process. 
The philosophical splitting-off of mind from brain arises mistakenly 
from the necessity of retrospective insight in the affirmation of the 
mind's existence. 
This is not to deny ... that 
inforination processing leads to decisions 
that have 'downward' psychosomatic effects. Of course it does. It is 
the function of the cognitive analyser to perform in exactly this way 
and thereby to relate the organism more closely to the environment 
and social change. There is no case beyond this for some mysterium, 
an agent of non-material origins, unless information processing is 
itself is given that status (Crook 1980: 28-29). 
Mind as a collective entity notionally- distinct from embodiment is, therefore, a 
consequence of the functional properties of human consciousness. Crook gathers a 
number of definitions of consciousness which indicate its properties: 
1) Consciousness as being and having. 
Consciousness is 'being'. Verbal thinking, by creating an object, is 
'having' (Fromm 1979). About these polarities hang the various states 
of consciousness that can and do arise (Crook 1980: 30). 
2) Consciousness as a form of present intentional attending modelled on the visual 
system. 
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Consciousness is intimately related to attending. Attention is the 
focussing of conscious awareness. This may involve a narrowing of 
consciousness, a division of awareness into a more- and less-focal area, 
a widening of consciousness until it has no especial object, or a 
flickering of consciousness when steady attention is for some reason 
precluded. Attention creates the foreground of consciousness, letting 
the rest slip into peripheral awareness. Gaining control of attending is 
to control the mind and states of experiencing. It is one of the main 
disciplines of spiritual training (Crook 1980: 30). 
On this account, consciousness is 'patterned' after the fashion of the visual sense 
that is dominant in humans, in that it has a 'panoramic' peripheral attention, an 
intentional arena or 'focus' of attention, and is linked to memory recall and 
(concerned with the attempted resolution of unfinished business' (Crook 1980: 30). 
3) Consciousness as a set of properties that construct an interior analogue or picture 
of the world. 
Crook cites Jaynes (1976), who describes the properties of consciousness as the 
invention of a spatial world on which to plot experience, the selection or 'excerption' 
of relevant scenarios, the creation of a temporal narrative, and the 'conciliation' of 
concepts to produce a consistent world-view. 
[These properties] are not the immutable basis of our world but rather 
the constructs we create to produce a stable world of subject and 
object within which to act (Crook 1980: 3 1). 
For Crook, the biology, socio-biology, and ethology of the evolution of the 
conscious mind are prerequisites to the understanding of personal identity acquisition 
and meaning-creation, and prerequisites to understanding the development of person- 
centred therapeutic strategies for alleviating common ailments of the self-process. 
Identity- formation is a universal process which produces individuals by means of a 
sequence of reciprocal transactions with the human social community and particularly 
within families, as the child constructs identity by practising autonomous roles and 
expressing meaningful attitudes in an environment that provides more or less 
supportive feedback (Crook 1980: 265-266). Since it is a temporal social process, the 
development of personal identity is vulnerable to untoward events that can only be 
unconsciously assimilated in early life, and which have ambiguous consequences in 
later life. 
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... most adult 
human beings actually comprehend few of their sources 
of action and impulse and are often far from knowing consciously 
what they are about; what we profess to know is usually a 
rationalization of what has impelled or directed us from within (Crook 
1980: 283). 
Crook is not content to remain within the restrictions of one scientific discipline, 
and expands his study of the socio-biology and ethology of human consciousness to 
include psychological strategies for coping with the lack of mental well-being, which 
build upon the inherent structural feature of consciousness, as an enactment of 
Fromm's polarity between 'being' and 'having'. This polarity is re-configured by 
Duval and Wicklund (1972: 2), as 'subjective self-consciousness' ('being' as the 
conscious subject directing attention away from itself to the world) and 'objective 
self-consciousness' ('having' as consciousness which has itself as the object of its 
attention), (Crook 1980: 313). 
The problem with objective self-consciousness is that its occurrence during 
socialisation leads to comparison of self with others and a consequent sense of 
inadequacy. Subjective self-awareness, on the other hand, is task-oriented, free from 
concern about the adequacy of the ego, and often inherently satisfying (Crook 1980: 
317). Although Crook finds it inconclusive, research into cerebral hemisphere 
dominance suggests that consciousness is 'bi-modal', either objective, propositional, 
linguistic, concerned with relationships, and therefore prone to anxiety and neurosis, 
or subjective, playful, 'autotelic' and self-fulfilling (Crook 1980: 318,335, 
Csikszentymihalyi 1975: 10,22) 
Briefly, Crook's thesis is that objective self-awareness produces a concern for 
the ego that is constricting, defensive, and characteristic of alienation in 
contemporary, largely western, civilization. He locates a remedy in eastern 
meditational practices which re-connect restrictive self-identity to the peripheral 
breadth of world experience. Such practices are normally embedded in 
hierarchicall y- structured religious meaning-systems, but have lost some of their 
collective coherence as religion in modernity becomes a matter for individual choice. 
In such circumstances: 
Contemporary systems of meaning are shifting strongly in the 
direction of what I call a 'transpersonal hunianism'; that is to say a 
value-system based firmly in the realization that experience stems 
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from within man and cannot be attributed to supernatural intervention, 
a value-system that none-the-less questions the values of the assertive 
egotism at the roots of modem life and seeks to move to a deeper 
understanding of the personal or self-process and its relation to the 
perceived world (Crook 1980: 361). 
Crook appreciates the practice of Buddhism because it lacks 'metaphysical and 
ethical dogmatism', is based on 'experimental study of experience, is 
phenomenological rather than intellectual, has an underlying unity based more in 
individual practice than on doctrine, and is 'as much concerned with social 
issues ... as with self-salvation' (Crook 1980: 362-363). The conclusions he reaches 
in The Evolution of Human Consciousness are factored into his humanistic 
perspective on Buddhism and his Ch'an style of practice. He revisits the issue of 
consciousness as 'being and having' with a more detailed argument, in Crook (1992, 
2002b). 
Synopsis 
Crook considers that the human mind has not changed significantly since the 
time of the Buddha, therefore the experiences mentioned in the early Buddhist 
tradition are replicable. He prefers to define mind as a holistic continuity with the 
world. He does not consider current evolutionary science to be reductionist: it 
merely interrupts holism in order to do part experiments. He has a representational 
view of the mind: its role is that of image production. He does not consider that 
there can be one syncretic Buddhist dogma about any subject because of the diversity 
of tradition, because experience is negotiation with, not analysis of the world, and 
because Buddhism, unlike analysis, is not motivated by a desire for certainty. 
Having wondered to what extent interpretation and experience affect each other, 
in an unrelated part of the interview he provides an example of how different 
interpretations can be reconciled to one experience, by paying close attention to the 
etymology of words, rather than to their place in doctrinal argument. As an example 
he provides a consilient view of the problematic notion of tathagata-garbha; a view 
enabled, I suggest, by the broad antecedents of Ch'an thought in the Madhyamaka, in 
Yogdcdra and in Daoism- 
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In The Evolution of Human Consciousness (1980), Crook finds sufficient 
explanation for mind in embodiment in the world, without resort to mysterious non- 
material agency. The notion of a mind/body split arises with the difference between 
the subjective 'present continuum' of the 'attender', the 'F, and the ob ective j 
'retrospective insight' of the self-descriptive 'me, ). Crook characterises 
consciousness in three ways: as being and having, as intentional attending modelled 
on the visual system, and as the provider of a representational analogue of the world. 
The evolution of consciousness is a prerequisite for the social development of self- 
identity, but alongside the development of identity the possibility arises of mis- 
assimilation of emotionally- significant scenarios in early life, with ambiguous 
consequences that become unconsciously rationalized in later life. The self- 
constitution of identity is an objective or 'having' mode, as opposed to the 'being' 
mode of attention to the world. 
Ken Jones 
Ken Jones is a Zen and Ch'an Buddhist practitioner, living in active retirement. 
He is the founder of the U. K. Network of Engaged Buddhists, practices with the 
Western Ch'an Fellowship and the Kanzeon Sangha, and leads independent retreats. 
He has published on socially-engaged Buddhism (2005), on Buddhism and ecology 
(1997), as well as original works of Haiku (poetry) and Haibun (poetry/prose 
combinations) (2002). 
Interview summary 
Jones considers the development of tradition as 'not replacement views; they are 
more sophisticated views'. Thus he holds the Therav5da to be true, but 'not 
sufficiently subtle, not sufficiently ambiguous' from his own Mahdyana perspective. 
Ambiguity is the key to his approach to Buddhism. 
The whole thing really is about ambiguity. Jung said that if a spiritual 
practice is not ambiguous it is not authentic. It is absolutely vital - and 
there is no logical way you can express ambiguity (Jones). 
Ambiguity is almost a tool, or a reminder, directing attention away from 
intellectual reification, towards concentration on practice and experience. 
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... my own Orientation 
is not towards scholarship, but towards my 
practice and that of my fellows ... so 
it is more experiential. If it is not 
to do with the work, I am not usually very interested in it and consider 
it positively dangerous for practice to dabble too much in this kind of 
intellectual fascination. It is the biggest problem we have. The whole 
history of Buddhism can be seen as a conflict between the experience 
of practitioners and the constant tendency to ossify that tendency into 
intellectual structures and the institutional structures that go with 
them ... We see 
Buddhism as the way but also as the problem. It is the 
biggest problem Buddhists have. Some of them have gone along quite 
well in getting rid of the other klesas, but Buddhism is the last one - 
it's the cow's tail - waiting for it to go past the window, and the rest of 
the cow has gone (Jones). 
Even the distinction between mind and matter is a reification too far. Such a 
radical separation of one thing from another is essentially dualistic, and dualism is a 
root cause of the suffering (dukkha) that Buddhism tries to get beyond. 
You can feel the pain of dualism. Samsdra is in essence the pain of 
dualism. That is what drives people to the Dhanna, or to dope or 
whatever. But oneness of course is also dualism. Most of what I think 
is wonderfully [expressed in] the only Buddhist scripture I've learnt by 
heart, and that's Seng Ts'an's Hsin Hsin Ming. [It is] a wonderful 
statement of my kind of Mahdydna Buddhism, and a very important 
scripture in the Zen tradition. It keeps the balance; it does hammer 
this paradox (Jones). 
The paradox of the ambiguity of dualism is expressed in the Heart Sfitra 
statement that 'form is emptiness, emptiness is form'. Although not explicable 
logically, the fonnula can be approached metaphorically. 
There are a number of ways in which you can explain emptiness 
without getting into paradox. This room can be explained in a number 
of ways depending on which perspective you are using: structural 
engineering, impressionism, medieval art without perspective, 
chemistry. But what is this room? ... 
it is empty of substance (Jones). 
But emptiness is not a thing, but a dependent relation between things, and when 
those things are a person and a world, emptiness is the suchness of experience. 
I would say that a person experiences emptiness [when] they 
experience life free of the self-need to fill this strange nebulous 
mysterious self and make it into a somebody (Jones). 
There is a self of course. You and I could not be talking to each other 
if there was not a self. The only reason why the Buddha said there 
wasn't a self was because everybody was so ... convinced there 
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was ... but then we are 
back into ambiguity because there isn't a self 
either, in the sense of a permanent self, and in the sense that this isn't 
all a dream between us. In a way we are dreaming. You only have to 
do a little bit of meditation to see that. We have got the whole thing 
constructed so that it will make sense ... Only because we share a 
whole lot of constructs can we get on with it ... we share a conventional 
construction of reality (Jones). 
The way beyond that conventional, dualistic, self-needy construction of reality is 
through the practice of mindfulness. 
Mindfulness is an interesting way to understanding 'suchness'. If you 
look at something when your mind is in a state of 'emptiness'... then 
there exists only the lamp - you see it in itself. When you see things 
with that kind of vividness you are not seeing it in terms of 
comparison with anything else. That implies emptiness, because 
form 
... is philosophically about how one thing defines another. One 
thing isn't defining another when it exists in suchness, and some of our 
most profound experiences, whether spiritual or not, are received with 
extraordinary authenticity when we see their emptiness, see their 
suchness ... D6gen wrote a wonderful fascicle: 'All the universe is one bright pearl'. If one is totally absorbed by that thing it is the whole 
universe (Jones). 
For Jones, one consequence of an insistence on taking an ambiguous approach to 
traditional doctrine and to conventionally constructed reality is that there are no 
moral certainties to fall back on. 
... the desire to be right [is] back to dualism again. When one works 
with people on Buddhist ethics we all have the feeling there is some 
right and wrong up there, and if we could get in accord with that we 
would be good people. There isn't. It is quite scary. There is nothing, 
absolutely nothing. It is very difficult for people to understand this. 
You can understand it intellectually, but you assume there is 
something up there ... It is dualism again ... it is conceptual Buddhism, dogmatic Buddhism ... The Zen view tends to be dangerously 
antinomian, because the precepts come at the very end of your practice, 
by which time you are assumed to be a very ethical person without 
thinking about it. Of course that is questionable. I think one needs the 
precepts as a reminder, and as something to play with (Jones). 
Despite that pragmatic use of precepts, the lack of metaphysical moral certainties 
means that ethical practice depends on relinquishing the grasping of a reified sense of 
self 
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... 
in socially-engaged Buddhism emptiness is the skeleton in the 
cupboard, because one can be effectively changing the world only 
when the self isn't in the effort. The only way the self is not invested 
is when there is this sense of emptiness. Sometimes one takes oneself 
too seriously ... I'll express it in a Zen way: nothing is worth taking 
seriously and therefore everything is worth taking seriously ... If we are 
no longer driven by self-need there is nothing to do but helping other 
people. Engaged Buddhism in its purest form is where we will all end 
up (Jones). 
In the interview, Jones's answers often went against the run of the questions, and 
can be seen as a characteristically Zen expression of the Mahdydna. That perspective 
yields a philosophically 'externalist' view of the mind as 'a mutual event between 
world and brain' 
What interests me is the way that the subject, person and the object 
that is out there interact to form a relative experience in the subject and 
in that sense everything is mind. What I find particularly fascinating is 
the discovery that we are free to create whatever reality we like within 
certain limits, and that the needs of the self, its cultivation and 
personality, carries [us] into particular channels of experience. 
Dharma is about being able to transcend these experiences. It is quite 
extraordinary the extent to which we can transform the perception of 
what is reality. 
... I think that 
is straight-forward Mahdydna Buddhism, beautifully 
expressed in the Hsin Hsin Ming (Jones). 
Jones is not concerned with the investigation of the nature of mind from a 
philosophical point of view. 
I am a bit suspicious about differentiating between minds and 
bodies ... cautious 
in that I do not like to see a strong duality set 
up ... We are 
back to form and emptiness again, an ambiguous situation, 
and once we set up these situations we create these impossible 
questions for ourselves (Jones). 
... we are not 
interested here in the logical mind. It has its value but 
often it is just another way to enable a certain kind of personality to 
secure its ... existence 
(Jones). 
... there are some questions 
to which there are not any clear answers, 
and that raises the question as to what their meaning is as 
questions ... 
[with] all these things we are involved in structuring the 
formless (Jones). 
However, he is prepared to consider the psychological effect of Buddhist 
practice, which leads to a reduction in intentionality. 
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Someone who is on the cusp of the human condition is inevitably 
intentional in their stance, because they just want to do something 
about it because they suffer. They may move to Dharma, therefore, 
intentionally, and they want to be relieved of their suffering. If they 
stick with it; they enter through a long process, whereby ultimately the 
intentionally falls away ... the other-power we talked about (Jones). 
That reduction in intentionality does not entail that Buddhists become unfeeling 
6zombies'). 
We have our moments of calm presence of course, which is very 
important to inform our lives, but what strange desiccated individuals 
we would be if our emotions were somehow eliminated! ... That's an interesting k5an: that our passions are our Buddha-nature (Jones). 
Jones observes a complex relationship between Buddhism and psychotherapy. 
A starting point is that Buddhism is concerned with a person's 
existential predicament as a human being, and psychotherapy with 
more specific dysfunctions that make it difficult to operate what you 
would call a normal life. But beyond that the overlap is extremely 
complex. For example, if you go on a retreat and you conduct 
interviews with students as a teacher, most of the stuff that comes up 
has to do with dysfunctions in the course of life ... inadequacies as a human being 
... because you cannot separate these from the existential 
problems ... So in this sense so-called spirituality and so-called therapy intertwine the whole time. 
... One cannot, as some Americans 
did, suggest that people who 
want to undertake spiritual practice [should] go into a preliminary 
period of therapy and when they are "clean", go into these great 
existential questions. I think that is extremely naIve, but it is put 
forward in all seriousness because it is very good business for the 
professional psychotherapist (Jones). 
Avoidance of the resources provided by logical deliberation and overt 
intentionality opens the possibility that self-deception might pass unrecognised, 
particularly with regard to meditative experience, but Jones finds an external (other- 
power) source of confidence or validation in the 'facticity' of experience, which has 
enabled him, after many years of Buddhist practice, to be reconciled to the 
indigenous religious tradition. 
... all I can say 
is that when we experience structure in mind it comes 
with a certain facticity. It is just how things are. I prefer to trust that, 
whatever that means ... I am not 
bothered about certainty ... One can 
distinguish between notions which the self develops, and these things 
which seem to be given from somewhere, and this is something in all 
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the great spiritual traditions ... [from] my own experience as a Buddhist 
and the experience of many other Buddhists, it has given them an 
understanding and empathy for the idea of God. This Other is given, 
and one can see how in certain cultures this Other is personified. All 
this Other is of course one's self that is ignorant, which one has then 
divided. All this connects quite nicely with the whole gamut of inner 
path Christian mysticism, which is why so many older Buddhists, in 
my experience, have felt they have come home in later years to 
Christian mysticism. Buddhism has given them the key to empathise 
with [and] to come home, back to their own culture (Jones). 
With regard to the future of Buddhism in the West, the area where Jones does 
anticipate real change, as opposed to reinterpretation, is in hierarchical social 
organisation and in the well-springs of social activism. 
[Buddhism in western context] ... certainly means changes to social 
organisation, because ... [the West] is such a very strongly developed 
social culture, in terms of issues such as hierarchy. One has to ask 
oneself what is the nature of that hierarchy, because ... [the West] is 
quite an egalitarian sort of culture. How do ... [Buddhist groups] 
respond to this? Do they attract people who want security and want 
father figures? That would not be the case in a culture which is 
naturally hierarchical, and [where] no-one says it is hierarchical 
because that is the water in which they swim ... another important issue is that of social activism. We live in a culture in where the general 
approach to a problem out there, whether it is global warming or the 
threat of war in Iraq, or rheumatoid arthritis, or a bad marriage, is to 
fix it. We have resources and technologies and money to go out and 
fix it out there, or we think we do, whereas in traditional cultures the 
emphasis is on changing the way you experience it. That is what 
spirituality is traditionally about. So what happens when you have a 
traditional spirituality in the context of a culture which is obsessed 
with fixing it out there, and that is not what spirituality is about? That 
raises questions, of course, for socially-engaged Buddhism, which has 
to find a way of combining inner and outer work, and undertaking an 
inner work of personal change in order to be socially more effective 
(Jones). 
This discussion of social organisation and social change gives rise to the 
question of who effects change in a world of selfless persons, how change is effected, 
and what is changed in enlightened persons. 
Of course it's other-power ... When 
for example we have an insight it 
comes with a sense of facticity, rather than an idea that I've got. (Such 
as, ) when we are moved to help someone and are able to act in a 
critical situation, and afterwards we say 'Who did thaff So in a sense 
it is other-power, and it might look like superhuman power - so I am 
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happy with that. Beyond that you are touching on the whole question 
of enlightenment, which I think is a big issue in the West. 
By enlightenment, the belief that if one practices long enough, 
skilfully enough, one will be reborn with a fundamentally changed 
personality; this becomes the object of one's practice. This I think is a 
hugely destructive notion. There are three delusions involved. The 
first one is that someone who admits that they are deluded can imagine 
what this situation would be. The other [second] delusion follows 
from that. This is simply inflated desire. The whole point of 
enlightenment is getting rid of desire or seeing it fall away. The third 
delusion [is that] it is always something that is going to happen in the 
future, it is not something that is happening now. You get this all the 
time. People sit [in meditation] and they are waiting for something to 
happen. We get the dualism again that becomes all this misery. 'I'm 
here -I want to be there. ' 'Other people have this experience, so why 
can't I? ' 'Whereas the whole point of meditation practice is to accept 
what comes up. It is actual acceptance of one's inadequacies, of one's 
hopelessness. That is liberation: a total acceptance of it ... You are just 
accepting your inadequacies and the world as it is. Then you are free 
to do something about it, because you act out of total acceptance, 
[which] implies that the self-serving self has shrunk very significantly. 
When we accept totally, the self has almost abandoned its project, and 
can start to address the needs of the world instead of own needs 
(Jones). 
Jones is not daunted by the possibility of dialogue with traditions and 
perspectives from outside Buddhism. 
... I regard outsiders' criticism 
[as beneficial]. If they are serious and 
thoughtful criticisms one can respect them. They are like gold, much 
more [helpful] than from someone who is anxious to embrace the 
whole lot (Jones). 
He thinks that the possibility of dialogue between Buddhists is limited by 
practical considerations. Firstly, Buddhism in Britain suffers from sectarianism, 
'using that word in the technical, not the derogatory sense'. Secondly, although there 
is a central forum - the Network of Buddhist Organisations - there is no central 
journal. Thirdly, the present need is to 'build up trust on a personal level' therefore 
'the last thing you need is to talk about doctrine'. He also senses that Buddhists are 
characteristically wary of entering into debate on divisive issues: 
In my experience Buddhists are afraid of conflict, because they are 
afraid of stirring up things - other beasts that live deep down. it is a 
controversial view but I have the feeling very strongly, and do not 
think Buddhists are any better than anybody else at handling 
conflict ... 
Buddhist organisations tend to have the same organisational 
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problems as any other ... Spiritual people can get very wary about 
exposing themselves to conflict and the powerful emotions that come 
up, not realising that if one can open to these without taking them 
personally, these strong feelings that flow can have a warmth to them 
as well. As long as we do not take ourselves too seriously, and of 
course, what can be more serious than spirituality? That's the problem 
(Jones). 
Synopsis 
The development of Buddhist Mahdydna tradition represents increasing doctrinal 
sophistication, and increasing ambiguity. Emphasis on ambiguity enables Buddhism 
to avoid of ossification in logical, intellectual and institutional structures. The 
experience of emptiness as suchness is a way to avoid the construction of a world on 
the basis of self-need, and to avoid continually assessing one thing comparatively in 
ternis of another. As well as the absence of doctrinal certainties, there are no moral 
certainties, but an ethical system arising naturally from self-relinquishment is the 
well-spring of socially-engaged Buddhism. 
Everything is mind, in the sense that 'subject, person and world interact to form 
a relative experience in the subject Usually that experience is channelled by the 
needs of the self, with the relinquishment of self-need perception can be transformed. 
The division of mind and body is the kind of logical dualism that Jones abjures, a 
'structuring of the formless' out of a search for certainty. With mindful attention to 
other-power, selfish intentionality falls away, but that does not mean that what 
remains is an emotionally 'dessicated' non-intentionality. 
There is some overlap between religious and psychotherapeutic practice. 
Religious practice is warranted by experience, and confidence in experience comes 
from 'facticity': the sense that, although experience is 'structure in mind' it has an 
external source, describable as 'other-power', and more trustworthy than 'self- 
power'. The 'other' is 'our own self divided'. Appreciation of the facticity of other- 
power in experience has reconciled Jones to Christian culture, mysticism and divine 
personification. He makes a general distinction between the western tendency to 
resolve problems by material change, and the eastern tendency to resolve problems 
by experiential change. He is critical of the notion of enlightenment as a future state 
of profound personal change in another lifetime. That enlightenment is imagined at 
all implies inflated desire; that it needs to be imagined implies that it is to be found in 
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the future. For Jones, enlightenment is just as likely to be found in acceptance of the 
present. 
Jim Pym 
Jim Pyrn has worked as a publisher, author, assistant manager of Watkin's 
Bookshop in the West End, London, and manager of the Quaker Bookshop in Euston. 
He first encountered Buddhism in his 20s, and later began Zen meditation in London 
with a former monastic who taught a few friends inforinally. After his death, 
Pym practised with Rev Jack Austin, who was at that time a Zen priest. Austin came 
to feel that progress in Zen meditation was not possible without the influence of an 
enlightened teacher, and he started to investigate the Jodoshinshu or Other-Power 
tradition, where progress is considered to be empowered by Arnida Buddha, the 
Buddha of Infinite Light and Life. He passed his discoveries to Pym, who recognised 
that this was also the right path for him. Together with Hisao Inagaki, an ordained 
Jodoshinshu priest who lectured at SOAS, they established the Shin Buddhist 
Association of Great Britain. This association later became the Pure Land Buddhist 
Fellowship, which is more a network of like-minded practitioners than a forinal 
organisation. Pyrn is the editor of its quarterly journal: 'Pure Land Notes'. 
Pyrn was ordained into the Japanese Seimeizan School by the Rev. Tairyu 
Fuwakawa. The Seimeizan School is outside the mainstream of J6do Shinshi! 
tradition, but appealed to Pym by virtue of its interest in ecumenicism and social 
engagement. Rev. Fuwakawa had Zen as well as Jddo Shinshii transmission, he 
cooperated in joint Buddhist/Catholic retreats, and his home temple enshrined a relic 
of Albert Schweitzer. The Seimeizan movement campaigns for the abolition of the 
death penalty in Japan, and is supported by Sister Helen Prejean, whose similar work 
in the U. S. A. was featured in the film Dead Men Walking. 
Pym has taken up the Seimeizan emphasis on ecumenicism in the British context, 
rediscovering an interest in Christian spirituality that was overshadowed by his 
youthful rejection of Catholic upbringing. He suggests that Shin Buddhism and the 
mystical traditions of all world faiths are fundamentally compatible (Pyrn 1998: 14- 
28). He has written on Quaker spirituality and on the relation between Quakerism 
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and other faiths, and in You Don't Have to Sit in the Floor (2001: 7), argues that 
Buddhism can be undertaken without engaging in culturally- specific practices. 
Interview summary 
Pym's attitude to tradition is informed by his first encounter with Buddhism, 
when he attended a lecture on the Kdldma Sutta (Woodward 1932: 170 [AN 111. 
7.65]), 'where the Buddha says, "Believe only things that are helpful to you"' (Pym). 
This advice informs his practical approach to ecumenicism, and to obscurities in 
historical transmission: 
The teaching in the Pdli Canon was recorded and remembered orally for 
over 300 years by monks - no recollection at all of it being recorded by 
lay people, so consequently what came over in the Pdli Canon was for the 
benefit of the Sangha. Now we all know the game of Chinese 
whispers ... I am not saying any serious thing of that [nature] 
happened, 
but human memory is a fallible thing. In addition to that it was recorded, 
probably, and remembered, in verse form. To put into poetic verse form 
in that Indian tradition meant that you used rather flowery language. So 
all that means that for me that the Pdli Canon is not as much solidly 
4 gospel' as some people would have it to be (Pym). 
... many of the Mahdydna siitras were written 
down so long after the 
Buddha and were not historical in their setting ... so you have to 
look at 
those and say 'this is the language of myth'. I like D. T. Suzuki's 
definition, (in Buddha ofInfinite Light) where he says that myth can often 
be more powerful than fact because it touches deeper levels. That is 
certainly true of the three Pure Land Sfitras (Pym). 
I do not find scripture as important as experience. For me it is the 
experience of people who have chanted the name of the Buddha, who 
have experienced Shinjin or have practiced vipas'yana or other forms of 
meditation - the cumulative experience of those people coming down to 
the present day ... so my attitude towards scriptures 
is much the same as 
my attitude towards the gospels. There is much that is helpful and much 
that is totally unhelpful (Pyrn). 
Pym considers that the complexity of tradition has obscured the simple message 
of the Buddhist teaching that there is suffering or 'unsatisfactoriness', a cause of 
suffering and a way out of suffering. Complexity developed as a negative 
consequence of inter-denominational philosophical dispute, but simplicity re- 
emerged in the twelfth century Pure Land tradition of H6nen and Shinran, who 
democratised Buddhism by providing practices that were accessible to illiterate non- 
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professionals such as farmers and fishermen, who were prevented by law from 
becoming Buddhists because of their occupation. The simple practices of chanting 
the name of Buddha as advocated by H6nen (nembutsu), and cleaving to the state of 
mind that accompanies the chant, as advocated by Shinran, enables access to the 
experience beyond words that is the essential Dharma. 
It is the sense of presence, sense of being, that which is beyond 
words ... but it takes form, and it takes form in three ways: in action, 
particularly compassionate action, it takes form in words, and it takes 
form in presence or being ... there has to be a form, as with one of the 
skandhas: a form has to be there (Pym). 
There is, for Pym, an intimate link between the priority of the present and 
Dharma as a sense of presence. Enlightened actions are just actions, not reactions 
out of, or towards, the past or future: 
... the word presence is of course closely linked to the word present, 
which is the eternal now, so in a sense everything that we do in terms of 
expressing things ... putting it into words or whatever, is all related to the 
past, or possibly related to the future, but there is a sense of presence, a 
sense of being, a sense of nowness, which is that essence out of which 
all this comes. I might be wrong to speculate, but to me the 
enlightenment of the Buddha ... is that he always spoke from a sense of 
now ... I have met this with other, what I call, spiritual beings - people 
who are totally with you at that moment. They are not thinking about 
the past, they are not thinking about the future, they are not thinking 
about anybody else (Pym). 
As well as in the KdIdma Sutta, Pym finds this emphasis on the present in the 
Hsin Hsin Ming. The emphasis in that text is on action rather than reaction, and on 
non-discrimination. This attitude informs Pym's desire that religion be 'a circle that 
includes everybody', his preference for positive rather than critical dialogue, and for 
religious practice as a 'life-teaching that does not fit into one of the faith pigeon- 
holes'. 
Pym considers Buddhism to be scientific. Buddhist practice is the 'experimental 
observation of experiments ... you 
do certain things and certain things will happen'. 
He does not understand, or think that anyone understands the mechanism of rebirth, 
but he does not doubt rebirth, for otherwise 'there can not be any real justice around'. 
For him, the fabulous details of eventual rebirth in Pure Lands are 'boring' if taken 
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literally. He considers that these details constitute a symbolic system for which the 
interpretation has now been lost. 
... but the important thing about rebirth ... is that ... we are born where we 
are bom. In other words, wherever you are born and whatever 
circumstances you find yourself in: that is something that you have to 
deal with, there and now, and not be forever running off on retreats or 
going off to foreign climes or following this teacher around or that 
teacher around, to the extent of neglecting what is under your nose 
(Pym). 
Pym's view of the mind is experiential rather than scientific or philosophical. He 
gives a detailed account of 'going beyond the mind to the unborn', an introspective or 
vipas'yand method of practice: 
You observe the way thoughts arise and thoughts drop away, so there is 
an observer to observe those thoughts and there is a space in which 
those thoughts arise and fall away. It is almost like a cinema screen: the 
thoughts get projected on it and they go away. So Buddhism looks 
towards helping you understand or discover or even live within that 
awareness of the space. That is what I understand Buddha to mean by 
the Middle Way. There is a space, a point of balance between past and 
future, between positive or negative, or whatever: that point of balance 
which is the space within which the thought arises. But we see the 
thought as not us. That is what I mean by 'going beyond the mind', 
because there is no word within western psychotherapy or psychology, 
that I know of, to describe that space, and yet the experience of 
meditation tells us that is there ... Now, what Buddhism is trying to say is, what is the screen [space] and more important, who is the watcher? 
And thatl then, is clearly taking you beyond your thoughts, because you 
are observing a thought, and so you observe the nature of your self - not 
in terms of saying there is a self or there isn't a self, but in terms of 
being able to observe the nature of the self by being it ... it is becoming 
the self, and it is becoming the self that observes, and the nature of that 
self is not-self. In other words the nature of self is that any thoughts or 
concepts that we project onto that [space] are only thoughts. They do 
not have any impact upon the observer or watcher ... you might even call it the unseýf (Pym). 
Pym is describing an experience that may be thought to be psychotherapeutic in 
the technical sense that it is a reworking of habitual mental functioning, but actually 
goes beyond the usual psychotherapeutic concern to reconfigure the normal social 
functioning of the self. He is aware of the Jungian view that westerners need to first 
find a way through their unconscious dispositions to coherent sense of self before the 
self can be transcended (Jung 1958: 537,553), but his description is of a movement 
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from duality, in the form of the concept of self, to 'mystical oneness', better 
described as anatta. He stresses that this experience is accessible to everyone, and 
that it can lead at least momentarily to a radical change of vision, as the recognition 
of separation from one's own thoughts, emotions and feelings suddenly causes 
transference beyond the 'circumference' of subjectivity. 
... [This experience 
is] there and you don't recognise it ... We expect 
enlightenment to be flashing lights and beautiful visions and beautiful 
music-but it isn't. It is actually the acceptance of the ordinary in the 
here and now, but free from time. That's all.... the illusion we have [is] 
this vision that enlightenment is going to be something wonderful ... yet I suspect ... 
from glimpses that I and many other people have had that it 
is a beauty here, it's finding the kingdom of heaven, or the path home, 
here somehow, and it is real (Pym). 
Pym expects this experience to be accessible through any fonn of religious 
practice. He compares this to Shinjin: the generation in the Pure Land tradition of the 
4entrusting mind' of enlightenment when the recitation of the nembutsu (or any other 
mantra) becomes instinctively internalised, and metaphorically transfers from the 
head to the heart. He points out that the term 'mind' has several meanings in 
Buddhism: 
Some teachers will talk about 'all is Mind' in the same way as Christian 
mystics will say 'all is God', and mind is capitalized to indicate 
this ... almost the idea that mind 
is seen as ultimate reality ... [The 
capitalized mind] is Buddha-mind, is the divine in a sense. It is mind that 
is all-embracing. It is the substance, the essence of everything... (Pym). 
Capitalized mind, Pym considers, is also used to denote the Tao in Ch'an, where 
writers did not wish to import a term from outside Buddhism. Capitalized 'Mind' is 
thus a term for the divine, for the essence of all, for the Tao, and also for the kind of 
ordinary/extraordinary experience that Pym describes. Although he does not 
specifically say so, my impression is that, by virtue of his focus on experience, Pym 
is untroubled by philosophical distinctions between these different meanings. 
"at Kind of Buddha? 
Because his primary concern is with Buddhism as religious experience rather 
than as scriptural tradition, Pym thinks that Buddhism should be explicable in 
language enables westemers to practice effectively. In What Kind of Buddha, "at 
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Kind of God? The language of Western Mystical Theology as an aid to understanding 
the Shin Buddhist experience (1998: 14-28), Pym asserts that Dharma is universal, 
therefore present in western life, religious practice and literary expression. 
Buddhism and Christianity may or may not lead to the same goal. It 
would require someone who had walked both pathways and arrived to 
say whether the Pure Land and the Kingdom of Heaven are the same 
or different. Perhaps it is best to take the Buddha's advice, and avoid 
speculation (Pyin 1998: 24). 
To be universal, Dharma must be discernible in Christian discourse. Pym finds 
its traces not so much in theology or philosophy as in the poetic language of the 
mystics of all faiths. 
... the written word can only express the full range of meaning when it is not used literally. Words placed together can convey more than the 
sum of the individual words. The language of the spirit is not the 
language of the dictionary: it is the language of poetry (Pym 1998: 22- 
23). 
... we need the experience first, and then we can find the language (Pyni 1998: 24). 
For Pym, commitment to Dharma as a universal experience entails that mystical 
explanation in any religious tradition can be a guide towards that experience. This 
commitment colours, the way he evaluates both Christian and Buddhist doctrine. 
When I wish to express [my] experience in words I would like to be 
free to use without prejudice the language which gives me the words 
that come closest to that experience. I am grateful to Buddha, Amida 
and my teachers who have shown me the Dharma. I am also grateful 
to my parents, to God and to the religion of my childhood, without 
which the Dharma would always have been something foreign (Pym 
1998: 25). 
Pym justifies a life spent variously in Catholic, Zen, Quaker, and Shin Buddhist 
practice, because from all he receives the message that 'we can all surrender our lives 
to the Infinite, but we cannot do it by ourselves' (Pym 1998: 26). 
Synopsis 
Pym describes himself as 'a mixture of a traditionalist and an anarchist'. 
Underlying this statement is his belief that experience is more important than 
scripture, and the experience that matters is 'the people's experience'. His emphasis 
is on actual experience in the present rather than exemplary experience in the past, 
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and this emphasis informs his attitude to tradition, to the Dharma, to other faiths, and 
to the philosophy of mind. 
Pym only accepts that which is useful to his religious life, and is therefore able to 
be ecumenical, and unconstrained by a specifically Buddhist identity. He is not 
concerned with the literal truth of scripture produced by and for the Sangha, rather 
than the laity, and in any event, he holds that the poetic language of myth is more 
powerful than fact. The urgency of the Buddhist indication of a way out of suffering 
has been obscured by interdenominational philosophising: the Buddhist way 
indicates the essential Dharma, which takes the forms of action, words and being in 
the experience of presence. 
He considers Buddhism to be scientific because its practice proceeds by 
experiment. The kind of dialogue he finds productive is non-confrontational. He 
does not understand the mechanism of rebirth, but accepts it on the basis of the 
justice argument. However, what matters is this rebirth now, and the circumstances 
in which we find ourselves. His explanation of mind is experiential, taking the form 
of a description of vipas'yana practice of the observation of awareness. He believes 
that enlightenment is accessible through this, or any other kind of religious practice, 
as 'acceptance of the here and now, but free from time'. He gives the example of the 
metaphorical transfer of the prayer 'from the head to the heart', in the Russian 
Orthodox faith, which he compares to the generation of 'entrusting mind' (shinjin) as 
the nembutsu becomes internalised in the Pure Land tradition. Pyrn is well aware 
that mind has several meanings in Buddhism, from reference to individual mental 
events to the 'essence of everything'. Literal meanings, however, do not 
communicate the full range given by the other-power of experience. 'Essentially, it 
is the poet who gives us insight into the depth of religious experience' (Pym). 
Ratnaprabha 
Ratnaprabha (Robin Cooper) is a senior member of the Western Buddhist Order, 
the ordained community around which the FWBO is focussed and organised. He has 
been the Chairman of Cambridge Buddhist Centre and part of the team responsible 
for the ordination process at the Padmaloka retreat centre near Norwich. He now 
works with Windhorse Trading in Cambridge, involved with applying Buddhist ideas 
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to the work environment, and to international trade. He trained as a physicist, and has 
taught and researched in environmental physics. He is the author of 'The Evolving 
Mind: Buddhism, Biology and Consciousness' (Cooper 2003), and continues to write 
about connections between Buddhism and Science. 
Interview Summary 
Ratnaprabha considers that there is a basic unity to all forms of Buddhism, and a 
sense of unity between all Buddhists: con an intuitive level we are doing the same 
thing'. He is aware that the tradition has its discontinuities, and some interpolations 
from other traditions, but feels that the significance of these aporias depends mainly 
upon the 'interpretative weight' given to them. He has no objection to the 
philological investigation of canonical texts, finding it 'fascinating, usually 
helpful ... sometimes sterile'. He considers the continuing oral transmission of 
enlightenment experience to be more important than the textual transmission of 
tradition. Ratnaprabha is aware of the problems that can arise in interpretation, 
either in the translation of terms, or of instructive examples: 
... it can be very easy to think you 
have understood or explained 
something within a particular framework when actually it did not quite 
fit ... traditions of thought take certain things 
for granted (Ratnaprabha). 
Since what matters about tradition is not whether it is adhered to but whether it 
continues to be useful, Ratnaprabha considers that contextual interpretation is 
necessary. Contextual problems motivate the interpretation of textual tradition under 
the guidance of oral tradition; in this way the explanatory act is warranted by the 
personal experience of the original author, of the teacher, and of the practitioner. 
... 
in my case and that of a great majority of Buddhists, ... contact with 
Buddhism has come through the human beings I've met and through 
what they have transmitted to me of their own experience on all sorts 
of levels ... So when 
I start reading the Pdli canon I interpret in the light 
of what I have learnt through my experience and what I have learnt 
through my own teachers ... so 
I would say oral transmission is still 
very important (Ratnaprabha). 
Since Ratnaprabha has a background in science education it is unsurprising that 
he takes scientific findings seriously. He agrees that an understanding of scientific 
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explanation is one component of seeing things as they really are (Yatha-bh17tam) but 
he does not presume that all scientific explanation will have relevance for Buddhism. 
With regard to the mind, Ratnaprabha is not persuaded by computational models 
of mental functioning. He considers the neuroscientific account of mind/brain 
identity to be 'not a dogma, more a slight impoverishment of thought'. The problem 
is not that mental phenomena might have a material base, but that explanations of 
mental functioning should be reduced to terms that are only relevant to that material 
basis. He does not argue for a particular belief about the nature of mind. 
My starting point for all these things is to say that first of all I am 
immersed in consciousness, so there is nothing nearer to me or [more] 
familiar to me but nothing more mysterious either. I want to avoid as 
much as I can, thinking that I've actually gasped it, and ... come to 
conclusions, even logical conclusions, that say - 'it depends upon the 
brain, and therefore without the brain it can not possibly exist. ' I 
would rather say that I do not know ... and use the whole conditioned 
co-arising approach (Ratnaprabha). 
His preference is for an externalist view of the mind, which stresses the mutual 
constitution of mental and physical events. That externalism does not entail idealism: 
mind and world are mutually constituted in the world of experience, but there 
remains an objective world beyond experience. The consequence of such a view is 
that, in contrast to the 'eliminative materialist' philosophical perspective, he holds 
that the investigation of conscious experience remains a valid topic. 
How do you investigate the subjective pole? ... you can not investigate 
it objectively because you are taking it as an object, so it is no longer a 
subject. Presumably all you can do is be present in it ... as yourself as a 
subject, which is what meditation is in a sense ... What then may 
happen is that, according to the traditions - and this would go along 
with my very limited experience - is that the sense of there being a 
split between the object and the subject starts to attenuate, so it is not 
so much that you rise above the objective and go off into the 
subjective, it is more that you realise that the split you made in the first 
place is only a provisionally helpful thing for dealing with sensory 
experience. So when you get into other forms of experience you do 
not have to make that split between subject and object and you simply 
have a unified experience of some kind, and that unified experience is 
what Buddhists refer to as the very subtle levels of consciousness and 
experience (Ratnaprabha). 
He relates these experiences of the unification of subject and object to 
descriptions of ' higher or formless dhydnas' (meditative states, Pdli. jhdna), which 
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are achieved after the attainment of the four dhydnas of form. Such states are 
mentioned in the Buddhist canon but not emphasised, for they are not considered to 
be a necessary part of the path to liberation. 
... if one takes rather 
intuitively what those things could be getting at, 
they sound like a great attenuation of the split between subject and 
object, so you have a very spacious experience in which there is no 
sense of there being an external side to reality. ... my impression of 
the formless dhydnas is that it is an oversimplification to regard them 
as four layers on top of the fourth Ayina, but that they are more four 
ways of meditating in the fourth dhydna, in other words ways of 
applying your attention... It seems to me to be rather a lost teaching, 
and the commentaries will therefore try to explain it away... 
(Ratnaprabha). 
Nothing said thus far conflicts with the scientific notion that the material basis of 
brain is causally-necessary condition for mental events. Ratnaprabha is, however, 
prepared to envisage this condition not being necessary. Despite strong 
circumstantial grounds the mind/brain causal relation remains uncertain, and 
Ratnaprabha is suspicious of certainty, in Buddhism as much as in science. If 
science is never certain, it remains possible to conceive of mind continuing without 
dependence on physical embodiment, even if science cannot (yet) explain how that 
could occur. 
... there 
is a great network of conditionality that goes into this instant 
of consciousness ... one of these, and a very 
important one, is ... the 
nervous system. If someone [suggests] that it is possible for 
consciousness to be differently embodied - not embodied in a material 
way -I might at first say that I do not understand how that could be, 
but I also realise there are so many conditioning factors of 
consciousness that maybe it is possible for it to continue with that one 
particular conditioning area being removed, because I know it can 
continue with some of the other areas removed (Ratnaprabha). 
... if I 
look at my experience either in deep meditation or in dreams I 
can see that experientially I seem to continue without any reference to 
my physical body - so if I have a dream I do seem to be undergoing 
experiences that still are embodied, I am still able to look and touch 
and so on, but I'm definitely not doing it with my physical body ... 
it 
went to some other place in time and space entirely, at least in my 
imagination ... that 
helps me to imagine what it might be like to be 
living a non-physically embodied existence. So it is imaginable, but 
that does not necessarily mean that it is explicable (Ratnaprabha). 
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Ratnaprabha's suspicion of certainty allows him room for mythological 
interpretation and flexibility of thought about specifically Buddhist issues that 
influence views of the nature of mind, such as disputes about absolutism, between 
the sudden and the gradual path, and the problematic notion of innate enlightenment. 
... I would 
look at [disputes] much more charitably and say that there 
are different ways in which one can approach one's own spiritual life; 
different helpful pictures and images or models to use ... so you can have the model: ... just let go of all this [rubbish] that I am producing at 
the moment, then there's an underlying awareness which is very pure. 
And it is here - you do not have to go anywhere else for it, you do not 
have to add anything to it. In a sense you could already argue it is 
already enlightened ... but then, to live life as [one] was living before [is] not living life in accordance with that underlying 
awareness ... because a lot of what [one does] is in accord with all sorts 
of ego, self-interest and all sorts of mistakes ... So even if I do believe [in innate Enlightenment] that does not give me an excuse not to 
follow the gradual path. If on the other hand my favourite metaphor is 
of the gradual path, moving towards a very distant goal ... that is OX ... but I have got to realise that if I did not in a sense already have [Enlightenment] within, then how could I possibly produce it? If it 
was completely foreign to me how could I get there? You get into the 
same problems [as] the theistic religions, of God being completely 
divorced and separate from His creation ... If you go for the Buddha- 
nature or the gradualist approach, in both cases there is a danger of 
tipping over into something that will prevent effective practice, and the 
other approach may well bring in the cure for that... (Ratnaprabha). 
Employing similar flexibility, he has a preference for the doctrine of rebirth, 
based on some confidence in traditional accounts, and on the grounds that the end of 
consciousness, at death, renders life meaningless. However, he agrees with 
Sangharakshita that lack of belief in rebirth is no barrier to Buddhist practice. 
... previous accounts, 
because they seem to be reliable in other ways 
and because they seem to be almost unanimous on the issue of rebirth, 
it must make my doubting side stop for a while and say, 'Well, it's 
interesting, here are some very intelligent and highly realised people 
who did not just take it for granted , 
but even say that this is part of 
their experience, or this is true, including the Buddha himself .. When 
Sangharakshita was asked about it once he said, 'Well, if you don't 
believe in rebirth you have got to go for Enlightenment in this life, 
haven't you? So you must work very hard. ' So in a sense, not 
believing in rebirth will give you an even stronger incentive 
(Ratnaprabha) (see Sangharakshita 1998: 38-42). 
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The Evolving Mind 
In The Evolving Mind: Buddhism, Biology, and Consciousness (Cooper 2003), 
Ratnaprabha develops Sangharakshita's view that, with the development of self- 
awareness, physical evolution gives way to 'Higher Evolution', as persons actualise 
their potential as 'True Individuals' in the course of religious progress. 
... inevitably I was taking a 
Western idea, the idea of evolution and I was 
saying can we fit Buddhism into that? There are dangers in that and I 
am sure that in the long term that will not be the way that it is done, but 
it is worth playing around with it and seeing what happens, and there are 
also great advantages in it because people are not particularly wanting to 
educate themselves completely in a non-Western way of looking at 
things in order that they can practise the Dharma (Ratnaprabha). 
The key ten'ns that Ratnaprabha uses to link Darwinian evolution to Higher 
Evolution are of concepts of levels, of transcendence, self-awareness, self-reflective 
consciousness, and of inner and outer worlds of experience. His hypothesis is that 
evolution by natural selection is a process of change (self-transcendence) to another 
level of response to an environment (Cooper 2003: 18-18). Self-transcendence in 
humans was carried a step further by certain Axial Age sages, including the Buddha, 
when they developed techniques of self-reflective consciousness that enabled them to 
transcend nature and become 'more fully human' (Cooper 2003: 126-130). It is not 
clear that self-reflective consciousness is an environmentally-transcending or solely a 
self-transcending response, but it might be both: with the development of agriculture, 
urbanisation, and complex social and cultural structures, the concept of an 
environmental niche can be interpreted widely for theoretical purposes as the total 
environment of an individual or society, providing the leisure and impetus for radical 
reflection on the human predicament in its relation to the world. 
The concept of evolution was used before Darwin to indicate ordered growth 
unfolding towards some teleologically-necessary completion. In both the pre- 
Darwinian and the Darwinian sense the prototypical meaning of 'evolution' derives 
from the observation of biological events. In the case of Buddhism, however, 
Ratnaprabha uses 'evolution' to refer to mental events that can only introspected, not 
observed in the world. He therefore comes close to the conflation of two different 
mechanisms of evolution, one biological and the other mental, one other-power and 
the other self-power, with each mechanism having a different epistemological status, 
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one empirically observable, the other introspected. It could be argued that the 
difference leads to category confusion, but it is precisely Ratnaprabha's point that 
empirically-observable natural selection processes in humans have been overtaken, 
transcended, and even cancelled-out by empirically-unobservable mental 
conditioning processes of 'Higher Evolution'. He is not saying that the two processes 
are identical, but that evolution by natural selection loses efficiency as humanity 
uncouples itself from environmental pressures, and that humanity has reached a point 
beyond which mentally transformative self-reflective processes begin to take over the 
leading causal role in determining human individual and social change. 
As with all accounts based on introspection, there is no evidence for 'Higher 
Evolution' other than testimony, whereas the wider theory of natural selection is 
warranted by an accumulation of empirical evidence, including the fossil record. 
This indicates the general problem faced by religious explanation: it largely depends 
for verification on the testimony of private introspection and personal realisation. 
Ratnaprabha tacitly accepts the point that there can only be inferential evidence for 
the depth of sanctity or level of mental attainment of particular practitioners in any 
religious tradition, when he mentions the possible existence of an unknowable 
number of 'undercover Bodhisattvas' (Cooper 2003: 207). 
Although both evolution and Higher Evolution are progressive accounts, natural 
selection does not depend on progression. Darwinian theory simply observes current 
complexity of adaptation accompanied by evolutionary dead ends, species extinction 
and stasis, as well as examples of the emergence of the new capabilities that 
Ratnaprabha refers to as 'self-transcendence'. Higher Evolution, on the other hand, is 
an inherently progressive evaluation, yet the theory is incomplete, for it does not 
predict how mental transformation could transcend the cognitive re-arrangement of 
individual personality to progressively affect society as a whole. 
The Evolution/Higher Evolution combination is rhetorically effective, because it 
aligns religion generally and Buddhism particularly within evolutionary theory rather 
than against it. The two theories become complementary rather than competing 
explanations of 'the way things really are'. Buddhist soteriology loses some of its 
mystery in the process, becoming a practical matter of psychological change, based 
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on the traditional teachings of the 'three trainings' of ethical action (sila), sustained 
self-reflection (samddhi), and wisdom (prajfid) (Cooper 2003: 167). 
Ratnaprabha's theory is a controversial but defensible view that self-awareness 
constitutes a natural limit to physical evolution, as individual self-awareness becomes 
a matter for individual development. He accepts that the notion of the 'True 
Individual' is controversial, but defends it with an argument reminiscent of Jung's 
view that westerners interested in eastern practices have first to find the self, before 
they can transcend it (Jung 1958: 537,553). 
... when I consolidate my sense of myself I am not speaking about my 
atman or anything like that. I (mean): do I know what I am doing and 
who I am? Have I got any kind of continuity of awareness in what I 
am doing? (Ratnaprabha). 
In his book, Ratnaprabha is concerned to present a positive interpretation that is 
accessible to westerners. He lays no claim to a definitive interpretation, and on 
reflection he wonders if tenns like transcendence and nirvd? 7a should only be used 
verbally, with reference to a process rather than a goal. 
Synopsis 
Ratnaprapha, is aware of problems with the translation of discourses into new 
contexts. He considers that inconsistencies in tradition are less important than the 
motivations behind interpretation, and that adherence to a doctrine is less important 
than its effective use. In this way he accounts for problematic issues in Buddhist 
philosophy that impinge on mind-theory, such as absolutism, sudden and gradual 
approaches to enlightenment and the doctrine of innate enlightenment, by a 
charitable attitude to mythological interpretation. He is content with the historical 
and philological analysis of texts, but finds that the link to experience makesl oral 
transmission as important as textual transmission of the Dharma, enabling 
interpretation to be triply-warranted by the experience of author, teacher and 
practitioner. He considers science to be a valid contribution to the explanation of 
the 'way things really are' (yatha-bhuitam), but that the notion of mind/brain identity 
is a 'slight impoverishment of thought'. He accepts that mind has some material 
basis, but rejects explanations seeking to reduce mind to that material basis. He 
prefers an externalist view of mind, as the 'mutual constitution of mental and 
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physical events', and considers the introspective investigation of conscious 
experience to be a valid endeavour, scientifically and otherwise, which he 
characterises in relation to the traditional typology of meditational states (dhyanas). 
As a scientist he is suspicious of certainty, and is therefore able to conceive of 
circumstances where the brain is not a necessary condition for mind. 
Jonathan Shaw 
At the time of interview Jonathan Shaw was the administrator of the Awakened 
Heart Sangha. This organisation provides graduated access to Mahdmudrd and 
Dzogchen teachings in the Kagyu-Nyingma tradition, as interpreted for western 
sensibilities by Shenpen Hookham, the Sangha's teacher. For several years Shaw 
has been personal assistant to Shenpen Hookham, as well as producer and manager of 
the Sangha's website and online distance-learning courses. Shaw's education in 
philosophy and psychology enables him to supplement a practice-based approach to 
Buddhism with an uninhibited and speculative approach to issues of doctrinal 
explanation. Since the interview took place he has embarked on a prolonged period 
of meditation retreat. 
Interview summary 
Shaw considers Buddhism to be a positive path of practice, experience, and 
realisation. He approaches tradition accordingly, seeking guidance rather than 
opportunities for analysis and critique. He has faith in the 'immediate Buddhist 
tradition' and is 'open-minded about the Buddhist tradition of earlier times. ' Within 
that earlier tradition he detects 'a core practice lineage in all schools at all times. ' 
... I once thought of calling it 'the natural mind tradition of Buddhism'... that centres around instructions to look at the nature of 
one's experience and to relax into the nature of one's mind. The idea 
of clarity and awareness as being the essential nature of one's being 
(Shaw). 
This positive tradition can become submerged by the concerns of doctrinal 
scholarship. 
If we are to talk about subtle things wrong with our experience, about 
space, time, self, other worlds, definitely we should be looking to see 
what wrong ideas we have. But does going away and studying mind- 
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bending texts for 13 years really help you to look at these facets 
of .. experience? 
I am not convinced it does undercut my worldview 
(Shaw). 
In keeping with his orientation towards practice, Shaw reflects on how doctrines 
are assimilated before they are understood. 
I do find I have assimilated vast tracts of ways of thinking. The classic 
case is always things like rebirth, but there's a whole host of Buddhist 
ways of thinking, without any divine revelation giving me 
unconvertible evidence of their truth, or indeed of a great deal of 
thought on my part ... I simply came to assimilate them. Now this is 
obviously disturbing for one's perception of oneself as a reasonable 
person ... 
is it an example of our delusion, or is it merely because these 
things are true, so one's intuitive wisdom will eventually shine 
through? ... so, even if one has not got real realisation, still it is possible 
that this process of gradually falling into it - this other way of seeing - 
one could not rule out the possibility that it is good and true and wise 
and real, rather than simple delusion, but one has no way of 
knowing ... one is left in a rather uncomfortable position, 
discovering 
one is falling into a position without knowing what's real (Shaw). 
Subscription to traditional beliefs is not necessary for Buddhist practice; a mind 
that is alert to the attitudes that reinforce a belief might be more beneficial than the 
belief itself. 
How much belief in the issue of rebirth do you need to engage in 
Buddhist practice and Buddhist meditation and to get good results? I 
would say none. Would some help? Not necessarily. Could there be 
other beliefs you have in your mind? ... maybe you 
have some subtle 
other belief about how you end at death. Could that actually be some 
other belief about the nature of your mind? [Ifl you have a fairly fixed 
idea of who you are, could that be an obstacle to your meditation and 
Buddhist practice? Probably, but in some sense anything as gross as a 
belief is not subtle enough to have a powerful obstructive effect or a 
powerful helpful effect on your Buddhist practice ... But gross 
beliefs 
could reinforce or signal the presence of more subtle attitudes that 
could be problematic ... you [do not] need the answers, you need to 
be 
looking in the right place, and a certain world view could conduce you 
to look in the right place (Shaw). 
He concludes that S'raddha or conviction is 'the same as rea isation-). 
When they say you need certainty, [that does not] mean you need to 
have defined your idea extremely clearly and have a tightly held belief 
with it, more just that you need to become it so totally that that is 
simply how it is for you ... 
but it does help to have the right ideas 
pointing you in the right place (Shaw). 
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Given his mistrust of scholarship, it is natural that he should consider that oral 
transmission from teachers and the benefits of connection with teachers (adhisthana) 
takes priority over texts, although text may also partake of the nature of speech. 
... but 
fundamentally one is talking about a direct contact with a reality. 
Given the delusions we have in place we might be only able to get 
such direct contact by meeting someone face to face... (Shaw). 
When faced with the characterisation of tradition as essentially a collection of 
views, therefore possibly falling within the right view/wrong view paradox, Shaw 
suggests that only the person who is enlightened possesses right view. He finds the 
dilemma of views to be 'not philosophically hardcore - it just requires some 
disambiguation. ' He does this by means of the Sanskrit terms prapahca and upadeýa. 
Prapahca is elaboration or proliferation, and can also be thought of as 'structures of 
delusion or grasping'. Upadeýa means 'instruction' or 'whispered words'. Shaw 
interprets this to mean 'words that are said to convey an effect on the listener - 
particularly to convey them to a place in their experience. ' 
... prapahca that I exist or prapahca that there 
is a world, or prapahca 
that there is time. You could call this prapahca of views, meaning you 
should have no views, meaning you should not have this fixed 
structure of grasping. You should dissolve them all, but then that is 
not the same as Buddhist teachings. Are they a view? Are they right 
or wrong? ... Firstly there's the trivial observation that you shouldn't 
cling to them ... you can generally condemn clinging to anything 
in 
Buddhism ... but there's a subtler question about: are they actually true? (Shaw). 
Words must have their meaning as part of some public context, 
otherwise you can't really make a theory of language. I do not 
contradict that [with his interpretation of upades'a] ... maybe you can't 
really apply the word[s] 'true meaning'... here, but the simple fact is 
whenever you utter words they do have an effect, so what we are 
concerned with is not whether they are true but what effect they 
have ... does it convey to you the characteristic of your experience 
that 
I am trying to convey, and does it have an interesting effect? ... that 
accounts for an awful lot of Buddhist doctrine. It is non-literal 
language... (Shaw). 
Two questions ... 
how do you apply that to things less obviously 
experiential, to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, Pure Lands, etc.? Secondly 
does that leave Buddhism willing or able to say anything that it would 
say was literally true? ... Firstly it would not surprise me 
if the domain 
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of literally true things was limited to the domain of the natural 
sciences and mundane life, but nothing of any concern or value to 
human beings ... or what the 
basis of the world was, or what the bases 
of the natural sciences were ... they might all fall outside the relatively 
narrow bubble of what could be spoken about with literal truth ... my 
second point would be that there might also be a non-literal theory of 
truth around ... with another meaningful thing pointed to by the word 
truth ... that there 
is actually some feeling of rightness which might be 
pointed to by the word truth, which is why we cared about 
truth ... There 
is some feeling about trueness, so what we actually mean 
by truth and trueness is not the same as the formal semantic meaning 
of truth ... [then] there is the whole question of the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, pra? 7idhdnas and Pure Lands, all this esoteric stuff. Is it 
true? I don't know if they are going to fall into the domain of things 
that are literally true like the natural sciences, or whether they are 
going to fall into the experientially true like the good upadeýa (Shaw). 
His analysis amounts to the development of two orders of what the word truth 
might mean in traditional Buddhist discourse; although '... in a traditional Tibetan 
context it is all bog-standard traditionally true' (Shaw). He observes that tradition 
evolves slowly as it assimilates cultural and contextual changes, whereas the 
transmission of Buddhism to the West has been rapid, over not much more than a 
single generation of Buddhist teachers and students. He thinks that informal dialogue 
about change within Buddhism might occur naturally as boundaries between groups 
and affiliations become more penneable. With regard to dialogue between Buddhist 
and scientific views about the nature of the mind, even if it is not taking place 
formally, it is occurring informally. 
What is really productive from my point of view is that Buddhists are 
forced to think about both ordinary western conceptions of the mind 
and western scientific neurological work and psychological work. Not 
because of encountering dialogue with representatives of these so- 
called'traditions but simply, one, because they are representative of the 
common-sense tradition by their very location and birth, and two, 
because science has such tremendous [status] in our culture, and 
rightly so, amongst Buddhists even, that we are normally inclined to 
think about and attempt to reconcile scientific positions that we can 
read about and may have even studied at university ... with Buddhist 
stuff. You can have an interaction between Buddhist views of the 
mind and Western common sense and scientific ones without 
Buddhists ever sitting down and talking to non-Buddhists. Buddhists 
are so embedded in the non-Buddhist world that that will happen ... any 
time a Buddhist is talking to another Buddhist about mind they are 
both speaking in the common sense assumptions of their language and 
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culture, so it is kind of bound up in the intra-Buddhist discourse 
(Shaw). 
However, for those who wish to develop a specifically Buddhist realisation out 
of their own innate understanding, some of the egocentricity that is involved in 
egalitarian dialogue needs to be relinquished to enable a hierarchical dialogic relation 
to an experienced teacher. As an interesting comparison, despite careerist 
egocentricity in the academic study of Buddhism, Shaw detects a marked reluctance 
to confront tradition. 
I guess Buddhist Studies is the study of a dead religion, in a 
sense ... They tend to go on: 'This Buddhist says this, this Buddhist 
says that. ' I am much more interested for them to say: 'This Buddhist 
says this, and he's wrong'... [they] are not actually advancing the 
debates in the texts, [or] concerned with the truth of them. They are 
simply reporting on the debates, which is boring. It is like the history 
of philosophy rather than actual philosophy (Shaw). 
Shenpen Hookham uses the tenn Awakened Heart to refer to the core of being, the 
Buddha nature (absolute Bodhicitta) that is always present, to be revealed fully at 
Awakening. She also uses the term to indicate 'complete perfect enlightenment'. The 
idea of the heart as location of the mind appears to be a Vedic importation into 
Buddhism (Sugnasiri 1995: 423), but Shaw is not concerned to distinguish his school 
of Buddhism from any other school or tradition, including Hinduism, 'because there 
aren't that many ways to skin a meditation cat. ' 
... it is in Longchenpa - absolutely 
definitive Nyingma thought. Heart- 
stuff is very important in the Awakened Heart Sangha ... the first 
course book, 'Discovering the Heart of Buddhism' talks a lot about the 
words heart and mind ... basically the idea that we can use our 
heart 
language that we have in our culture, and when we use that we have a 
certain feel for that, or it conveys a certain meaning to us ... heart 
language points to what is the most important thing about our 
experience (Shaw). 
There [are] various things we think about the heart ... we talk about a 
steadfast heart -a lot of words to do with a sense of stability and 
groundedness - then we have words to do with essentialness, like the 
heart of hearts at the core of our being. Then we have words to do 
with sensitivity and feeling. So various different loci of meaning all 
converge on the one word, which makes it a quite powerful 
word ... guiding us 
in our experience to the place where those things 
converge, which is the Awakened Heart (Shaw). 
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If you said Buddhism is all about the mind you are giving people a 
really dodgy idea of what Buddhism Is all about ... very intellectual and 
rationalistic ... 
if you are thinking about the heart then you are probably 
closer to where you should be from a practising Buddhist point of 
view (Shaw). 
Given his caveats about scholarship, intellection and rationality, and his lineage's 
preferential use of heart-language, Shaw has good reasons to find the term 'mind' to 
be equivocal, and he is prepared to express uncertainty about the precise extension of 
its meaning. He uses the term, but in two markedly different senses, making 
distinctions between '... a kind of awareness as the ground of everything, or just 
awareness or experience in general', and 'mental functions or mental operations'. 
Awareness as the ground of everything is Buddha-nature; it overflows the ordinary 
meaning of the term 'mind', to encompass all other appearances. 
Technically in Dzogchen they say the nature of mind has three aspects: 
openness, clarity and sensitivity. Openness: spaciousness. Clarity: 
awareness. Sensitivity: responsiveness ... three qualities, three ways of 
pointing at the mind. The nature of our experience is openness, is 
clarity, is sensitivity ... an actual description of Buddha-nature and 
how 
we are and how we will come to realise we are (Shaw). 
Everything else is in experience. The body and the brain are in the 
mind rather than vice versa (Shaw). 
Every [mental] ten-n is problematic. It is almost like ... I have no idea 
what the mind is. I know that the Buddhist idea of the experience of 
awareness is fundamental to everything, so that there might not be a 
thing called mind (Shaw). 
By mental functions, Shaw means mind in terms of the six Buddhist 
consciousnesses. 
... 
if you are asking about mental operations and what's the real nature 
of these, or indeed what's the real nature of sensory awareness, what's 
the real nature of body, I am going to have to say that is a really 
esoteric question and I do not know the answer at all. It is simple 
enough to be able to conceive that awareness is the ground of 
everything and the world is just the kinds of things in it. But then to 
try and work that out? So everything in the world is then like that 
already, and actually our experience of it is a deluded reflection of 
xuh, qt it Pq rf-nllv like ... if the 
difference between inside and outside is 
completely different to how we think it is, what is a sense impression? 
(Shaw). 
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I do not expect that this pseudo-idealism I am espousing as the Buddhist position is capable of defence or justification or even is 
conceptually meaningful. I guess it makes sense as upadeýa- What it is trying to do is not to be coherent in defence of a philosophical 
position, but ... trying to convey something ... existentially about the nature of my experience (Shaw). 
His idealism dissolves many of the logical and conceptual difficulties in 
understanding mental powers and alternative realms, or worlds that are inaccessible 
to ordinary consciousness. 
The kind of position I am talking from within ... has all sorts of weird 
and wonderful things as being entirely possible. It is not the slightest 
bit metaphysically conservative! If thought is appearance and 
awareness you can have some quite strange appearances (Shaw). 
On Shaw's account, unconsciousness or impainnent of consciousness is not the 
interruption of a faculty, but an alteration in the manifestation of that faculty. 
... these would be changes in the manifestation of one's 
world ... unconsciousness is interesting because this kind of way it is 
projected does not really believe in the existence of unconsciousness, 
because consciousness is unbroken, so unconsciousness is simply a 
disjunction in the story, a kind of narrative disjunction in a thought 
(Shaw). 
Shaw speculates that the brain might be 'somehow a critical control junction in 
the dream', but the fact that the whole world is structured through awareness, and 
therefore through persons, provides some insight into the quasi-divine nature of 
enlightened beings. 
... if everything 
has a personal and impersonal aspect, that applies to 
the true nature of reality as well. The big God rears his head, but if 
you follow the logic of that principle you have got the big God back in 
there ... I see the consequences of that principle as simply saying 
that 
there is this sentience, aliveness, awareness that pervades everything 
(Shaw). 
Thus the so-called material brain upholds the mental functions of the person and 
is both within and implicated in controlling the structure of deluded awareness, yet 
the brain is itself a deluded reflection in the light of a more enlightened form of 
awareness. At least in the form of an instructive explanation (an qpadeýa), karma is 
the mechanism that motivates the delusion of ordinary experience in an ordinary 
world. Shenpen Hookham has referred to 'reversing a mistake' in the ordinary view 
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of the world, an exchange perhaps synonymous with pardv. rtti (revolution of the seat 
of consciousness). It seems extraordinary that the ordinary consciousness of a 
natural world, normally related to by sentient beings through the filters of egocentric 
intentional attitudes, might be fundamentally an error. At the root of such error is 
the dual action of gasping at awareness and reacting towards it, so establishing a 
negative causal chain. 
... emotion is the energy or just activity of awareness. The question is how [do] you relate to that? ... every negative emotion has a positive 
counterpart. The more precise way of saying that is that every 
negative emotion originates in a particular aspect of awareness ... when 
you have a rare intense moment of clarity you grasp onto it ... you can't handle the intensity of that clarity so (you) grasp onto it as 
anger ... which still has some of that flavour of precision and 
cuttingness as the clarity, but also quite a lot has gone wrong with it as 
well (Shaw). 
... properly speaking [conditioned co-production] is actually talking 
about the arising of our deluded self from the ground of awareness. 
(What) it is actually talking about expressly is error. There is the 
original state ... there is error, then gradually the process of that error 
then building and elaborating ... we made a mistake and we got 
born 
into a world that reflected that mistake, or we created a world that 
embodied that mistake (Shaw). 
It all depends on how much of a realist you are about this 
world ... [Shenpen's] perspective 
hinges around the idea that the story 
of this world is not the real story of us, so that it means natural in the 
context of some bigger story of our ascent into Enlightenment rather 
than the story of the evolution of animals on this planet (Shaw). 
The mistaken view of the world includes its temporality. 
... it is important to understand about the world, that 
it is a-temporal. 
So that mistake is the same mistake that is being made in every second. 
That mistake is made with the birth of every thought ... and 
it is only 
made once as well - the same once that is the birth of every thought. I 
think Dzogchen uses the term thefourth time to make that point, but it 
does not really help. [It is] the same process as birth ... and rebirth. 
Taking birth starts with pure awareness, then some structure appears in 
that, then you [mess] it up by grasping onto the structure, then you get 
birth into a complicated world, or rather you twist up the world into 
which you are born. We twist up the natural structure, sart7sdra - there 
is no beginning point (Shaw). 
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The Buddha and the movement towards awakening constitute the link between 
the a-temporal and temporal worlds. 
The Buddha career as a fully awakened Buddha marks the point of 
contact between the world of being in time and the totally outside 
time-world, and there can only be one such point of contact. That's it 
forever. The Buddha's cosmic career lasts forever (Shaw). 
If a Buddha is aware of the temporal world from the standpoint of the a-temporal 
world, that Buddha's powers of memory could theoretically be immune from 
temporal attrition, so enabling full remembrance of past lives. From the a-temporal 
standpoint, Buddhas might also have beneficial access to, and influence on 
(adhisthana) momentary events in individual lives. Pure Land teachings are one 
form of qpadeýa, used to explain the beneficial influence between the a-temporal, 
enlightened awareness that is the nature of the mind of a Buddha, and the temporal 
awareness of an embodied mind in a delusory world. Such teachings are skilful 
means, pointing from the temporal and the material to the a-temporal and immaterial 
nature of the enlightened mind. 
In acting to help to clarify the awareness of beings, a Buddha is acting with 
spontaneous intentionality, without the egocentric cunning that tends to underlie 
ordinary human intentionality. 
I do not think that a Buddha has no intention, or it is a flaw in his 
compassion if he does, and indeed [I think] that the word spontaneous 
should not be interpreted literally. It is ... an upadeýa, a word that 
is 
pointing at some kind of arising of a quality without contrivance ... you 
can do wrong with intention. You can also have a right intention and 
indeed a Buddha creates a Pure Land through his pratfidhana, his 
wishing spell, like a mega-intention that is focussed and arises so 
purely, through his connection with the nature of reality (Shaw). 
Synopsis 
Shaw's Buddhism is oriented towards practice, experience and realisation. He has 
faith in the immediate (contemporary) Buddhist tradition, and in historical tradition as 
a guide for that faith. He does not see tradition as an invitation to scholarly analysis 
and critique. He observes that he has assimilated doctrine as a 'way of seeing', and is 
unsure if that process is a matter of delusion, or of intuition. Lri any event, he 
considers that it is not 'gross' beliefs that influence practice, but the subtle attitudes 
that reinforce them. 
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His equivocal attitude towards doctrine emerges as a preference for oral rather 
than textual transmission, for 'whispered words to convey an effect' (upadeýa) rather 
than proliferation of views (prapafica). Direct contact with a teacher is qualitatively 
different from indirect contact through a text, for it establishes a more effective 
communicative and beneficial connection (adhisthdna). Shaw wonders if, alongside 
the literal theory of truth that accounts for empirical things and kinds in the natural 
world, there might not be a non-literal theory of truth that accounts for the non- 
empirical things of human meaning and value. He does not know, but surmises that 
Buddhas, Pure lands and Bodhisattvas may fall within the category of things that are 
non-literally true. 
He does not like the notion of organisations sitting down to fon-nal dialogue about 
doctrinal issues. With respect to the mind, it is unsurprising that such dialogue is not 
happening, because of the rapid transmission of traditions to the West over a single 
generation. He expects informal dialogue between groups to happen, because group 
boundaries are becoming more permeable in the multi-cultural West. He considers 
informal dialogue between individuals about scientific perspectives to be an 
inevitable consequence of their immersion in the prevailing social milieu. 
Shaw's Nyingma tradition uses heart-language to explain mind-events. He finds 
that 'mind' has overly-intellectual connotations, whereas 'heart' more effectively 
communicates 'experientially true' meanings about the feeling-tone at the core of 
being. He suggests that 'mind' has two distinct references: to mental functions, but 
also to awareness as the ground of everything. This latter meaning can also be 
characterised as Buddha-nature (tathagata-garbha), and qualitatively described as: 
'Openness: spaciousness. Clarity: awareness. Sensitivity: responsiveness' (Shaw). 
Shaw considers philosophical clarification of his view of mind to be fairly 
irrelevant. His extension of the meaning of the term 'mind' beyond reference to 
mental functions is exterrialist, but because he is unsure of the nature of materiality 
and thinks 'there might not be a thing called mind, ' he charactenses his view as 
(pseudo-idealism'. There is a paradox here, which he feels no need to resolve 
intellectually because the brain is not as it seems: the brain in some way upholds 
mental functions, and perhaps the structure of awareness, yet is itself part of the 
structure of deluded awareness. 
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Following Shenpen Hookham, Shaw holds that kan-na motivates delusory 
awareness; his tradition seeks to 'reverse that mistake', by reversing the tendency of 
ordinary consciousness to set up a negative causal chain by a grasping, reactive 
response to awareness. He considers that the mistake is temporality: the world is a- 
temporal, but the process of grasping 'twists up' that natural structure and initiates the 
structure of time. 
Bhikkhu Vajiro and Bhikkhu Gavesako 
Bhikkhu Vajiro and Bhikkhu Gavesako are members of the ordained Sangha of 
the Theravdda Thai Forest tradition. They live at the Amaravati monastic community, 
which is situated at Great Gaddesden near Hemel Hempstead. Bhikkhu VaJiro is an 
Ajaan (teacher). His personal appreciation of the monastic code (vinaya) as a way of 
life informed his response to questions, a response that was both practical and 
grounded in practice. Bhikkhu Gavesako, who is of Czech nationality, had 
philosophical training before ordination. They decided to combine their different 
talents in a joint interview. 
Interview summary 
Bhikku Vajiro and Bhikku Gavesako accept the Pdli suttas as the actual teaching 
of the Buddha, and as directly addressing the reality of the problem of suffering 
(dukkha). They feel that other texts and commentaries, such as the Abhidhamma, 
(and even more so the Mahdydna si7tras) have a subsidiary status as interpretations 
that refer back to the earlier suttas, whereas the only interpretation that is actually 
required is application in daily life. As Bhikkhus, they accept the strict regulation of 
daily life according to vinaya rules, but rather than stressing their normative aspect, 
Bhikkhu Vajiro values their usefulness as the means by which the teachings can be 
realised. Bhikkhu Gavesako highlights the difference between practising according 
to the sutta teachings as opposed to just understanding them intellectually: 
I originally came from the scholastic point of view, looking at texts and 
trying to understand them in that way. I also looked, at that time, at some 
of the teachings of the Thai Forest tradition and [they] seemed to me very 
unclear and chaotic, kind of unsystematic, and I could not figure out how 
[they] fit within the scriptures ... 
later, when I made the practice part of my 
life, I kind of leamt this art of interpretation ... it is also 
how we live, what 
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we do practically with our bodies. That affects how we interpret people's 
words, people's messages, so then later on I realised they [the practices] 
actually make sense ... like a key to unlock the suttas, because [when 1] 
approach[ed] them from abstract understanding I did not get the full 
meaning of them; it's very superficial. Now I can understand them on a deeper level through the practice (Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
This 'deeper level' is described by Bhikkhu Vajiro as 'the capacity for sensitivity 
that life brings'. 
Contact with the rest of the Safigha can provide a sense of confidence in 
Buddhist practice, especially when others are observed to act in a way that is 'free 
from confusion, hatred and greed'. Another significant benefit of communal practice 
in the Thai Forest Tradition is access to the teaching style of a lineage extending 
back from Ajaan Chah and Acariya Mun, through centuries of forest-dwelling 
dhutan"ga monks, to the Buddha's disciple Mahdkassapa. 
... (in) a sense it goes through a teacher, but if the teacher is any good they 
point beyond themselves ... they do not say, 'I'm teaching you', they say, 'Look here: teach yourself. Look at this, look at this within yourself, and 
learn' (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Given their belief that interpretation should be an existential, rather than an 
intellectual act, the Bhikkhus do not consider that the concept of evolution can 
usefully be applied to Buddhism, either in terms of an evolution of tradition, or in 
terms of an evolutionary development along the Buddhist path, for: 'the goal is not 
evolution, it's liberation' (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Where I resist the word evolution is when people come up with these 
notions of how Buddhism has evolved and needs to evolve and modernise 
itself. Which is exactly what I do not agree with, because when the 
Buddha described his own discovery of the Dhamma he said, 'I have 
discovered an ancient path. ' It is the same insight as the previous 
Buddhas had, and it's akdlika: it is timeless at the [moment of] insight. It 
does not need more vehicles and more schools (Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
Despite his orientation towards the sutta teachings and against the interpretation 
of tradition, Bhikkhu Vajiro is not averse to dialogue within certain constraints. 
Because their Sangha is not large and has other preoccupations there are limits to the 
amount of time that can be given to discussion. There needs to be an appropriate 
level of clarity and understanding of the relevant issues before dialogue can be useful 
or meaningful. 
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I do not mind debating with Christians, Hindus, whatever ... 
if they are 
very sure about where they are coming from and they are not feeling I am 
trying to convert them, because personally I do not feel that is my role. 
Then I am interested in exploring ideas about the nature of reality, because 
there it usually comes down to the clarification of terminology; then things 
become purer. I do not have the confidence personally and I do not know 
many people who have ... to 
debate in as clear and un-ambiguous and non- 
confrontational a way as the Buddha did. I do find that some people write 
polemics against things, and I do not find that energy is helpful. That is an 
awareness of my limitations (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Meaningful dialogue is possible within the plethora of Buddhist schools by 
virtue of a common ground in the Four Noble Truths. From this grounding, 
discussion is focussed on the alleviation of suffering, rather than the explication of 
views. If a sharp distinction is made between the discussion of views about reality 
and the unsatisfactory nature of reality as dukkha, it might be concluded that no 
teaching can fully encompass reality, because any teaching, even a correct teaching, 
is at bottom a perspective, or a view: it is an explanation of reality, not the reality in 
itself. The Bhikkhus argue that the distinction is not relevant in the case of the 
Dhamma. 
Dhamma refers to the way things are ... but 
it also refers to the 
teaching ... [the distinction] 
is not necessary for the cessation of 
suffering. People [do] not have to make that distinction ... It may be 
helpful, it may not be helpful. It's how to use it. Do you use it to stab 
somebody or do you use it to chop vegetables? (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Ajaan Chah used to say 'Read Dhamma, study Dhamma, put it into 
practice, and then finally you are the Dhamma. ' There is no 
distinction between your views and things (Bhikkbu Gavesako). 
The Bhikkhus are aware of some similarities of method between Buddhism and 
science, for Buddhists investigate themselves, to see if they get the same results that 
are referred to in the teachings. 
... you can see the 
limitations of science, where the scientist has his 
instruments and does his research, and you have some objective, 
quantifiable data as a result. That's your research ... you actually 
have to 
turn [to] yourself - your body and mind, your senses when you meditate, 
they become the tools, the measuring and the proof You can see it in 
your own experience (Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
But there are differences of purpose. 
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Maybe there is a bit of confusion between the Western scientific ideal of 
finding the ultimate nature of reality - then I think people confuse this 
ideal a bit with what the Buddha teaches about the truth, or perceiving the 
truth of the way things are. But I think they are talking about quite 
different things. For the Buddha it is seeing things in terms of one's 
experience as impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self. That is an 
experience: when a thought of anger comes up, is one actually able to see 
it as impermanent and not identify with it? That is what the Buddha is 
concerned with. The scientist may have a really excellent understanding 
of the universe ... but when the anger comes up, he is completely identified 
with it, and that's the difference (Bhikku Gavesako). 
They are critical of science for straying beyond the constraints of its own 
methodology in an unwarranted search of certainty. 
My concern is [that] if science is true to its real basis, it does not accept 
anything as final or absolute truth, but only as an explanation ... it is always only going to explain things, and any explanation is only as good as until 
the next explanation comes along. If that [view] is held, then O. K., but it 
is not usually held like that [in the scientific community] ... or within the lay community (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Most science makes an absolute of that which is uncertain, so that it 
ignores one of the primary characteristics of any existence: uncertainty 
(Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
I think there is a difference in the goal of science and Buddhism and in the 
objectives. [Ifl you ask does Buddhism ever come to an absolute truth or 
something, I think ... that is exactly the purpose: the breakthrough to a dimension that is unconditioned, [which] I would call nibbana, (an) 
unfabricated or deathless realm (Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
Without having any personal knowledge of neuroscience, Bhikkhu Vajiro sees 
no reason believe or disbelieve the correlations scientists assert between mental 
events and neuronal events. The problem is that descriptions of neuronal events 
cannot perform the same explanatory roles that can be fulfilled by explanations of 
mental events: 
You lose a lot when you reduce mental events to the behaviour of neurons, 
because certain 'ethical qualities' that you refer to when speaking about 
mental states: you cannot measure them in terms of what is a good neuron 
or an unwholesome neuron (Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
Bhikkhu Vajiro believes in the power of mindful introspection to bring the whole 
of one's mental activity to consciousness. The possibility of self-delusion remains, 
but can be tested by searching for the continued presence of suffering (dukkha). 
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One can know for oneself what is happening in one's heart or one's 
mind or one's citta. That is something that one can directly realise for 
oneself.. Is there more dukkha? The delusion is dukkha. One can be deluded to think there's not dukkha when there is dukkha. That is 
possible ... one can go through the whole of one's life deluded. Most 
of us do a lot of the time; that is puthujjana [the worldly condition] (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
The Bhikkhus point out that the different explanations of the mind in the suttas 
are taught with different purposes. Thus the six-element doctrine might be used in 
meditative contemplation of bodily physicality, while the five khandhas would be 
used in the detailed analysis of mental events. They clarify the status of an 'element' 
in the suttas: it is either an experienced quality (property), or a conceptual category. 
[Elements] are properties of experience. We are not trying to reduce this 
into earth water fire [and] air. One is experiencing one's experience of it 
in terms of earth water fire and air. In those terms they are brilliant ... they 
are just metaphors for solidity, cohesion, temperature and movement - 
and mind, and space (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
If you read the PdIi Canon, then the word dhatu, element ... in different 
contexts you will see that it does not refer to elements in the scientific 
sense. The Buddha, for instance, talks about three elements: of sensuality, 
of form and the element of cessation, which are more like mental 
categories, or more like conceptual categories if you like; it does not mean 
element (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Whether property or concept, the reference with regard to mental states is to 
processes conditioned by kamma, not to things: 
They are labels given to processes, so yes, they have existence, but for the 
sake of convenience, for the sake of delineation, one gives them names, 
and that gives them a sense of solidity which is not actual, because they 
arise dependent on conditions and they cease dependent on conditions 
(Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Processes are temporally successive and conditioned by kamma. The paradox of 
Buddhist liberation, from the standpoint of an unliberated being, is to understand 
how liberation is possible from this basis. Bhikkhu Vajiro considers it a mistake to 
think temporally at all in this context. 
This idea that all sentient beings can be liberated is interesting, but where 
does that happen?... 'Where does that happen? ' is a kind of k5an for me. 
It is not in the realm we see it in, where every blade of grass is liberated - 
every blade of grass is liberated in the heart of the Tathdgata, in the heart 
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of the Arahant, that is where every blade of grass is liberated. It is not 
something that is going to happen sometime in the future (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
Maybe [time is relevant] according to the conditioned realm. The Buddha 
says, 'What is the characteristic of the conditioned realm? Arising, 
change, and disappearance. And the characteristic of the unconditioned 
realm is no arising, no change, no disappearance' (Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
I mention Johansson's view that, in the suttas, matter is described as on a 
continuum with mind, from gross to subtle (1979: 32-34). Bhikkhu Vajiro thinks 
that any such description is an explanation of a structural pattern, not the pattern 
itself, and that explanation only adds another structural level to the pattern. The need 
to sort out the structures of reality is a byway on the pragmatic search for liberation. 
I think the suttas are not concerned with what you would call the ultimate 
nature of reality, which is a separate issue to liberation. Liberation is more 
to do with skilful and unskilfal kamma - these kind of things, but actually 
getting a precise description of the ultimate nature of reality and mind and 
matter - they are very pragmatic and the Buddha was very pragmatic. He 
just did not go into those areas ... Certain [questions 
he] just set aside, and 
when the schools split up they started developing the later Abhidhamma 
because they thought, '. Ah! The Buddha didn't explain these things' 
(Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
Responding to questions about explanations of the metaphysical entailments of 
the view of the mind as laid out in the suttas, they point out that the ascription of 
omniscience to the Buddha occurs in the later commentaries, but not in the suttas 
themselves. The notion that a winged spirit (gandhabba) might be involved in the 
mechanism of rebirth is a simple explanation: 'if you take it literally, you are lost' 
(Bhikkhu Vajiro). Rebirth itself, until it is an experience, must be a belief- 
It depends on how they hold the [idea of] rebirth. I do not know about 
rebirth from one life to the next because I do not have a faculty that has 
actually been developed that could know it for sure for myself I have 
never ever had in my heart any doubt about it, ever since I heard about it. 
It just seems really sensible. Kamma needs some form of fulfilment, and 
kamma has consequences (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
I prefer the rebirth, which is the one that Buddhadassa would talk about, 
the moment by moment rebirth which is the self - which is 
an ... interesting way to examine 
the self (Bhikkhu Vajiro). 
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Synopsis 
The Bhikkhus do not interpret the teachings of the suttas Intellectually, but 
through their practice, by following the vinaya and the renunciant tradition of forest 
ascetic (dhutahga) monasticism. From this perspective, Buddhist doctrines are not so 
much teachings as injunctions to teach oneself The Bhikkhus do not expect any 
significant 'evolution' (hermeneutic interpretation) of the Dhamma, for the Buddha's 
teaching is not just an explanation, but the re-discovery of an 'ancient path', which is 
akalika: 'timeless at the moment of insight'. The distinction between Dhamma as 
explanation and Dhamma as experience should not be made unless it is useful to do 
so, for the two modes become unified through practical application in daily life and 
monastic practice. 
If the underlying motivation is conversion, Bhikkhu Vajiro has no interest in 
dialogue with other faiths; outside that context he expects debate about the nature of 
reality to focus on clarification of terminology. The scope of possible dialogue is 
limited by the ability of interlocutors to debate in the non-confrontational manner that 
is characteristic of the Buddha's discourses. Bhikkhu Vajiro considers that the Four 
Noble Truths should be the foundation for inter-Buddhist dialogue, in which case the 
motivation is to alleviate suffering, rather than simply to explicate views. 
Science and Buddhism have different purposes, for science offers explanations 
while Buddhism offers solutions, and working out the ultimate nature of reality is not 
the same as perceiving the truth of the way things are. If science is true to its 
empirical basis it should not claim certainty, because conditioned processes are 
inherently uncertain. The scientific imperative to sort out the structure of reality is a 
byway on the path to liberation, and scientific explanation is the imposition of 
another pattern onto an existing structural pattern. There is a clear distinction 
between Buddhism and science, in that conditioned existence is uncertain, but 
Buddhism seeks to break through to the certainty of an unconditioned realm. 
Neuroscientific explanations cannot contribute to ethical considerations in the 
way that Buddhist explanations can, for there is no such thing as a wholesome or 
unwholesome neuron, and scientific understanding of the nature of the universe is of 
little help, for example, when dealing with anger and its consequences. Despite the 
instrumentally-observed correlation between neuronal events and mental events, the 
seat of consciousness is not the brain, but the awareness that takes cognisance of 
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those observations. Bhikkhu Gavesako does not rule out the possibility that there 
could a more subtle form of embodiment than the 'coarse physical body' as the 
carrier of consciousness, but he is generally more realist than idealist with regard to 
embodiment, for according to the suttas consciousness cannot be the basis of the 
other four khandhas, which arise in mutual dependence. 
Buddhist mind-explanations are not just theories, but guidance to practice. 
Terms in those explanations (such as 'dhdtu' or 'gandhabba') are conceptual 
c ategories: they do not refer to things, but to processes. To take such terms in a 
literal or scientific sense is to miss the point that ordinary reality is set of processes 
conditioned by time and by kamma, never possessing the apparent objectivity given 
by acts of naming. Rebirth can be believed in advance of any direct knowledge 
because it is intuitively reasonable, but the notion of rebirth also fulfils a guiding 
function, pointing to an important experiential insight into the momentary 
constitution of the self. 
Andy Wistreich 
Andy Wistreich is a Buddhist practitioner whose teachers come from the Gelug 
tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Since he works in national computing services for 
higher education, and also has a family life, he has not taken ordination. Instead, he 
has maintained a long-term pupil relationship with several Tibetan teachers, and as 
such has undertaken a commitment to Tantric practice, although such matters of 
private practice were not discussed in the interview. He facilitates the 
Saraswati Buddhist group, which currently meets at his home in Somerset, and he 
teaches at FPMT Buddhist groups and centres in the UK. 
Interview summary 
Wistreich teaches and practices the Gelug-pa tradition as established by Lama 
Tsong-khapa, which is distinguished amongst other schools by the balanced approach 
taken between the sfitra path of intellectual explanation and understanding, and the 
tantra path of ritual practice and experiential realisation; the former being a 
prerequisite for the latter. Gelug-pa understanding of tradition is syncretic and 
systematic, in that previous Indian Buddhist schools continue to be valued as skilftil 
means, but are ordered and studied according to a hierarchical system. 
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... it 
does not mean that because [the Tibetan tradition] developed later, 
that it rejected what came before. It used it as a basis ... 
Tibetan 
Buddhism does not reject anything they find in the Pali Canon, in fact 
they embrace the whole of the Theravdda suttas, the Mahdyana su-tras 
and all the tantras. They are unique in that they cover the whole 
spectrum. That is one of the features of Tibetan Buddhism 
(Wistreich). 15 
in the traditional monastic training they study, successively, 
increasingly subtle systems of tenets, but [with] each new system they 
refute the earlier one in order to refine their understanding, until they 
reach the most subtle, which is the Prdsanglka-Madhyamaka, and along 
with each system goes various tenets related to the mind (Wistreich). 
For the Gelug-pa, the key to liberation is the realisation of emptiness. Wistreich 
considers the Prdsangika-Madyamaka system to be the summation of all Buddhist 
systems because only in that system is it emptiness taught 'extensively'. He argues 
that the systemisation of teachings is appropriate on three grounds. Firstly, because 
adherents to Theravdda and various Mahdyana schools and tenets appear to have co- 
existed reasonably equably in Indian monasteries, so monks could change their 
practice as their understanding developed; secondly, because systemisation is 
educationally efficient; thirdly, because all the systems have the same goal of 
liberation from suffering. Western historical scholarship suggests that the Mahdydna 
Sfitras were composed long after the death of the Buddha, but Wistreich gives 
reasons why he has chosen to fully accept the more traditional account. 
... at the end of the 
day I have to say I do not know, then I have to 
choose which tradition I am going to follow. Am I going to follow the 
western academic tradition, which says they were actually written 
around the time of Asahga and Ndgdýuna, or am I going to follow the 
tradition that I have been taught by my Tibetan teachers, which is that 
they were taught by the Buddha at specific times during his life to 
specific disciples, and were then hidden? In fact they say that the 
Perfection of Wisdom sfitras were given to the ndgas and that Ndgdduna 
went and retrieved them from there. 
So ... as an ordinary westerner, which one am 
I supposed to 
believe? ... Now all my western education would prepare me 
to believe 
the former, so how could it be that I might even countenance the latter? 
There are lots of ingredients that might make me do that. One of them 
would be that I met these incredible teachers who bowled me over so 
much that they made me challenge everything I had learned up till then 
through my western education, to the sense of thinking: 'maybe it's not 
the whole truth'. Maybe there is a depth which my western education 
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hasn't been able to ... induct me 
into, because that knowledge, if it ever 
did exist in the West, has been lost. 
... there are certain practices, 
for instance, in my tradition, where 
we do certain prayers to what we call the merit field, which involves all 
the lineage gurus, and they are in a line. They come down from 
Sdkyamuni to the present and there's a whole notion about the living 
tradition, and its source is back to Sdkyamuni, and that is very important 
because the Buddha became enlightened and therefore if it does not 
source back to him - as you say, it might come from enlightened minds, 
but somehow they do not have quite the authority that the Buddha [has], 
so therefore it might be problematic for my faith in the Mahdydna - for 
me personally - and I am not speaking for all the other Mahdydnists in 
the West - but for me personally it might be better for my mind to have 
faith in what I was taught by my Tibetan Buddhist teachers (Wisteich). 
His faith is strong, but not absolute. He remains open to persuasion, and if given 
absolute proof of the non-existence of, for example, hell-realms, he would 'work them 
out of [his] meditation. ' 
[The Dalai Lama] says that if there is something that our direct 
perception can refute - Vasubandhu taught, in the Abhidharma-kos'a, that 
the hells were so far below Bodhgayd that they would be out the other 
side of the earth - now His Holiness, he has referred to that, and said that, 
therefore, we have to refute that particular teaching. Even if it comes 
from Lord Buddha, we nonetheless cannot accept it because it goes 
counter to direct perception. I am very pleased with that, and I think that 
westerners generally should feel some confidence that an authority like 
His Holiness can say categorically that if science can disprove 
something that's in the Abhidharma texts then we should reject them, 
even if the Buddha taught them (Wistreich). 
Asking for absolute proof appears to be an impossibly high standard; in fact there 
are circumstances when an accumulation of compatible evidence from different 
sources can lead to a change of view. 
It is very hard to prove that the world is flat, but that is certainly what 
they believed in those times ... 
it would be very hard to believe that the 
world is flat now, in fact there are so many different bases on which we 
are certain that it is round, that it's best if we realign all the teachings 
round the idea that the world is round ... Geshe 
Thegchok, who is one of 
my teachers, said the shape of the world is determined by your karma, 
and what that refers to is: if you were born at that time the world was flat 
- if you are born now the world is round ... phenomenology says that our 
experience of the world is flat, because the sun rises on one side in the 
morning and sets on the other, so our senses tell us that the world is flat, 
therefore any notion that the world is round is based on conceptuality 
rather than direct perception (Wistreich). 
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For dialogue between Buddhism and science to be productive there must be 
openness to a change of view on both sides. Wistreich thinks this is possible, for he 
does not limit the scope of Buddhism to the explanation of meaning, rather than the 
explanation of fact. 
I do not think there is anything in Buddhism which I regard as 
unempirical. So I mean I can accept there are some things we can not 
measure with scientific instruments, but to me that is a sign of the 
inadequacy of the instruments. I would say that omniscient mind is 
every bit as empirical as that glass of water. It is just that we have not 
researched it yet. His Holiness does sometimes say some things would 
benefit from further investigation, and I think that is a useful phrase for 
something like that (Wistreich). 
The Dalai Lama has paved the way with his dialogues with Western 
scientists for a gradual development which I am sure will happen 
throughout the 21s' Century, where we will end up ... with a Buddhism that completely accords with aspects within science and maybe there'll 
be rub-off the other way too ... where Buddhism and science accord there is no reason to keep them separate (Wistreich). 
Mind is synonymous with consciousness, and is one of the six elements that 
combine to constitute reality. The element of mind manifests as six consciousnesses, 
five being the senses, while the sixth is mental consciousness, with mental events as 
its object. Wistreich explains the operation of the consciousnesses with reference to 
visual consciousness. 
Let's take the visual sense consciousness. That is different from the eye, 
the retina and all the other apparatus physically involved with seeing. So, 
in order for visual perception to take place you have got to have the eye 
faculty, the visual object and the eye consciousness. It is like that with 
all the senses. Actually, according to the Lo-rig or mind and awareness 
teachings, the definition of mind, which divides into the other six, is 'that 
which is clear and knowing'. So the word clear refers to the fact that the 
mind is clear of matter, so it is completely non-material, the mind. So if 
we go back to the visual ... when we see something the visual 
faculty is 
material [but] it is not all gross matter. It is also flesh and blood, and it 
also includes some pretty subtle workings in the brain and the nervous 
system and all that. So they do not say that the sense faculty is a gross 
thing. They do not say that it is the eye that you could pluck out. The 
sense faculty is the whole [function] that enables us to see. The object is 
obviously physical, and the consciousness, which is the third essential 
ingredient for seeing to take place, is clear, in other words it has no 
physical aspect at all (Wistreich). 
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Clear in this particular context means not physical, and then knowing 
means aware: able to experience: the subjective side of experience. So 
we have already wrapped up awareness into mind, which divides into the 
six consciousnesses ... Now, 
luminous is also part of knowing, because 
luminous refers to the mind's capacity to throw light on things, which 
even an ordinary person's mind can do (Wistreich). 
The clear nature of mind is one of the two aspects of Buddha-nature, which is 
present when the mind is impure (samsara) and when the mind is pure (nirva? 7a). 
There is also talk about the ultimate Buddha-nature, which is the 
emptiness of that Buddha-nature or clear nature of the mind. This is 
based on the fact, first of all, that the clear nature of the mind is always 
there but nonetheless it is a continuum of moments: each moment 
triggers the rest. It is the continuum of mind that is said to be 
beginningless and endless, and passes from one life to another. In a 
sense it is permanent and eternal, because it goes forever and started 
beginninglessly and in another sense, on a subtle level, it is impermanent, 
because it is still momentary and so no moment exists by itself. It only 
exists in relation to the previous moment and the next moment and 
therefore ultimately it is unfindable... 
... in the end you come down to what 
is helpful to your own mind and 
your practice, and for some people, their practice might be better if they 
think [Buddha-nature] exists by itself from its own side, for then when 
they get down to it they feel they can develop a more stable mind based 
on it. But if you look into the writings of Lama Tsong-khapa, he says 
that is a fantastic object for developing s'amatha, in other words shi-ne 
or calm abiding, but when you move on to insight you have got to 
deconstruct it and see it's emptiness, and that is what in the Lama 
Tsong-khapa tradition is called Mahdmudrd: the union of these two: the 
union of the conventional and ultimate aspects of the clear mind 
(Wistreich). 
I 
The key Madhyamaka tenet of the 'emptiness of the inherent existence of 
anything from its own side' is more than an intellectual understanding: it has to be 
realised in practice, by 'deconstructing the self and phenomena'. 
... that ... shows that 
'me' is just relative. It is O. K. to say 'me' but 'me' 
is mere imputation, mere label, and if [one] just take[s] it as that, that's 
fine, but the trouble is that [one] exaggerate[s] it and on the basis of that 
arise all the afflictions like attachment and anger and jealousy 
(Wistreich). 
There is no denial of the reality of the external world, but there is a denial that 
that world exists except in relation to the mind. 
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... according to the 
Madhyamaka there is an external world and a 
subjective mind-world, but neither of them exist independently; it is just 
an interdependence, and neither of the interdependent phenomena exists 
by itself They only exist relative to one another. So in that sense you 
have got emptiness and dependent arising co-existing. That means you 
don't have to argue with the world ... It's just that if you want liberation 
you have got to realise the ultimate reality, which is emptiness. 
... it is maybe the word emptiness that 
is challenging because emptiness 
sounds like nothingness, but it is ... important to recognise that the word 
emptiness is being used to translate the Sanskrit s'finyatd, and s'i7nyatd 
does not mean nothingness. It means empty of intrinsic reality, empty of 
its own existence ... as soon as you think emptiness means nothingness 
you have lost the plot (Wistreich). 
Wistreich is aware that emptiness teachings are intellectually difficult, and that it 
is difficult to realise those teachings in each moment, and so to modify the ethical 
motivation for every act. 
It is not as if this is a westerners' problem, that emptiness seems like 
nothingness. This goes back to the time of Buddha ... The Buddha turned 
the Wheel three times; the second time he taught emptiness, really 
heavy-duty, so because people were falling into nihilism he taught the 
third turning where he emphasizes the Buddha-nature, which seems 
more positive because it sounds like ... we have got something 
but ... the 
Buddha-nature also has an ultimate aspect, which is emptiness. The 
other thing is [that] emptiness does not exist by itself, emptiness is a 
quality of something, so we talk of the emptiness of the glass, so the 
emptiness of the glass depends on the conventional existence of the 
glass. You can not have an emptiness of the glass if there is no glass 
there, therefore emptiness does not exist independent of what it 
qualifies.... So there is this classic phrase, 'the emptiness of emptiness'. 
In all the traditional teachings that is one of the types of emptiness ... and 
it is the saving grace really, because as Ndgdijuna says, if you cling to 
emptiness you have made a poison of the medicine, and then there is no 
hope. Better never to have heard of it, than to do that, because then you 
have destroyed the thing that can free you. So you have got to be very 
careful of either making a thing of emptiness, or thinking that emptiness 
means nothingness. That's where the Middle Way is, between the two. 
It is understanding that emptiness and conventional existence are two 
sides of the same reality; that the Two Truths are not separate... 
... to 
be completely free is to fully realise emptiness; not just partial 
realisation, which is what the lower schools teach. They still leave an 
intrinsic smallest atom and an intrinsic shortest moment. They say 
everything else is mere imputation, but they are all collections of those 
things ... 
but the Madhyamaka view completely smashes all that. It says 
[there is] ... nothing at all 
from its own side, and that is the challenge: to 
go down that [route] without denying cause and effect. Once you have 
denied cause and effect you might as well be a mass murderer... it junks 
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ethics if you abandon cause and effect. That is why Ndgdýuna says the 
medicine becomes the poison (Wistreich). 
Both moral rules and the ethical motivations that generate or comply with those 
rules are thought to be consequential effects of the liberating realisation of emptiness. 
In other words, it is impossible to be truly wise without also being compassionate. 
I think we have got to bring in the method side ... which is the nature of 
great compassion ... one of the most important things about Buddhahood is that Buddhahood depends on compassion for every single sentient 
being and it is on that basis that the merit to create omniscience is built. 
So we have got to have a notion of what merit means - that from 
positive deeds comes a kind of positive potential, which if it is directed 
towards a particular goal can be very efficacious towards that goal 
(Wistreich). 
The method side is basically this compassion [or] Bodhicitta aspect to 
enlightenment for the benefit of all beings, and the wisdom is this 
deepening letting go of clinging and self-existence, and both of these are 
essential to Buddhahood. The wisdom side evolves into the 
Dhan-nakdya, which is the Buddha's mind which simultaneously realises 
emptiness and can perceive all phenomena. Prior to Buddhahood 
nobody can do that. Even the moment before Buddhahood all one is 
capable of is seeing them separately, because to bring together one's 
awareness of the conventional truth and the ultimate truth, in one, 
requires a unification of method and wisdom, which is what 
Buddhahood is (Wistreich). 
Buddhahood is completely perfected wisdom and compassion, and as such is 
completely perfected mind, with the ability to manifest embodiment in the form of 
radiant clear light. Although this is a special form of appearance, it is on a 
continuum with the embodiment of ordinary beings. 
Even this [body] is an appearance of mind. It is a result of my karma 
and my mind joining with the sperm and the egg and producing this. 
Without my mind and karma the sperm and the egg would not produce 
this, according to Buddhism. Maybe the biologists would not 
agree ... but again I think the Buddhist description is empirical. If you look into it, look into it, look into it, it so works, it is just so neat , it is 
not mysterious: it is almost mechanistic, it is just that it includes mind, 
whereas the Western one does not. They say that mind somehow comes 
from those genetic confabulations: somehow that is going to produce 
mind, that mind is somehow produced by matter ... 
for a Buddhist that is 
just a joke. I am schooled in the West but I suppose I have been deeply 
influenced by Buddhism, so I am now at the point where I am a western 
Buddhist: I see things as a Buddhist. I could not possibly accept that 
everything comes from just the spen-n and the egg, even though I accept 
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the effect of genetics on certain things which help shape our personality. 
No problem with that, but somehow something karmic makes me link 
with that. I think there is a mind which connected to those two cells and 
led to this, and I suppose I also think this mind will continue after death, 
but again I do not have total proof of that. It is not like I can remember 
my past life ... I 
do not have that to go on (Wistreich). 
Wistreich's religious practice and his mode of pursuing, reflecting upon and 
interpreting his life is based upon the Gelug-pa Buddhist teachings about the mind, 
about liberation, rebirth and the process of rebirth, but above all about emptiness 
(S'finyatd). He sees no soteriological value in reinterpreting these accounts, or 
bringing them into dialogue with western modes of discourse, although interpretation 
and dialogue may be of benefit to others. 
I have no need to do that as a practitioner. The only reason I would 
need to is when I am talking to somebody who is not a practitioner, and 
I want to sort of build a bridge with them, like His Holiness does in his 
dialogues with scientists ... I know I have kind of made a big step, and I 
would not expect future Western Buddhists to all make that step, so I 
think it would be helpful if .. studies helped to improve the dialogue between the two traditions (Wistreich). 
... what we need to do in the 21" Century is to come out of Tibet and let's say all the other cultures in the East as well, into the 21" Century 
globalised culture, with something that is not alien but which is 
accessible for those ordinary people who think it is useful. We have got 
to do that. We have not got that long. The world needs it badly. I am 
confident that there is a whole next generation of Tibetan lamas who are 
going to help a lot with it. I have met one or two of them. They are in 
their late teens now: they are absolutely brilliant and they are going to 
help Tibetan Buddhism get over this. My teacher Geshe Wangchen has 
already written a book in Tibetan on Western science ... that is studied by the Geshes in the monasteries (Wistreich). 
Synopsis 
For teaching purposes and as a prerequisite for tantric ritual practice, the Gelug- 
pa tradition of Lama Tsongkhapa has developed a hierarchical ordering of doctrinal 
systems, justified on the grounds that cohabitation between intellectual traditions 
within monastic institutions was the norm in pre-Moghul Indian Buddhism, because 
systernisation of doctrines is educationally coherent, and because all traditions have 
the same goal of liberation from suffering. Wistreich upholds the view that the 
Mahdydna si-itras were taught by the Buddha; he finds this acceptance of traditional 
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accounts conducive to his own soteriological progress, to faith in his teachers and 
their lineage, and to effective practice within their explanatory paradigm. He finds it 
reassuring, however, that the Dalai Lama has indicated that if doctrines are refuted by 
'direct perception' they should be set aside. 
According to Lo-rig teachings, mind is synonymous with consciousness and is 
clear, knowing and luminous. 'Clear' indicates that mind is clear of matterl as an 
element with no physical basis at all. 'Knowing' indicates that mindis aware: it is 
capable of experience. 'Luminous' indicates that, as a part of knowing, all minds are 
able to throw light on things. In a conventional sense, the continuity of the clear 
nature of mind is the Buddha-nature, but it is impure. In an ultimate sense Buddha- 
nature is the emptiness of the clear nature of mind: its emptiness of inherent existence, 
as a momentary relation in dependence on a sequence of relations. Mahdmudrd 
practice is the combined realisation of both the conventional and ultimate aspects of 
the clear nature of mind. 
From this relational viewpoint, the external world and a subjective mind-made 
world both exist, but only in relation to each other. Emptiness of inherent existence is 
true of both world and mind, and even of emptiness itself. the 'emptiness of 
emptiness'. To imagine emptiness refers to nothingness, and thereby to cling to 
emptiness as itself a paradoxically-inherent abstract object, is to have 'lost the plot', 
to 'deny cause and effect', and to 'make a poison of the medicine' by eliminating the 
basis for practical ethics and of compassion as an inevitable concomitant of wisdom. 
Wistreich upholds the Mahdydna view that diligent practice over many lifetimes leads 
to the unification of wisdom and compassion, and to omniscient Buddhahood. 
Wistreich only feels the need to interpret traditional teachings when 
communicating with non-practitioners: only then does it become useful to construct 
bridging explanations between markedly different Paradigms and discourses. That 
process is exemplified by the Dalai Lama's discussions with scientists under the 
auspices of the Mind-Life Institute. Wistreich appreciates that many westemers will 
be unwilling or unable to attempt the complete immersion in Buddhist paradigm and 
practice that he has undertaken, but he is confident that the next generation of Tibetan 
Geshes will have the knowledge, skills and wisdom required to build bridges between 
Buddhist and other discourses in a globalised world. 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
I The bottom up/top down directional analogy is both a metaphor and a metonymy. 
As metaphor, the point is that explanations that begin with the problem and its 
context are preferred to explanations that begin with probable material causes. As 
metonymy, neural events are either 'top-down' cognitive manipulation of ideas or 
'bottom-up' information from the senses. 
2 The disagreement between Sangharakshita and the English Sangha Trust has long 
been the subject of hearsay report. Those interested in gossip should consult the 
fairly scurrilous Anonymous (n. d. ). 
3 In Leeds there are enough traditions to motivate the establishment of an umbrella 
organisation in the interest of cordial relations and external representation. 
4 In Kennedy (2004) 1 give a figure of 158,000, the difference being a consequence 
either of my own poor arithmetic, or the confusing regional division of census data 
between England and Wales, and Scotland, as well as the omission Northern Ireland. 
I defer to Bluck's (2006: 13-16) calculations, and in this section I am indebted to his 
excellent presentation of recent data. 
5 S6ka Gakkai has been excommunicated by the Nichiren Sh6shil monastic 
organisation in Japan. There is some uncertainty concerning the ordination claimed 
by Sangharakshita, the founder of the FWBO. (Anonymous n. d. ). The leader of the 
NKT has effected a schismatic separation from the Gelug-pa tradition 
6 The phenomenology of religion does not necessarily extend to the use of rigorous 
Husserlian methods, apart from bracketing out questions of the truth or falsity of 
doctrines (Pye 1980: 32). The hunt for abstract categories to explain interactions 
between religious phenomena is just the extraction of general principles from 
particular examples, which has always been the stock in trade of western philosophy. 
7 Dumont's conclusion that the 'this-worldly' western ideology of individual 
personality is mirrored by an 'other-worldly' Indian ideology of renunciation has 
been criticised by Harris (1993). 
8 The FWBO's evolutionary theory is discussed in the summary of the interview with 
Ratnaprabha. 
9 The nature of mind is one of the points at issue between Sangharakshita. and 
Batchelor. Batchelor argues that: 'It is odd that a practice concerned with anguish 
and the ending of anguish should be obliged to adopt ancient Indian metaphysical 
theories and thus accept as an article of faith that consciousness cannot be explained 
in terms of brain function' (1997: 37). Sangharakshita responds that 'Logically 
speaking, [practice] begins with the 'existence' of what might be described as a 
transcendent Absolute... ' (1998: 10). Both sides of this argument about the 
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transcendent or immanent origin of Buddhist practice can claim doctrinal orthodoxy, 
by privileging different sources in the Pdli Canon, such as the 
Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta or Udana 80. The incompatibility of these two 
views comes to a head around the question of the materialism or immaterialism of the 
mind, and Sangharakshita points out that either view is an 'article of faith', because 
'belief in the existence of 'matter' is as much an article of faith as belief in the 
existence of 'spirit'. The issue is then which article any particular Buddhist prefers, 
and why. 
10 Oliver (1979) is not sufficiently analytical to be included in this list. 
11 Something very like Pye's process of recoupment has been offered by Chappell 
with respect to the interpretation of revolutionary doctrinal texts. He outlines a 
tripartite hermeneutic sequence of 'individualization', which equates to the new 
interpretation, of 'integration' as the new interpretation is 'restored to the historical 
milieu and the tradition', and 'control' as the text is forced into compatibility with 
traditional doctrine (Lopez 1987: 80). 
12 It could be argued that ritual theory amounts to a monolithic theory because most 
behaviour can be considered to be a form of ritual (Lewis 1980: 6, Bell 1991: 200). 
But doctrine must be exempt from ritual theory, or else theory would be ritual. 
13 For example, the Simafifia-phala Sutta is framed so that the advantages of 
Buddhist practice stand in contrast to the metaphysical doctrines of the other 
heterodox teachers. In the Kalama Sutta a selection of 'consolations' of the religious 
life are offered, in accordance with the variety of metaphysical views that might 
reasonably be entertained 
14 Geshe Kelsang Gyatso champions the Doje Shugden practice, which the Dalai 
Lama has proscribed (Bluck 2006: 131,135). Doje Shugddn is a pre-Buddhist 
Tibetan spirit-deity who is believed to have waited over the centuries for the 
opportunity to become the protector of Tibet and of the Dharma, following the 
departure from Nechung monastery of the oracle of the Gelug-pa sect, Doje Drakden 
(Chan: 1994: 165-166). Thus the Doje Shugden practice is not just a private ritual, 
but is enmeshed in a centuries-old dispute amongst arcane protectors and magical 
forces. This demonic stand-off perhaps symbolises long-standing political strains 
amongst the Gelug-pa, which have re-emerged as a consequence of the Chinese 
occupation of Tibet. 
15 Contemporary Tibetan Buddhists have access to the Pdli Canon, which was not 
available to their forebears. For example, I have attended teachings on the 
Dhammacakkappavatana Sutta, by Geshe Tashi Tsering, at the Jamyang (FPMT) 
centre in Leeds. 
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Chapter 5 
Attitudes 
Introduction 
Minds are inherently attitudinal, in that they attend to the world in ways that are 
intended to be useful; it is therefore inevitable that the participants in this study 
respond to contemporary circumstances, even when their response takes a negative 
form. On the evidence of the interviews, they respond to the scientifically-motivated 
reduction of the category of mind to mind/brain-identity with an overall attitude of 
resistance. Accompanying that resistance are combinations of more specific attitudes 
of, firstly, faith in tradition; secondly, equanimity with respect to the ontology of 
mind, which enables concentration on psychological matters; thirdly, speculation 
about transcendence; and fourthly, some qualified acceptance of neuroscientific 
findings. As a general characterisation of their responses, I suggest that the majority 
tend to prefer psychological explanations of experience to ontological of explanations 
of mind. Their relative equanimity about ontology reflects the importance, for 
Buddhists, of subjective 'realisation'. This term ordinarily refers to the understanding 
of an explanation, but Buddhist usage refers more specifically to the verification of an 
explanation in immediate experience, stabilised over time in extended experience. 
I use an explanation of attitudes by Lewis (1979) to elucidate the combination of 
I 
experience and explanation in the formation of the participants' attitudes and opinions. 
The participants' emphasis on subjective experience and their characteristic Buddhist 
de-emphasis of the self motivates an addition to Lewis's theory to account for the role 
of the subject of immediate experience. With this modification the theory can serve 
as a relatively simple and culturally-neutral model of the mind, incorporating 
acquaintance with the world by the subject, historically- sedimented responses to the 
world by the self, and the modification of action and experience according to 
explanation. 'Acquaintance' refers to the sensori-motor perceptual initiation of 
mental events, the 'subject' refers to the immediate awareness of those events, the 
'self refers to historically-conditioned responses to the temporal continuity of 
immediate mental events, and 'explanation' refers to the 'top-down' modification of 
mental events, both linguistically and by the cognitive modification of percepts. 
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Resistance to scientific mind-theory 
Despite the even-handedness of 'Middle Way' rhetoric against eternalism and 
annihilationism, advocates of Buddhist mind-theories in India and East Asia have 
non-nally encountered belief systems that advocate some form of etemalism, or a 
metaphysics of spirit. Buddhism under globalisation finds itself in dialogue with the 
opposite pole, that of annihilationism, in the form of a metaphysics of physics, 
according to which the mind is just the organisation and neuronal activation of the 
brain, and cannot survive the dissolution of that organisation. My task was to identify 
contemporary Buddhist responses to this shift in dialogic partnership from etemalism 
to a neuroscientific version of annihilationism, and this chapter presents findings 
from the interviews, not necessarily in the form of unambiguous views (opinions), but 
in terms of wider attitudes. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary an attitude is a 'habitual mode of 
regarding anything'. A person's attitudes can be identified from subjective 
impressions of underlying motivations, but are more overtly demonstrated by sets of 
opinions. Attitudes are more than just continuity of opinion expressed in 
propositional form: they are the totality of states of mind that provide the 
background for the formation, retention and expression of opinions in propositional 
fonn. 
But what is the difference between an attitude and an opinion? I 
would like to say: the attitude comes before the opinion. (Wittgenstein 
1992: 38) 
If attitudes come before the verbal expression of opinions, attitudes denote a pre- 
linguistic intentional orientation, functioning to organise opinions into a consistent set 
or 'habitual mode of regarding'. The most typical attitude displayed by the interview 
participants was that of resistance, for they generally felt that scientific investigations 
into the ontology of mind were peripheral or antithetical to their psychological, 
existential and soteriological concerns. Although some of the participants felt that 
translation between Buddhist and scientific discourses might be useful under 
globalisation, most saw little benefit to be gained from recasting Buddhist mind- 
theory into western philosophical and scientific terms, with the exception, in the case 
of Ratnaprabha and Crook, of evolutionary terms. 
1 
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Their resistance is reminiscent of Jacques Derrida's analysis, in Resistances to 
Psycho-analysis (1998), of the resistance displayed by some of Freud's patients, who 
reftised to open the core of their dreams to psycho-analytic investigation. Demda 
suggests that the resistance of the subject of an investigation presents a challenge to 
all analysis (1998: 2-9), but his Freudian example indicates that resistance is mainly 
to the interpretation of personal meaning by impersonal others in terms of a 
prescriptive theory; that is to say, resistance is to analyses that aim to reduce, reify 
and vitiate the 'unanalyzable synthesis' of non-rational forms of cognition (Derrida 
1989: 14). 
Derrida is concerned to suggest that resistance necessitates his style of 
deconstructive analysis (1989: 26-28); the participants in this study are more 
concerned to retain the right to interpret their own minds. Their resistance was not to 
dialogue, but to reductive analyses that forced them to react to explanations of the 
nature of mind in wholly scientific or western philosophical terms, rather than 
allowing them to consider the implications of scientific research in their own time and 
on their own terms. Only Wistreich predicted a transitional timescale, century-long, 
after which dialogue between Buddhism and neuroscience might be expected to have 
reached some agreement. I suggest that the resistance of all the participants to 
scientifically-informed analysis is a transitional attitude, for three reasons. 
1) Resistance is a whole-minded response. 
Attitudes are not just rational responses but completely human responses, which 
are inclusive of emotions and intuitions affected by unconscious cognitive processes. 
Emotive processes are not under the same degree of self-control as rationality, and 
rationality is not always as self-controlled as when it is deployed as an after-the-event 
mode of justification for decisions already taken under the sway of emotion and 
unconscious intuition. Any change of attitude to neuroscience is, therefore, likely to 
depend on wider perceptions of the influence exerted by science on the fate of society 
and the environment, as well as on the relevance of specific findings. 
2) Resistance is hermeneutically transitional 
It is perfectly reasonable to withhold judgment about neuroscientific explanations 
that are themselves transitional, incomplete accounts. Mapping of cognitive 
functions and connections by means of pathway tracing and real-time imaging 
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techniques has yet to identify the precise function of many areas of the brain, 
(Freeman 2003: 27-36). Progress also needs to be made on specific hypotheses, such 
as the conformation or disconfirmation of Crick's identification of the claustrum as a 
neural correlate of consciousness, or the ways in which sensory stimuli are 
neuronally-encoded (Sharpee et al 2006, Smith and Lewicki 2006). Resistance is an 
appropriately hermeneutic transitional response to neuroscientific explanations that 
are themselves in transition until their heavy theoretical overhang is diminished. 
3) Resistance is methodologically transitional 
So long as neuroscience is work in progress towards a notionally complete 
explanation, 'belief 'knowledge' or 'certainty' about the nature of mind can be 
considered to inappropriately reify the dynamism of explanations, scientific or 
Buddhist, in the course of their evolution from one paradigm to another as a result of 
experiment, introspection, religious practice and dialogue. It is therefore reasonable, 
as a transitional position, to posit mind as a separate category or element that 
performs real work in the world, yet not on that account to rule out dialogue with 
science. This is the position taken by Wistreich, who argues that Buddhist teachings 
are empirically true, and that it is a matter of time before the Buddhist-scientific 
dialogues initiated by the Dalai Lama '... will end up ... with a Buddhism that 
completely accords with aspects within science and maybe there'll be rub-off the 
other way too ...... 
Effectively, the Dalai Lama postulates the existence of immaterial mental events 
that correlate with neuronal events (Wallace 1999: 159). This correlation is similar to 
supervenience (Kim 1993: 175-178), although the Dalai Lama also entertains the 
possibility that supervenience is not quite contemporaneous, so allowing for prior 
mental events that exert a causal effect on physical events. 2 Because the Dalai 
Lama's view is expressed with exemplary respect for empirical scientific 
investigation, it retains the advantage of being methodologically transitional; firstly 
because his view is a theory like any other, awaiting empirical verification or 
falsification, and secondly because it occupies a 'middle way' position, linking 
Buddhist and neuroscientific explanation by means of a conceptual connection, but 
without positing any causal mechanism by means of which the mental exerts 
influence in the physical (Wallace 1999: 160-161). On one hand, mindibrain identity 
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suffers from a 'gap' in the explanation of how the physical gives rise to the mental 
(Wallace 2002: 19). On the other hand, mindibrain supervenience, contemporaneous 
or not, risks Ockham's razor, should it become evident that brains do all the work that 
is ascribed to minds. Neither Wistreich nor the Dalai Lama anticipates such an 
outcome. 3 
It is significant that the Dalai Lama should be interested in dialogue with 
neuroscience, and that Wistreich's testimony indicates that the Dalai Lama is 
supported by at least some of the Gelug-pa Buddhist community in that initiative. 
His openness to dialogue is a reminder that differences of view need not spell the end 
of equable communication .4 Openness to dialogue allows Gelug-pa Buddhists to 
retain their belief that mind is immaterial, as Wistreich does when he asserts that, for 
a Buddhist, the idea of a material basis for mind 'is just a joke', yet at the same time 
also to take neuroscience seriously, accepting that both Buddhist mind-theory and 
neuroscience are explanations susceptible to empirical verification at some future 
time. In the meanwhile, if supervenience, contemporaneous or not, is a real relation 
between mind events and brain events, it follows that there is a close relation between 
the details of neuroscientific explanations and mind explanations, and that the 
examination of either system might cast light on the other. 
Specific attitudes 
Once the participant's precautionary attitude of resistance was made clear, they 
willingly engaged in the interview process, so long as dialogue was sufficiently 
reflexive to allow for discussion of the expectations, terms and relevance of the 
research. Most of the interview participants feel that the underlying nature of mind is 
peripheral to their main concerns: several, particularly Wistreich, upheld a firm belief 
that mind has a non-material nature, yet none expressed their views with absolute 
certainty. Some have confidence in a particular view; others consider resolution of 
the issue to be deferrable or irrelevant. Although negative, such responses are 
interpretative attitudes, occurring in relation to the contemporary view of the mind, 
for the participants are well aware of what Baker calls the scientific 'Standard View' 
of mind-brain identity (2001: 17-18). In addition to general precautionary resistance, 
the participant's responses reveal combinations of attitudes along a spectrum from 
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reliance on traditional explanations through indifference and ambiguity to some 
agreement: I say 'combinations), because although one attitude generally 
predominates, the other attitudes are interwoven to produce the individuality of each 
response. 
From the interview data, I distinguish four attitudes of response (separating the 
second into five types) to the findings, conjectures, and sheer cultural presence of the 
scientific 'Standard View'. The rather indistinct label 'attitudes of response' is 
appropriate because the participant's views are not expressed as knowledge, or 
invariably cashed out in tenns of attitudes of belief. 
1. Faith in tradition 
The first attitude is faith in traditional teachings that describe mental events as 
non-material. Under a prototypical version of this attitude, faith in overall doctrine 
is thought to be more conducive to salvation than sceptical winnowing of teachings 
to account for the entailments of scientific theory. Faith-based justifications are 
reinforced by the subjective experience of the intangibility of mental events, and by 
appreciation of the logical coherence of traditional arguments, but faith depends in 
the first instance on the ad hominem warrant of the Buddha and his lineage; 
experience and reason are subsequent confirmations. 
Faith in tradition is variously apparent in Wisteich's acceptance of the Gelug-pa 
paradigm, in Bhikkhu VaJiro and Bhikkhu Gavesako's experiential interpretation of 
the Pdli suttas through the medium of monastic practice, and in Shaw's reliance on 
'immediate Buddhist tradition', by which he means the tradition as it is expressed for 
contemporary circumstances by his teachers. Faith in tradition is demonstrated by 
all the participants, but sometimes selectively, as when Crook doubts rebirth, or Pym 
advocates belief in 'only what is helpful to you'. Unusually, Wistreich rarely 
mentions the subsequent validation of traditional teachings by subjective experience, 
but that may be an effect of the qualitative interview process, which in his case 
strayed into doctrinal exposition. 5 Shaw is critical of Gelug-pa over- schol astici sm, 
but the emphasis in Wistreich's exposition of Gelug-pa teaching is directed towards 
making apparent the meaning of the relatively simple fon-nula of 'the emptiness of 
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everything from its own side' (s'finyatd), as a teaching that is intended to be realised 
in practice. 
There are clear differences of approach to traditional explanation between those 
who are openly reflective about Buddhist and scientific mind-theory, such as Crook 
and Ratnaprabha, those who make assessments of teachings, such as Shaw, 
Dharmavidya, Prasada and Pym; those who, for soteriological reasons, are 
deliberately not selective, such as Wistreich, Bhikkhu Gavesako and Bhikkhu Vajiro; 
and finally Jones, who 'pulls the rug from under' respect for tradition with 
characteristically Zen 'skilful means', when he describes Buddhism as the 'last of 
the kleýas' (defilements). Too much can be made of these different attitudes to 
tradition, for all the interview participants have pursued a continuing commitment to 
Buddhism for most of their adult lives. This commitment to one faith, and usually to 
one tradition or lineage, contrasts with the postmodern 'new age' shift from religion 
to spirituality, where 'multiple spiritual sources are engaged with simultaneously' 
and 'the web of spiritual interests is constantly revised and reconfigured' (Philips 
and Aarons 2005: 217-210), (Cush 1996: 205-206). Their commitment represents 
faith or trust (s'raddhj) in the sense of firm confidence rather than unthinking 
acquiescence. The differences between the participants are not so much matters of 
faith as of degree of reliance on words; that is to say, the extent verbal explanations 
are expected to provide accurate descriptions of the events, persons and experiences 
to which they refer, and to facilitate access to those experiences. For example, Shaw 
has a nuanced view of explanation, which separates out the question of the literal or 
descriptive truth from the ability of the explanation, as an upadeýa, to facilitate 
access to soteric experience. Pym suggests that the truth of any religious explanation 
cannot be evaluated until the relevant experience has been attained. 
2. Equanimity 
Apart from resistance to reductive scientific analysis, neglect of scientifically- 
informed contributions to the ontology of mind may spring from equanimity or 
indifference about issues of the kind that Pym expects to be unfathomable by 
ordinary minds, as opposed to enlightened minds. 6 Whether equanimity, 
indifference, or any other term is the appropriate characterisation for any particular 
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participant is difficult to determine without supposition about implicit motivations 
for attitudes and opinions. Such supposition is an impressionistic procedure that is 
methodologically inadmissible in the qualitative interview context 
Fortunately, the participants do provide a variety of explicit justifications for 
their tendency not to respond to questions about the ontology of mind. Pym's 
reference to the Buddha's 'Unanswered Questions' as the exemplary way to deal 
with ontological doubt (Homer 1957: 162-167 [MN 1.484-489]), falls partly within 
the category of faith in tradition, but also expresses his preference for evocative and 
indicative poetry over explicative doctrine, on the grounds that 'the language of the 
spirit is not the language of the dictionary'. Shaw and Bhikkhu Gavesako consider 
that scientific discourse is only informative about objective matters, rather than 
subjective concerns; Crook and Jones feel that ontological explanation suffers from a 
grasping after certainty where certainty cannot to be found; Prasada makes the same 
point in different terms by arguing against the tendency to grasp at objects and views, 
particularly views that reinforce a sense of self, Dharmavidya considers that 
scientific discourse is on an equal metaphysical footing with any other, for science 
also depends on metaphysical presuppositions that are merely 'human construct[s]'. 
Preference for subjective experience, analyses of 'grasping' and observations 
1111ý about the human limitations to metaphysics, all suggest that the participants find 
concentration on the ontology of mind to be a psychologically suspect craving for 
certainty. In consequence, they direct their attention towards psychological rather 
than ontological concerns. This finding supports the most general conclusion that 
can be drawn from the interview testimony: that despite devotion to tradition and 
appreciation of its utility, participants consider that the ultimate nature of reality is 
not to be discovered in explanations: since explanations emerge from experience 
they must be validated by experience of the 'way things are in the world ,-7 It is in 
consequence of this existential attitude that their resistance to unwonted analysis is 
tempered by equanimity or indifference. From the inter-view testimony, I 
conceptually isolate five alternative attitudes, which permit equanimity or 
indifference about ontology, by directing attention away from grasping after the 
nebulous certainty of a particular view of the mind, scientific or otherwise. 
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i. Essential experience 
This is reliance on primary (immediate) awareness as the validation of all 
experience, including ostensibly objective instrumental scientific observations. Pym 
describes introspective investigation of primary awareness as 'the Middle Way'. The 
prototypical Buddhist metaphor is here recast as existential 'presence', which Pym 
describes as a fon-n of enlightem-nent, 'acceptance of the here and now, but free from 
time'. This experience is of living mindfully between past and future, not overcome 
by cognitive constraints that limit, by means of definition, what it is to be a person, 
with a mind. Such a phenomenological approach is non-doctrinal, very 'this life', 
amenable to ecumenicism, and is not necessarily incompatible with the scientific 
Standard View. The point is that there is a special kind of warrant in personal 
experience, rather than the experience of another time or person, which Jones (and 
Heidegger) describes as 'facticity'. There is a temporal distinction between primary 
experience, which seems to confer this warrant directly, and historical, 'secondary' 
experience, which observes facticity through the less reliable warrant of memory. 
This is not an absolute distinction, for primary experience is not absolutely immediate. 
Consciousness ... comes into being when information 
is represented to 
a monitoring faculty under deliberative attention ... Only as attending 
proceeds, however, does it become possible to describe the 
immediately antecedent experience of a conscious episode. In fact 
mental experience can be consulted only retrospectively and such 
experience, as evidence for the existence of mind, can appear only as 
an introspective report of past events. (Crook 1980: 28) 
Neuroscience supports Crook's view that primary experience is a mental 
construction requiring some temporal duration (Libet 1965: 83,1979: 640, Freeman 
2003: 178-186). If the absolute immediacy of experience is open to question, so is 
the absolute reliability of 'facticity', but that does not diminish the qualitative sensory 
difference between the relative immediacy of primary experience and secondary 
recall from memory. There is also a 'folk' psychological difference, in that primary 
experience is always motivated by intentionality in Brentano's basic sense of 
intentional 'aboutness' with respect to the world (Dennett 1987: 32-33), whereas 
secondary experience tends to be co-opted for the guidance of acts of 'cunning' 
intentionality, which are aimed at the preservation of the self (van Reijan 1988: 411- 
412, Adomo and Horkheimer 1997: 57). 8 
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Crook's 'attender' and Pym's 'unself seem to be about the business of 
'aboutness', not the business of 'cunning', but it is not clear if that Is the case with 
Ratnaprabha's notion of 'self-reflective consciousness' (Cooper 2003: 97 102-107), 
for reflection is normally a temporal process more characteristic of the self than the 
attender, and the self which reflects is prone to cunning intentionality. A conceptual 
dilemma is set up, if both the 'unself and 'self-reflective consciousness' are 
envisaged to be capable of self-transcendence. It is difficult to understand how that 
can be so if consciousness is a relation between the world and a monitoring faculty, 
and it is unclear whether, by 'transcendence', is meant some revisioning of the 
dualism of ordinary mental relations, or some form of escape from dualism. The 
dilemma seems to result from the use of the term 'self without clarity about the 
extension of its meaning, a problem that attends all 'folk' psychological concepts. As 
a preliminary resolution to the dilemma, I interpret Pym to mean that the unself is 
entirely without self, and Ratnaprabha to mean that self-transcendence is 
transcendence of self: they may both be referring to escape from the intentionality of 
the historically-constituted self, not from primary experience as such. 
ii. Essential doctrine 
The Four Noble Truths in particular are held to be self-evident. Because other 
doctrines gain coherence from their consonance with these Truths, it is possible to 
practice Buddhism without hardening an attitude of preference for the non-material 
nature of mind into an attitude of belief, even though a literal interpretation of some 
doctrines depending on the foundation of the Four Noble Truths also depend upon the 
notion of immaterial mind. Concise doctrines such as the Noble Truths or the 
sunyatd teaching have the advantage of covering a wider set of cases and so attracting 
wider agreement than explanations that refer to specific cases (Strevens 2004: 155). 
Pym and Shaw emphasise that the Buddha's simple message has been obscured by 
proliferating doctrinal speculation, and Ratnaprabha volunteered a brief list of 
essential teachings on mind, 9 and Bhikkhu Gavesako and Bhikkhu Vajiro point out 
that agreement on the Noble Truths is the foundation for dialogue between Buddhist 
traditions. This preference for simplicity of explanation clears the way for emphasis 
on practice and experience, and both consistency of practice and coherence of concise 
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doctrine provides some defence for Buddhist identity against the threat, under 
globalisation, of dissolution into the welter of 'New Age' spirituality (Phillips and 
Aarons 2005: 216-218). 
iii. Essential ambiguity 10 
Ambiguity is refusal to discriminate, or rejection of discrimination in favour of 
radical doubt. It is sometimes validated, as with Pym and Jones, by reference to 
cryptic texts such as the Kdldma Sutta (Woodward 1932: 170-175 [AN 111.65]), the 
Prajhd-paramitd sfitras (Conze 1973), or the Hsin Hsin Ming (Clark 2001). 11 For 
Jones, ambiguity is a tool designed to undermine the reifying tendency of 
explanation, and return attention to non-discriminatory practice and experience. The 
practice of non-discrimination can be linked to soteriology, for Jones remarks that 
4sarvsdra is in essence the pain of dualism'. Non-dualism encourages a holistic view 
of the mind, as operating in dependent relation to the world and in continuity with 
the world. From this standpoint, whether the mind is material or non-material can be 
left indeterminate, opening the way for explanations that view mind and matter on 
some sort of continuum. 12 
iv. Essential practice 
Practice involves a suspension of speculation in favour of ritual activity that 
allows intuition to arise spontaneously. As Crook remarks: 
... to ask for the meaning of the universe: from the point of view of the 
universe that is a gross impertinence ... If you back off that, the 
universe is given to you. (Crook) 
Preference for practice is practically an entailment of preference for the warrant 
of primary experience. There are three justifications for this approach: that mind 
reorients itself when released from the flood of intentional activity; that precious time 
is not wasted on irresolvable issues; and that unlike intellectual activity, practice is 
inherently psychotherapeutic. Bhikkhu Gavesako describes practice as 'the key to 
unlock the suttas'. The Theravdda Thai Forest tradition traces its practice attitude 
back to Mahdkassapa, a lineage also cited by Crook on behalf of the Ch'an sect. 
Although Crook has Dharma transmission from his teacher, he accepts that some 
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names in the traditional lineage are fictional: what matters is faith in the continuity of 
practice, not faith in the specific identity of historical persons. 
v. Essential therapeutics 
The diagnostic form of basic Buddhist doctrines, the emphasis on the alleviation 
of suffering and the differentiation of practices according to psychological types all 
suggest some affinity between Buddhism and psychotherapy. The key difference, 
according to Prasada and Dharmavidya, lies in highly nuanced Buddhist attitudes 
towards the notion of a self. The self that Buddhism denies is not what Pym calls the 
(unself , and Crook calls the 'attender' to primary experience (Crook 1980: 28), but 
the development in secondary experience of what Prasada describes as the 
'accumulation of habit-energy', and Crook describes as 'identity-forination' 
resulting from 'objective self-consciousness'. Buddhist therapeutic practice is about 
observing and modifying the processes that enable habit energy to exert obsessive 
effects, leading to grasping after self as if it were a stable object, and craving for 
external objects that reinforce a sense of self. 
According to Abhidhamma explanation, any conscious event (citta) arises with 
the support of psychological conditioning factors (cetasikas) (Rhys Davids 2002: 
175-177, Rowlands 1982: 9-10, van Gorkham 1975: 12-13). Buddhism is practically 
concerned with the psychological conditioning that makes each conscious event 
wholesome and joyful rather than unwholesome and painful (Govinda 1969: 63 -64), 
on the belief that not only are action-decisions conditioned by cetasikas, but that 
perceptual cognitions cannot be trusted, unless unsuitable (unwholesome) cetasikas 
such as geed or attachment (lobha) hatred or aversion (dosa) and delusion or 
ignorance (moha) are restrained. This is why Prasada and Dharmavidya refer to the 
Buddhist diagnosis of human ills as a 'psychology of addiction'. 
Prasada interprets the basic diagnostic formulations of early Buddhism, ) 
particularly the Four Noble Truths and the five skandha, as diagnoses of the 
predilection to escape existential suffering (dukkha), which leads paradoxically to 
imprisonment in a self constituted entirely out of habit, and a consequent inability to 
encounter the real state of affairs in the world. The basic doctrinal formulations 
indicate a therapeutic method for reconditioning the mind, by enabling attention to a 
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more direct experience of encounter with the world to become the antidote to 
habitual, self-constituting responses (Brazier 2003: 21-24). 
According to Prasada and Dharmavidya, the tenn ri7pa in the skandha-formula 
refers to phenomenal forms as appearances to consciousness, and not to material 
embodiment. The formula constitutes an entirely phenomenological explanation, 
and when the Buddha is said to have said 'leave the skandhas behind', he did not 
refer to physical extinction, but to perfecting functioning by relinquishing the 
grasping of phenomenal form and the grasping after a self. What matters is not the 
materiality of embodiment or whether the mind has an embodied basis, but 
psychological modifications to the process of encounter with the 'other' that 
constitutes the world. 
3. Transcendental speculation 
Despite these five alternative supports for equanimity or indifference about 
ontology, Shaw, and to a much lesser extent Pym and Jones, express an attitude that 
transfers seamlessly from existential and psychological matters to ontological 
speculation, and in the process transcends the scientific concern for the material 
world. This attitude has affinities with idealism interpretations of Yogdcdra thought; 
it resembles pantheism, but is not particularly theistic, although neither Pym nor 
Shaw are averse to God-talk, for this attitude is sufficiently transcendental to 
encompass an ecumenical lack of concern for the precise labels and details of 
personification. 
... it is a different question - didactically how best to communicate bizarre things that are outside our ordinary language and thought, 
rather than the question: personal or impersonal? (Shaw) 
The transcendental attitude depends on a metaphysic that transcends realism by 
including all phenomena within ordinary subjective experience, and all 
unenlightened subjective experience of conventional reality within experience of the 
ultimate reality of enlightened Mind. 13 In this transcendental account, Mind tends to 
be capitalized. Shaw's speculative view transcends the mind/matter conundrum, by 
holding that neither mind nor matter are as they seem, for beings not only 
misconceive their world, but make manifest the material and temporal structure of 
saqisari .c reality. There is no shortage of ontological discussion in this 'pseudo- 
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idealist' view (Shaw), yet the question as to whether the ordinary mind is material or 
immaterial loses relevance, because the categories of materiality and non-materiality 
are symptomatic of an erroneous attempt to grasp the appearance of enlightened 
Mind. 
4. Qualified acceptance ofscience 
The fourth attitude is inclination to accept scientific findings on the grounds of 
empirical probability. Acceptance of scientific findings is the least evident of the 
attitudes; never dominant, and complicated by differences in the standards of 
verification that are expected of a scientific theory. This attitude is most clearly 
expressed by Crook, in his published account of consciousness, when he says that 
'the mind is ... materially present in the world' that 'there is no case ... for some 
mysterium, an agent of non-material origins, unless information processing is itself is 
given that status' (Crook 1980: 28-29). It is also expressed by Ratnaprabha, who 
thinks it would be 'rather silly' not to accept some material basis for mental functions. 
Girded with more qualification, acceptance of science is also expressed by Wistreich, 
notwithstanding his traditional approach, when he suggests that there is nothing in 
Buddhism that is not empirical, when he agrees with the Dalai Lama that 'if science 
can disprove something that's in the Abhidharma texts then we should reject them, 
even if the Buddha taught them', and when he expects that 'we will eventually end 
up ... with a Buddhism that completely accords with aspects within science and maybe 
there'll be rub-off the other way too... '. In principle, Wistreich adopts the same 
attitude to scientific investigation as Crook and Ratnaprabha, but he sets up a difficult 
verification-standard by expecting proof to take the form of direct perception. But it 
seems that in some circumstances a consilience 14 of indirect, conceptual evidence 
from several sources may be sufficient, as when he remarks that 
... 
it would be very hard to believe that the world is flat now, in fact 
there are so many different bases on which we are certain that it is 
round, that it's best if we realign all the teachings round the idea that 
the world is round. (Wistreich) 
Lewis's theory of attitudes as a model of the mind 
Resistance is a general response to the totalizing tendency of reductive analysis, 
but faith in tradition, equanimity about ontology, transcendental speculation and 
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qualified acceptance of scientific findings, are all more hermeneutic interpretative 
attitudes, because formed and expressed in the context of current circumstances. 
Acceptance of scientific findings clearly depends upon assessments of the relevant 
details of sound experimental work. The other attitudes could be justified solely by 
reference to tradition, but they acquire particular salience from their deployment in 
the contemporary context, and in the interview context of this research. I may be 
interpreting beyond the opinions of some of the interview participants, in suggesting 
that this salience is in part a response to the scientific 'Standard View' of the mind, 
but I justify this interpretative step on two grounds. Firstly, all attitudes, collective or 
personal, are responses to present contexts, and with respect to the mind the standard 
scientific view forms a major part of the contemporary context. Secondly, at the 
outset it was made clear in an introductory letter to the participants that the research 
was motivated by the '... heightened interest over the last fifty years in philosophical, 
psychological and neuroscientific investigations into the nature and functioning of 
mind'. In the same letter I raised the preliminary question, 'are Buddhist views 
compatible with the scientific view of mind as simply an emergent property of 
neurobiological functioning? ' The participants were, therefore, fully informed of the 
nature of the research, and the opinions and attitudes they expressed constitute their 
personal response to that research focus, even when they decided to redirect that 
focus in accordance with their own attitudes. 
To illustrate my interpretation that the participants' views can be arranged into a 
set of attitudes, and incidentally to illustrate why propositional analysis is inherently 
liable to meet with precautionary resistance, I build upon Lewis's argument in 
'Attitudes de dicto and de se' (1979). He suggests that all attitudes, including belief, 
knowledge and desire (1979: 528), are fundamentally attitudes de se: they are 
attitudes of seýfllocation with respect to the properties of things in the world, 
including things imagined in logically possible worlds (1979: 520-521). Attitudesde 
dicto, which depend upon propositional statements (teachings, doctrines or texts) 
made by others, are not self-locations but other-locations, yet they cannot be achieved 
without the cooperation of an attitude de se. In other words, attitudes towards 
properties take precedence over attitudes towards propositions about those properties 
(1979: 516,522). This is because de dicto propositions are themselves abstract 
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entities with properties external to the individual, therefore de dicto propositions are 
entities towards which attitudes de se are possible. Attitudes de se and de dicto are 
formed on the basis of acts de re, that is, they are ascribed on the relational grounds 
of 'suitable acquaintance' with the properties of the object of the attitude (1979: 539- 
542). Attitudes are therefore not entirely 'in the head', but depend on a relation 
between a mind and its object, whether or not the object is located externally in a real 
world context, or is a mental event appearing to consciousness. To remain 
meaningful, suitable acquaintance must be continuously re-assessed to ensure what 
Lewis calls 'apt transmission of reliable inforination' about the properties of any 
object (1979: 539-540). 
Lewis restricts his discussion to 'the attitudes of imaginary hyper-rational 
creatures' (1979: 515), but all attitudes are interpretations of contextual acquaintances 
with the properties of things, therefore not only may acquaintances be 'unfit for 
purpose' but interpretations may be irrational. Reasoning is continually influenced 
by context, prejudice, language, emotion and memory: in Buddhist terms, by karma. 
It is because attitudes are not determined logically but with the whole mind and on 
the de re basis of uncertain acquaintance that interpretations are hermeneutic: they are 
intuitive and seemingly given when they are sourced in areas of mind and world that 
are beyond rational control. 
Lewis admits that his description of the relational process ensuring transmission 
of information between the object of an attitude and the self is rather vague (1979: 
540). As a result, his unexamined notion of the self, like the neuroscientific 
assumption that thalamo-cortical processes constitute a 'self, leaves something more 
to be said, particularly with respect to the Buddhist doctrine of the absence of a 
permanent self (Skt. andtman, Pdli anattd), which motivates more precision in the 
characterisation of individual mental personality. 
As do Crook, Pym, Jones and Prasada, the linguistic philosophers Lakoff and 
Johnson make a conceptual distinction between the present subject and the 
historically and temporally- constituted self (1999: 267-288). Deploying this 
distinction, I suggest that an attitude becomes 'realised', in the sense commonly used 
in Buddhist discourse, when the object of the attitude is attended to by the subject of 
primary experience without interference by the habitual presuppositions of the 
189 
historically-constituted self, 15 and that realisation is stabilised when this state of 
affairs becomes temporally extended; that is, when understanding of the 'way things 
are in the world' is not radically modified to suit the obsessive requirements of a self 
An addition is required to Lewis's sequence of Mediaeval Latin 'tags' to 
accommodate temporal duality in the constitution of subjectivity. Thus, the temporal 
foundation for other-location de dicto and self-location de se resides in subject- 
location de animo, which participates in the relation of suitable acquaintance de re 
with the object of a prospective attitude as it is experienced in immediate or 'primary' 
awareness. 16 Only the immediacy of subject-location de animo enables continuous 
reassessment of the object of an attitude; without that, both self-location de se and 
other-location de dicto can only repeat past attitudes. 
The interview participants' four attitudes of response to the scientific 'Standard 
View' of the nature of mind (faith in tradition, equanimity about ontology leading to 
emphasis on psychology, speculation on transcendence, and inclination to accept 
sound neuroscience) all utilise combinations of de re acquaintance with de dicto 
doctrinal and scientific explanations. This occurs when they look for guidance 
outside immediate experience and when they express preference for traditional 
Buddhist analysis. But all the participants, including those with strong faith in 
doctrine, in their own terms emphasise the soteriological utility of primary 
experiential subject-location de animo, eventually and hopefully to be stabilised in 
realisations unaffected by habitual modes of interference de se. They do not, 
therefore, resist analysis just because analysis conflicts with tradition, as a rhetorical 
block against dialogue with anything other than their preferred version of 'right view', 
for any view must be capable of explanation and defence. They resist analysis, even 
Buddhist analysis in Jones's case, when analysis reduces textured meaning to 
propositions that cannot simply be accepted and repeated as prescribed, but may be 
acceptable when personally located de animo in awareness, and stabilised de se in 
self-awareness that is not habitually erroneous. This, I think, is the substance of 
Wistreich's point when he refers to the Dalai Lama's acceptance that 'direct 
perception' confirms or disconfirms an explanation. 
To summarise, any attitude, such as a belief, may depend on traditional 
explanation but attitudes are provisional until their object is located in the primary 
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experience of the subject and attitudes are transitory until repeatedly confirmed in a 
'bottom-up' flow of acquaintance with the world, which alters the habits of the 
historically constituted self. Response to contemporary context matters, because 
attitudes may be erroneously formed if the mode of acquaintance with the ob ect of j 
an attitude is forced on the immediate subject in a pre-explanatory 'top-down' 
direction, as a habitual mode of regarding initiated by the historical self, irrespective 
of perception of the external world. 
For the reader, this discussion constitutes yet another de dicto account, which 
may present an erroneous view of the world by reifying explanation, self and subject, 
and by rationalising the experiential functioning of 'suitable acquaintance' relations 
between them. This is not just an interplay of concepts, but of problematic 
psychological issues, which may now be illuminable by reference to the theoretical 
commentary on neuroscience. 
Underlying these issues, old and intractable ontological problems about the 
nature of self and subject are brought into focus by the translation of the subject of 
primary experience into the appropriate Latin term animus, despite the historical 
'excess baggage' of that terrn as a reference to the mind as an eternal soul with 
(secondary' or extended temporal duration. 17 Like the Pdli and Sanskrit terrn citta, 
animus evidently denotes momentary sentient consciousness, but consciousness 
forms part of a temporal sequence that can be remembered and can have a 
hypothetical beginning and a predictable end. Because any awareness dependent on 
memory is an indirect recall to experience, the history of subjective awareness has a 
lesser epistemological warrant: the developing sequence of animus or citta is only 
fallibly remembered to be a continuous mind, and that fallible continuity of animus 
or citta can only be predicted de dicto to be a soul or atman. 
18 
Irrespective of any direction of causation between mind and brain, if mental 
events occur in identity or supervenience relationship to neuronal events, then 
investigation of the order and structure of neuronal events should provide Insight 
into the reference of concepts used to describe the mind. Conversely, investigation 
into the meaning of mental concepts could clarify the functional purpose of neuronal 
events. These assertions amount to the view that psychological and neuroscientific 
explanations can be compatible without reduction. 
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Wittgenstein famously corrected his assertion, in the Tractatus, that words can 
denote simple objects (Wittgenstein 1961: 11-13 [TLP 2.02- 2.04]), to propose that 
'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (Wittgenstein 2001: 18 [P. I. 43]). 
Yet we do talk about the world with an agreed rough and ready accuracy of reference, 
because the world is organised into natural kinds that can be indicated by concepts 
with sufficient reliability for human purposes (Kornblith 1993: 107). Similarly, 
neuronal groupings have Hebbian plasticity in the developmental determination of 
their purpose (Hebb 1949: 69), so the functional role of a particular ensemble cannot 
be predicted with certainty, yet the functions that brains are called upon to fulfil with 
respect to the natural kinds in the world are sufficiently reliable for general mapping 
of brain function. The upshot is that sufficient accuracy can be expected when 'folk' 
psychological concepts are used to describe and relate mental and neuronal 
functioning. On this account it is possible to say what we do, why, and how, in 
psychological and neuroscientific explanations that can be cross-referenced to each 
other, and to illuminate the way in which the tetrad of explanation, experiential 
acquaintance with the world, primary subject, and historically-habitual self are 
interrelated in the formation of attitudes. This four-fold interrelation constitutes a 
simple functional model of the mind in action. This model can be equated with 
neuroscientific explanation, if explanation equates to the mainly cerebral cognitive 
modification of mental events, if acquaintance or experience is thought of as the 
phenomenal appearance of things and events in conscious awareness, which stand in 
relation to the subject, yet can be modified by habitual and intentional seýf-processes. 
Consideration, in subsequent chapters, of how these four components of the 
attitudinal model of mind are interrelated begins in Chapter 6 with an examination of 
the relation between explanation and experience, motivated by the interview 
participant's testimony that they have a preference for the former as warrant for the 
validity of the latter. 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
I Bhikkhu Vajiro does not support the idea of the evolution of the Dhamma, because 
the Buddha referred to the Dhamma as the rediscovery of an ancient path. 
2 Hume argues that temporal difference is vital to the notion of causality (Ryan 2003: 
29-30). 
3 Whatever the Dalai Lama's motivation, his decision to become involved in dialogue 
with science is significant because the outcome of public dialogues tend to be 
deten-nined by public judgement, rather than predetermined by the active participants. 
4 The Dalai Lama's openness to dialogue is not shared by all of the neuroscientific 
community, for there was opposition to his invitation to address the 2005 
Neuroscience Conference. It has been suggested that the opposition was motivated 
by geopolitical rather than scientific reasons (Nature Editorial 2005: 889, Cyranoski 
2005: 454). The Dalai Lama is partially protected from the unpleasant aspects of 
disagreement because his encounters with scientists are mainly facilitated under the 
auspices of the Mind and Life Institute conferences (Houshmand, Livingston and 
Wallace 1999: 175-179). 
5 Wistreich confirmed the importance of the warrant of experience in a personal 
communication after the interview. 
61 thank John Pickering for suggesting indifference as an appropriate tenn. 
Equanimity, indifference and poise are all used to translate the Buddhist cardinal 
virtue (brahmavihara) of upekkha (Pdli) or upeksd (Skt. ), although indifference 
carries the additional connotation of lack of care. Hamilton suggests that 'non- 
partiality' 'better conveys the point of non-attachment' (2000: 201 n. 58) 
7 The importance of experience in early Buddhism is described by Hamilton (2000: 
84,110-111). This emphasis stands in marked contrast to Sharf s view that the 
religious appeal to experience is ideological (1998: 96-97), but it should be noted that 
Sharf s critique is mainly of mystical or ineffable experience. It cannot be assumed 
that the Buddhist enlightenment experience is a mystical experience (Gombrich 1997: 
5-6). 
8 In Abhidhamma tenns, aboutness-intentionality is manasikdra and 'cunning' 
intentionality is cetand. See Chapter 7 note 13. 
9 Ratnaprabha's list: 
I Mind as moral. 
2 Mind as the source of dukkha. 
3 Mind as perfectible. 
4 Mind, as indicated by 1,2 and 3, as subject to conditioned arising. 
5 The accessibility of ýamatha and vipas'yana. 
6 The influence of prior sartzkharas and the survival of sartzkhiras. 
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10 Ambiguity is described by Pye as 'the unresolved coexistence of elements 
belonging to the transplanting religion and to the situation being entered' (1969: 23 7). 
Rather than being an example of such an analytical category, the ambiguous attitude 
displayed by Jones is a characteristically Zen procedure of withholding determination 
as a method of soteriological practice. 
" Clark's (2001) translation of the Hsin Hsin Ming is widely available in ephemeral 
sources, both with and without citation; see <http: //www. mendosa. com/way. html>. 
For other translations, see <http: //www. sacred texts. com/way. html>. 
12 In contrast to the Augustinian view of an incompatible union of body and soul 
(Abercrombie 1938: 87), a metaphorical version of the continuum view is implicit in 
Aquinas's notion of a hierarchy of becoming, with humans occupy a position as the 
highest of the material creatures and the lowest of the intelligent creatures: '... on the 
borderline between spirits and bodies' (Gilson 1929: 216). Humans are considered 
the highest of the embodied beings with material fon-n, and the lowest of the beings 
with intellect; above them are the angels, transposed into pure, disembodied 
intelligences. 
Johansson suggests that in early Buddhism the tangible/intangible mind/matter 
distinction was not clear-cut (1979: 32-34). Consciousness can be described as a 
force which causally energises the four material elements (Rhys Davids 2001: 25-26), 
yet it arises with them in causal dependence on co-operating conditions, and if the 
relational ontology of causal dependence is stressed, rather than the phenomenology 
of qualitative difference, mind may alternatively be conceived as not practicably 
separable from matter. Consciousness, in the suttas, only arises on contact with 
sensory stimulation, rather than by act of mind alone, and 'without bodily functions, 
the mind would not be stimulated' (Johansson 1979: 33). There are two possible 
perspectives on this intimate association between mind and matter. On one hand, 
matter and mind lie at either end of a continuum of materiality from gross to subtle to 
formless, and mental events inevitably partake of the quality of materiality in that 
their psychological contents are expressive of material forms (Johansson 1979: 32- 
34). On the other hand, the psycho-physical entity (ndma-riipa) can be characterized 
idealistically as conscious processes or phenomenal objects apprehended by other 
conscious processes: 'the body is known only through the mind' (Johansson 1979: 
33). 
Vififidým is not altogether "mental" in the western sense, and rlipa is not 
altogether material. There is no dualism in Buddhism. (Johansson 
1979: 33). 
13 For this dual use of the term 'Mind' in a Ch'an context see Cheshier (197 1). 
14 , Consilience' was used as a term for the mutually-reinforcing compatibility of 
different theories by Whewell (1858), and misappropriated by Wilson to support the 
'Ionian Enchantment' of the reduction of different theories to one fundamental 
physical theory (1996: 1-5). 
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15 Lewis does make the distinction between self and subject when he distinguishes 
between 'people as continuants' and as 'a more or less momentary time-slice thereof, 
but he considers both to be forms of the self (1979: 527). It is the contention of this 
thesis that the 'time-slice' is not a form of the self. Neuroscientific work that 
supports a differential origin for the subject, as opposed to the self (Varela 1999), is 
discussed later in the thesis. 
16 1 thank Elizabeth Pender and David Levene for suggesting de animo as the 
appropriate Latin translation for 'of the subject". 
17 1 owe this point to David Levene. 
18 Buddhism repudiates dtman as a continuity term for the mind, yet the individuality 
of karmic consequences fulfils the continuity function. 
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Chapter 6 
Explanation and experience 
Introduction 
This chapter examines explanation de dicto and acquaintance de re, that is, the 
linguistic commentary on the primary sensori-motor experience of acquaintanceship 
with the world. Two main modes of explanation can be differentiated 
epistemologically. One is empirically-based on particular knowledge, the other based 
on evaluative propositional thinking about meaning, at a remove from the 
commonsense certainties of everyday life (Arendt 1978: 57-58,62-64, Wittgenstein 
1979: 28ý 31,46 [OC. 209,234,354], Stroll 1994: 39). In pre-modem times the 
possibility of a moral connection between these two modes was assumed (Maclntyre 
1971: 111, Jauss 1989: 4-10, Fuller 2005: 9), and the traditional Buddhist Dharma is 
a pre-scientific discourse that includes them both. Modernity is typified by the 
separation of discourses of knowledge and meaning, 'is' and 'ought', yet they both 
refer to the same world and can be interrelated with the aid of bridging terms or laws, 
which preserve the 'folk'-psychological explanatory schemas typical of the evaluative 
mode (Maclntyre 1971: 120, Fodor 1974: 129-13 1). 
Explanations never achieve absolute truth, for they are indicative models that 
depend on information from prior 'representations' of the world (Teller 2004: 439). 
Representations are perceptual cognitions resulting from sensory acquaintances with 
the world. Despite the experiential certainty of everyday life, representations are so 
permeated with habitual responses to earlier perceptual cognitions that it is 
questionable whether the external world is directly experienced, indirectly 
represented, or internally 'enacted' (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991: 172). 1 
contend that although perceptual cognition correlates to the activity of a closed 
nervous system (Maturana and Varela 1998: 163-166, Llinas 2001: 57), it is 
sufficiently coupled to an external world to enable representational correspondence to 
that world. The quality of perceptual cognition is indirect, approximate and idealized, 
yet is sufficiently 'homomorphically' isomorphic (Llinas 2001: 65) to bestow a sense 
of 'facticity' on ordinary experience. 
The commentarial character of explanation might be taken to indicate that it 
is a transcendent function with respect to primary experience, but this is not so 
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phenomenologically: explanation is not external with respect to immediate or primary 
experience, but appears to primary experience as yet another feature of the world. 
The constructions of explanation depend on memories of 'secondary' experience, but 
always appear with the 'lightning speed of thought' as an integral part of primary 
experience (Wittgenstein 2001: 89, [PI. 1.318-321] Johnston 1993: 72, Arendt 1978: 
44), therefore acquaintance with an explanation (a thought) appears in awareness on a 
par with acquaintance with a percept. Neuroscientific evidence suggests that 
linguistic explanation is a relatively flexible development of perceptual cognition, and 
perceptual cognition is a relatively fixed mode of explanation of the world; the 
difference between explanation and experience is therefore a matter of degree rather 
than fundamental ontology. 
Buddhism implies that explanation and experience can be altered for the better. 
Alteration is simple in the case of explanations because they are flexible models, 
which can be adjusted to be more or less effective or true. Although felt to be certain, 
primary experience of the world is more difficult to modify because it takes the form 
of phylogenetically, developmentally, and psychologically conditioned conscious 
qualia, by means of which change and continuity in the world is understood. For 
mental events to have a relation of identity or supervenience with respect to neuronal 
events it is necessary that there be an ordered relation between one moment and the 
next and between one event and the next, otherwise continuity and change amongst 
the properties of the world could neither be experienced, explained, or modified. 
Certainty in experience 
By the nature of the empirical method, the scientific order of knowledge offers 
the inductive warrant of probable truth, but not of certainty. By contrast, the 
phenomena of the everyday, which form the objects of primary experience and 
therefore also of Buddhist mindfulness practice, are largely things that are felt to be 
certain: this is the reliable procession of night and day in the peopled space of 
community. Although such things are not immutable, Wittgenstein suggests that their 
existence cannot be doubted: they 'stand fast for us' with foundational certainty 
because they form the 'hinge' on which more uncertain events of everyday life turn, 
and are thus not open to doubt or revision (Wittgenstein 1979: 18 [OC 116], Stroll 
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1994: 105-110). Even though life embedded in the experience of communal praxis 
provides the foundation of animal certainty, derived explanations in terms of 
knowledge or meaning are less certain. This is because explanations are not 
metaphorical 'conduits' for the transmission of the full texture of information, as if 
conveying the phenomena-in-itself, but are reductions of reality: they are analogical 
models or 'frameworks' constructed as aids to discovery and understanding 
(Reddyl979: 286-292). This reductive constraint on explanation-as-modelling 
applies equally to the Buddhist Dharma. Although it is an exegetically unified 
account, the explanatory Dharma can only indicate a possibly soteriological mode of 
acquaintance with the world, of the sort that warrants certainty. ' 
Orders of knowledge and meaning 
Arendt (1978) argues that there are two types of explanation. Underlying the first 
type, a Platonic sense of wonder motivates generalisations from experience and the 
systematic constitution of an unchanging order of meaning behind appearances (1978: 
1145 138,141-151). Underlying the second type, wonder about the world also gives 
rise to a sense of puzzlement, which motivates the scientific constitution of an order 
of empirical knowledge (1978: 114). Bhikkhu Gavesako makes this distinction 
between meaning and knowledge, when he distinguishes between 'what the Buddha 
teaches about the truth, or perceiving the truth of the way things really are', and the 
6western scientific ideal of finding the ultimate nature of reality'. Shaw makes a 
similar point when wondering if there might be a non-literal as well as a literal theory 
of truth. The distinction between truth in terms of meaning and truth in tenns of 
verifiable knowledge relates to the difference between subjective and objective 
experience, and thus the separation of the two orders parallels the explanatory gap 
between first-person and third-person access to the -mind, and the associated 
distinction between introspection and observation. 
Wittgenstein remarks that 'observation' depends for its correct grammatical use 
on the possibility of independent verification, therefore introspection can never be 
observation (Johnston 1993: 2, Hacker 1990: 58,191), yet a grammatical difference is 
not a psychological difference, and both observation and introspection remain forms 
of experience. Not only do the two orders spring from the different attitudes of 
puzzlement and wonder, but they have different ends: broadly speaking, knowledge is 
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understanding of the physical world, while meaning is understanding of the human 
condition. 2 Despite these differences, the two orders advert to the same world in the 
philosophical sense of 'world, ' which includes all that can be thought, sensed, or 
performed. Ratnaprabha and Jones, Crook and Pym make this point when they assert 
that in the final analysis all objective observations are subjectively experienced; thus 
the third person/first person division is a methodological constraint on access to the 
world, not an absolute distinction: person as object and person as sub ect inhabit the j 
same world. 
The issue for traditional forms of explanation that combine both knowledge and 
meaning, such as the Buddhist Dharma, is not whether there are two distinct 
epistemological orders or whether one order should be reduced to the other, but 
whether conclusions in one order can be meaningfully related to conclusions in the 
other. Since the grammatical and methodological difference between the two orders 
does not obviate their basic ontology as explanations, the order of knowledge is 
susceptible to interpretation in the order of meaning, and vice versa, and confusion 
only arises with translation issues in the course of the interpretative process. 
Maclntyre interprets Hume's critique of the illogical progression from a factual (order 
of knowledge) premise to a moral (order of meaning) conclusion to be an argument 
that transition from an 'is' statement to an 'ought' statement requires the use of 
'bridge notions' that express human dispositional evaluations, (Maclntyre 1971: 120- 
121). 
We could give a long list of the concepts which form bridge notions 
between 'is' and 'ought': wanting, needing, desiring, pleasure, 
happiness, health - and these are only a few. I think there is a strong 
case for saying that moral notions are unintelligible apart from bridge 
notions such as these (Maclntyre 1971: 120). 
Maclntyre is not concerned with the epistemological status of factual statements, 
nor does he agree with Hume that 'is' and 'ought' statements are incommensurable. 
He is suggesting that the transition from factual statements to prescriptive statements 
is illegitimate without reference to human dispositions. I think it is the apparent 
absence of these bridging terms that moves Ratnaprabha to describe mind/brain 
identity theory as a 'slight impoverishment of thought'. The tendency to make the 
distinction between 'is' statements in the order of knowledge, and 'ought' statements 
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in the order of meaning, without concern for the means to bridge that distinction, 
constitutes a significant difference between thought under modernity, as opposed to 
thought in medieval Europe (Jauss 1989: 4-10) or in ancient and medieval India 
(Fuller 2005: 9). 3 
The Buddhist Dharma refers to both the explanation and the reality of the way 
things are in the world (Griffiths 1999: 159n. 77). Since 'is' and 'ought' are not 
disassociated, the experiential meaning and the empirical facts of the world are not 
disassociated. Unless, therefore, it is possible to connect meaningful statements with 
knowledge statements using 'bridge notions' referring to human dispositions, doubt 
can be cast on the indicative reliability of the Buddhist Dharma in its explanatory 
sense. Bridging notions facilitating relations between explanations are not unique to 
moral and religious discourse, for they are also necessary for transition between 
levels of explanation in the sciences (Fodor 1980: 131). Of most relevance to this 
thesis is the validity of broadly psychological, Abhidharma forms of explanation, but 
any more fundamental or 'lower-level' explanatory discourse, right down to quantum 
physics, should be capable of eventual relation to any 'higher-level' discourse such as 
sociology or economics, by means of evaluative dispositional terms. If there is no 
mysterious means of transition from 'ought' to 'is', by which the ontology of the 
external world can be altered to accord with human disposition, then the unification 
of empirical and meaningful explanation does not depend on the subservience or 
reduction of one discourse to another, but on the consistent interpretation of the 'is' of 
scientific findings in terms of the 'ought' of human, and in this case Buddhist, values. 
Against reduction 
Contrary to contentious sociobiological claims (Wilson 1998), when an 
'extended' or 'higher-level' psychological or cultural explanation such as the 
Buddhist Dharma is related to a lower-level explanation such as a scientific theory 
the result is not afurther explanatory reduction (for all explanation is reduction of the 
rich qualitative texture of experience to the thin texture of a model) of the former 
theory to terms of the latter. It is suggested by Friedman (1974: 18-19) and Kitcher 
(1976,1989) that scientific explanations do not advance understanding by means of 
reduction, but by theory-unification. Fundamental theories possess the 'explanation 
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extension' required for unification (Kitcher 1989: 447), but lack the concepts 
necessary to do the explanatory work of the higher-level theory. 4 Jones (1995) argues 
that if 'completeness of explanation is the goal of unification theory', then a lower- 
level theory, such as neuroscience, cannot do explanatory work without the aid of 
terms derived from higher-level theories such as psychology, if it is to adequately 
explain the important generalisations of those theories. Thus unification is not a 
reduction but a combination of lower-level 'explanation extension' and 'higher-level 
non-reductive explanatory schemas' (Jones 1995: 27-29). In psychological cases the 
'explanatory schemas' are precisely MacIntyre's 'human evaluative dispositions', 
which make use of 'folk' psychological categories to explain patterns of events 
(Dennett 1987: 27-28). It is only with reference to these categories, or improvements 
upon them, that different levels of explanation can combine to extend scientific 
understanding of the relations between mind, brain and world. 
Hardcastle (1992) suggests that the explanatory extension of a lower-level theory 
can 'illuminate' problematic issues in a higher-level theory. In the case of 
neuroscience and psychology (and Buddhist mind-theory) neuroscience could either: 
1. theoretically demonstrate the possibility of some antecedently 
problematic presupposition of the extended theory; or 
2. conceptually refine the extended theory by better specifying entities 
which belong to the extensions of the predicates in the extended 
theory such that proponents of the extended theory alter the ways in 
which the referents of these predicates are fixed in accordance with 
the new specifications. (Hardcastle 1992: 419) 
The first 'way of illumination' amounts to confirmation or disconfirmation of a 
presupposition, the second is a matter of conceptual improvement. Of particular 
concern for this study is the implication that the explanatory extension of 
neuroscience might illuminate apparent inconsistencies in Buddhist mind-theory, and 
vice versa. With respect to Hardcastle's first point, the 'antecedently problematic 
presupposition' in need of illumination in Buddhist mind-theory is what is meant by 
the metaphysical intuition that 'mind' is an element. 5 With respect to Hardcastle's 
second point, there are concepts on both sides in need of refinement in order to 
establish the kind of unification between Buddhist and neuroscientific explanation 
that is anticipated by Wistreich. There may be many ways of explaining 'the way in 
which things really are' in the order of meaning, yet the theoretical possibility of 
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consilience between the two discourses of knowledge and meaning is guaranteed 
from the outset if both advert to the same world. That unification need not entail 
reduction of either Buddhist or scientific explanation. 
... the various ... 
domains which make up the cognitive sciences are 
separate and independent fields of inquiry; each has its own history, 
with its own set of important questions, research techniques, 
explanatory patterns, criteria for error analysis, and so on. How and 
whether one domain will ultimately reduce the other is simply the 
wrong philosophical question. (Hardcastle 1992: 424-425) 
Buddhist explanation aims to answer different questions to those generally 
pursued by science; questions that could be restricted, as Bhikkhu Gavesako supposes, 
to issues in the order of meaning. However, metaphysical entailments of the 
consequences of karma, such as rebirth, enlightenment and the continuity of mental 
events, all indicate that to the extent that those posits are intended to be taken literally, 
they extend into the order of knowledge. In that case, Buddhism ought not to fear 
conceptual refinement or the examination of problematic presuppositions, for the 
overriding concern ought to be with 'the way things really are' in terms of both orders 
of meaning and knowledge, rather than with the defence of tradition for ulterior 
reasons. 
The pluralist alternative 
As Dharmavidya implies when he suggests that science is as metaphysical as any 
other discourse, the grand 'Ionian enchantment' (Wilson 1998: 1-5) of the reduction 
of all explanation to the brute facts of foundational physics is as much an article of 
belief, and a matter of metaphysical dispute, as are the tenets of any religion. 6 
Cartwright considers that scientific theory-reduction is only achievable by virtue of 
assumptions, including mathematical assumptions, made in order to manufacture a fit 
between theoretical models and the evidence they portray (1983: 4). Foundational 
science idealizes rather than describes reality, for the world is amenable to plural 
explanations, and therefore ontologically various or 'dappled' rather than 
ontologically unified under one foundational theory (Cartwright 1994: 357-361). 
Sklar opposes Cartwright on the grounds that pluralism of explanation is not the 
same as pluralism of ontology (Sklar 2002: 429), for the 'best explanation' of science 
(currently quantum field theory) charactenses things as they really are, whereas the 
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phenomenological explanations provided by the special sciences are ontologically 
misrepresentative or false, but sufficiently 'similar' to be explanatory and predictive: 
they are 'merely useful fictions' (Sklar 2002: 430). Sklar considers that the only 
grounds for scepticism about the universality of the best explanations of physics are 
provided by the vitalist presupposition of a 'life-force' outwith biological explanation, 
by the 'hard' problem of explaining the mind, and by the apparent inability to derive 
applied explanations and predictions from quantum field theory (2002: 434,441). He 
sets the first problem (vitalism) aside as implying something beyond the 'elementary 
constituents of the world', ignores the second (qualia), and tackles the third, arguing 
that even though foundational theories are inexact and do not provide the best 
explanatory route to knowledge of complex phenomena, they are 'on the road' to the 
truth of the 'desired ultimate theory' (2002: 439). Sklar asserts that science is now 
sufficiently supported by argument and evidence for the burden of proof to fall on the 
relativist sceptics. 
Contradicting Sklar, Teller is sceptical about the possibility of progress towards 
such an ideal fundamental theory (2004: 429-430). There is no way of knowing the 
difference between a true or ultimate description of the way things really are and a 
(useful fiction' or approximation to the truth, therefore no way of measuring the 
distance travelled along the 'road to truth' by any provisional foundational theory. 
Sklar asserts that higher-level 'phenomenological' theories are fictional idealizations, 
while foundational theories are approximations to the truth; Teller responds that the 
approximation/idealization (quantative/qualitative) distinction is misguided, for 
features of both higher and lower level theories are equally ideal. He cites quarks and 
gluons, which are just as fictional as the notion of a fluid (2004: 433). He also argues 
that there can be no clear road to a truth that is as yet unknown, and that matters are 
only true in certain respects, with the particular respect depending on the interest of 
the researcher (2004: 435). 
Teller implicitly restores the relevance of the problem of mind, which Sklar 
explicitly sets aside, when he states that truth-evaluations 'are characteristics of our 
representations', and 'our representations serve as our guides to what we take to be a 
world independent of us' (2004: 439). Because representations do not give direct 
knowledge of the world they cannot determine exact truth. Teller invokes the 
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Buddhist parable of the blind men and the elephant (Woodward 1948: 82-83 [Udana 
68-69]), to illustrate the human epistemological predicament, but suggests that the 
analogy inappropriately and teleologically identifies the beast, just as science 
inappropriately presupposes the outlines of a desired explanation of reality. 7 He 
argues that humanity cannot get beyond imperfect representation to achieve direct 
observation (Teller 2004: 440), is indeed 'stuck' within the elephant analogy, and 
therefore needs to embrace the plurality of explanatory contexts. 
Complete relativism can be avoided, for in any particular context one explanation 
will have greater 'verisimilitude' than any other (Teller 2004: 442). When an 
explanation is adequately explanatory it can be characterised as relatively true; in 
respects in which the same explanation is inadequate or problematic, it can be 
characterised as relatively fictional. Teller extrapolates from Sklar's statement that 
all conceptual explanations, including current foundational theory, are not universally 
true (Sklar 2002: 440) to argue that all theories are fictional yet useful for prediction 
and understanding. Such theories are informative fictions, and since they inform, yet 
are not true, they had better be called 'veridical fictions' or 'fallible veracities'. Thus 
it is 'only through idealizations ... and their alter egos, inexact truths, that we have 
access to the world' (Teller 2004: 447). 
Teller's introduction of hermeneutic issues of context, interest and sensory 
representation indicates that the epistemological dilemma of the mind-world relation, 
which Sklar mentions only to ignore, is as salient for scientific explanation as it is to 
any other form, including religious explanation. Teller is making the same point as 
the interview participants when they assert that scientific methodology finally 
depends on presentation to subjective experience. But Teller also remarks that all 
subjective experience is fallible: it is true in part, fictional in part. Sklar says 
something similar, when he suggests that our 'conceptualizations' are: 
... misrepresentative of the true state of affairs, 
but ... sufficiently 
similar to "how things are" for some predictive, and even genuinely 
explanatory, purposes. (Sklar 2002: 430) 
It is understandable that linguistic representations of the world should be fallible 
veracities, for they are only indicative models shorn of the rich texture of perceptual 
experience, but Teller's assumption that all 'representations' are fallible guides to the 
world stands in need of justification before perception, which is usually felt to be 
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certain, can be bracketed with explanation as having both 'fictive and veridical 
aspects'. In effect, Teller is saying that explanations must be reductive indicative 
models of a Kantian external world of unobservable things-in-themselves, because 
they depend on perceptual representations that are also reductive indicative models of 
the same Kantian world. This view of perceptual representation is radically at odds 
with the commonsense view of perception, exemplified by Augustine's account of the 
intermediate 'trinity of the outer man', which trusts perceptual cognition to transfer 
true and accurate information about the world to consciousness and to memory 
(Augustine 2002: 79). If partially true and partially fictional, as Teller suggests, 
representations only achieve a partial isomorphism with the world they represent, 
constructing some parts of the representation out of 'useful fictions'. 
In the interviews there are indications that the participants appreciate the fictional 
component of explanations, including traditional Buddhist explanations. 
Ratnaprabha is suspicious of certainty, wanting to leave room for myth and 
'flexibility of thought', and finding that there are 'different helpful pictures and 
images or models to use... '. For example, in the case of the dispute between 
'sudden' and 'gradual teachings' (Dumoulin 1963: 85, Ruegg 1989: 3,7), he feels 
that deficiencies in either method can be corrected by the alternative approach. Pym 
has a strong preference for the language of poetry over literal, logical language in the 
expression of religious ideas; Shaw wonders if traditional Buddhist explanations, 'the 
good upadeýa' may not be entirely couched in non-literal language. Referring to 
gandhabba in rebirth explanations, and to earth, water, fire and air as descriptions of 
the basic material elements, Bhikkhu Vajiro notes that 'if you take it literally, you are 
lost'. His remark succinctly indicates that explanation can be fallible or fictional 
because explanation functions metaphorically, not literally expressing states of affairs 
but indicating how to identify states of affairs by similarities between their properties. 
Despite choosing to take doctrine more literally than the other participants, Wistreich 
is aware that explanations offer scope for misapprehension, his archetypal case being 
to have 'lost the plot' or to 'have made a poison of the medicine' by taking emptiness 
(S'i7nyatd) to literally mean nothingness. There are also combinations of metaphorical 
and literal allusion in Wistreich's characterisation of the mind as 'clear', 'knowing' 
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and 'luminous', and Shaw's account of the three 'aspects' of mind as 'openness, 
clarity and sensitivity'. 
Given the interview participants' general attitude of reliance on subjective 
experience, it needs to be clarified how perceptual representation of the world could 
be indirect and partially fictional yet felt to be experientially certain. There are 
indications that some of the participants presume that perceptual contact can be direct, 
for Wistreich mentions direct realisation, both Wistreich and Prasada mention direct 
perception (Brazier 2003: 68), Crook refers to 'direct seeing' and 'Immediate 
apprehension of existence', and Shaw mentions 'direct contact with a reality'. Care 
needs to be taken in the interpretation of these statements, in view of their dialogic 
context: the participants may not be explicitly thinking about whether the 
mechanisms of perception provide direct access to the world. It is more likely that 
they mean that perceptual experience may be misguided by prior dispositions and 
explanations, rather than that perceptual experience is an inherently direct form of 
contact with the world. Nevertheless, if perceptual acquaintance with the world is 
inherently indirect, the interview participants' case for preferring experience as a 
reliable warrant for the truth-value of explanation is slightly undermined. 
Cognitive enaction versus representation 
Varela Thompson and Rosch (1991) (hereafter VT&R) argue, on the basis of 
neuroscientific evidence, that perceptual experience does not directly represent an 
external state of affairs, and does not represent at all, directly or indirectly, for the 
mind internally 'enacts' the world by means of the autonomous functioning of a 
closed, 'autopoetic' neuronal system. Against that view, I contend that the 
evolutionary history of the brain-world relation supports an approximate or idealized 
correspondence to the way things are, in that perceptual cognition represents the 
external Kantian world of things-in-themselves in ways that are partially true and 
partially fictional. 
VT&R's account of perceptual cognition is an example of how a bottom-up, 
lower-level theory (the neuroscience of perceptual cognition) can be used to 
illuminate an intermediate-level cognitive theory. Their account is of particular 
relevance to this thesis because they attempt to demonstrate how that intermediate 
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theory supports a higher-level Madhyamaka explanation that experience is not 
grounded on relations between a real self or a real world. They conclude that 
perceptual cognition is a 'closed' neurological process (VT&R 1991: 139), that there 
is no self to be found in experience (VT&R 1991: 79), and that since perceptual 
cognition is an autonomous enactment rather than a representation it cannot support a 
correspondence theory of truth warranted by reference to an independent external 
world (VT&R: 134-140,193-194). 
VT&R consider that both self and world are transcendent concepts: neither can be 
found when experience is examined with circumspection, therefore experience is 
groundless (VT&R 1991: 217-219). They consider that enacted experience cannot 
justifiably be divided into events occurring between a subject and an object, but can 
be reliably introspected 'with precision' by mindfulness techniques, giving access to 
insights that are experientially and ethically transformative. Their alternative to 
subject/object duality is that cognition: 
... is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history 
that a being in the world performs (VT&R 1991: 9). 
The theory of enaction which portrays a 'bringing forth' of both mind and world 
is an extrapolation from the theory of 'autopoesis', which asserts the autonomous 
self-organization of systems 'coupled' to an external environment (Maturana and 
Varela 1987: 43-52). Autopoesis is particularly characteristic of cellular biological 
systems, but the concept has been used more widely in systems theory and social 
analysis (Luhmann 1995). VT&R provide evidence for autopoesis from studies of 
computations in simple artificial computational 'neural' networks 'structurally 
coupled' to random external influence (1991: 88-91,151-157). Neural networks 
undergo state changes in response to external influence, but those changes are 
internally specified: they are externally initiated but entirely dependent for their 
subsequent form upon the capacities and prior states of the network. VT&R therefore 
consider the altered states of the network to be autonomous, emergent enactments 
within a closed system, rather than symbolic representations of the initiating external 
stimuli. They extrapolate that the 'being-in-the-world' that constitutes the operation 
of the human mind emerges from the operations of closed neural networks of extreme 
complexity, which are 'structurally coupled' externally (1991: 156). These networks 
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enact a lived world of experience, which does not consist of internal representations 
of any external reality. 
VT&R illustrate their theory with examples from the visual system, citing 
research which demonstrates that although colour perception is a response to light 
wavelengths, its qualitative characteristics are internally generated by cooperation 
along three different transmission pathways from the retina, and are contextually 
modified by other sensory modalities (1991: 158-163). They cite Varela & Singer 
(1987) in support of their contention that the task of the brain is to enact a world, 
rather than to represent it (VT&R 1991: 96 n. 21). Sensory information from the eye 
to the visual cortex passes through the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) of the 
thalamus, but amounts to only 20% of the total input received by this nucleus. The 
other 80% comes from the reticular formation, the hypothalamus, the superior 
colliculus, the posterior geniculate nucleus and feedback from the visual cortex 
(VT&R 1991: 94-96). VT&R conclude that visual experience depends more upon 
internal feedback states than it does upon external input. 
What we have described for the LGN and vision is, of course, a 
uniform principle throughout the brain ... An individual neuron 
participates in many such global patterns and bears little significance 
when taken individually. In this sense, the basic mechanism of a 
visual ob ect or a visual attribute could be said to be the emergence of 
a global state among resonating neuronal ensembles (VT&R 1991: 96). 
Their evidence does not entirely support their enaction theory, for although 
neuronal activation is a closed system, initial variation in background neuronal 
activation results from sensory interface or 'structural coupling' to an external 
environment. Incoming information may be overwhelmed by internal feedback, but 
the purpose of that feedback is likely to depend on the developmental history of the 
organism and the phylogenetic history of the species in its dealings with the external 
world: the result, as Llinas suggests, of an evolutionary inculcation of the efficient 
use of relatively fixed patterns of qualia to facilitate rapid prediction and response in 
salient and complicated scenarios. The world may not be as it seems, in that the 
qualities of experienced properties are internally enacted, but that does not entail that 
they are not representative of the external world, at least with Teller's 'fallible 
veracity'. Varela and Singer's statistical evidence that 20% of 'bottom-up' perceptual 
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information combines with 80% 'top-down' cognitive information indicates that 
perceptual cognition is partially representative and partially fictional. 
My disagreement with VT&R's conclusion that the world is not represented turns 
on the evolutionary history of 'structural coupling' to the external world. In the terms 
used by VT&R, everything known about that world is an enactment. In the terms 
used by Llinas, the outcome of the history of embodied organisms is the evolution of 
neural systems that are sufficiently coupled to enable a homomorphic form of 
isomorphism (Llinas 2001: 65). Taken together, the concepts of homomorphism, 
isomorphism and representation seem to combine neuronal autonomy, structural 
coupling and the external world into a set of relational events. 8 They can be separated 
for experiement, analysis and explanation, but are only functionally autonomous (in 
the sense of absence of any on-going structurally-coupled relation) in the cases of 
dreaming and imaginative fantasy, when the brain is only connected to what Damasio 
calls the 'as if body loop' (1999: 1415). VT&R are right to be chary of the word 
6 representation' because it is complicit in the dilemma of the mind as an internal 
mirror of an external world for the benefit of a non-existent cognitive agent or self 
(VT&R 1991: 134-141), but so long as it is admitted that there is a hylic world 
external to personal embodiment the term 'representation' retains some meaning. 
Although they mention the equal importance of both 'structural coupling' and 
'enaction', the latter receives the most attention, and they fail to locate both in a 
single space, or 'entre-deux' between external and internal (VT&R 1991: 230-231), 
as they must do if the concept of representation is to be entirely exhausted. The fact 
remains that the sensorimotor system functions to identify and predict danger, 
security and possibility amongst the natural kinds that constitute an external world, 
prior to any mental enaction. As such, percepts are never direct, but they are 
representational; they are selectively focussed on features of the world that are 
predictively evaluated to be of human concern, and, because they are constituted from 
relatively fixed qualial patterns, they are habitual representations. 
The indirect, 'top-down' cognitive input of habitual information ftom past 
perception into present perception is like metaphorically ' ... experiencing one thing in 
terms of another' (Lakoff and Johnson: 1980: 5), but is actually experiencing now in 
ternis of then, and entails that present acquaintance with the world has a non- 
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linguistic explanatory dependency upon the entire embodied history of sentient 
sensori-motor structural coupling. A 'first-person' experience of someone else's 
'third-person' linguistic explanation is therefore an epistemological difference, but 
not a fundamental ontological difference: de dicto explanations appear in primary 
experience, yet primary experience is a phylogenetically-infoirmed explanation, only 
differing from linguistic explanation by degree of cognitive enhancement, for both 
are indirect ways of representatively modelling the world. 
There are two implications to be drawn from this excursion into the neuroscience 
of perceptual cognition. Firstly, a long history of use means that although most 
features of primary perception, such colour, sound and texture are fictional 
enactments, perception can be relied upon to correspond usefully with the 
unknowable Kantian way that things are in the world. Secondly, the high proportion 
of cognitive modification of incoming perceptual information may indicate that there 
are phylogenetically-embedded impediments to seeing 'the way things really are'. 
Thus, although perception may be a reliable correspondence for everyday purposes, it 
may still be evaluated as an erroneous explanation of the world for religious purposes. 
Discussion 
Explanation is the predictive modelling of truth-values, containing some 
components that are empirically true and others that are imaginatively fictional. 
Belief, doubt and deferred commitment, but not certainty, are reasonable responses to 
the fallible veracity of explanation. Beyond such epistemological considerations, 
religious explanation is distinctive, in that as instruction (qpadeýa) it is intended to 
facilitate soteriological practice. Like any other explanation, imaginative fiction for 
the purpose of prediction is likely to play a significant role in that facilitative process. 
In comparison to perceptual experience, verbal explanation de dicto requires 
more cognitive processing delay (Pibram. 1999: 27,38), but is no more than a 
linguistic development of the non-linguistic cognitive intervention that enacts the 
qualitative content of perceptual experience. To be conscious, and so to see, hear, 
smell, taste, touch and propriocept is to accept the intervention of an explanation: a 
model that reduces the world to shapes, aspects, colours and sensory textures that are 
relevant to human concerns. This representational model depends on the cognitive 
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assistance of habitual imaginative prediction, made on the phylogenetic and 
developmental basis of past experiences. In the Wittgensteinian sense of certainty, 
although the world 'stands fast for us' the primary experience of awareness of 
acquaintance with the world is not as certain as it seems, for it is already permeated 
by habitual explanation. The participants' tendency to prefer subjective experience 
de animolde re to objective explanation de dicto is therefore not an assessment 
between different modes of verification, but a preference for a more spontaneous 
form of representation, which is enacted so habitually and rapidly that it appears to 
consciousness with the degree of animal certainty that Jones call 'facticity'. 9 
The fallible facticity of underlying representations, that is to say, the possibility 
that cognitive events underlying experience might not always provide a reliable 
correspondence to a real world, becomes a salient issue in the light of the interview 
participants' marked preference for personal experience over scientific explanation. 
Bhikkhu Va iro and Crook both contend that this life is marked by uncertainty, i 
and most participants are psychologically idealist: they take it that experience is a 
psychological variable. In the heat of conversation the participants do not always 
distinguish between the two temporal modes of 'experience': acquaintance de re with 
the world, as opposed to acquaintance de se by means of productions from the 
memory and imagination. The conflation is unsurprising, for de re acquaintance 
includes habitual cognition, and both forms of acquaintance appear in awareness with 
the 'lightning speed of thought". Amidst the combination in conscious awareness of 
cognitively-mediated perceptual information about the external world with 
somatosensory information about the embodied person, it is hard to distinguish the 
epistemologically variable from the psychologically variable, or truth from fiction. 
Once the susceptibility of primary experience to cognitive, affective and perceptual 
variation becomes apparent, primary experience can appear to be without firm 
foundation, as VT&R suggest. Groundlessness may be psychologically destabilising 
if animal certainty in worldly embodiment is altogether lost, even though 
groundlessness as a religious practice may also facilitate psychological change. 
When Bhikkhu Vajiro says that '... one can go through the whole of one's life 
deluded' he presumably means that, for the unenlightened being (Puthujjana), the 
apparently certain 'facticity' of perception may be a deluded or erroneous view of the 
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world. At some period in the development of the species, experience has been 
moulded by the homeostatic needs of the individual into the imaginative form of an 
enduring self, and it is the therapeutic task of Buddhism to remedy that habitual 
misguidance. The usual remedy prescribes repeated attention to conscious awareness 
by means of ritual behavioural practice of the technique of mindfulness (Kennedy 
2004: 149-151), under the provisional guidance of explicit linguistic explanations de 
dicto selected from the traditional Buddhist doctrinal portfolio. 
Summary 
There are two sorts of explanation, of knowledge and of meaning, differentiated 
in modem times by their mode of verification, but combined in the unified discourse 
of the traditional Buddhist Dharma. Explanations tend to be arranged into levels of 
description from the most fundamental quantum levels, 10 through classical, 
sociological, psychological, metaphysical and soteriological scales, but they may be 
unified without reduction by the use of 'bridging notions' that reflect 'human 
dispositional evaluations' (Maclntyre 197 1: 110). 
There is a quality of felt certainty about everyday experience that is absent from 
explanations. Explanations never convey the truth completely, for they are reductive 
indicative models, which contain contextually useful predictive fictions. 
Explanations depend on perceptual representations of the world that are also only 
indicative, and also indirect, because they are cognitively enacted out of a relatively 
fixed system of qualitative explanatory possibilities. It is the long habituation of 
4 structural coupling' that allows perceptual acquaintance to correspond sufficiently to 
the way things are in the world to convey a feeling of certainty. In fact both 
explanation and experience are fallible for the same reason: they depend on a 
homomorphic isomorphism that is quasi-metaphorical, as the identity of one thing 
(the external world) is established in terms of another (neuronal autopoesis) by the 
structural reliability of sensorimotor information. 
Neuroscience suggests that the interview participants would be misguided if they 
preferred primary experience over explanation on the ground that awareness grants 
direct access to the world, for the world is only indirectly known through fallible 
isomorphism, and a large part of perceptual cognition is itself a habitual form of non- 
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linguistic explanation. However, the interview participants are correct in their 
understanding that the primary experience of awareness is the only means of access 
through which the world can be fallibly known and explanations of the world can be 
evaluated. 11 
Explanation and secondary experience arise together in primary awareness, as 
two related kinds of fallible, reductive, isomorphic modelling of reality. The 
fallibility of the constitutive contents of awareness makes the world uncertain; in 
particular, explanation and experience model features of time and space in ways that 
are psychologically variable. It is a dilemma of mind, indicated by the difference 
between the subject de animo and the self de se, that despite appearances the 
immediate arena of awareness is neither temporally immediate nor spatially an arena. 
Embodied humans are clearly spatio-temporal beings, yet despite the apparent 
immediacy of awareness and its role in the representation of spatial difference, 
awareness encompasses brief temporal extension, yet no spatial dimension 
whatsoever. It is the task of the next chapter to understand what these assertions 
mean with respect to Buddhist mind-theory and with respect to the views of the 
interview participants. 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
I That explanation is only indication reinforces the argument that nobody can be 
taught anything: they find out for themselves by observation (Burnyeat 1999: 286, 
Wittgenstein 2001: 2, [PI. I. 1]). Bhikkhu Vajiro makes the same point when he 
remarks that a good teacher says 'teach yourself, and a similar point when he 
remarks that 'the most important abhififid (supernormal power) is the abhififid of 
being able to teach'. 
2 That the distinction between knowledge and meaning, science and the humanities is 
'fuzzy' reinforces Rosch's argument that categories have an internal structure built 
around prototypical examples (Rosch 1973). 
3 Brahmanic sacrifice presupposes a direct causal connection between 'is' and 'ought', 
as if the ritual actions of the human microcosm exert a direct influence on the 
macrocosm (Collins 1982: 41). It is not necessary to posit such a metaphysical causal 
link in order to argue that modernity has lost sight of the psychological association 
between fact and value, or that religion has a contemporary role to play under 
modernity precisely because it attends to the fact/value association. 
4 For a discussion of Nagarjuna and 'explanatory work' as a justification for the 
irreducibility of theories, see Garfield (2001: 511-513) 
5 The issue, dealt with in Chapter 8, is whether in this context an element (dhdtu) is a 
brute fact, or whether it is an emergent property. 
6 Wilson's position is that: 
... total consilience ... argues that nature 
is organised by simple 
fundamental laws of physics to which all other laws and principles can 
eventually be reduced. This transcendental world view is the light and 
way of many scientific materialists ... but 
it could be wrong (Wilson 
1998: 58). 
7 If Dhannavidya is right in identifying eight different versions of enlightenment in 
the Buddhist tradition, Buddhists are no better than scientists at identifying the beast 
on the basis of inadequate information (Brazier 2001: 80-132). 
8 Homomorphism is 'resemblance without explicit structural affinity' (OED). It could 
also be described as analogical isomorphism: 'a relationship of resemblance rather 
than a resemblance of relationship' (Cazals in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). 
French suggests that representation can be based on 'partial isomorphisms' with 
considerable 'looseness of fit' (2003: 1479-1482) 
9 Facticity (Faktizitdt) is an aspect of Heidegger's Dasein or 'being-there' (Grondin 
1994: 91-100, Philipse 1998: 52-53). 
10 The theory that consciousness depends upon the maintenance of quantum 
indeterminacy in microtubules (Pen-rose 1990,1994) is not discussed in this thesis 
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because it is a speculation with as yet no evidential support. See Koch and Hepp 
(2006: 611-612) for a critical assessment of the arguments. 
11 Pibram makes the same point, and argues that subjectivity 'exists as the starting 
point for all enquiry', which is then a process of 'progressive objectification'. He 
thinks that this resolves the 'hard problem' of the dilemma of subjectivity versus 
objectivity (Pibram 1999: 20). 1 disagree; the dilemma is set up by the attempt to 
understand conscious experience objectively. 
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Chapter 7 
Subject and self: the activity of mind in time 
Introduction 
The neuroscience of visual perception indicates that perceptual cognition 
constitutes a dilemma, because it only provides representative access to the world by 
means of a closed neuronal enactment, which is as much an indirect explanation of 
the world as it is an experience of the world. Despite the cognitive penetration of 
perceptual experience by explanation, the categories of experience and explanation 
can be clearly differentiated, because the former confronts immediacy, while the 
latter is a response to duration. According to Llinas (2001: 21-5 1) and Crook (2002b: 
100-101), it is the task of the mind to combine the experience of immediacy with 
feedback explanations from previous experiences for the purpose of prediction. But 
attempts to achieve this combination encounter a dilemma in the experience and 
explanation of time. It is a mark of this dilemma that explanations of mind seek to 
make organised mental activity over time comprehensible, by modelling time in 
ten-ns of space: the property of endurance is metaphorically understood in terms of 
the property of dimension. In effect, the dilemma of mind in time is demonstrated by 
the split between the first-person intimacies of subjective experience and the third- 
person estrangements of explanations of self-processes. The subject and the self are 
not the same; they are divided by time into subjective happenings that are 'fallibly 
true' experiences, and imaginations of the self that are 'veridically fictional' 
explanations. The dilemma of mind, in practice, is how to combine these two sorts of 
representation in order to predict and then cope with the changes that happen over 
time. The source and the continuity of the dilemma of mind in time can be identified 
phenomenologically and neurologically, as the mind apprehends itself existing in 
time by a retrospective awareness of the subject of the previous moment as the 
'horizon' of the present moment (Varela 1999: 118-119). 
The way to an enlightened view of 'the way things are' is through close attention 
to subjective appearances as they occur in the short duration of the existential 
moment, not by the use of spatial metaphors in order to locate the self-mind in the 
form of an object enduring through time, for there is no real space in either time or 
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mind. Although spatial metaphors can usefully characterise affective characteristics, 
they misrepresent the ontology of mind. Spatial metaphors for time and mind are 
misrepresentative when taken literally, because they reify the dynamism of property- 
relations into differences between enduring objects and enduring mental states. 
Misrepresentation can be partially avoided by the use of cryptic, k5an-like statements. 
These brief indications highlight the dilemma of mind-in-time by transferring the 
dilemma intact from the master to the novice, instead of indicating a de dicto 
explanatory solution. Some of the interview participants make such cryptic 
statements, indicating that the temporal division between the subject and the self is a 
prime source of dissatisfaction (dukkha), and sometimes suggesting that escape from 
the dilemma is envisaged in the fon-n of escape from sequential time. The dilemma 
can then be recast as an ontological question, as to whether a mind that is not 
temporally-bifurcated could be called a 'mind' in the conventional sense. If the 
spatial metaphor of the sequential 'flow' of time does not point to a literal truth about 
the constitution of the world, then Llinas's core predictive function for mind becomes 
a technical impossibility. If time is not sequential, mind and world are not as they 
seem. If minds are as they seem, then time is sequential. 
Metaphysical considerations about time give rise to different beliefs about minds, 
but irrespective of differences of belief, minds in this life are engaged in the cognitive 
manipulation of perceptual representations in time and space. Crook (1992,2002b) 
has modelled the possible 'range of states of awareness' that can be manipulated. I 
argue that, amongst the range, to call reflexive states introspective is spatially 
misrepresentative, for they occur on the same plane of awareness as perceptual 
cognition of the external world. As with introspection, intentional states reduce 
attention to the external world; they are unconscious attempts to make the world suit 
the desires of the mind, and have the unfortunate side-effect of erasing the experience 
of time. Crook (1992,2002b) argues for a rebalancing between states of intention 
towards the world, and states of attention to the world. I suggest that such a 
rebalancing can be promoted by emphasising external relations with the otherness of 
the world, and de-emphasising imaginatively-intemal relations with the self I also 
counter three objections to my characterisation of persons as time-beings devoid of 
space in mind. 
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The subject of primary experience 
The phenomenal moment when awareness happens appears to be pre-occupied by 
the 'subject' de animo, but a brief remark by Crook implies that is not the case; he 
suggests that the subject is only retrospectively aware of itself (1980: 27). The 
subject is the reflexive observer in awareness; it is what Pym refers to as the 'unself, 
and Crook calls 'the attender'. Naming the pre-occupation of immediate awareness 
as an 'unself 'attender' or a 'sub ect' is more precise than the use of terms which j 
carry the 'conceptual baggage' of objective continuity, such as the notions of 'self 
(mind' 'soul' or 'life', which are alternative translations of the Latin term animus. 
The attender only has temporal continuity in so far as it is the subject of a particular 
event, including the reflexive awareness of its own subjectivity. It is because the 
subject lacks continuity and objective reality apart from its participation in primary 
experiential events that Crook can reasonably remark that 'the attender of an 
experience can only be retrospectively introspected' (1980: 27). 
Crook has noticed that there is a delay in reflexivity, such that the subject is 
aware of the present moment without being aware of itself, yet that very present 
moment includes awareness of the role of the subject as the 'attender' of the previous 
moment. All that can be phenomenally introspected about the subject of the previous 
moment is that it partook of the immediacy of that moment. Thus the apparent pre- 
occupation of awareness by the subject is a misrepresentation; the actual experiential 
state of affairs is an awareness that the subjective attending function of 'aboutness' 
was characteristic of the previous moment. 
This retrospective explanation of the 'immediate' subject of experience is 
phenomenological, but raises as many questions as it resolves: 
1) The manifestation of the subject is limited to participation in an experiential event, 
but how is such an event delimited? 
2) How could one experiential moment be retrospectively aware of the previous 
moment? 
3) How can the subject be associated with immediate awareness-experience, yet only 
be identified by its traces in just-seceding experience? 
4) In what way are experiential events momentary? 
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5) What is the relation between the apparent immediacy of the subject and the 
apparent continuity of the historical selP 
The answers to these questions are unlikely to be clear: firstly, because all 
explanations involve reductive conceptual modelling; secondly, because these are 
reflexive questions asked of minds by minds; and thirdly, because they involve 
entrenched metaphysical problems about the nature of time, space and objectivity. 
However, under methodological impartiality with respect to the supervenience or 
identity theories about the relation between mental events and brain events, the 
answers to these questions may be illuminated with the aid of neuroscience, in the 
way that Hardcastle (1992: 419) suggests that lower-level theories can illuminate 
higher-level explanations. Varela (1999) attempts this illumination by relating 
phenomenological introspection of the nature of immediacy to the temporal details of 
neuronal activity. His argument turns on his view of the mind as an embodied 
dynamic system. 
Endogenously constituted integrative frameworks account for 
perceived time as discretized and not linear, since the nature of this 
discreteness is a horizon of integration rather than a string of temporal 
'quanta' (Varela 1999: 116). 
His point, in agreement with Pibram (1999: 22,27) is that although individual 
neuron firings are too quick to be consciously perceived, the integration of neuronal 
groups or 'ensembles' occurs at a slower scale, always conditioned by previous 
integrations, with sufficient delay to permit global dissemination across the brain and 
therefore appearance to consciousness. Present brain states depend on previous brain 
states, yet are discrete with respect to those antecedent states because they are not 
constituted from quite the same array of integrated neuronal ensembles. The present 
array has an inevitable relation to the previous array, because its beginning-state or 
initial 'horizon' depends upon the polarization and de-polarization of axonal action- 
potentials bequeathed by the cessation of the previous array. In neuroscientific terrns, 
Varela is explaining the same phenomenal intuition as Crook, that the 'attender' of a 
perceptual moment is only knowable retrospectively, when he contends that the 
subjectivity of the previous perceptual moment is constituted by the beginning 
'horizon' of the present moment (Varela 1999: 118-119). 
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Varela separates neuronal temporal duration into three scales. Firstly, the '1/10- 
scale' of the 'elementary', ten-millisecond firing of interneurons is too quick to 
achieve consciousness, but allows sensory stimuli to be unconsciously differentiated. 
Secondly, at the 'I-scale', from a hundred milliseconds up to one or more seconds 
duration, neuronal firing is integrated right across the brain into synchronised 
ensembles capable of contributing a representation to consciousness. 
In brief, we have neuronal-level constitutive events, which have a 
duration on the 1/10 scale, forming aggregates that manifest as 
incompressible-but-complete cognitive acts on the I scale. This 
completion-time is dynamically dependent on a number of dispersed 
assemblies and not a fixed integration period; in other words it is the 
basis of the origin of duration without an external or internal ticking 
clock (Varela 1999: 118). 
Thirdly, at the 'I 0-scale', dynamic integration of neuronal ensembles exceeds the 
duration of conscious 'nowness', allowing processes of memory and imagination to 
create a 'broader temporal horizon'. 
It constitutes the flow of time related to personal identity. It is the 
continuity of a self that breaks down under intoxication, or in 
pathologies such as schizophrenia or Korsakoff s syndrome (Varela 
1999: 119). 
It is clear that the 'I -scale' of primary experience of the 'lived present' is not 
immediate, but has a variable duration from fractions of a second up to a few seconds, 
in dependence on the delay required for the integration of neuronal ensembles that 
constitute a particular conscious experience. ' On my understanding of Varela's 
neurophenomenology, the self is different from the subject, for traces of the subject 
are reliably and retrospectively present as the beginning horizon of every experience 
at the 'I -scale', whereas the self is retrospectively constructed over the third scale of 
duration, as a fallible, fragile and fictionally-prospective standard of identity, by 
means of the imaginative recombination of episodes recalled from memory. 2 
According to Varela's presentation it is not a succession of distinct retrievals from 
memory or their imaginative recombination that creates a sense of the momentary 
passage of time, but the finer phenomenal dynamics of the second scale of duration, 
as the beginning 'horizon' bequeathed by the neuronal depolarization of one 
synchronous activation of 'nowness' has a determinate effect on the next. Without 
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successive electro-chemical activation of neuronal ensembles over sufficient temporal 
duration, 'nowness' could not represent change, and the past-present- future structure 
of time could not become apparent to consciousness (Varela 1999: 119-121). The 
subject is apprehended at the peripheral interstices of this successive flow of sensori- 
motor activity. It is this apprehension that enables the mind to perceive time, and, in 
Augustinian terms to 'know' itself with certainty (Abercrombie 1938: 62, Augustine 
2002: 39). 
Transformation of time into space 
Like all naming, the act of denoting the subject suffers from the disadvantage that 
it reifies its meaning. The subject is not an object, but a succession of antecedent 
handover states of varying neuronal ensembles. Recollection that the reference of a 
name is to an abstract object is not sufficient to prevent the notion of the subject from 
imaginative cognitive manipulation as if it where an object, for that is the effect of the 
differentiation achieved by naming. This cognitive achievement is a misperception of 
the nature of the subject, for the neuroscientific evidence suggests that the subject is 
not so much an object as a transitional state in a process, and a relational nexus that 
enables other appearances to manifest in awareness. 
The subject-as-nexus is just one aspect of the process whereby different modes of 
sensory information are combined, a process which Aquinas called the 'sensus 
communis' (Gilson 1929: 228-229, Arendt 1978: 50). This combination requires an 
integration of so much sensory information at such a level of complexity that the 
temporal synchronisation of their communal interconnection emerges in the form of 
consciousness of the world. Thus the subject is a transitional event in integrated 
mental processing over a brief length of time, which by its peripheral status as the 
antecedent 'horizon', creates the temporal contrast that gives the subsequent sequence 
of neuronal ensemble activation its immediate character of 'nowness'. Appearance to 
consciousness occurs irrespective of delay required in order to achieve the 
synchronous combination of all the discrete neuronal ensembles underlying a mental 
event. 
Explanations of the neuronal processes underlying the phenomena of subjectivity 
and awareness are entangled in metaphysical issues about the nature of time, for 
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although these processes require a brief passage of time in order to take place, time is 
a succession, not a length, and there is no literal taking of place: the retrospective 
sense of the subject and the present sense of awareness emerge anew with each 
transition in the neuronal dynamic. When spatial metaphors are used to describe such 
a temporal process (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 159-168), the continual and 
conditioned recreation of the sub . ect becomes reffied as a spatial object, with the 
metaphorical implication of the unconditioned continuity of that object through time. 
There seems to be no escape from the modelling of temporal processes as 
metaphorically-spatial objects in the course of linguistic explanation. Metaphors 
describe 'one thing in terms of another' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5), and only in 
that manner do temporal relationships between processes become apparent, for time 
is a useless coordinate after the event, unless it is represented as movement in space. 
Time passes like a stranger, time flies like an arrow, time flows like a river, events 
happen in time as if time were a spatial container. Even the immediacy of a single 
moment is a tacit spatial division with respect to the next immediate moment, as time 
is cut up on the spatial chopping board that constitutes explanation. Because time is 
empty of explanatory power, most descriptions of time are spatial and temporal. 
Continuity is only explicable in terms of changes to spatial form. 
It is argued in Chapter 6 that experience is permeated by non-linguistic 
explanation. The implication of that argument in this context is that because of 
cultural neglect of the temporal, as opposed to the spatial, character of embodied 
persons, the inability of persons to comprehend time without spatial metaphors 
penneates ordinary experience to such an extent that 'the way things are in the world' 
is not properly experienced. 3 It follows that explanations of enlightenment 
experiences may not be 'illuminating' in Hardcastle's sense, because an enlightened 
being, by hypothesis, knows 'the way things really are', whereas spatial explanations 
present temporal processes in the misrepresentative spatial form of object-events. It 
may be, therefore, that Buddhist notions of enlightened realisation refer to a reduction 
in the spatially-explanatory characteristics of habitual experience, and to a consequent 
understanding of subjectivity as constituted by temporal succession as much as by 
spatial embodiment. Subjective time-being does not refer to narrative history on 
Varela's third scale of duration, which is the domain of the hypothetical self, but to an 
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attitude that is attentive to Varela's second scale of duration that produces the 
qualitative phenomenological experience of the present moment. This appears to be 
the experiential attitude valued by the interview participants, but it is not clear from 
their testimony if they would agree that the phenomenological present moment has 
some brief temporal duration or that experiential immediacy is not the same as a 
hypothetically timeless, philosophically-atomic moment. 
Consequences of spatial metaphors 
The imaginative, predictive components of a theory tend not to be as amenable to 
combination as the empirical components, when unification of explanations is 
attempted. This is one reason why, as Cartwright suggests, the world appears to be 
ontologically 'dappled' when different levels and sorts of explanation are taken 
together (1999: 361). Ontological 'dappling' is a metaphorical description of a set of 
explanations that are inconsistent because they are not unified. Ontological dappling 
is exacerbated by the availability of paradigms with different terminologies, in the 
form of fundamental explanations to which more applied theories are expected to be 
reducible. Fundamental paradigms such as string theory, quantum theory and 
Newtonian physics come to mind in science, and dependent arising (prafitya- 
samutpdda) or the emptiness of the inherent existence of anything from its own side 
(S'zinyatd) fulfil a similar role in Buddhism. 
As Fodor (1980), Hardcastle (1992), Cartwright (1999), Garfield (2001) and 
Teller (2004) suggest, human scientific and cultural flourishing is reinforced by the 
attachment of different sorts of explanations to different contexts, from astrophysics 
to Buddhist mind-theory to economics to psychology and zoology, without any 
requirement to reduce explanation to a set of brute facts, one part of the world to 
another, or to deny that the multiplicity of explanations actually refers to a unified 
web of relations that constitute the 'way things really are'. Arendt remarks that 
persons do not live amongst events at an underlying causal level, but amongst 
qualitative appearances (1978: 25). In so doing, persons commonly deploy a 
multiplicity of naturalistic explanations that specifically address the multiplicity of 
appearances on their own terms. Since precise laws and concepts that bridge between 
explanations are sometimes difficult to construct in the light of the (relative) 
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indeterminacy of translation, attempts to fully unify explanations tend to become 
mired in terminal confusion about terminology, particularly because explanation is a 
linguistic form of inexact predictive modelling that depends as much upon 
metaphorical allusion as upon linguistic precision. 
It is unsurprising that time is modelled in spatial terms, since the most common 
metaphorical allusion is to space. Ex-planation is the laying out of conceptualisations 
after the manner of things in the world, usually according to agricultural metaphors 
of separation: into spatial locations or fields contained by barriers, so that nominal 
and natural relations can be understood in terms of 'vegetative' metaphors (Collins 
1982: 22-224), or from a notionally elevated or disinterested perspective. Barriers 
and fields are concrete objects that are used with metaphorical abstraction to make 
limiting distinctions. The barrier/field metaphor is paradigmatically spatial, as a 
typical example of the physical world's resistance to freedom of movement. The 
barrier/field metaphor is sourced in ordinary human praxis, and transfers useful 
properties of definition, control and differentiation from the physical to the abstract 
order. The barrier functions in its literal and its metaphorical use by the 
establishment of intransigence and the modulation of penneability; it expresses the 
control of enclosure both within and beyond a location, and imposes spatial 
coordination upon non-spatial entities. Barrier enclosures are physically preventative 
of loss of possession of objects, and metaphorically preventative of loss of meaning 
and understanding, as if meanings were objects of possession. Barriers are instances 
of definition, or 'the setting of bounds' (OED), dividing physical and abstract 
phenomena into areas to which attention and intention can be meaningfully directed. 
In a potentially disorderly world, understanding is participation in a cultural history of 
exploration and mapping of barriers set up to pattern undifferentiated phenomena by 
social agreement. This definitional use of barriers establishes order against chaos, 
culture against wilderness, meaning amongst meaninglessness, until proliferation 
(prapahca) exhausts their utility, as the significance of meaning is dissipated in a 
maze of differentiations. 
Despite the qualities of consistency, clarity and coherence which barrier/field 
spatial modelling brings to explanation, spatial metaphors can be problematic 
analogies. The general problem with spatial models is that of rhetorical promiscuity: 
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barriers are arbitrary with respect to space in general, and their location in 
explanation can be situated for ulterior purposes unconnected to the model. The 
particular problem of spatial modelling with respect to menta I events is that the 
model is completely metaphorical, for there is no space in time, and apart from the 
functional neuronal correlates of mental events, there is no space in mind, unless the 
world that is represented is taken to be a part of the mind. 4 The limit problem for 
explanation is that spatial metaphors do not literally bestow spatial characteristics of 
objectivity onto non-spatial entities. Arendt observes that the Aristotelian equation 
between the two terms of a metaphor is not truly an equation because it is usually 
'irreversible'. The meaning is only 'handed down' from one side of the metaphor to 
the other (Arendt 1978: 103,105). 
The irreversibility of the relationship expressed in 
metaphor ... 
indicates 
... the absolute primacy of the world of 
appearances and thus provides evidence of the extraordinary quality of 
thinking, of being always out of order. (Arendt 1978: 109). 
Spatial metaphors from the world of appearances illuminate the 'target' of the 
metaphor, in this case the time required for mental events, by evoking affective 
qualities that are normally associated with the 'source' (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 
264), in this case the experience of space. This is what I interpret Shaw to mean by 
his description of 'openness' or 'spaciousness' as one of the 'three aspects of mind'. 
Bringing the operations of mind into conscious awareness can evoke feelings that are 
qualitatively similar to the feelings evoked by the consciousness of space, and the 
use of spatial metaphors indicates the presence of this affective correspondence. 
Since they are micro-explanations, the limit-problem of metaphors is the same as the 
problem of explanations: they cannot represent all the textured inforination provided 
by consciousness. Explanatory modelling must always remain incomplete; 
otherwise it approaches the Borghesian, nightmare of a book without beginning or 
end (Borges 1979: 89), or a map that is identical with reality. 
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Placing mind in time 
If explanations are inherently spatial, then Buddhist explanations of the temporal 
nature of being also risk misrepresenting the 'way things really are', if they are taken 
too literally. In particular, the theory of 'instantaneous momentariness' (Stcherbatsky 
1962: 79-83), entails that moments 'replace' each other with causal efficiency yet 
without any relational connection (Grupp 2005: 51-52), of the sort demonstrated by 
the 'horizon' bestowed by one neuronally- synchronous event upon the next. The 
Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is just as metaphorical as theories that grant that 
time has extension, for moments are girded by temporal barriers that bestow the field 
metaphor on time. If one moment replaces another without any association other 
than displacement, no reason can be adduced for the evident order that emerges from 
the relations that allow any previous event, physical or mental, to have an efficient 
conditioning effect on any subsequent event. In consequence, the Buddhist theory of 
instantaneous momentariness does not provide an adequate explanation for personal 
continuity (Johansson 1978: 61-62, Griffiths 1999: 31-33,60-63). 
Grupp justifies a philosophical version of the Buddhist metaphysical theory of 
time by reference to quantum theory (2005: 54-55,83-85), but does not address how 
such a theory could explain meaningful life at classical scales, beyond the suggestion 
that the intuitive, sequential perception of time is conventional or samsaric, while 
direct perception of the non-sequential, atomic, replacement-momentariness of time is 
an ultimate or nirvd? zic apprehension of reality (Grupp 2005: 55). 
The nirvd? zic mind has direct awareness of the atoms that make up 
empirical reality, and which empirical reality can be reduced to (Grupp 
2005: 108). 
The practical problem for Grupp's account is that neuroscience indicates that 
absolutely-direct perception is impossible because 'top-down' cognitive conditioning 
requires temporal duration in excess of the timeless unit of an atomic philosophical 
moment (Varela 1999: 119, Pibram 1999: 28-29, Libet 1999: 49). 
If the criterion for a useful theory is whether or not it does explanatory work 
without preference for higher or lower levels, then theories that account for the 
sequential succession of time are more applicable to human concerns. Thus, although 
the spatial modelling of time is misrepresentative, it developed because it is a 
veridical fiction with respect to the context, interests and the existence of the minds of 
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ordinary human beings. If minds are identical to, or supervenient upon brain 
processes and brain processes require temporal duration, it follows that temporal 
duration is required for fundamental theories to be thought in the first place: 
consciousness depends on event-relations that exceed the momentary. 
As Augustine understood, thought (cogitatio) is combination (coactu) (2002: 66- 
67), and the combination of different events cannot take place without continuity 
relations between one moment and the next. Since primary experience requires some 
temporal duration, mind explanations and brain explanations would fail to represent 
an orderly world if events in one moment could not be related to events in the next 
under a sequential 'arrow of time': without that relation there can be no such things as 
brains or minds. If there were nothing like minds, brains, or supervenient 
combinations of the two by which to perceive, both conventional and ultimate 
realisation of 'the way things really are' could not happen. 
The sequence of time sets up a metaphysical dilemma that casts doubt on the 
possibility of momentary mental events, and a doctrinal dilemma as to whether 
awareness of a hypothetically-momentary ultimate nature of reality could possibly 
constitute enlightenment. Because momentariness is an extreme of measurement that 
is just as metaphorical as the notion that time flows, it cannot appear in enlightened 
awareness, for it is just an explanation that depends on fictional spatial modelling. 
Some of the interview participants come close to entrapment in the metaphysical 
dilemma of momentary time, only escaping because their remarks about time are 
cryptic, as when Bhikkhu Gavesako says that the Dhamma is 'akdlika: timeless at 
insight', when Bhikkhu Vajiro says that liberation is 'not something that is going to 
happen sometime in the future', or when Pyni says anaud 'is actually the acceptance 
of the ordinary in the here and now, but free from time'. 
Cryptic, k5an like remarks allow the speaker to transfer explanatory dilemmas, 
leaving their audience with the task of discovering how the combinatory nature of 
mind and thought, experience and explanation become tacitly entangled with the 
metaphysics of time, constituting a dilemma which can be wished away, yet cannot 
be explained away without an equally paradoxical neglect of experience. Of all the 
participants, Shaw's expression comes close to an alternative theory of time, when he 
says that: 
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... it is important to understand about 
the world, that it is a-temporal. 
So that mistake is the same mistake that is being made in every second. 
That mistake is made with the birth of every thought ... and it is only 
made once as well - the same once that is the birth of every thought 
(Shaw). 
It will not satisfy Shaw, but if time is a property of the external world, then 
freedom from the sequential flow of time may be a psychological, but not a 
metaphysical possibility. 5 Freedom from time is more likely to be 'of the nature of an 
affect' (Crook), and a state of mind rather than a state of the world. 
Thought apparently arises outside perceptual experience and outside experienced 
time, for the turn of conscious attention to reflexive or imaginative cognition causes 
temporary neglect of attention to the basic sensori-motor constitution of experience of 
the world. This neglect leads Arendt to infer that thinking is not only 'out of order' 
with the world of appearances (Arendt 1978: 109-110,211), but also out of order 
with the immanence of immediate time, because the exercise of the imagination 
entails sequestration from the world and immersion in the archives of memory 
(Arendt 1978: 78,84-87). Arendt's argument is not a full-blown psychological 
theory of time, for she does not deny that time is a property of the world, but she 
implies that time is apprehended psychologically and as such is a constituent of 
perceptual experience that may be suspended, depending on the degree to which 
attention to the external world is overcome by cognitive involvement with memory 
and the imagination. Arendt's point is that a shift of attention to thought, which 
amounts to a shift from experience to imagination, is an absence from the world. She 
remarks that 'time is the thinking ego's greatest enemy', and speaks of 'the old dream 
of western metaphysics ... a timeless region of quiet 
beyond clocks' (Arendt 1978: 
6 207). 
Because one of the primary functions of consciousness is the direction of 
attention, thinking entails some neglect of attention to the immanence of experience, 
and this neglect of the world is experienced as a hiatus in time. This hiatus can have 
consequences for good, in the affective experience of the nunc stans, 'a small 
inconspicuous track beaten on non-time by the activity of thought within the time- 
space given to natal and mortal man' (Arendt 1978: 86,210), a state that bears 
resemblance to being 'timeless at the moment of insight' (Bhikkhu Gavesako). 
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However, this hiatus could have harmful, even 6evil' consequences if consistency of 
response to the otherness of the world is relinquished. The dilemma of mind, that it 
is a 'two-in-one' (Arendt 1978: 179-183), of self for the imagination and subject for 
the world, thus encompasses the explanatory nature of experience, the temporal 
nature of the subject, and the possibly unethical consequences of introspection. 
From the subject to the self 
In sum, the subject is the 'attender' of experience, a phenomenally-known effect 
of the initial 'horizon' of every component of relatively-immediate awareness, which 
is cognised without need for recall from memory or use of the imagination. The 
historical self, on the other hand, has a different provenance. It is the creation of 
imaginative developments of the second-order mapping of Damasio's 'proto-self, 
and from extended recall and manipulation of qualitatively-veiled episodic memories 
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of past subjective events . The subject appears retrospectively as the 
'horizon' of all 
conscious awareness, whereas the self is a metaphorical characterisation of 
unconscious processes of 'top-down' cognitive functioning. In Arendt's sense the 
self is 'out of order' with the temporal succession of the world, in that it is a mere 
name referring to processes that combine episodic memories of past events. 
Although the self is an imaginative fiction it is vital to the development of feedback 
predictions of the kind described by Llinas (2001: 21-29) as the prime task of the 
mind/brain. The notion of the self, the predictive scenarios in which the self 
participates imaginatively, and the intentions that seek to actualise those scenarios, 
are not literally 'out of time', for they appear in awareness with the 'lightning ... speed 
of thought' (Wittgenstein 2001: 89 [PI. I. 318], Arendt 1978: 44). This rapid 
appearance gives the misleading impression of appearance from another time and 
another place, when what actually happens is the emergence to consciousness of 
contemporaneous unconscious processes, as they become globally available 
throughout the brain by means of anatomical interconnectivity and neuronal 
synchronicity. Mind/brains are rational in the sense that they proceed by step-by-step 
causal processes, but irrational in the sense that cognitive processes are conditioned 
by affective processes (Damasio 1995), rather than by logical principles of the sort 
that are applied in the task of retrospective justification. 
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The historical self is associated with social judgement in the external world, and 
with comparison to social and personal standards. It is built out of past relations with 
the world and generates predictive feedback about relations in the future. As an 
imaginative fiction, the self is not an object in consciousness, for it is a fictional 
characterisation of habitual sensori-motor actions over extended periods of time. 
Though the self is not perceived, it is cognitively manipulated in 'as if processes, as 
if it were real. This manipulation emerges to consciousness in the imaginative fonn 
of the mind as a container with contents that includes the self in the form of a discrete 
and continuing abstract object. 
Overcoming spatial explanation 
When asked specific questions about the nature of mind, the interview 
participants tend not refer to a substantial or essential object, but to mind as 
subjectivity, experience or awareness; that is to say, they refer to mind as a set of 
world-happenings around the nexus of a subject of primary experience. However, in 
the course of conversation they employ the ubiquitous metaphor of the mind as a 
container for psychological contents. This use of the metaphor of the 'inner' also 
appears in discussions of meditative experience, with clear examples in Pym's 
interview description of vipas'yana meditation, in Crook (1992: 358-359) and 
Ratnaprabha (Cooper 2003: 134), although Ratnaprabha briefly remarks that 
4 ultimately, Buddhism questions the whole basis of the mind-body problem: the very 
distinction between 'inner' and 'outer" (Cooper 2003: 69). 
Apart from Prasada and Dhannavidya the participants do not reflect on whether 
spatial containment metaphors are appropriately applied to the mind, for the idea of 
the mind as an 'inner' space is in widely used in the ascription of intentions to others. 
The concept of inner mental space enables the 'folk' psychological explanation of 
social behaviour, yet this is only a prediction of 'the way things really are'. (Johnston 
1993: 198, Wittgenstein 1992: 61-88). The metaphor of the 'inner' exerts a 
subliminal influence on attitudes to the mind, as the metaphorical explanation invokes 
the spatial representation, and the mind is assumed to be a 'Cartesian' theatre in 
which psychological protagonists perform (Dennett 1971: 96,2001: 225). 
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I suggrest that Pym and Ratnaprabha's descriptions of the cumulative effects of 
meditative practice are accounts of the overcoming of the metaphor of inner space, 
and a realisation of the occurrence of all primary awareness on a neutral plane of 
representation. When the mind is recalled from the imaginative activity of the self to 
the perceptual cognition of the external world, there is a sense that the boundaries 
between self and world become 'porous' or less meaningful (Cooper 2003: 133). 
This change from internal to external attention is not a move from one world to 
another, but a qualitative difference in the perception of features of the same world, 
for 'world' is a philosophical reference to whatever is present to awareness, including 
ostensibly internal mental events. This characterisation of the neutral perceptual 
cognition of self and world chimes with the Buddhist view that the notion of a fixed 
self set against an objective world is a ftindamental error, a sarVsdric view of the 'way 
things are in the world'. Because the self - or what the self stands for - is 
experienced as an internal historical object over against the spatio-temporal world, it 
is the self, not the subject, which requires the kind of barrier differentiation supplied 
by internal sequestration, and the retrospective justification supplied by rational 
explanations. In the process it becomes a fictionally objective surrogate for the 
'unself (the retrospective subject or 'attender' of awareness), in the logical 
explanation of events over extended time. 
There are four temporal divisions in the life of the person, generated by: 1) the 
immediacy of awareness, which emerges from the short timescale of the electro- 
chemical depolarization and repolarization of ensembles of neurons In synchronicity; 
2) the reflexively- subjective awareness of awareness, which emerges from the 
beginning-specification of the subsequent array of neuronal discharge by the 
patterning of its antecedent 3) a memorially-imaginative construction of historically 
extended past time; 4) an imaginatively- fictive prediction of future time. The first 
two divisions are generated from the 'bottom-up' by the prototypical functioning of 
the mind/brain, and are closer to immediacy than the third and fourth divisions, which 
are unconscious 'top-down' cognitive feedback modulations. Nonetheless, the third 
and fourth divisions appear contemporaneously to consciousness on a neutral 
representational plane, alongside perceptual information generated by structural 
coupling to an external world. 
231 
Such a rational explanation of the temporal, imaginative and qualitative variety of 
mental events is difficult to equate to cryptic and mythological Buddhist 
understandings of the way things are. This may be because, according to Crook, it is 
only when a person 'back(s) off from the struggle to achieve rational understanding 
that 'the universe is given to you'. The grammar of the gift implies a giver, but 
Crook is using the word metaphorically to express the 'other-power' of the world, as 
if it was the product of an embodied agency, because persons are the prototypical 
causes of effects for social beings, therefore language usage tends to personify causal 
processes. His point is not that a divine personage has the universe in their gift, but 
that the intellectual struggle to achieve certainty by rational means forecloses 
experience of the world. 
Buddhist realisation is not a gift exchange, but a change in mental behaviour, 
which allows a previously obscured state of affairs to be revealed. I contend that 
realisation of the pre-given-ness of the universe can be characterised, in the Latin 
terminology of attitude-formation, as a change from self-location de se, which is the 
adoption of a position with respect to other times and other values, to location in 
relations de re; that is to say, location in the relatively-immediate temporal moment, 
occurring as the indissoluble connection between the subject de animo and indirect 
representation of the external world. 
With this change, awareness is no longer overcome by rational thought or by the 
imaginative fiction of a fixed self located over and against the world. The 
psychologically-momentary duration of awareness is enabled by the event-horizon of 
the subject, which is retrospectively located on the temporal periphery of conscious 
awareness. In the virtually immediate, non-spatial relation occurring in the form of 
subjective awareness, not only is the universe metaphorically 'given', but the value of 
relations to things is also given, when not obscured by the needs and desires of the 
sel f. 8 This is primary experience shom as far as is possible of imaginative 
commentarial overlay or prior determination by de dicto explanation. 
9 This 
experience involves nothing more than a turn of attention to an 'open' or extentional 
awareness of present process rather than restricted intentional cognitive manipulation 
of future possibilities (Crook 1992: 354-357). This seems to be an 'enlightening' 
experience: not full-blown nirva, ýia as it is presented in the suttas and si7tras, 
10 but an 
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intimation of the dismantling of barriers set up to contain the nebulous unity of self- 
identity. Self-restriction either results from the deployment of a defensive form of 
I intentional stance' towards the world (Den-nett 1971: 90), or from sequestration from 
the world within a fictionally 'inner' mental life-space. In a life of reflexive response 
to both external and (hypothetically) internal distraction, freedom from restriction is 
always available, as the realisation that the extended past and future are only cognised 
by acts of imagination, whereas representations of the external world are relatively- 
immediate cognitive manipulations of the structural coupling of perception. Such a 
state of affairs is what I interpret Bhikkhu Vajiro to mean by his cryptic remark that 
liberation is 'not something that is going to happen sometime in the future'. 
Crook's model of awareness 
Crook provides a spatial model of the possible 'range of states of human 
awareness' (1992: 356,2002b: 106)11, which incorporates open, non-intentional 
experience under the category of 'bare attention'. Crook's discussion of awareness is 
a good example of the use of spatial modelling in order to clarify analysis. In most 
respects his explanatory aim is achieved, but the model cannot be expected to depict 
the dynamic transitions between different sorts of state, and the left/right modelling of 
the distinction between intension and extension may be misleading. If it is granted 
that the plane of representation to primary experience is spatially-neutral, the states to 
the left of the vertical dimension are only metaphorically intensional, although they 
are mentally reflexive. In other words, by virtue of their appearance in awareness 
such ostensibly-internal states are not internal at all, since they happen on the same 
plane as representations of 'structurally-coupled' events in the external world. All 
mental states manifest on the same plane, because they are relationally-appearing 
parts of awareness, irrespective of their perceived location. Relational representations 
are contents without any vehicle other than (methodologically identical or 
supervenient) mind/brain processes, for the constituents of representations are also 
constitutive of awareness. 
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High Intention 
Introspective referential 
thought - self-conceived 
subjective reflection 
intellectual analysis - discriminatory referential 
thought, planning 
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Intension Extension 
ssc 
Awareness of internal 
states. In extreme 
form samadhi. 
Awareness of Situation, 
'Here and Now'arousal, 
Zazen. rDzogs-chen 
Present-centred orientation 
High Attention 
Figure 6. The range of states of human awareness (Crook 1992: 356,2002b: 106). 
Because the notion of intension is part. of the spatial metaphor of the mind as a 
container, the left-hand , intensional side of Crook's model can only metaphorically 
bestow spatial dimensions upon awareness. There can be qualitative awareness of 
space when awareness turns to the world (extension), but no space as a property of 
awarenessl whether the object of awareness is a mental intension or a physical 
extension. The metaphorical attribution of intension does not refer to space as such 
but to a feeling-tone similar to the feeling tone of the quality of external spaciousness; 
ansing, as it were, synaesthetically in connection with ostensibly-intensional types of 
experience. At one end of a qualitative continuum, that feeling-tone may be 
constrictive. At the other end , it may 
be a sensation of freedom from barrier 
constraints, creatively associated with embodied experience of unrestricted space: the 
feeling may be like space, but does not refer to a mental space as such. This 
synaesthetic point has little relevance with respect to states that express sensorimotor 
coupling with the extensive world (the right side of the diagram), which grants a 
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perceptual opportunity for the feeling of dimensional space to become apparent to 
awareness, but it is relevant with respect to the reffication of the mind as an object of 
containment. An overly-literal interpretation of Crook's model could perpetuate the 
notion that there is space, not only in awareness, but in mind; precisely the 
Augustinian manoeuvre which risks reifying the mind as a substantial, soul-like, 
independent object containing internal contents, rather than a holistic nexus of world- 
relations. In order to depict the manner in which awareness actually occurs, the 
model could be envisaged as folded along the vertically and the horizontally 
intersecting lines, so that the different types of states emerge on the same plane of 
awareness. 
My point that intensional (mentally internal) space is only metaphorical, can also 
be expressed with respect to the 'OSC-SSC' diagonal line. 12 This line represents 
Duval and Wicklund's distinction between states of 'objective self consciousness' 
(OSC), which take the self as an object for comparison with the world, and states of 
(subjective self-consciousness' (SSC), which focus on external activity without 
reflexive thought for the self. (Duval and Wicklund 1972: 2, Crook 1980: 312-313, 
2002b: 104). Quite apart from the psychological instability of intentionality, 
objective self-consciousness is inherently unsatisfactory, precisely because it depends 
on the supposition of a hypothetical object trapped in an internal metaphorical space. 
Despite my caveats, Crook's model achieves its purpose by effectively 
distinguishing between the future-orientation of intellective intentionality, located 
above the horizontal, and the present-centred orientation of attention, located below 
the horizontal. In effect, a temporal difference is being explicated, as usual, by 
translation into a spatial difference. Given that time can only be modelled spatially, 
that is a reasonable manoeuvre, especially since Crook takes care in his commentary 
to remark that the general function of conscious awareness is to provide feedback 
monitoring of 'feed forward' processes of intentional prediction (Crook 1992: 354), 
and since he acknowledges that his model does not represent the temporal dynamism 
of the relation between present attention and future intention. 
The vertical dimension calls for further comment, for it will be clear 
that high levels of attention often accompany goal-oriented thought 
and action. What is implied here is, however, the relative degree to 
which the subject is oriented towards a desirable situation in future 
time (intention expectation, etc. ) or, conversely, oriented towards the 
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quality of on-going present moment experiencing in which focus on 
alternative conditions is absent. The dimension defines what is 
essentially a difference between concern about a desirable or non- 
desirable state other than the 'Now', and a non-judgemental 
observation of the actual passing moment. (Crook 1992: 357). 
To reiterate, the vertical division in Crook's model is problematic if it is 
interpreted to carry the implication that space (dimensional extension) is the same 
experience on either side: to the left, space is fictitious; to the right it is factitious. 
The qualitative experience of space in awareness is different with respect to each 
quadrant. Space is an entirely illusory quality with respect to the bottom-left 
intensional quadrant, for this state of awareness is a dimensionless temporal 
succession, which is spatially-located solely by the inclusion of some recollection of 
embodiment. In the top-left quadrant, as objective self-consciousness, space can take 
the form of a dimensionless emotional experience of separation-anxiety, as the acute 
differentiation between self and others, but it can also take multiple fantasy-forms in 
dependence on imaginative functions. It is not obvious if the imaginative recollection 
of past events in past spaces, or the imaginatively-predictive creation of future events 
in future spaces, ought to be located in the bottom-left or the top-left quadrant, but to 
the extent that memory and imagination are both involved intentionally in the 
temporal constitution of the self, both advert to the top left quadrant. Once again this 
is a temporal division, and spatial mapping does not fully explicate the complex 
relation between attention and intention in each case. Crook equates mental activity 
in the bottom right and left quadrants to attention without undue intention. Attention 
could be to the occurrence of representations of the external world, or to a gradual 
meditative silencing of the mind until there is 'consciousness without an object', 
meaning no occurrence of mental representations whatsoever. From a neuroscientific 
perspective, consciousness of nothing would be a contradiction in terms; it would be 
the cessation of consciousness, or a concept without reference. The notion of 
meditative cessation of consciousness is an example of Buddhist mind-theory at its 
most problematic (Griffiths 1999: 111-113), and a conceptual exposition standing in 
dire need of the confirmation of experience. It is significant that Crook should 
remark that in the absence of thought processes 'unconscious monitoring of situation 
seems to be present throughout' (Crook 1992: 358). 
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To complete the modelling of differential awareness in different quadrants, in the 
top-right quadrant space is the metaphysical abstraction of generalised co-ordinates 
from the full texture of attention to awareness. Attention to coordination and 
assessment of the future behaviour of objects constitute most of the information that 
is required of the world by a mind entirely bent on the fulfilment of an intention. 
Space is only experienced with the full texture of dimensionality in respect of Duval 
and Wicklund's subjective (SSC) orientation to the world (1972), modelled by the 
bottom-right quadrant referring to 'bare attention'. Freed from the cognitive cunning 
of intentionality, 'subjective self-consciousness' is experienced as a sense of 
relationality with the world, and very much an experience rather than an insperience. 
In the discussion of his diagram, Crook maintains that states of awareness are out 
of balance in modem western cultures, because there is too much time spent above 
the horizontal division, in intentional states, and too little time spent below the 
horizontal, in attentional states. In Buddhist terms, increased attention to the world 
opens up the beneficial qualitative experience of suchness: an unmediated experience 
of relationality, of the interdependence of objects, and of engagement with the world, 
with the consequence that the intellect is as much affected by present experience as 
by ingrained reflex responses to past attitudes. After so much theorising, the 
empirical question arises: is such an attentional mode of being as hypothetical as. 
Lewis's hypothetically hyper-rational person? (Lewis 1979). Perfect stabilisation of 
attentionality may be an ideal, but quantitative and qualitative realisations along a 
continuum of attentional states are a possibility. 
To summarise the key elements of the critique of space in mind, so-called 'inner' 
mental space is a metaphorical location, a representation of imagined alternatives in 
the form of past or future external spaces, which places immediate awareness of 
present time and space under 'erasure'. My critique is therefore of spatial 
interpretations of mind, not of Crook's reasonable motivation to explicate the range 
of states of awareness by means of a spatial model. All that is required to guard 
against over-interpretation is the caveat that metaphorically spatial elucidation does 
not entail, by analogical reasoning, the conclusion that the mind possesses inner 
spatial qualities additional to the spatial dimensions of the brain, which although 
non-nally hidden form part of the external world. 
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Trouble with intentionality 
A distinction has been made in Chapter 5 between, firstly, the basic mental 
property of intentional 'aboutness', which directs animal attention to the world and is 
the motivator of all conscious awareness, and secondly, the more complex 
development of intentional goal-orientation, volition or 'will' in higher animals. The 
equation between this distinction and Buddhist terms for intentionality is fraught with 
difficulty because although 'psychological concepts slide into each other' (Johnston 
1993: 49), conceptual discriminations in Abhidhamma texts strive for exactitude. 
According to Govinda, basic aboutness or 'spontaneous attention' (manisikdra) is an 
initial arousal caused by the perceptual object, and volition (cetand) is a separate 
'instinctive volition bound by previous causes' (1969: 116). Buddhism is concerned 
with the modification of karmically-active intentions, which can take either 
wholesome or unwholesome forms. Goal-orientation of cetand is a psychological 
attitude, broadly of desire, which is seen as being initiated by the individual. 
Manasikr7ra, on the other hand, is relational, because it is initiated as much by the 
presence of the object as by the perceiver (Govinda 1969: 116-1 19). 13 
The Abhidhamma discrimination between types of intentionality is conceptually 
refined, but is problematic because there may be no opportunity for experiential 
verification. This is because the concepts of spontaneous attention and intention are 
explanatory characterisations factors (cetasika) that exert a subliminal or unconscious 
influence on conscious states (citta). A similar problem attends Crook's 
discrimination between intention and attention. He is able to differentiate states 
above his model's horizontal line by reference to qualitative differences between 
intentional and attentional states, but that does not entail that intention and attention 
actually appear to awareness as such. Intention and attention become apparent to 
conscious awareness in the form of percepts, propositional thoughts, and emotions, 
but like the cetasika, intention and attention are antecedent conditioning motivations, 
not apparent in consciousness as such, therefore a conscious event can only be 
retrospectively characterised along an intentional/attentional continuum. 14 
According to Hulse, Read and Schroeder, consciousness depends on the world: it 
has a 'mind-to-world direction of fit', because perception depends on 'how things 
stand' in the world (2004: 74,79). In the case of any discrepancy of fit it is the 
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perception, or belief in the perception, which is in error and must change to fit the 
world. They add that, amongst the 'propositional attitudes', desires and intentions 
have the opposite, world-to-mind fit, for if a desire and intention is misdirected it is 
the world that must be changed to fit the desire or intention. Hulse, Read and 
Schroeder cite neuroscientific evidence from stimulation studies to support their 
contention that consciousness depends on sensory cortical regions of the brain, and is 
concerned primarily with an 'episodic' demonstration of 'what the world is like' 
(2004: 78-79). Only when non-episodic dispositions such as desires and intentions 
give rise to urges and actions that are episodic, and therefore can be sensed, do they 
become part of consciousness. 
As Hardcastle (1992) predicts, and like Varela (1999), Hulse, Read and 
Schroeder use 'lower level' neuroscientific explanation to illuminate conceptual 
problems in 'top-down' psychological explanations, such as the notion that 
intentionality is a conscious state. ' 5 In the absence of 'lower-level' neuroscientific 
support, 'folk' psychological concepts such as 'thought', 'desire' and 'intention' are 
tacitly assumed to be accurate labels for conscious states that are apparent to 
phenomenological reflection. If the phenomenality of intentional attitudes is illusory, 
because attitudes only manifest to consciousness in the form of subsequent 
propositions or physical urges and acts, then the way in which consciousness is 
conceived of is more permeated by imaginative explanation than it seems. 
As an extrapolation from Hulse, Read and Schroeder's view that desires have a 
'world-to-mind fit', it is a result of lack of restraint on unconscious intentionality that 
human beings try to construct a world fit for the satisfaction of their desires. Along 
these lines, Crook suggests that 'educational bias under cultural pressure' reinforces 
future-oriented thinking, to the detriment of attention to the present. 
The function of intellect is to rehearse action in scenarios that will 
produce a future state or lead to a comprehension of what has 
happened - and which could happen again. In all cases the 
experiential context of intellect lies primarily in the upper half [of his 
diagram]. Introspection is essentially an intellect focussed upon its 
own nature and social status. An understanding of intellect in this 
perspective is thus only half an understanding of the mind... (Crook 
1992: 361). 
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Pym makes it clear that such a temporally-absented intellective mind is not at all 
like the Buddhist ideal: 
... to me the enlightenment of 
the Buddha ... is that he always spoke 
from a sense of now ... I 
have met this with other, what I call, spiritual 
beings - people who are totally with you at that moment (Pym). 
Crook and Pym's point is reinforced if Hulse, Read and Schroeder are correct in 
their argument that intentional desires are not conscious states. The implication is that 
contemporary minds are developmentally imbalanced by excessive time spent 
predictively addressing the future in the light of the past, and that obsessive concern 
for the future amounts to a transcendental and psychologically-harmful abstention 
from existential time: from embodied and conscious relations to the immanent world 
of appearances in the present. For Crook, this imbalance causes a 'continuous concern 
with degrees of self-esteem and social coping', and is the source of 'personal 
alienation in western cultures' (Crook 1992: 361-2). His conclusion is that human 
well-being requires 'optimum balance between purposive action, present awareness, 
and creative reflection' (Crook 1992: 362). 
Persons sequestered in their imaginations, desirous of some intentional world-to- 
mind fit, are not wholly within present time or wholly aware of actual space. They 
inhabit a hypothetical second world which lacks 'real' time and space: life under 
occlusion, which Derrida calls 'erasure'and alienation from the world is the likely 
consequence (Derrida 1997: 181-182). The difference between presence in a first 
world or retreat into an imaginative second world is attenuated if Varela Thompson 
and Rosch are correct in their internal 'enaction' view of the mind; the difference is 
considerable once it is allowed that there is an external or hylic world (Lusthaus 2002: 
26-29), as an incontrovertible part of 'the way things really are', prior to the addition 
of human representations, values and intentions. This can lead to the awful modem 
intuition that despite the order of meaning (the 'ought' of Maclntyre's is/ought 
dichotomy), humanity is dispensable. 
Pym's suggestion that the Buddha always responded from an awareness of the 
present is given a different formulation by Dharmavidya and Prasada, who suggest 
that at the time of the Buddha the mind was imagined to be a location in an 
environment of time and space, and that it was not until the Yogdcdra development of 
the concept of the store-consciousness (d1qya-vijhdna) that the idea of the mind as an 
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inner psychological container took hold (Brazier 2003: 45-55). This point-instant 
location view might appear primitive if it is thought to involve the illusory projection 
of really internal psychological contents into the world in mythological form, but if 
those contents are only metaphorically internal, and if 'folk' psychological concepts 
refer only to general classifications of unconscious states, then the earlier view, which 
mythologically extemalises unconscious intentions as the personification of natural 
forces, is as perspicacious as the modem view, which personalises unconscious 
processes in the form of the imagination of an objective internal self. Psychological 
projection suits pre-modem Gemeinschaft: the immersion of the individual in the 
immediacy of the social group and the natural world. Psychological containment 
suits modemity's Gesellschaft: the discrete individual who can be differentiated, 
alienated, and manipulated by technological modemity. 16 In the face of such 
diametrically alternative views of human being-in-the-world, the rhetoric of the 
'Middle Way' springs to mind as a characterisation of the individual subject and the 
objective world as an interactive relation. As Crook, Ratnaprabha and Jones suggest, 
subject and object can be functionally differentiated, but in appearance to awareness 
they form a holistic continuum. 
With all due respect, I interpret Ratnaprabha's description of 'expanded 
awareness' (Cooper 2003: 132) and Pyrn's description of the effects of vipas'yana- 
meditation, in a manner that differs from their own. The expansion of awareness is 
the abandonment of the socially useful metaphorical fiction of the 'inner', which 
diminishes the mind by characterisation as an internal space. 'Expanded awareness' 
is not the same as the cognitive enrichment of Darnasio's 'extended consciousness' 
(Parvizi and Damasio 2001: 140), but an experience that transcends the spatial 
explanation of a Cartesian lair occupied by a hypothetical self. Relinquishment of an 
introverted self is a turn from self-location to subject-location, attended to by what 
Pyrn describes as the 'unself. The resulting experience is what Crook and Jones 
refer to as 'suchness". In more Buddhalogical terms, it may be a step along the road 
to the state of liberation referred to by Bhikkhu Vajiro, 'where every blade of grass is 
liberated". These interview participant accounts mark a turn away from metaphor- 
induced introversion to a more externally-relational understanding. They are cryptic 
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characterisations of 'the way things really are', rather than attempts at analytical 
explanation. 
Without this externally-relational understanding, the notion that properties of 
mind occupy a separate internal location has the effect of importing not just separate 
dimensionality but separate temporality, so constituting mind as a discrete object with 
enduring parts. The phenomenally space-less experience of mind is nonnally 
restrained by internally- spatial explanation, and in this respect belief in the very 
existence of mind is a self-location, in advance of any de re evidence from 
phenomenal acquaintance. As examples: senses are said to leave (dimensional) 
impressions, which memory places in storage (spatial location), the unconscious 
constitutes an asylum (spatial location) from which foregone childhood versions of 
the self emerge (spatial traversal) into imaginative scenarios (second-world event- 
spaces). If all of these things happened as metaphorically described they would 
demonstrate spatio-temporality, yet spatial and temporal dimension is absent from the 
'lightning speed' of the occurrence of thoughts and percepts to awareness 
(Wittgenstein 2001: 89, [PI. 1.318]). 
There are several objections to the denial that the mind is an inner psychological 
space: that the properties of mind inhabit a dimension that is outside the normal 
spatio-temporal order, that metaphors do not refer to literal reality, but produce it, and 
that imaginary mental space forms a necessary and a creative refuge. 
First objection 
The objection that the mind inhabits a second world-order is a metaphysical 
belief that cannot be gainsaid, but some of the supporting arguments can be refuted. 
It is objected that 'folk' psychological properties of mind such as feelings, emotions, 
thoughts, dreams, and personality (self) differ radically from externally-experienced 
sensory properties such as sights, sounds, smells, tastes and so forth, in being inherent 
to the mind. Some of these 'folk' psychological properties continue when sensory 
properties are disabled by trauma or age-related degeneration, therefore properties of 
mind must be sourced from another dimension that can be characterised 
metaphorically in 'inner' spatial terms. 
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The counter-argument is that non-sensory properties of mind can also be removed 
by trauma. As with sensory properties, their proximate cause is in embodiment and 
as with the elimination of sensory transport the relevant trauma is to neural tissue. 
Despite the conceptual obscurity of the topic, explanations of mental properties can 
be deconstructed into parts that are verifiable, and parts that are imaginative. They 
are true in the sense of being useful when suggestive and indicative of phenomenal 
modes of experience, yet imaginative when ordering experience into modes that 
cannot be found by paying 'bare attention' to awareness. Internal mental spaces fall 
into the imaginative category. 
Second objection 
The second objection is that strictures against the use of spatial metaphor for 
mind are too literal. The presumption that metaphors misreport an independently 
existing objective reality ignores the cognitive enrichment of perceptual experience 
by the creative functions of metaphors (Johnson 1988: 66-67). This valid criticism is 
based on the sound quasi-idealist point, made by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) 
and by several of the interview participants, that perception of reality is not simply a 
matter of trustworthy and accurate conveyance of sensory impression to the mind, but 
is constituted by a mixed process of perception and cognition. This view is only 
problematic when it leads to the extrapolation that the external world of the 'hyle' is 
mind-made, and therefore illusory. 
With the world in doubt, it is not possible to rely on an 'objectivist' theory 
(Johnson 1987: 66). whereby a metaphor is just the 'substitution' of a literal meaning 
by a metaphorical meaning (Black 1979: 27), instead it is the metaphor that structures 
the world. Black states that meaning is generated by metaphor, as the invention of a 
new 'implicative complex' of relationships between concepts, with a consequent 
enrichment of understanding (Black 1979: 28-29). Enrichment notwithstanding, 
Black admits that metaphor depends on 'isomorphism' between one system of 
implications (the target) and another (the source), and that some of the implications 
are more contextually appropriate than others. The most basic metaphors are 
productive of many implications, not all of which are equally isomorphic, therefore 
(every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model', and the 'implicative system" of the 
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metaphor (in this case, variations on the theme of the mind as a container for an 
objective self) is a 'mixed lot' of ambiguous (projective relations' (Black 1979: 31). 
In effect, metaphors create a certain view of the world. Black suggests that they 'can 
yield insight into how things are'(1979: 39-41). 1 suggest that they can also show 
things as they are not. The problem with the metaphor of space in mind is that it has 
become a 'metaphysical archetype'. 
... there 
is an ever-present and serious risk that [an] archetype will be 
used metaphysically, so that its consequences will be permanently 
insulated from empirical disproof. The more persuasive the archetype, 
the greater the danger of its becoming a self-certifying myth (Black 
1962: 242) 
The belief in some degree of representative isomorphism between awareness and 
a hyletic world is based on a foundationally-realist, structurally-coupled view that 
perception has some reliability of reference that enables a fallible truth- 
correspondence between perceptions, descriptive explanations and embodiment in the 
world. My neuroscientifically-informed conclusion is that the spatial properties 
ascribed to the external world are not replicated in any inner mental location except in 
a metaphorical sense. My contention, in the context of Buddhist soteriology, is that 
the 'implicative complex' of the spatial metaphor for the mind is not invariably useful 
and can be harmful if the metaphor is taken to be literally the case, rather than an 
imaginative production. 
Basic metaphorical micro-explanations such as the ascription of space to mind 
have wide 'implicative' possibilities. The wider the implicative scope the more an 
explanation is capable of obscuring 'the way things really are'. The obscurantism of 
the prediction of space in mind is caused by the gap between first and third person 
modes of access, for spatial characteristics proper to the third-person mode are being 
ascribed to the first-person mode. It might follow that a refutation of the notion of the 
'inner' as a home for psychological objects such as a self ought to amount to a 
refutation of the distinction between subjective and objective access to the mind. 
Wittgenstein's radical supposition is that this is so, and that persons have no 
privileged access to their own thoughts. He implies that that no more than the 
expression or suppression of demonstrative utterance distinguishes first-person from 
third-person access. (Wittgenstein 1992: 92, Johnston 1993: 154-157,170-172). The 
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point is intuitively difficult to accept for experience remains a private mode, 
inaccessible to neuroscience and only partially revealed by utterance and by 
testimonial. First-person privacy restricts the assault on the use of spatial 
explanations of mind to precautionary words about how the existentially-momentary 
nature of subjective awareness can become erased by a metaphorical fantasy of minds 
as objects containing enduring selves. Outright elimination of the use of spatial 
metaphors for mind is impossible, not least because Wittgenstein makes it clear that 
the 'inner' is a socially useful fiction which grants the juridical status of personhood 
to embodied human continuities, and enables the motivations and feelings of others to 
be explained. 
The Inner is not a brute reality, a set of experiences or a set of brain 
states; rather it is the concept that lies at the heart of all our mutual 
interaction and understanding (Johnston 1993: 187). 
The deconstruction of metaphorical spatial explanation is one facet of a more 
general cautionary tale about how explanation should be received. It may be 
empirically useful, but only in the form of fallible, approximate, reductive 
correspondence to the external world, for only primary awareness of the world 
conveys the affective sense of 'facticity' (Heidegger 1962: 82), and only a history of 
awareness of the world makes that facticity certain (Wittgenstein 1979: 25-36 [OC. 
275]). The upshot is that explanation de dicto should not be assimilated thoughtlessly, 
without the test of attention to phenomenal experience. 
Buddhist mindfulness meditation is a practical phenomenal testing technique 
(Kennedy 2004: 150). Mindfulness is a cognitive behavioural way of reinforcing 
'bare attention' that is not literally introspection, for the things examined appear to 
awarenessl not 'in' the mind. Because of the first-person privacy of awareness, this 
form of checking is not observation in the scientific sense, for it cannot be replicated 
(Wittgenstein 1992: 7,10, Hacker 1990: 59,189,191, Johnston 1993: 157). The 
individual is left without the warrant of empirically-verifiable knowledge, without the 
warrant of replicable introspection, but with the animal sense of certainty or facticity 
warranted by subjective experience. Although the interview participants do rely on 
attention to subjective experience, that does not mean they assume that certainty is a 
foregone achievement: they are aware, both because they sense it in their own lives 
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and because Buddhist explanation tells them so, that experience of the world can be 
affected adversely by psychological conditioning. 
Third (and fourth) objection 
The third objection has a fourth as its twin; they are structurally similar, but the 
motivations are different. The argument is that the metaphor of internal 
psychological space fulfils two vitally useful functions. Firstly, internal space is a 
refuge from external experiences that are burdensome. Secondly, as Virginia Woolf 
appears to suggest in A Room of One'S Own (1977), the flowering of creativity is 
literally and metaphorically dependent upon the availability of a remove from the 
world. 17 
In view of the Buddhist diagnosis that all existence is impermanent (anicca), not- 
self (anattd), and marked by suffering or dissatisfaction (dukkha), The foreclosure of 
any means of relief from acute suffering would not be compassionate, so if belief in a 
metaphorical mental space enables temporary relief from harsh reality, it ought not to 
be gainsaid. But acute suffering has a different feeling-tone to existential 
dissatisfaction, which is generated by unfulfilled desire for permanence and for a 
permanent self. Such permanence is not to be found in any metaphorical space 
because such a space is produced by the imagination. As Augustine realised, the 
imagination, which he called 'fantasy', can only manipulate memories of objects and 
spatial relations recalled from prior perception of the external world (Augustine 2002: 
100). The tension between the possibility of temporary escape and the impossibility 
of permanent escape into an inner, imaginative world is reminiscent of the tension in 
Buddhist doctrine between a conditioned and an unconditioned view of the mind. 
However beneficial, imaginative retreat into a metaphorical second world is a 
temporary retreat, not an escape to an unconditioned realm, and without self- 
deception some tension between the imaginary and the real is inevitable. Denial of 
(space in mind' is not a denial of the ability of the mind to therapeutically construct 
imaginary worlds, just the denial that the experience of imaginary worlds can be 
found anywhere other than in awareness, 'on all fours' with the rest of experience. 
Retreat into an imaginary space entails the temporary erasure of some elements of 
experience from conscious awareness, by virtue of the ability of consciousness to 
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focus attention intentionally, thereby denying awareness to irrelevant percepts. This 
capability has a neuroscientific explanation (Llinas 2001: 168), albeit a mainly 
theoretical (imaginative-predictive) one until the neural correlates for consciousness 
mechanisms are more clearly understood. However beneficial access to a second 
world of mental imagination may be in extreme circumstances, second worlds could 
not be unconditional, because their constituents are sourced from embodied relations 
in a first external world. This is precisely Arendt's point when she says that the mind 
is only knowable by metaphors 'derived from the world of appearances' (1978: 108- 
113). From a Buddhist point of view, it is significant that refuge is found in the 
Buddha, Dharma and Satigha. The Buddha exemplifies an ideal way of relating to 
the world, the Dharma exemplifies an ideal truth about the world, the Sangha 
exemplifies an ideal social community, and 'Going for Refuge' signifies confidence 
that these qualities are amenable to practical realisation. As ideals, they are 
imaginary, and whatever they represent with regard to subsequent lives, they are 
applicable in practice to external circumstances in this life. Dharmavidya argues that 
an exclusively individualistic 'other-worldly' interpretation of these ideals is a 
betrayal of the Buddha's this-worldly social message (Brazier 2001: 28-61). 
With respect to the fourth objection, that the imagination requires space for 
creativity, I accept Woolf s thesis that women have been deprived of the material 
opportunities for the exercise of creativity, and that, as opposed to worldly repression 
'... there is no gate, no lock, no bolt that you can set upon the freedom of my mind' 
(1977: 72). But her concern is as much for the material as the non-material 
conditions for creativity (1977: 101). Even though her interest is in the production of 
fiction, the space for women's creativity that Woolf calls for is not so much a 
sequestration for imaginative fantasy as a withdrawal that allows for a response to 
reality that is as much heroic as reclusive. 
... the writer, 
I think, has the chance to live more in the presence of 
reality. It is his business to find and collect it and communicate it to 
the rest of us ... when 
I am asking you to earn more and have a room of 
your own, I am asking you to live in the presence of reality, an 
invigorating life... (Woolf 1977: 104-105). 
It is not clear what Woolf means by 'the presence of reality', but she seems to 
suggest a response to the world that is reminiscent of an epiphany or peak experience. 
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She implies that, in the past, access to reality was impeded for women writers whose 
minds were pre-occupied by the excess baggage of masculine opinion (1977: 29), but 
despite her use of spatial metaphors for the mind Woolf does explicitly argue that an 
internal refuge for the imagination can be an adequate substitute for an unrepressed 
and unimpeded relation to the world as the real source of creativity. 
Summary 
That the mind constitutes a temporal dilemma becomes apparent once it is 
realised that because of indirect access to the world experience is permeated by 
habitual explanation, yet a temporal difference obtains between experience and 
explanation and between the human subject of experience and the human self of 
explanation, which cannot be resolved by the use of spatial descriptions for temporal 
duration. Epistemologically, the dilemma emerges as the fallible truth of the subject, 
in contrast to the imaginative fiction of the self. The onset of the temporal dilemma 
of mind can be illuminated at the neurological level, as the initial 'horizon' of the 
subject in a continuing sequence of neuron-ensemble synchronicity. The onset can 
also be discerned phenomenologically, as the retrospective awareness of the 
subjectivity of the previous moment in the course of the present moment (Varela 
1999). 
Spatial metaphors for time can transfer affective qualities from their source to 
their target, but not literal qualities, for on the experiential plane of human awareness 
there is no space in time or in mind. The temporal division between subject and self 
is a source of existential dissatisfaction (dukkha), which motivates desire to escape 
the consequences of change. Mind out of time could not be mind in a conventional 
sense, for there would be none of the duration required for the predictive functioning 
of sensori-motor feedback activity. Irrespective of metaphysical beliefs about minds 
and time, minds are able to psychologically manipulate the experience of time and 
space in different states of awareness. It is spatially misrepresentative to call 
reflective states 'introspective', because they appear on the same plane of awareness 
with perceptual cognition of the external world. Both so-called introspective states, 
and states motivated by unconscious intentional desires, induce qualitative attrition 
and even obliteration of the awareness of experiential time. Crook (1992) considers 
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that some of the suffering of humanity can be alleviated by balancing the influence 
exerted by intentional motivation against the influence exerted by simple attentional 
awareness of the world. 
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Notes to Chapter 7 
1 The duration required for consciousness can mean that intentions are formed, 
decisions made and actions initiated, before the relevant situation becomes apparent 
to consciousness. (Libet 1965: 83, Libet et al 1983: 623, Freeman 2003: 177-186) 
2 Duval, Silvia and Lalwani suggest a 'dual systems theory', whereby an 'internal 
representation' of an 'object self is judged against 'internal representations of 
behaviours, thoughts and feelings encoded deeply in memory', which constItute 
'standards of correctness' (2001: 4-5). Whether this conceptual duality between self 
and standards is replicated in the fon-n of different neuronal systems remains to be 
investigated. 
3 The argument that humans are embodied time-beings is propounded by D6gen in 
the Sh5b5genz5 (Cleary 1988: 76-83) 
4 In Black's terms, the concept of space is a 'strong' metaphor: space is a theme that 
is 'emphatic' because it has no alternatives, and that has 'resonance' because it is 
amenable to elaboration (1979: 26-27). Unfortunately, the metaphor of space in mind 
carries the implication that mental relations are so isomorphically like relations 
between objects in space that the comparison is one of abstract identity. In fact 
mental relations are homomorphically isomorphic, a resemblance without likeness of 
structure, so that the comparison is one of abstract representation (Llinas 2001: 65). 
Black remarks that strong metaphors are isomorphic indications of 'how things are' 
in reality (1979: 40-4 1); 1 am unsure if the metaphor of space in time is indicative of 
an isomorphism, but I am convinced that the metaphor of space in mind is not. 
5 Observations of cosmic background radiation suggest that the arrow of time is 
caused by the negative curvature of space (Allahrerdyan, A. E. and Gurzadyan, V. G., 
2002). 
6 According to Augustine (2002), the rumination of thought is the work of the 
imagination or 'fantasy'. Ordinarily, the inner vision or fantasy is simply one of the 
finite number of impressions retrieved from memory, but Augustine also envisages 
that the will can selectively retrieve and combine parts of those impressions, to 
construct a potentially infinite number of imaginary fantasies: 
But because the mind possesses the great power of forming images ... it 
often fancies that something is so and so, when it knows that it is not 
so, or does not know that it is so. In doing so it must take care that it 
does not lie so as to deceive, or hold an opinion so as to be deceived. 
(Augustine 2002: 70) 
7 Findings in neuroscience indicate that memory is more than one faculty or process, 
facilitated by neuronal systems widely distributed in the brain, as synaptic 
connectivity becomes functionally-dedicated and strengthened by use. Memory can 
be short or long-term, semantically factual, or episodically contextual. The temporal 
cortex is particularly implicated in semantic memory, and the hippocampus is 
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particularly concerned with the establishment of memories, and with episodic 
memory. (Freeman 2003: 137-157) 
81 take this to be the meaning of Paul Fuller's strong assertion that, for Buddhism, 
'is' and 'ought' are not separable (personal communication). 
9 The relinquishment of the prior determination of experience is referred to by D6gen 
as 'shedding' (Cleary 1992: 87-88,134). 
10 Gombrich remarks that nirva? ia in early Buddhism is a metaphor for the 'blowing 
out' of the three fires of 'passion, hatred and delusion', and that its 'emotional 
quality' is 'ineffable' (1997: 6), yet he considers that the truth of the achievement of 
nirva? 7a can be expressed propositionally. I suggest that the metaphor only indicates 
the means to a state of affairs, not what the state is like in itself. It is therefore 
unsurprising that there should be many different explanations of the nature and 
meaning of enlightenment in the Buddhist tradition as a whole. (Brazier 2001: 80-118) 
11 1 am grateful for John Crook's permission to reproduce his diagram of the range of 
states of awareness. 
12 Crook envisages his model working in three dimensions, with the OSC-SSC line 
occupying the third. I am only able to envisage it in two dimensions. Duval and 
Wicklund's OSC-SSC distinction is also explained in Crook's interview summary on 
page 78. 
13 Contact (phassa), feeling (vedand) perception (safifid), intentionality (cetand), 
one-pointedness (ekaggati), vitality (jTvitandriya) and attention (manasikdra) are 
omnipresent conditioning factors (sabba-citta-sddhara? ia). They constitute the group 
of cetasikas that arise to some degree with every conscious event (citta). See van 
Gorkham (1975: 4-6), and Sangharakshita (1998: 72-99). 
14 There is nothing derogatory about saying that certain processes are unconscious if 
minds are only usefully conscious. If consciousness is a functional feedback system 
for speed of prediction, dispositions may unconsciously initiate conscious events. 
Confusion about the unconsciousness of dispositions perhaps arises because humans 
have highly developed capabilities of pretence and detection of pretence in the 
manifestation of their unconscious dispositions (Wittgenstein 1992: 33,59, Johnston 
1993: 172-181). 
15 Crook considers that 'top-down' ethology can provide more useful explanations of 
behaviour than can 'bottom-up' neuroscience (1992: 350). 1 think that they can 
usefully be unified and employed together. 
16 Mellor (1989,199 1) argues that western Buddhism is a 'Protestant' form of 
religiosity because it is individualistic in comparison to indigenous forms. 
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17 1 am indebted to Kim Knott for this twin objection. For further discussion of the 
real and metaphorical use of space see Lefebvre (1991) and Knott (2005: 35-58) 
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Chapter 8 
Freedom of mind in homeostatic relations 
Introduction 
Thus far in the thesis, investigation of a model of the activity of the mind has 
enabled some conclusions to be drawn about the four notional categories of 
explanation, experience, self and subject. That model, which emerged from Lewis's 
explanation of the formation of attitudes, also arose from a discussion of the 
interview participant's attitudes towards the scientific 'standard view' of mind/brain 
identity, a discussion that took account of their preference for the warrant that is 
uniquely afforded by subjective experience. 
This chapter briefly recapitulates previous conclusions about the four categories. 
In broad agreement with the prevailing attitude of the interview participants, I isolate 
the de re category of relational experience of the world as being mainly responsible 
for warranting the suitability of explanations. That relation occurs during primary 
experience, which compresses structural connection to the external world, and the 
cognitive and affective commentary on that connection, into one swift, interrelated 
temporal process. By making the on-going state of mental relations immediately 
evident, experience provides the feedback access required for effective monitoring of 
strategies capable of modifying habitual relations with the world. This modification 
can occur in spite of, rather than because of, attempts at rational cognitive control, 
and Crook and Prasada both describe means by which this psychological sleight of 
hand can be achieved. In the course of examining ways by which acquaintance with 
the world can be psychologically modified to become more suitable to function, I 
argue that the underlying function of mental activity is to create circumstances that 
are conducive to homeostasis, and that an extension of the, biological concept of 
homeostasis can be equated to ideal religious concepts of 'enlightenment' and 'the 
sacred'. 
Buddhism asserts the possibility of freedom in the midst of determinism, but 
. 
r__ 
- freedom is a paradox if minds are identical to or supervenient upon determinate 
biological systems directed towards the achievement of homeostasis. I suggest that 
mechanistic micro-explanation only refers to causal determinism, but that at the 
experiential level addressed by psychological explanation an affective sense of 
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freedom can arise from psychological modifications that contribute towards the 
achievement of both embodied and psycho-social forms of homeostasis. This 
affective sense of freedom is not freedom of choice in the strict philosophical sense, 
but it is freedom from the effects of habitual imperatives that become 
homeostatically-destabilising in situations complicated by multiple external variables. 
Both 'freedom' and 'spaciousness' are useful metaphorical characterisations of the 
sense of release from suffering that accompanies approximation to homeostasis. 
It is clear from the interview testimonies, especially from Jones, that acceptance 
of the otherness of the world does not entail the elimination of all intentionality. 
there is a purpose for the imaginative functions of the mind, for fiction is vital to 
prediction, and reliable prediction provides vital guidance towards homeostatic 
balance on all explanatory measures. In perceptual cognition, in imaginative 
scenarios, and in explanatory modelling, 'veridical fictions' are all forms of what 
Shaw calls 'the good qpadeýa% which are designed to exert beneficial effects. If not 
the precise actuality, then the functional reliability of these percepts, myths, and 
teachings can be verified by experience de re in the form of alterations from bad to 
good habits, from deliberation to spontaneity, and from feelings of suffering to 
feelings of freedom. 
The broad argument advanced in this chapter is that the incomplete, internalist 
model of the mind is a source of suffering. This socially-useful but illusory model 
reinforces intentional self-grasping by making insufficient allowance for the 
dependent relation of the individual upon the otherness of the external world. Since 
the mind/brain is literally and figuratively senseless when functioning apart from the 
external world, the world had better be considered to be part of the mind, and the 
mind had better be conceived of in terms of its complete set of relations. This 
holistic Perspective stretches the common meaning of the term 'mind', but it 
conforms to Crook's view that 'we have to get away from this strict dualism of mind 
and matter towards something that is more holistic' and is in conformity with Jones's 
interest in 'the way that the subject, person and the object that is out there interact to 
form a relative experience in the subject, and in that sense everything is mind'. 
Although it is an alteration to common usage, it is more applicable to the way 
things really are, to say that the brain/world relation is identical to the mind, or to say 
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that the mind supervenes on the brain/world relation, rather than to say that the mind 
is identical to, or supervenient upon the brain alone. Since it is not just the brain, but 
the entirety of the eighteen dhdtu that constitute the seat of consciousness (Ndnamoli 
1995: 926 [MN 115.4]), both the identity and the supervenience theses offer 
incomplete models of the mind. On the supervenience model, the concept of mind 
refers to an abstractly-real entity, which is an 'out of order' fellow-traveller with the 
'All' (Arendt 1978, Woodward 1993: 8, Bodhi 2000: 1140 [SN 35.23]). On the 
identity account, the concept of mind refers to only one half of a relational totality. 
From the perspective of the 'All' there is no such objective 'thing' as a mind, yet 
there is an orderly pattern of property-relations that can be denoted by the term. 
Awareness that the self-imprisoning internalist view of mind is not 'the way things 
really are' (yatha-bhu-tam) is conducive to an affectively transfiguring, and 
metaphorically 'free' or 'spacious' experience of relationship with the world. 
My conclusion, that the ideal of horneostasis and the concepts of explanation, self, 
subject, and experience are senseless without reference to external circumstances, is 
reinforced by the Yogdcdra revisioning of prafftya-samutpdda in terms of the 'other- 
dependent' aspect of mind (paratantra-svabhdva) (Harris 1991). The location of a 
mind/world barrier is a socially and juridically useful aspect of models of the mind, 
but can lead to the over-valuation of individualism in opposition to the otherness of 
the world, and the reffication of sentience, as if sentience could be decoupled from the 
dynamism of its causal matrix. Buddhism does assert the individuality of mind- 
streams and the individuality of effort, but because Buddhism is polythetic, other 
more holistic perspectives can be found, or devised, which also have social and 
psychological relevance. 
The four-fold model of mind 
The model of the mind, put forward in Chapter 5 on the basis of a modified 
version of David Lewis's account of the fonnation of attitudes, can be restated in the 
light of the basic neuroscientific information in Chapter 3 and the conclusions 
reached in Chapter 6 on explanation and experience, and in Chapter 7, on the subject 
and the self 
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Explanation is a cognitive commentary on experience of the world. Explanation 
is not entirely logical, not just because it is permeated with imaginative fictions which 
inform reasoning by analogy, but because the decision-choices that inform 
explanations are heavily constrained and modified by 'somato-sensory systems' 
(Damasio 1995). The logical component of explanation is a subsequent justification 
that tends to disguise the role played in decision-making by emotional constraint. 
Although explanation is indicative communication to others, explanation is not 
entirely distinct from experience, because it appears in the form of utterances or 
records of utterances, only knowable as a mode of experience. Although 
emotionally-constrained, explanation is flexible: it can be simplified, improved, 
proliferated, imaginatively ornamented, and it can be firmly believed, provisionally 
believed, treated agnostically or ignored. It is a symbolic, imaginative and mainly 
linguistic higher cognitive development of the functioning of neural systems. The 
function of explanation, apart from its communication to others, is to assist complex 
neural systems in reliable, effective and timely decision-making about complex 
predicted scenarios (Llinas 2003). 
Basic conscious experience emerges as bodily awareness in the course of 
homeostatic monitoring and response undertaken by the thalamo-cortical-brainstem 
sensori-motor system, described by Damasio as the 'proto-self (1999), and by 
Panksepp as the 'Simple Ego-type Life Form' (1998). Pathways associated with 
cognition and pathways associated with expression of bodily feeling and emotion 
interact to enrich experience in the forin of 'extended consciousness'. 'Cognition' 
and 'emotion' are actually bridging terms, or 'folk' psychological concepts for 
reasoned and bio-regulative fon-ns of knowing. 'Top-down' cognitive and 'bottom- 
up' emotional systems can be differentiated conceptually, physiologically and 
anatomically. Cognitive functioning, which is often compared metaphorically to 
computation, is mainly neocortical and responsible for the convergence and 
association of current and memonsed sensory information, and for predictive 
decision-making. Emotional functioning is mainly limbic, and responsible for 
increasing the speed of response to urgent scenarios by imposing constraints on 
cognitive decision-making. These two systems cooperate, but the ability of the 
limbic pathways to condition and control higher cognitive systems may be 
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underestimated when the brain, as in this thesis, is described as a neuro-connective 
system rather than a neuro-chemical system (Thargard 2002). The ubiquity of 
socially acceptable and unacceptable pharmacological routes to altered states of 
consciousness is a testament to the role played by chemical neurotransmitter 
modulation in determining the computational efficiency of cognition and the 
qualitative nature of experience (Thagard 2002: 430,439-442). Directly via axonal 
signalling, and indirectly via modification of the neurochernical environment, the 
limbic emotional pathways play a vital modulating role in cognitive decision-making 
and in determining the feeling-tone accompanying appearances to consciousness. 
Perceptually, experience is a fairly fixed form of explanation of the world 
because conscious experiences 'emerge' from the habitual 'top-down' cognitive 
commentary on information arriving from all sensory modalities (Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch 1991: 94-96). The fairly fixed patterns of conscious qualia are associated 
with veiled instances of similar patterns in episodic memory and with names in 
declarative memory. The result is the enrichment of the 'proto-self and of primary 
experience by means of the recall of information about previous or 'secondary' 
experience over time. Recall enables an imaginative expansion of the range of 
possible future scenarios beyond those envisaged unconsciously and determinately by 
fixed action plans and fixed emotion plans (Llinas 2001: 133-153). These 
imaginative scenarios resemble primary experience because they are entirely 
constituted from recall of previous perception, but with the imaginative addition of a 
hypothetical self in place of a real subject of the scenario. In non-pathological 
circumstances the resulting cognitive familiarity reinforces the emotional restriction 
of imaginative scenarios to those from which a timely and effective selection can be 
made. 
Primary experience is not immediate, because conscious events are products of 
the 'phase-locked' synchronicity of neuronal ensembles, requiring temporal duration 
in the 0.3-1 second scale (Libet 1965: 83, Varela 1999: 116-118). Although past and 
future imaginative scenarios can appear in primary experience as hallucinations, it is 
questionable whether the self/standards dyad (Dulal, Silvia and Lalwani 2001: 41), 
which attends to those scenarios is ever consciously experienced other than nominally 
in the form of an explanatory thought, that is to say, as a symbolic representation of 
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an imaginative construct that is always either retrospective or prospective with 
respect to experience. In theory, this absence of the self from conscious awareness 
includes the 'Simple Ego-type Life Fon-n' of the 'proto-self. That primitive sense of 
self is the image of what has just taken place, and the standard of homeostasis that 
ought to take place, whereas the primary experience of awareness is a qualitatively- 
approximate temporal sequence of representations of 'the way things really are' from 
the sensori-motor location of the individual. The apparently-enduring self, which acts 
as an agent in imaginative recall and prediction of past and future scenarios, develops 
continually out of the history of the participation of the individual as the embodied 
locus of their own primary experience. The self, therefore, is a purely imaginative 
construct, which is only registered in primary experience in the form of thoughts 
about a fictional presence in imaginative scenarios. Duval, Silvia and Lalwani 
associate the hypothetical self-construct with a hypothetical standard of judgement 
(2001: 31-40), but self and standards are categories that are only conceptually- 
differentiated by their reference to the past and future respectively, for they arise as 
unconscious processes that combine to cognitively constrain decisions that are also 
emotionally-constrained (Damasio 1995). The imaginative construction of the self 
relates to a norm that is retrospectively constituted as an 'essential' version of the self 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 282-284). It is ideal in the sense that it is believed to exist 
as an abstract object capable of a non-dynamic or unconditioned resting state (Collins 
1982: 95). This ideal of self-homeostasis, I suggest, finds expression in religion as 
belief in the survival of the self after the death of the person. 
Unlike the hypothetical self, the subject is always present to awareness. It is a 
peripheral presentation because it is marginally retrospective, as the end-state of the 
previous moment of neuronal synchrony, and therefore the beginning 'horizon' of the 
present moment of neuronal synchrony (Varela 1999). Asserting such a liminal 
origin for the subject makes it seem insignificant, but such an impression would be a 
failure to pay due regard to the very large numerical scales of complex associations 
that are dynamically enacted by neuronal -ensemble sequencing throughout the brain. 
It is the presence of the beginning 'horizon' in all these interconnected associations 
that constitutes the intimacy of the individual subject. The subject does not signify 
the presence of the self in immediacy, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the self, 
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because the subject is a-historical, it possesses no qualities, and adverts to no ethical 
or homeostatic standards. As long as the human brain is in a 'structurally-coup led' 
relation to the world, then the beginning state of one neuronal ensemble sequence 
generates the indifferent continuity of subjective being on the basis of the end-state of 
another neuronal ensemble sequence. 
Although explanation, experience, self, and subject all contribute to the forination 
of attitudes, the de re experiential relation of 'suitable acquaintance' with the world 
takes precedence. Experience is like a spatial arena, within which information from 
perceptual cognition is exhibited, along with information from imaginative cognition 
and an awareness of the continuing 'horizon' of the subject, but there is no arena 
apart from neuronal processes of integration and binding of information from 
different sources. The vehicle or arena of consciousness is constituted by the 
unification of its contents (Treisman 2003: 95-98), and its contents are enacted by 
neuron firing in 'homomorphic' relation to the external world (Llinas 2001: 65). 
Consciousness is the primary experience of relatively immediate awareness, and 
integration and binding is the relational act of structural coupling, not just of 
perceptual information from the world external to the brain, but between different 
functional neuronal processes that respond reactively and predictively to the external 
world. The relative ascendancy of each structurally-coupled process, in relation to 
the other processes, is bound together, possibly by the claustrurn (Crick and Koch 
2005), to constitute the apparent unification of consciousness. These processes are 
dynamic events, not static states of affairs. Most of their relations occur habitually 
and unconsciously, but the more these relational events are disseminated across the 
neuronal system, the more likely they are to take the time to modify all 
interconnected feedback systems and so appear as conscious events. The more 
complicated the task, the more systems are involved and the slower the speed of 
response (Pibram 1999: 22). If sufficient systems are involved their interrelation is 
experienced across the hierarchy in the form of consciousness. 
The possession of human consciousness, then, relies upon the phylogenetically, 
ontogenetically and developmental ly-orgam sed structural connectivity of the brain, 
That connectivity and evolutionary history is necessary but not sufficient for 
consciousness. Crick and Koch's (2005) hypothesis implies that the claustrum only 
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correlates with consciousness in the sense that it provides the connectivity required to 
create the global dispersal of perceptual, somatic, emotional and cognitive 
information that could give rise to synchronisation in the form of qualia 
representative of external circumstances. The mind, therefore, is notjust identical to 
or supervenient upon brain events, because consciousness depends crucially upon de 
re acquaintance-relations in the form of 'structural coupling' to a world external to 
the brain. ' Suitable acquaintance de re with the world does not only provide contents 
for consciousness, but is necessary for the evolution of brains, and necessary for the 
enrichment of consciousness, whether or not consciousness has an identity or 
supervenience relation to neuronal events. 
This study has focussed on mind/brain congruity, and thus far has adopted an 
impartial stance with respect to the conflicting ontologies of mind/brain identity and 
mind/brain supervenience, because in the absence of personal knowledge of 
disembodied circumstances any other attitude would be a conjectural matter of 
personal belief. Both identity and supervenience ontologies pen-nit neuroscience to 
illuminate mind explanations, and allow 'folk' psychological mind explanations to 
illuminate brain explanations (Hardcastle 1992: 419). In both cases unification of 
explanation is achieved with the aid of bridging terms referring to human dispositions 
(Maclntyre 1971: 120-121). 
Intentional and attentional acquaintance 
The interview participants present a positive view of what they call 'subjective 
experience', and I call de animolde re acquaintance with the world. They rely on 
subjective experience organised according to religious practice as the anvil on which 
teachings de dicto are tested in order to determine whether adherence to any 
2 
particular explanation is personally and socially beneficial . In effect, the practice of 
appropriate attention to primary experience is expected to naturally warrant suitable 
attitudes towards the world, towards others, and towards oneself Shaw describes this 
emphasis on experience and practice as 'a positive tradition', and as 'clarity and 
awareness being the essential nature of one's being'. This experiential strand running 
throughout Buddhist tradition is what primarily concerns him; it is why he places 
greater emphasis on the influence of teachers (aabistana) than the guidance of 
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doctrines. He dislikes negative doctrinal formulations, ca bunch of scholarly tricks', 
which he discerns in the Pdli commentarial and Madhyamaka traditions, and which he 
considers to be designed to distinguish Buddhist from Hindu attitudes towards the 
self. For Shaw, any logical explanation designed to refute meditative understanding 
interpreted within another tradition misses the point, because all explanations tend 
towards prapahca: an 'elaboration or proliferation of views', or 'structures of 
delusion or grasping'. Logical understanding of doctrinal expression is less important 
than 'insight', and 'if you want to get insight ... you've got to talk about what your 
mind is like' (Shaw). 
What the mind is normally like, according to Crook and Prasada, is structured by 
underlying intentions that are deluded, gasping, and proliferating. Crook calls for a 
rebalancing of awareness, which, I suggest, implies a psychological forin of 
homeostasis, achieved by reducing the amount of time spent in attentional states as 
opposed to intentionally-motivated states, and/or more attentional awareness during 
intentional activities. Occurrence in consciousness usually indicates that an object is 
the focus of attention, because the individual anticipates a need to develop 
judgements and intentions with respect to the object (Nelkin 1993: 420), therefore 
intention and attention non-nally occur hand-in-hand. Despite making the attention/ 
intention distinction in his spatial model, Crook notes that attentional awareness does 
occur during intentional states: it is just that attention can be widely focussed during 
more attentional states, but is narrowly-focussed during intentionally-motivated states 
(Crook 2002b: 105). 
Initially, religious practices for the modification of psychological states involve 
training to turn a deliberate modification of awareness into a habitual and 
spontaneous modification (Kennedy 2004: 151-152). In neuroscientific terms, 
neuronal pathways are being reconfigured or reinforced by means of Hebbian 
plasticity (1949: 69). In Hulse, Read and Shroeder's terms, a 'mind to world' 
expectation is transmogrified into a 'world-to-mind' direction of fit (2004: 74). If the 
expectation is fulfilled, the result from a Buddhist point of view is the replacement of 
a harmful with a beneficial response, for goal-oriented intention (cetand) generates 
karnia, whereas spontaneous attention motivated by the basic de re quality of 
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'aboutness' (manasikdra) does not (Govinda. 1969: 115-116) and can be beneficial if 
it is proper to circumstances (yoniso-manasikdra) (Nyan4tiloka 1980: 115). 
Crook considers that a balanced mind should spend more time in subjective self- 
consciousness and in wide attentional states than is wont to happen these days, and 
his point is reinforced, not undermined, by the criticism that intentional states are not 
conscious states at all. The desired consequence of such a relocation of awareness Is 
not the elimination of intention, but an ethical alteration to intentional motivation as a 
result of greater awareness of 'the way things are in the world', rather than the ways 
things ought to be for the benefit of an imaginary self. Crook's model can be related 
to the Buddhist discourse of compassionate wisdom (karu? 7d), for awareness reveals 
that the susceptibility of all existence to change is felt by sentient beings to be 
unsatisfactory (dukkha). 
Attenuation of craving 
Lewis (1979: 540) admits the definitional vagueness of his de re condition of 
'suitable acquaintance' with the world, but 'acquaintance' presumably means 
structurally-coupled experiential access to the object of an attitude, and 'suitable' 
indicates that the understanding gained from access is sufficient warrant for the 
ensuing attitude. In terms of Buddhist psychological theory, 'suitable' presumably 
means whether or not acquaintance is karmically-conditioned by an attitude such as 
craving (ta? iha), for a conscious event (citta) always arises with attendant 
conditioning factors (cetasika), most of which can be evaluated for good or ill (Rhys 
Davids 2002: 175-177, Rowlands 1982: 9-10, van Gorkham 1975: 12-13). The 
notion that cognitive events are habitually combined with evaluative dispositions 
explains why the epistemological 'is' and the ethically-evaluative 'ought' are not 
considered separately in Buddhism (Fuller 2005: 9). While western philosophy tends 
to separate moral suitability from suitable acquaintance under the rubric of 
epistemology, Buddhism emphasises the ubiquitous arising of psychological 
conditioning factors that make acquaintance with an object morally suitable or 
unsuitable (Govinda 1969: 99). Not only are 'world-to-mind' action-decisions 
conditioned by those factors, but 'mind-to-world' perceptual cognitions cannot be 
trusted, as they are in the West by Augustine (2002: 79), until unwholesome 
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a conditioning factors such as greed or attachment (lobha or r ga) hatred or aversion 
(dosa) and delusion or ignorance (moha or avijjj) are restrained. This is the context 
in which Prasada and Dharmavidya refer to the Buddhist dispensation as a 
'psychology of addiction'. 
Prasada interprets the basic formulations of early Buddhism, particularly the Four 
Noble Truths, the five khandha, and the 'omnipresent conditioning factors' (sabba- 
citta-sddhirana), as a diagnosis of the predilection to escape into the self from a 
world existentially experienced as dukkha. She calls this escape 'both a protection 
and a prison, creating a cordon sanitaire between the person and the world' (Brazier 
2003: 33). The basic diagnostic formulations give rise to therapeutic prescriptions for 
re-conditioning the mind until it is freed from both dukkha and the 'self-prison'. 
These prescriptions work by enabling more 'direct' fon-ns of acquaintance with the 
world to act as antidotes to modes of acquaintance that are considered to be indirect 
in the sense that they are conditioned by habitual, self-constituting responses (Brazier 
2003: 69). 
Prasada refers to cetand and manasikara as 'subdivisions' of consciousness 
(vififidna) (Brazier 2003: 101). 3 Together with three other 'omnipresent factors', 
attention and intention motivate the subject/object orientation which guides the day- 
to-day doings of individuals. Prasada associates the operation of the khandha and the 
omnipresent factors with selfish individualism, as the cause of ignorance of the way 
things really are in the world. For her, the form of every mental phenomena (r - a) is UP 
conditioned by 'self-investment', therefore fails to be a 'direct' perception of the 
'thing-in-itself (dharma) (Brazier 2003: 68). 4 Although persons are conditioned by 
the objects they perceive, they condition their own perception of those objects. By 
investing objects with preferential qualities, they identify with objects, their 
personality is reflected by objects, differentiated in contrast to objects, and the objects 
are felt to be possessions, with the result that the apprehension of objects is 
implicated in the creation and reinforcement of an imaginary, objective self (Brazier 
2003: 63). Prasada argues that the mode of relating to external objects is deeply 
implicated in the mode of relating to the self. Self-investment is not just an aspect of 
intentionality (cetand), but adheres to each of the khandha, and to each of the 
(omnipresent factors' of the perceptual stages of a mental event: contact (sparS'a), 
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feeling or 'reaction' (vedand), perception or 'entrancement' with imagery associated 
with a percept (sarvjfid), volition or intention (cetand) and attention (manasikdra) 
(Brazier 2003: 100-105). This systematic, Abhidhamma-based account is 
conceptually complicated in comparison to Crook's relatively simple notion of 
rebalancing intentionality and attentionality. In particular, the psychology of 
behavioural change is complicated by the hypothesis that each of the omnipresent 
factors, including attention (manasik5ra) can be self-invested. Prasada's thesis is that 
change is possible at the appearance of each factor, for where there is self-investment 
there is the possibility of self-disinvestment. She describes psychotherapeutic 
techniques for self-disinvestment with respect to each of the omnipresent factors, and 
with respect to each of the five khandha (Brazier 2003: 79-115). 
Because Prasada's explanation is more systematic than Crook's, the opportunities 
it affords for psychotherapeutic exposition may appeal to some practitioners, but not 
to others, like Shaw, who feel burdened by the 'proliferation' of scholarly Buddhist 
explanation, especially if the referents of the terms used are not necessarily found by 
phenomenological observation. As with any de dicto account, there is a risk that the 
existence of things is assumed simply because they are conceived of and named in a 
particular context. It is likely that the khandha and the omnipresent factors will 
exceed the powers of phenomenological observation, because they are 'folk' 
psychological analytical categories rather than discrete parts of experience: they 
dissect parts of the world that are normally conjoined. 
Neuroscience indicates that cooperation between cognitive and emotional 
systems occurs before neuronal event-synchronicity is sufficiently globalised across 
the whole brain to appear as consciousness. This indicates that the 'omnipresent 
factors' are not discrete mental events in their own right: contact, reactive feeling, 
associated imagery, volitional disposition and heightened attention become bound for 
appearance to consciousness as one phenomenal event. In other words, citta and 
cetasika are thoroughly combined by the time a cognition (a representative 
imagination) or a perceptual cognition (an indirect representation of the external 
world) appears to consciousness. The omnipresent factors may be logically 
conceivable independently, but not cognisable as discrete phenomena. 
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The self is apparently the most discrete of the 'folk' psychological categories. It 
is a symbol for the historical person, but in ordinary discourse both 'self and 
'subject' commonly denote the 'I' as if it were an enduring abstract object. Thus, self 
becomes confused with the subject de animo, in the dual meaning of that term, firstly 
as the initial and transitory 'horizon' of every experience, and secondly as a 
hypothetically eternal soul. From a neuroscientific point of view the self is not an 
abstract soul-like object, but the transitory arising of habitual feedback processes that 
produce unified effects in consciousness. Damasio (1999), Llinas (2003) and 
Panksepp (1998) have described some of those processes in the thalamo-cortical- 
brainstem system, and Damasio (1995) has hypothesized the cooperation of top-down 
cognitive self-process functioning under 'somatic' control in the medio-ventral 
prefrontal cortex. It would appear that there is a self, in the neuroscientifically- 
restricted sense of the habitual patterning of cognitive/affective neuronal feedback 
processes, but Prasada makes it clear that there is no self, in the philosophical sense 
of an abstract, enduring, spatially internal object, capable of meaningful possession of 
external objects of desire (Brazier 2003: 31-32). 
Homeostatic control 
The attitude of equanimity or indifference towards the ontology of mind, 
displayed by most of the interview participants, is not the same as methodological 
impartiality. Equanimity does not prevent the equable advancement of opinions, 
ranging from Crook's rejection of the possibility of a 'body-mind dichotomy' (Crook 
1980: 14-36), through Jones's preference that mind and body should not be 
distinguished, Ratnaprabha's preference that they should be distinguished, to Shaw's 
transcendental 'neo-idealism' and Wistreich's view that mind/brain identity is 'just a 
joke'. Their equanimity is not based on absence of opinions, but on an ability to put 
irresolvable or transitional ontological questions to one side, in order concentrate on 
psychological issues that can be resolved in this life. 
The participants' concern is for subjective experience and for those doctrinal 
explanations such as the Noble Truths, S'i7nyatd and the skandha-theory, which 
indicate practical means to alleviate the suffering that is characteristic of embodied 
being. They use Buddhist ethical and psychological ways and means to modify the 
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effects of selfish intentionality on their own subjective experience, and on the 
experience of others. They are not particularly interested in whether a particular 
doctrine can be improved, for imperfections in explanation are expected to be 
clarified in the course of experiential realisation. The Dhamma is considered to be an 
(ancient path' (Bhikkhu Gavesako): it is the truth about the world whether it is 
correctly explained or not, and whether it is correctly realised or not. With a belief 
that there is a path to truth, there is less requirement for absolute faith in the Dhamma 
as a once-and-for-all revelation requiring no experiential testing, because past 
realisations are expected to be replicable in the future. 
The Buddha is obviously very important as the founder of this Process 
and as, in my opinion, a very, very great teacher. (It is) well worth 
listening to what he says - but it is not absolutely crucial to know - 'did he really say this or did somebody add it later? ' What matters is, for 
me at least, does it work or not, is it useful or not? (Ratnaprabha). 
What matters is how to traverse the path to realisation, which means how 
experience of the world is altered under the guidance of fallibly-true explanations of 
an ideal pre-existing truth. If Hulse, Read and Schroeder are right about the nature of 
consciousness, such alteration would initially be a 'mind-to-world' direction of fit 
under the de dicto sway of a teaching, but a 'world-to-mind' direction of fit as the 
experience approximates to 'the way things really are'. This suggests, firstly, that 
during religious practice the mind is altered to conform to an explanatory ideal of 
imperturbability, and secondly, that the alteration is an unconscious performance, 
because the disposition to make an alteration is an intention or desire, and there is no 
such thing as a conscious desire (Hulse, Read and Schroeder 2004: 75). From a 
physiological point of view, the affective sense of unease or suffering that 
unconsciously motivates desire is a manifestation of the work of systems monitoring 
homeostasis. Approximation to homeostasis is therefore experienced as an affective 
sense of freedom from suffering, as the outcome of a succession of emotionally and 
cognitively-guided sensorimotor manoeuvres in response to a succession of 
developing homeostatic imbalances. 
The religious notion of the 'sacred' can be envisioned as referring to culturally 
significant evaluations of events conducive to homeostasis in all possible situations. 
Thus, the notion of the sacred can denote thoughts, emotions and actions by 
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individuals and by groups, sometimes with respect to objects and places, either with 
immediacy or over extended time, which have direct and indirect bearing on 
embodied homeostasis. The category of the sacred can therefore include its profane 
antinomy, because it is a way of making sense of or propitiating events such as 
childbirth, coercion or mortality, which are liminal or antithetical with respect to the 
homeostatic ideal. Since the Buddha's enlightenment is traditionally respected as an 
event of ultimate significance it can, I contend, be ascribed to the western category of 
the sacred, and can be understood by comparison to the ideal of homeostatic balance, 
the ideal of cessation of striving for homeostasis, or 'middle way' approach to 
recurring approximations to the homeostatic ideal. 5 
'Homeostatic balance' prototypically refers to the stable maintenance of the 
internal environment of an embodied organism. The view that mental operations 
such as imagination, concept-formation and logical reasoning are all derived from 
embodied experience of the external world is propounded by Johnson (1987), with 
respect to basic 'Image schemata' of containment, force, and balance (Johnson 1987: 
80-100). These are not images as such, but 'a means of structuring particular 
experiences schematically, so as to give order and connectedness to our perceptions 
and conceptions' (Johnson 1987: 75). Johnson argues that balance is a pre- 
conceptual ability acquired through embodied activity, prior to the intervention of 
(rules' or explanation (Johnson 1987: 74). 
We ... come to know the meaning of 
balance through the closely 
related experience of bodily equilibrium, or loss of equilibrium. We 
understand the notion of systematic balance in the most immediate, 
pre-conceptual fashion through our bodily experience. 
... the meaning of balance 
begins to emerge through our acts of 
balancing and through our experience of systematic processes and 
states within our bodies. (Johnson 1987: 75) 
Johnson is not only describing the sensorimotor integrating mechanisms of those 
parts of the mind/brain, loosely denoted by Aquinas as the sensus communis (Gilson 
1929: 228-229), which integrate perception and motor response; his remarks also 
encompass the phylogenetically-ancient brainstem processes of bodily homeostasis, 
which, according to Damasio, give rise to the (proto-self (1999: 158-161). Balance 
and homeostasis are structurally similar bodily events, with some overlap of identity, 
involving equilibration of forces. The difference consists in the forces evoked. which 
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in acts of balance are mainly muscular on the basis of neuronal transmission, whereas 
in embodied homeostasis all the bodily action systems are involved, mainly under the 
influence of autonomic neuronal and endocrine hormonal transmission. In its limited 
scientific sense, homeostasis means 'the maintenance of metabolic equilibrium within 
an animal by a tendency to compensate for disrupting changes' (OED) but the term 
can be meaningfully extended to include the maintenance of bodily equilibrium 
within an external environment. It is common to extend the use of 'balance', but less 
common to extend the use of 'homeostasis', to refer to the maintenance of 
psychological and social equilibrium. The psychological use of 'homeostasis' is 
partly rhetorical, for it reinforces the message that the mind is embodied, but unlike 
the psycho-social use of 'balance', the psycho-social reference of 'homeostasis' is 
more synecdoche than metaphor, in that psychological equilibrium is a contribution 
to bodily homeostasis in any event. 
We have seen that Crook (1992) argues for a balance between intentionality and 
attentionality. In his interview he gives a simple explanation of what that means: 
Now, it is clear that human beings have needs: needs for food, needs 
for sleep, needs for shelter, needs for sex, and human beings also have 
need, which means you want more of whichever of these it is. And 
this is related to the development of comparisons between people: he 
or she is better than others, so you begin to get values which are really 
ratings of self versus others, and we turn these ratings and values into 
desires. Not needs: desires. Now needs could be said to belong to 
biology; desires belong to psycho-sociology, but of course they are 
connected. [Here we arrive at] what the Buddha called the second 
Noble Truth, [which] refers to desire. Desire is related to values; we 
value the world and then we set about desiring it or not desiring it as 
the case may be, wanting or not wanting, and that of course is the 
source of suffering, as the Buddha said, in my view perfectly 
accurately. 
If you are thinking in terms of some kind of homeostatic model, it 
is clear that only when those desires have either diminished or been 
totally satisfied is one going to reach some point of balance, otherwise 
the mind is going to be continually disturbed and therefore suffering in 
some form or another is also going to continue. So the Buddhist 
answer is to examine very tightly and closely what those desires and 
wants are, and of course ultimately whether there is a self which really 
is there, or is the whole thing just an cognitive construction? The 
answer, of course, is that it is just a cognitive construction. 
So what is all this about? The aim of Buddhism is to reach a point 
where you do not bother anymore with these desires, and that is 
freedom in a sense ... 
but then a critic would say, 'but that just means 
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doing nothing at all'. No, because the biological needs are still there. 
You still need to live a life that has food, satisfactory social 
relationships, sex and children and all the rest of it. All of this is 
biological, but you do not have to encumber that with all the extra- 
ordinary business of egotism and self-aggrandisement and desire, and 
finally wars, murders and quarrels; none of that is actually necessary. 
But if you manage to reach equilibrium more or less with respect to 
that, you still have an active life to live; you still have to be a farmer or 
a banker or something or other, so the idea that finding some kind of 
homeostasis would mean inactivity is not in my view correct. (Crook) 
A psychological homeostatic model does not achieve stasis because, as with 
balance, homeostasis is maintained by a succession of corrective activities. The 
regulation of bodily homeostasis is largely automatic, but Damasio suggests that it is 
precisely the modelling of sensorimotor responses to the disruption of homeostasis by 
external 'objects' that gave rise to the evolution of self-consciousness (1999: 159- 
161). The notion of homeostasis can therefore be extended to include conscious 
relations between embodied beings and the external world, and to include 
psychological and social processes. As a 'Middle Way' between asceticism and 
hedonism (-&dnamoli 1993 [SN. 56.11]), Buddhist practice is quite literally a 
psychological and physiological means to homeostasis, and on that basis it is 
reasonable to suppose that enlightenment in this life (saupadisesanibbana) refers to 
an ideal psychological and ethical achievement of balanced relations with the world, 
which is felt in the form of liberation from suffering. 6 
In contemporary developed societies under peaceful circumstances, where many 
gross forms suffering are alleviated, palliated or sequestered within institutions, speed 
of response to external causes of homeostatic imbalance becomes relatively less 
important than the quality of judgemental deliberation over complex choices, but 
there remains an imperative to attend immediately to deviations from bodily 
homeostasis, along with a requirement for psychological and social rebalancing over 
extended time. 
Different sorts of homeostatic rebalancing impose practical constraints on 
freedom of choice. Both body-system rebalancing and psycho-social rebalancing 
depend on the control and maintenance of permeable barriers against the world, the 
bodily barriers are physical and obvious, whereas the psycho-social barriers are 
imaginary projections of bodily barriers. The individuality of persons not only 
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depends on overt embodiment, but on 'autopoetic' barriers (Maturana and Varela 
1998), which, according to Varela Thompson and Rosch (1991) constitute a division 
between the mind/brain and the external world at physiological levels of explanation, 
so the imperative to make sense of the division between mind and world constitutes a 
dilemma at all levels of explanation. At the underlying causal level, there is the 
dispute between enaction and representation theories, discussed in Chapter 6. At the 
'level of appearances', the greater the psychological sense of personal individuality, 
the more the mind/world barrier becomes impermeable, and the more that psycho- 
social relations with the world become disfigured by inappropriate habitual reactions. 
Both Pym and Ratnaprabha remark that enlightened relations with the world are 
characterised by creativity rather than reactivity. Their suggestion goes with the grain 
of evolution, for in comparison to animals human beings have developed an ability to 
respond to the present with cognitive creativity in the light of information from the 
past, rather than reacting exclusively by triggering the 'fixed action patterns' 
restrained in the basal ganglia (globus pallidus and putamen) (Llinas 2001: 135-136), 
which are of phylogenetically-ancient 'reptilian' origin (Maclean 1989: 35). 
Creativity of response is an indication of the freedom with which unusual options are 
initiated, rather than being constrained by fixed emotional patterns which trigger 
fixed action patterns. 
The problem, for human animals, is that creative responses are still unconsciously 
conditioned by the emotional responses that trigger fixed actions over short 
timescales. These quick responses often turn out to be bizarre, destabilising or 
destructive when they have psycho-social effects over extended time. The psycho- 
social effects of emotional destabilisations can be alleviated cognitively, by the use of 
language to refer symbolically to intended objects, because the experience of symbols 
does not generate the same degree of emotional response as experience of their 
associated objects (Panksepp 1998: 319). It may be that the inhibition of 
inappropriate short-terrn emotional responses to long-term situations is a contributory 
factor in the evolution of language, as a development of gesture in place of action. 
Imaginative explanation, as a symbolic, cognitive fon-n of experience, can stand in for 
extreme forms of experiential engagement, but explanation alone cannot eliminate 
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occasional breakdowns of psycho-social homeostatic control, leading to outbursts 
across the range of emotional modalities. 
Of course, the interchange between cognitive and emotional 
processes is one of reciprocal control, but the flow of traffic remains 
balanced only in nonstressful circumstances. In emotional tunnoil, the 
upward influences of subcortical emotional circuits on the higher 
reaches of the brain are stronger than the top-down controls. Although 
humans can strengthen and empower the downward controls through 
emotional education and self-mastery, few can ride the whirlwind of 
unbridled emotions with great skill (Panksepp 1998: 301). 
Symbolic representations of bodily and social homeostasis, such as self-image, 
personal standards or religious or patriotic values, may be swept aside when they are 
tested by external circumstances beyond habitual control. In those cases the 
operation of 'top-down' cognitive intervention is overwhelmed by emotional 
responses initiated by the diffusion of chemical neurotransmitters. In practice this 
means that freedom of choice in the midst of determinism may be habitually over- 
constrained by Llinas's fixed emotion and action patterns, unless those patterns are 
themselves modified by long-term behavioural conditioning. That hypothesis is a 
justification for Buddhist practices that incorporate 'bottom-up' behavioural 
techniques designed to encourage emotional balance in stressful and non-stressful 
circumstances. 
The structure of homeostatically- functional neuronal systems is part of the 
evolutionary heritage of what it is to be a human being. Homeostatic monitoring is 
inherently valuable, but when immediate personal survival is not the primary issue 
the mind may respond to complex long-term situations in ways that destabilise 
psychological and social homeostasis. Religious practices function psycho-socially 
to moderate, mitigate or incorporate inappropriate responses, and in the process to 
provide an occasion for the generation of significant meaning. 7 Most emotional 
responses are phylogenetically-habitual, but they are also developmentally-habitual 
over a lifetime, and are in theory modifiable by both 'top-down' cognitive and 
'bottom-up' kinaesthetic techniques, sometimes involving intentional manipulation of 
ascetic or hedonistic embodiment, but mainly involving ritual practices, including 
meditation, which deal with embodiment attentionally by the development of 
and and tantric sddhana practices do mindfulness' (Kennedy 2004: 150-15 1). Vipasy 
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use 'top-down', that is to say, cognitive linguistic or de dicto explanations that mainly 
involve language and visual manipulation centres in the cerebral cortex, but most 
ritual Buddhist practices are directed towards 'bottom-up' alterations to habitual 
modes of acquaintance with the world, involving repetition of somato-sensory 
activations of the thalamo-cortical-brainstem system. By so doing, Buddhist 
soteriological techniques partially circumvent the philosophical problem of how 'top- 
down' cognitive freedom can be implemented in a causally-determined world. 
Freedom in determinism 
In the course of her explanation of the psychology of addiction, Prasada 
characterises the mind as engaged in compulsive processes that serve to reinforce the 
notion of an objective self (2003: 21-26). The importance of reinforcement feedback 
in mental processes is confirmed in neuroscientific terms by Varela Thompson and 
Rosch (199 1), Llinas (2003), Damasio (1999) Panksepp (1998), and by Grush (2003: 
68-71) in terms of systems theory. 8 Feedback reinforcement constitutes a closed 
system, hence it may seem paradoxical that Prasada emphasises the possibility that 
the rise or origin of a response (samudaya) to affliction can be a choice (Brazier 2003: 
11-13,215 26ý 33ý 80), although only a choice in the sense of the containment of an 
afflictive emotional response (Brazier 2003: 84). Amidst the determinist causal law 
of dependent origination (Pdli paticca-samuppdda, Skt. pratTtya-samutpdda), 9 
Prasada observes that a 'choice-point' (samudaya) arises, which allows an individual 
to either attach to a percept in a way that reinforces their sense of self-worth or to 
escape from the 'self-prison', as 'spiritual practice provides a means of breaking 
through the compulsive patterns that make up the self to a direct encounter with the 
world' (Brazier 2003: 100). But where and when in the course of 'spiritual practice' 
does the choice-point occur? As Prasada describes it, it is not absolutely clear that 
the turn away from self-investment is a conscious intentional act. As Crook describes 
it, the turn is not a conscious decision; it just happens to be the case that someone 
who 'focuses upon ongoing activity irrespective of personal agency' experiences 
freedom from stress, whereas intentional activity based on taking the self as an object 
is a comparative mode, often a socially-comparative mode, which generates anxiety 
(Crook 2002: 104,1980: 312-314). Prasada's use of the word 'choice' sets up the 
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dilemma of how an intentional act can lead to freedom from intentional acts. Crook 
only avoids that dilemma because he does not address the question of how the turn 
from intention to attention is initiated, in other words, how Duval and Wicklund's 
intentional 'objective self-consciousness' (1972: 2-6) comes to be replaced by more 
attentional 'subjective self-consciousness" in a religious context. 10 
Buddhism affirms that the world is patterned in an orderly fashion in accordance 
with the law of dependent origination, yet because a person's actions have 
consequences, there must be 'a sufficient measure of free will' (Basham 1981: 8,224). 
This was a significant issue for early Buddhism, for it differentiates the Buddha's 
teaching from the proto-AjIvika tendencies of Pdrana Kassapa (ethically-antinomian) 
of Makkhali Gosdla (fatalism or niyati), and of Pakudha Kaccdyana (Parmenidean 
immobilism), as described in the Sdmafifia-phala Sutta (Rhys Davids 1992: 65-95 
[DN 1: 47], Basham 1981: 15-18). The prospect of freedom in the midst of 
determinism remains a philosophical conundrum, although neuroscientific 
explanations for mental events appear, despite appeals to quantum indeterminacy, to 
have tipped the balance of the argument in favour of determinism (Honderich 1988: 
334-336). However, if the conscious properties of mind only emerge at a certain 
level of neuronal complexity and organisation, then they might be capable of 
downward causative effects (Varela and Thompson 2003: 275), which would amount 
to freedom of action in the midst of determinism. Against the notion that emergent 
properties exert downward causation, Klee argues that in most cases, emergent 
(macro' properties remain detennined by causal connections between 'micro' 
properties at the lower levels of a system (1984: 44-57). Only if emergent properties 
constitute another system altogether would they escape the causal determination of 
the system from which they emerged (Klee 1984: 58-62). Such systematic 
independence could not, however, be considered an emergent property, unless some 
mechanism could be shown by which a property could sever causal relations with the 
micro-level events that maintained its emergence. That leaves the possibility that 
consciousness is independent of brain activity in a relationship ofprior supervenience 
that allows time for causation (Wallace 1999: 161), rather than a non-causal 
relationship of contemporaneous supervenience (Kim 1993: 177-178). In the current 
state of knowledge an independent property of mentality remains only a hypothetical 
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possibility, whereas neuroscientific trauma and stimulation studies have empirically 
demonstrated a causal micro-determinism between brain events and many types of 
conscious event (Penfield 1950: 6-7,157-159,160-181). However, Damasio's 
'somatic marker' hypothesis implies that neo-cortical development has enabled 
automatic feedback responses to reach such a level of complexity that they can at 
least be described as decision-making, albeit under the constraining limitation of 
emotional systems (Damasio 1995: 1414). 
In Chapter 61 have cited work in the philosophy of science, which argues that the 
reduction of psychological discourses of the sort that admit the possibility of freedom 
of choice, to lower-level scientific explanations of the sort that imply determinism, is 
unnecessary, because different levels of discourse can be unified without reduction if 
they perform explanatory work that can only be done at that level (Fodor 1980, 
Kircher 1976,1989, Hardcastle 1992, Jones 1995, Teller 2004). It may be that an 
action undertaken freely according to 'folk' psychological explanation is in fact 
micro-determined by internal and external variables, but the complex causal relations 
between those variables are likely to be untraceable for all practical purposes. 'Folk' 
psychological, intentional, choice-based explanation forms a traceable causal 
explanation that is relevant to lives lived on the level of appearances, and therefore at 
that level the concepts of personal freedom and personal responsibility remain 
meaningful. Above and below that level, meaningful explanations are functionalist 
and determinate. Other than a rigorous demand for philosophical consistency, " there 
is no reason why useful free-will explanations should be reduced to determinate 
explanations at other levels. 12 However, once the unification of levels of explanation 
is accepted, approximate indications of the underlying determining causes of events 
can usefully guide explanations couched in terms of free choice, for they can indicate 
the reasons why intentional decisions taken in confori-nity with 'the way things really 
areý are less likely to be thwarted by the micro-deten-ninacy of underlying causal 
events. 
Crook's interpretation of his states of awareness model implies that bare attention, 
as a diminishment in the urgent intentionality that normally motivates choice, is a 
step on the road to enlightenment (bodhi), because it is a process of becoming awake 
to the world that resembles the practice of mindfulness under the s'amatha meditative 
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technique. It is a doctrinal question as to whether a psychological technique of 
intentionality-reduction is sufficient support for a Buddhalogical doctrine of 
enlightenment, but a practical question as to whether habitual intentionality could be 
eliminated from the cognitive and emotional management of sensorimotor response. 
If intentional dispositions are not conscious states, as Hulse, Read and Schroeder 
(2004) suggest, then habitual intentional dispositions are unlikely to be subjugated by 
the ostensible freedom of conscious cognitive control. If intentionality is not only a 
developmentally-acquired habit but a phylogenetic function instantiated along ancient 
neuronal pathways, then intentionality may be modifiable, but is unlikely to be 
eliminable. Although an intention is not a conscious act, it is alterable by choice, yet 
a choice is also an intentional act. It follows that intentional choices are not 
conscious acts, and from a restrictive neuroscientific perspective they are not even 
acts of mind, because only consciousness is 'minding'. 
If the brain makes decisions by unconscious feedback processes that are reported 
second-hand to consciousness, then freedom of choice is a fictional component of 
explanation. But imaginative fiction plays a vital part in the mind's feedback 
processes for the purpose of prediction, loosely delineating the future time and space 
in which actions are predicted to be effective. Because choice involves imaginative 
prediction about what ought to happen in a determinate world that it can only 
approximate to freedom, and it is because free action is subject to external curtailment 
that the concept of freedom elicits an emotional response, which gives it an affective 
quality. In Japanese Pure Land terms, choice is own-power (iiriki), and its external 
double is other-power (tariki). Both Jones and Pym associate other-power with any 
external circumstance, not just with the personification of Amitdbha. The implication 
of their interpretation of Pure Land teaching is that freedom is a balance, or a suitable 
equation between other-power and own-power, as the dilemma of choice in the midst 
of determinism is resolved experientially on each occasion. 
If intentionality is not a conscious state, then Prasada's samudaya tipping point, 
as the realisation of the Second Noble Truth, is an unconscious cognitive/affective 
occurrence prior to consciousness, when intention to grasp the desired object either 
does or does not happen as a motivation to action. In order to facilitate the 
relinquishment of grasping, therefore, Buddhist attitudes and behavioural practices 
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must take effect in advance of ostensibly free and rational decisions. If sedulously 
followed, 'bottom-up' Buddhist behavioural practices take advantage of the micro- 
determination of choice, restraining addictive emotional responses of craving (tanha) 
and grasping (upaddna) and carrying the individual beyond the tipping point without 
need for overt action in the form of a free choice. 13 
On this interpretation of Prasada's scheme the most significant choice-point is the 
decision to engage in Buddhist practice, whereupon the subsequent relinquishment of 
grasping, because it is a systematic effect of non-intentional states of mind, dissolves 
the anomaly of freedom in determinism, at least at the level of intentional 
behaviour. 14 1 associate this possibility with Crook's remark that the relinquishment 
of grasping enables the world to be 'given'. The difference between the world 
experienced with and the world experienced without the motivational disposition 
(cetasika) of grasping or attachment (updddna) may be that qualities of relationality 
become as apparent as qualities of objectivity. According to Crook, the difference is 
(of the nature of an affect', thus it is not a rational confinnation of a philosophical 
view, or a fundamental change in sensory object-recognition. The world experienced 
without grasping is the experience of being of the world, rather than in the mind, in 
other words, the realisation that all appearances to consciousness, sensory, affective 
or cognitive, are equably apprehended on the same plane. That is not a denial of the 
external hylic world, or a denial that appearances correspond representatively to the 
external world: it is a denial that there exists an internal world of unconscious 
psychological events, which happen to have the same form as conscious events, as if 
they were like conscious events. This is a denial of internal space inhabited by real 
referents for 'folk' psychological categories. ' 5 Such a metaphorical space is a 
socially-useful fiction, but is not 'the way things are in the world'. The internal world 
is only neuronal, and consciousness is an emergent property, or a supervenient 
property, micro-determined by very large scales of mutual neuronal interconnectivity. 
Mind, apparently, is either identical to that property, as 'minding', or it is 
supervenient, not just on the general property of consciousness, but on the 
functioning of every detail of every interconnected neuronal part that instantiates the 
emergent property of consciousness. Out of the micro-complexity of feedback 
processes there emerges the semblance of freedom of choice. Out of the conformity 
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of decisions with the way of the world, arises approximation to homeostasis, and an 
affective sense of fteedom. 
From the perspective of the four-fold mind-model based on Lewis (1979), the 
paradox of choice arises from the activity of self-constituting processes, not from the 
activity of subject-constituting processes. As a real but passive beginning 'horizon' 
to each conscious moment, the subject is utterly indifferent with respect to intentions 
about things appearing to consciousness. The self, on the other hand, is a fictional 
denotation of the activity of cognitive agency that becomes characterised as an 
abstract object and an ideal standard version of itself. Only the explanation of the self 
as an abstract object in metaphorical space is fictional, for the underlying transitory 
processes are real and neuronal. 'Self is a mere name that is useful in the 'folk' 
psychological explanation of embodied actions, and in the context of those 
explanations the imaginative prediction of freedom in determinism is also useful, 
therefore both self and freedom of choice are 'veridical fictions', which are 
experientially true in the context, and the level of explanation, at which they are used. 
Self is also useful as an evaluative bridging term in the unification of higher-level 
psychological explanations and lower-level functional neuroscientific explanations. 
On one hand, if neuroscientific explanations were bereft of unification by 'bridging 
terms' to higher-level psychological explanations, they would be functionally 
meaningless descriptions; on the other hand, the 'explanation extension' of 
neuroscientific theory reveals that the presumption that the self enjoys freedom of 
choice is functionally problematic. The conception of a self acting freely without 
determinate constraints overwhelms the possibility of a more relational experience of 
'the way things really are'. The category of the self, therefore, is not entirely an 'idle 
wheel', for the term denotes a cognitive function performed under emotional or 
(somatic' constraints, in relation to a set of developmentally-acquired standards by 
complex and determinate neuronal feedback processes. 
The Buddhist sutta and Abhidhamma resources that are deployed by Prasada. and 
Dharmavidya offer considerable insight into the different ways in which choice is 
emotionally-constrained. In a nutshell, Prasada and Dharmavidya describe 
perceptions and actions that are addictively-determined by appetitive and repulsive 
craving (lobha, dosa and nioha) and by 'self-investment'. Release from addiction 
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may not be the result of free choice in the philosophical sense, but it is a freedom 
from imprisonment in habitual patterns of response that cause existential suffering. 
With respect to the four-fold model of mind, could freedom be attained without 
de dicto forms of acquaintance with the prior guiding experience of others? Members 
of the category of Pratyekabuddhas are indeed surmised to achieve enlightenment on 
their own initiative, but they presumably respond to their external context, rather than 
only to themselves, as if they were part of a 'brains-in-a-vat' thought experiment. 16 
Similarly, the Buddha is reported to have achieved liberation without the prior 
insights contained in his subsequent teaching, but he did have the prior conditioning 
of his times, upbringing, teachers and experiences, and on the mythological account, 
of his previous lives. It is awareness and acceptance of this relationship of 
acquaintance to context, rather than specific acquaintance with doctrine, which allows 
a sense of freedom to arise. The most soteriologically effective Buddhist de dicto 
explanations may be those that merely indicate that relations de re are the only 'the 
way things are in the world'. In Shaw's terms, they are 'the good upadeýd, designed 
to convey an effect to the listener, but a soteriological rather than a rhetorical effect. 
Crook argues that 'we have to get away from this strict dualism of mind and 
matter towards something that is more holistic'. The holism he seeks does not 
happen in the form of truck between a self-existent self and self-existent objects, but 
as a complete set of relations between properties on either side of the mind/world 
division. The theory of 'autopoesis', and Varela and Singer's observation of the top- 
down cognitive suppression of initial perception in binocular rivalry (1987: 10,19), 
suggest that qualitative percepts only indirectly represent the external hylic world, yet 
at every stage in perception, property-relations are occurring across the 'autopoetic' 
barrier, in advance of the ascription of the form of objects to bundles of properties. 
As Prasada makes clear, a self-invested person ordinarily thinks of the self as an 
abstract internal object that exhibits intentional attitudes towards external concrete 
objects (Brazier 2003: 100), but what is required for the elimination of suffering is 
unmediated encounter with the externalism of relations, which on the Buddhist 
account gives rise to a spontaneous ethical attitude that is naturally compassionate, 
once it is realised that concern for the self cannot transcend concern for others 
without becoming a form of self-imprisonment. This ethical response, which 
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emphasizes relations per se rather than object-relations, chimes with Lyotard's view 
that 'the Other is prior to the Self (Lyotard 1997: 111). 17 It is the history of relations 
with external otherness that constitutes the self-centred habitual responses of 
attraction, indifference and repulsion. The way things are in the world is therefore 
better expressed in terms of the priority of relations, and the realisation that neither 
the person nor the other can escape a mutual relational dependence, which is most 
soteriologically effective when it approximates to homeostatic balance. 
Minimally, therefore, the concept of freedom in the midst of determinism refers 
to a psychological change of acquaintance with the world from object-relations to 
property-relations, and from addiction to individuality to balanced relations with 
otherness. This change is very like the Yogdcdra notion of 'revulsion of 
consciousness' (pardy. rtti) (Govinda 1969a: 82), and very like an intuitive 
understanding of S'finyata as the absence of the inherent existence of anything, 
including the mind. There is no escape from the world into a metaphorically-internal 
mind, for that form of escape is the route to what Prasada describes as 'self- 
imprisonment'. As a form of 'objective self-consciousness', internal self 
imprisonment is a natural source of anxiety (Duval and Wicklund 1972: 15-28). It is 
on the basis of a thoroughly experiential immersion in the relationality of the external 
world that 'is' and 'ought' are combined in experience, and a sense of freedom is 
expressed in the form of a 'somatic' feeling-tone, as conditioning of consciousness by 
unconscious desire is reduced. 
A history of reliable relationality is the basis for all predictions, including 
predictions that extrapolate beyond observable states of affairs. With the aid of these 
relational resources ontological beliefs become capable of expression and 
metaphysical projections can be made, such as Shaw's 'pseudo-idealist' view that the 
entire mind-world system is a projection of transcendent Mind. It is on the basis of 
conditioned relationality, and the prototypical role of individuals as causal agents, 
that it becomes possible to imagine and predict conscious interference in the causal 
procession of events, ways in which the mind could exert causal effects on the 
universal macrocosm, and ways in which psychological change might lie on a 
continuum with ontological change in the physical embodiment of the individual and 
the world (Johansson 1979: 32-34). 
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As a result of these predictions a tension arises between 'is' and 'ought', or 
between the conservatism of epistemology on one hand, and the liberalism of 
ontological prediction on the other. In Buddhist mind theory the unification of 'is' 
and 'ought' glosses over the combination of conditional and unconditional systems 
that are inconsistent because they depend upon different ontologies. These 
inconsistencies have been exposed by Dharmavidya in his characterisation of eight 
different accounts of enlightenment in Buddhist tradition (Brazier 2001: 80-118). 
Inconsistency can be blurred by exegetical rhetoric, but is apparent in interpretations 
of the early doctrine of elements, which can either be understood in terms of objects, 
or in terms of phenomenal properties. 
Continuity and the six-element teaching 
The doctrine of elements that appears in the suttas (Iýdnamoli 1995: 904-905 
[NIN 112.7]) is a development of the system that was common to Indian and Greek 
thought (Girill 1976: 383 n. 3). Simply stated, it asserts that objects in the world are 
constituted by objective combinations of earth, water, air, and fire. To this list of 
material elements Buddhism adds space and mind, neither of which is apprehended 
by the senses to display material qualities of form. The inclusion of space and mind 
complicates the basic four-element form, for space is an absence of elements, or a co- 
ordination of elements. Although mind is a perceiver and knower of the other 
elements, it is not clarified in the simple expression of the element theory whether 
mind possesses any objective status of its own, or whether it emerges as a result of 
the combination of the other elements, for the psychophysical person becomes 
conscious only in contact with stimulation (phassa) rather than by act of mind alone, 
and 'without bodily functions, the mind would not be stimulated' (Johansson 1979: 
33). 18 
The element doctrine also supports a metaphorical interpretation based on the 
properties of objects: earth, water, fire, air, space and mind denote typical properties, 
and categorise the combinations of properties that are typical of particular kinds of 
phenomena. These properties, such as the extension and resistance of earth, the 
fluidity and cohesion of water, the aggregation entailed by the dis-aggregation and 
radiation of fire, the vastness and openness of space, and the immateriality of mind, 
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are all phenomenal intuitions on the basis of primary experience of the world. The 
use of the ten-n 'element' (dhdtu), then, refers to properties and relations as facts 
known phenomenally by subjective observation and does not necessarily refer to 
substantially existing objective entities, although such entities are not denied 
(Hamilton 1999: 84). Observation of a phenomenon is just the apprehension of 
sensible relational properties, for objects encountered by the senses are distinguished 
by their property characteristics, not by any ontology known by any other means 
(Wood 1991: 5 7-5 85 243 -244 n. 1). 
It is normally assumed that where there is a property, it is the property of an 
object, but that assumption is just a manner of speaking, for physics has yet to find a 
philosophically-atomic object. Phenomena may be conventionally described as 
objects, but are observed to be efficient properties. The doing of properties is known 
in the form of their structural relations (Lady-man 1997: 422), but the being of objects 
is just a unification of properties that 'cohere' at a particular location of space-time. 
The moral here is that however realists choose to construct particulars 
out of properties, they do so on the basis of a belief in the existence of 
those properties. That is the bedrock of realism (Chakravarty 2003: 
876). 
Although he argues that objects are 'useful ontological conventions', Chakravarty 
concludes that 'our knowledge is constrained by the relations of which things are 
capable' (Chakravarty 2003: 877). This insight is applicable to the proto- scientific 
doctrine of elements, in that they phenomenally represent properties, and only 
conventionally represent objects or 'things'. 
In the application of the doctrine of elements, minds are considered to be subject 
to property-conditioning through cooperation with the four gross elements, in 
conformity with the doctrine of dependent arising or conditioned co-production 
(pratTtya-samutpdda). But Buddhist tradition also contains a line of thought which 
considers mind to be inherently unconditioned. Minds may be 'defiled', but not 
causally-conditioned by other properties in the world: 
This consciousness (citta) is luminous, but it is defiled by adventitious 
defilements. The uninstructed average person does not understand this 
as it really is. Therefore I say that for him there is no mental 
development. 
This consciousness is luminous, and it is free from adventitious 
defilements. The instructed anyan disciple understands this as it really 
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is. Therefore I say that for him there is mental development (trans. 
Homer in Conze et al 1954: 33 [AN 1.10]). 
There is a an inconsistency between the notion of mind as an element in the sense 
of an unconditioned object and the notion of mind as a property emerging from the 
causal conditioning of other properties, and continuing to be causally-conditioned by 
other properties. Neuroscientific and Buddhist conditionality-accounts indicate the 
the property-based option, whereas Buddhist unconditionality-accounts suggest that 
mind is a brute fact, an abstract object that is inherently unaffected by its relations 
with the world. 
The merelogical consequences of the difference between a brute property and an 
emergent property have been addressed in Greek thought. To deal briefly with a 
complicated discussion: in 'Empedoclean' systems macrocosmic properties inhere in 
all the relevant microcosmic parts, whereas in 'Democritean' systems, the 
macrocosmic properties do not exist at microcosmic levels of organisation and 
explanation, but emerge at a higher level, as a macrocosmic effect of the combination 
of the properties of the microcosmic parts (Girill 1976: 388-390, Klee 1984: 50). For 
instance, the properties of chemical compounds depend upon, but are different from 
the properties of their constitutive elements. It is unclear whether Buddhist element 
theory is intended to be a teaching about the properties of objective, atomic 
Empedoclean parts, or whether it is meant to refer to the phenomenal apperception of 
properties, which may or may not turn out to be Democritean emergent properties. 
Buddhagosha linked the notion of luminous consciousness (Pdli pabhassara citta) 
underlying adventitious defilements to the concept of residual mind (bhavaýga) that 
is thought to maintain mental continuity between one actively discerning citta and the 
next, and also between lives (Collins 1982: 247, Harvey 1995: 145-146). This line of 
thought is re-formulated in the Mahdydna as the store-consciousness (alaya-viihana) 
and as the mind's latent potential for enlightenment (tathdgata-garbha) (Harvey 1995: 
166). The degree of synonymy between these terms is a matter of opinion, but they 
all refer in some way to the idea of mental continuity, which is naturally problematic 
for the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, which entails that the mind (citta) cannot 
be an dtman or eternal soul in the extended, second sense of the Latin term anitnus. 
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Acquaintance with the phenomenal properties of the four gross elements, and of 
space, requires subjective experience. It is because the mind is vital to the 
apprehension of the other elements, yet is reflexively enigmatic, that there is an 
impetus to elaborate doctrine in order to characterise the nature and continuity of 
mind. This elaborative process on the basis of the element doctrine does not succeed 
in resolving the dilemma of whether or not the mind is a brute fact or an emergent 
property, and the dilemma is perpetuated by the interpretative weight attached to 
particular terms. Exegesis accommodates both conditioned and unconditioned mind 
in one element theory, with the implication that the only type of emergence is of the 
naturally luminosity of an 'Empedoclean' mind after the removal of conditioning 
defilements. Philosophical hermeneutics opens out the implications of Buddhist 
mind-theory, by observing the unexplained difference between a mind (a 
consciousness) that is implicated in the maelstrom of causal conditioning, and a mind 
with a nature that is unconditioned, yet obscured by defilements. Mind either is 
subject to conditioning or it is not; if not, then it is an dtman by another name, for it 
has enduring self-nature. It is a remarkable example of Buddhist polythetism that 
these two different points of view survive within the same tradition, despite their 
apparent philosophical inconsistency. 
The tension between self-nature and conditioned-nature accounts of mind with 
respect to mental continuity is not a modem problem, for it surfaces in debates about 
positive and negative doctrinal formulations and the tathagatagarbha (Ruegg 1989: 
43), which occasionally erupt into strong disputations about soteriological technique, 
as at the Council of Samye (Ruegg 1989: 138-141), in the 'Sudden and Gradual' 
dispute between Shen-Hsui and Shen-Hui (Dumoulin 1963: 80-87), and most recently 
with the excoriation of innate Buddha-nature (hongaku shiso) teaching, by the 
Japanese S6to Zen scholars Matsumoto and Hakamaya (Hubbard and Swanson 1997: 
6-18). Any religious teaching is not only at the service of soteriology, but also at the 
mercy of institutional politics, and these three examples suggest that the ontological 
tension in Buddhist mind-theory has adverse effects on institutional practice when 
there are social motivations for the misuse of doctrinal debate as a surrogate for a 
political quarrel. 
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The interview participants are generally concerned to understand the political 
causes behind the philosophical framework of doctrinal disputes, rather than to 
perpetuate those disputes, but that does not prevent views from being advanced. 
Dharmavidya argues, in conformity with Matsumoto and Hakamaya, that 
tathdgatagarbha and S'finyatd should not be interpreted as representing universal 
essences (Brazier 2001: 146-148). Crook advances an etymologically interpretation 
of tathagatagarbha in terms of s'finyatd, and Wistreich makes it clear that S'i7nyatd 
does not mean nothingness in an absolute sense, but absence of the inherent existence 
of all things from their own side. The full philosophical consequences of these 
remarks remain a matter for debate, but they may support a 'Democritean' 
6emergence' basis for a property of mind, rather than mind as an element or brute fact 
about the world. This is not the Gelugpa view, which argues the pre-existence of an 
effect in its cause (satkdýyavdda) (Ruegg 1989: 138), an argument that is consistent 
with the view that the efficient proximate cause of a mental event is its antecedent 
(Wallace 1999: 162). 19 
Mind according to YogAc5ra 
Unresolved problems of causal similarity and continuity in the early Buddhist 
accounts of mind leave the door open for the elaboration of explanations. 
Abhidhamma accounts take up the challenge by Isolating discrete mental events as 
occurring sequentially in the flux of consciousness, then listing, labelling and 
ordering them into comprehensible processes (Rhys Davids 2002: 135,193-198). 
These processes are activated in accordance with the ethical law of the continuing 
effects of intentional action (kamma): by not guarding against the harmful 
influxes 
(dsava), by ignorance, and by the three poisons of greed, hatred and delusion. 
There 
is less clarity about how mental processes occur and endure, for underlying problems 
of mechanism are dealt with in metaphorical terms, at the same causal 
level as 
psychological explanation. It is argued that 'a phenomenological theory of causation 
does not necessarily require mechanism' (Wallace 1999: 16 1). 
Even if the Buddhist account of mind postulates that effects are contained in their 
causal ground, the problem remains of explaining the nature and continuity of 
extended momentary sequences such as memory, karma and re-emergence of 
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consciousness from meditative cessation (Griffiths 1999). In early Buddhist accounts 
the stream of consciousness (vififidna-sota) is seen as able to store memories, 
including recollection of past lives, and to transmit the effects of kamma between 
lives in succession, but no mechanism is suggested to cross any temporal gap 
between a cause and its effect (Johansson 1978: 61-62). Such details as the integrity 
of persons over one and several lives, selectivity of remembrance, and the qualitative 
attrition of memory over time (Smith 1996: 311-314), cannot be fully understood 
without some explanation at an underlying causal level. Continuity of memory and 
kamma are therefore specific examples of the more general dilemma of how 
similarity and continuity can be coherently explained by a system based on the 
insubstantiality and impen-nanence of momentary events. 
Yogdcdra theorists sought to overcome problems of temporal delay and 
dissimilarity of kind between cause and effect by extending the Sautrdntika metaphor 
of the seed, and providing a mental basis or 'store consciousness' (alaya-vijfidna) in 
which karmic 'seeds' mature and come to fruition. Griffiths sees the store- 
consciousness as an 'ad hoc category, designed to deal with problems that, on the 
prevailing Vaibhdsika and Sautrdntika models, could not be explained' (1999: 93). 
The Yogdcdrins have hypothecated a consciousness that is unintentional, and 
paradoxically 'not conscious of anything', in order to account for an explanatory gap 
in Buddhist causal mind-theory (Griffiths 1999: 105-106); by doing so they have 
succumbed to the predilection to explain mind as an internal space (Rhys Davids 
1999: 198, Brazier 2003: 50-53). To characterise the 'store' as a consciousness 
avoids the unpalatable implication that in the absence of immediately antecedent 
mental causation there can only be a physical basis for the continuity of later mental 
events. This manoeuvre is reinforced by suggestions that Yogdcdra thought asserts 
that everything is 'mind-only': If all events are mental events, the problem of causal 
similarity loses relevance. 
However, there is disagreement about whether the Yogdcdra or Vijfidnavdda 
system of 'mind-only' (citta-mdtra) or 'representation-only' (vijhapti-matra) marks a 
genuine break with earlier Buddhist realism by asserting absolute idealism and 
denying the existence of a hylic world of objective 'things-in-themselves' external to 
consciousness. That was the conclusion of the previous generation of twentieth 
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century commentators (Kochumuttorn 1986: 1, n. 1-4, Wood 1991: 191). 20 Slightly 
more recently, Griffiths broadly supports the idealism interpretation, yet notes 
Schmithausen's observation that the inaccessibility of the world is a meditative 
insight with only a phenomenological basis (Griffiths 1999 (1986): 80-83,177 n. 18); 
Wood suggests that the Viffidnavddins wished to present a mind-only view but failed 
to do so consistently because of the exegetical requirement to conform to the realism 
of earlier doctrines (1991: 192-195). Kochumuttom (1986), Anacker (1984), Harris 
(1991), Wayman (1996), and Lusthaus (2001) all argue against the idealist 
interpretation. On both sides of the argument the issue turns on the precise 
philosophical meaning of 'classical' Yogdcdra statements in the works of 
Vasubandhu, but those who dispute the idealism interpretation are more 
hermeneutically inclined to take context into account, by paying attention to the 
soteric intentions of the author, of the school as a whole, and of its embedding in the 
qualified realism of the early Buddhist and Madhyarnaka traditions (Kochurnuttom 
1986: 11-14, Harris 1991: 90-91,98-99, Wayman 1996: 449-469). 1 am not qualified 
to comment upon the philological and historical evidence advanced by Harris and 
Wayman, but I note that, as with Kochumuttom, their arguments against interpreting 
Yogdcdra thinking as idealist turns on the absence of explicit denials of the existence 
of an external world of 'things-in themselves'. The thrust of their argument, which is 
remarkably similar to Varela, Thompson and Rosch's (1991) 'autopoetic enaction' 
view of the cognitive closure of the human nervous system, is that the physical senses 
do have direct access to an external world, but the associated perceptual 
consciousnesses do not. Conscious events are indeed 'representation-only' in that, by 
virtue of the interference of dispositional modifications (cetasika) they are inaccurate, 
deluded or partially-imaginative representations of the external world, because they 
are warped by mental construction (parakalpita). But consciousness depends upon 
contact (phassa) with an external, hylic world (bhdjana-loka) (Wayman 1996: 451-2, 
454,457 Lusthaus 2001: 25-26). If sarpdra and nirvdtza are epistemic orientations 
to one 'ontic realm' (Harris 1991: 2), then the world is not so much ontologically 
'dappled' (Cartwright 1994) as epistemologically-dappled. Confusion about 
Yogdcdra thought is then confusion about the role of explanation, which can indicate 
but cannot directly teach or convey the full texture of experience (Reddy 1979, 
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Kochumuttom 1982: 5-11, Burnyeat 1999, Wittgenstein 2001: 2 [P. I. 1]). Yogdcdra 
explanation points to experiences that may or may not come close to accuracy of 
representation, along a continuum that is more or less direct. If Reddy is right about 
the indicative status of explanation, and Kochumuttom about the practical purpose of 
Yogdcdra theory, then the concept of 'nature' (svabhdva) is not an ontological 
reference but an experiential aspect. The trisvabhdva doctrine then denotes a theory 
of cognisable aspects of the mind, rather than three alternative ontological natures. 
But the doctrine falls prey to the dilemma it illuminates, for until it becomes an 
experiential realisation of the absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, 
it has a 'mind-to-world' 'direction of fit' as both an imaginary cognitive construction 
and an ontological belief (Hulse Read and Schroeder 2004: 74). 
It is clearly stated by Vasubandhu that unenlightened experience is an imaginary 
aspect (parakalpita) -I should say in terms of both explanations de dicto and 
underlying cognitive conditioning de se. The second, other-dependent aspect 
(paratantra) stands in the theory for the other-dependence of all phenomena 
(prafitya-samutpdda), while the perfected or accomplished aspect (Parinýspanna) is 
just paratantra without any trace of parakalpita (Harris 1991: 125-126). An 
explanatory and ontological dilemma arises, because until it is realised experientially 
that the other-dependence of a mind can be freed from imaginary mental construction 
and thus be meaningfully cognised in an 'accomplished' or 'perfected' mode 
(parýspanna), such a mode can only be an ideal. As an ideal, it is an imaginative 
construction (parakalpita), and a belief, in which case it is an ontological assertion 
about the future existence of a mental state of affairs. The imagined nature 
(parakalpita), on the other hand, is a currently-exi sting, misguided mental state of 
affairs, yet the ontological assertion is made that it does not exist: it is an illusory 
obscuration of the real state of affairs, which is the other-dependence of mental 
experience (paratantra). The assertion that mental construction is illusory is 
extraordinary in the context of a supposedly idealist system, because it amounts to a 
tacit refutation of the inherent interrialism of idealist theory, and a refutation of the 
existence (ontology) of objects denoted by the 'folk' psychological concepts used to 
construct an intentional view of the mind. Since 'mind' is one of those concepts it is 
logical that it should be described as not-mind (acitta). 
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The trisvabhdva doctrine encapsulates some of the insights and dilemmas of the 
Buddhism of the past, and poses some dilemmas for the Buddhism of the future. 
Notwithstanding Augustine's si ... falbr, sum (if I am mistaken, I am) (Augustine 1968: 
532 [CG. 11.26]), it is a dilemma that the mind mistakenly knows itself to be a self, 
but the elimination of that error eliminates the mind in the conventional sense of the 
tenn, for if the mind is truly other-dependent it lacks the barrier-enclosure that 
constitutes it as a separate mind at all: as paratantra it is no-mind (acitta). As a 
tentative resolution to the dilemma, I suggest that the mind is individual because it is 
prototypically located, but structural dependence on the external world at least 
partially obviates the spatial distinction that enables minds to be considered to be 
individual entities. The possibility of the dynamic elimination of the imagined aspect 
from the dependent aspect constitutes another dilemma: the experience of the non- 
dual perfected aspect constitutes 'suchness' or 'thusness' (tathatd), but, empirically, 
does it ever happen 'thus'? 
It [thusness] is a pointer at reality, and eschews making a substantive 
prediction about reality. Where it does make a claim, it maintains, 
originally on the basis of an interpretation of meditative experience, 
that reality can be seen as it truly is in itself Now this is a substantive 
claim, indeed, though primarily about human beings and only 
secondarily about reality as such. It is a claim that human beings are 
such that through an intensive and extensive transformative process 
(Buddhist practice) they can become capable of seeing reality as it is 
in itself. It is a claim, secondarily, that what is being experienced on 
the part of one who has undergone this transformation is reality as it is 
in itself (King 1997: 185). 
The hypothesis, sourced in Varela's neurophenomonology (1999), that the 
subject is not the self, suggests that 'seeing reality' without the duality of the 
self/other or grasper/graspable distinction is a technical possibility. Unfortunately 
that does not entail that the reality seen is 'reality as it is in itself, for the 
representations constituted by mental events are sub ected to 'top-down' modification j 
by cognitive processes of the sort described by Varela and Singer (1987). These 
cognitive processes are real events, having effects that appear to experience. They 
are the work of neural pathways that are as old as the human species, and cannot be 
transformed without transformation of the whole species. Perceptions under the 
influence of self-processes may indeed be imaginary, but they are also real to the 
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extent that they are appearances to consciousness, and it could not be otherwise 
without major reconstruction of connective pathways in the brain. Until such a 
reconstruction happens, the trisvabhava formula stands in need of reinterpretation in 
the context of the realistic limitations discovered by neuroscience as to the extent to 
which direct perception is possible, and the extent to which self-processes can be 
controlled. As a provisional step, it is reasonable to note the epistemological status of 
parinýspanna as an ideal, and presume approaches to that ideal to be a succession of 
acts of accomplishment. As Ratnaprabha implies, this means taking nirvatza as a 
verbal reference to a movement of approximation to an imaginative ideal. 
The other-dependency of paratantra is comparable to Crook's suggestion that the 
mind/world system be viewed as a relational whole, irrespective of the precise 
location of any structural mind/world barrier, and irrespective of obsession with 
ontological questions of realism and idealism. As a 'Middle Way' teaching, the 
Buddhist soteriological path is less concerned with the reality of objects (artha) than 
with psychologically-induced changes to ethical functioning. But as Crook also 
suggests, interpretation may have an effect on perception, and the perception of 
Yogdcdra as a form of idealism lends support to the western misapprehension of 
Buddhism as an entirely 'other-worldly' or escapist religion (Weber 1965: 266-270, 
Dumont 1986: 25-355 51). Being philosophically aware that the world cannot be 
accessed directly or with certainty is very different from believing that the world is 
wholly a creation of the ordinary mind. Any view that denies the external relation 
between mind and world is liable to be characterised as extreme: a tendency towards 
absolutism or eternalism, rather than a 'Middle Way' position (Wood 1991: 191-195). 
It is significant that none of the interview participants adopts the idealist view 
outright. Shaw's 'pseudo-idealism' has similarities, but rather than internalising the 
external world in the mind, he includes it alongside the ordinary, ftmctional mind as 
an erroneous perception of the full manifestation of transcendental Mind. 
The salient issues, for a unified explanation of 'the way things are', remain how 
mental continuity is possible, and whether changes in psychological experience, 
which are microcosmic mind/brain enactions, could exert a macrocosmic causal 
effect on external events without the causal intervention of physical action. The 
Vedic assumption is that this is possible, but without any hypothesis of mechanism 
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the explanation is mysterious. The notion that nirva,! za is the complete cessation of 
karma and the round of rebirth implies that micro-macro causal effects are possible, 
but no explicit mechanism is given and the mystery is unresolved. The explanatory 
gap ethical cause and macrocosmic cessation effect suggests that there ought to be 
another level of explanation, of the kind that is afforded by neuroscience. 
According to the 'explanatory extension' of neuroscience and the bridging 
notions of psychology, the micro-macro relation is utterly experiential: the 
microcosmic effects inhere in the representation of the world to the individual, and 
only advert to the world as an external macrocosm when the individual is moved to 
undertake action. As well as being a statement about cause and effect, this is a 
statement about the location of notional barriers. By dispensing with a mind/world 
barrier the micro-macro distinction is lost in conflation, and the functional distinction 
between phenomenal experience and the hylic world is also lost. The mind/world 
barrier therefore fulfils a useful categorising purpose in functional explanation, but is 
less useful in the categorisation of experience, because it does not account for the 
penneation of perceptual experience by non-linguistic, explanatory forms of prior 
cognition. 
The only way that empirical 'is' features and predictive 'ought' features of the 
world can be unified with consistency is if they are ascribed to different levels of 
explanation, allowing conditional systems that rely on dependent origination to be 
considered empirically, and the sympathetically mysterious systems, which rely on 
unknown causal mechanisms or unconditioned absolutes, to be considered as fictional 
predictions. The provisional unification of apparently inconsistent explanations may 
be soteriologically useful in religious practice and might, or course, turn out to be 
accurately predictive. No prediction is known to be the case, but no possibility is 
impossible. Provisional acceptance of partially true, partially predictive explanation 
is no worse than the combination of partially-isomorphic theoretical models in 
science (French 2003: 1474-1477), by means of conceptually-indistinct propositions, 
approximations and idealisations (Cartwright 1983: 4, Teller 2004: 442). 
Whether or not the idealist or the hylic-realist interpretation of the Yogdcdra 
ýrepresentation-only' argument is correct, the sum total of empirical and fictional 
appearances to consciousness are considered in early Buddhism to constitute the 
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world or the 'All' (sabba) (Woodward 1993: 8 [Samyutta Nikdya 35.23]). This 
system of sensory objects, sense- faculties, and sense-consciousnesses is a sufficient 
phenomenological description of the world. Idealism versus realism is an argument 
about theý location and relevance of the definitional barrier that situates the five sense- 
objects externally, and the sense faculties and consciousnesses internally. Although 
'the All' form a brief categorisation of everything, the system, like Yogdcdra mind- 
theory, is not an exhaustive answer to all the questions that might be asked of it, since 
it is ontologically indeterminate. The notion of 'contact' indicates that this is a realist 
theory, for in the absence of an understanding of underlying physical mechanisms, 
the faculties are considered to actively project to apprehend their objects, including 
the body, and the bodily parts of the faculties themselves. Space, the absence of 
objects, is itself an object for the mental sense-faculty. Thus an apparently realist 
theory is also amenable to an idealist interpretation, or a phenomenological 
interpretation that ignores ontology, for the intemal/extemal boundary plays only an 
incidental role in the presentation of phenomena to consciousness. 
Simple explanation in primary experience 
Although theoretical models appear in experience, or they would not appear at all, 
explanations are distinct from the experiences to which they refer, because they 
present a context-dependent, interest-dependent and predictive perspective on an 
experience, not the experience-in-itself Explanations make the unobservable 
observable, usually by linguistic versions of spatial modelling. Even though 
expressions and models are present in awareness, they only become confirmable by 
the rest of experience once their referents are explicitly observed. 
As I interpret Fuller (2005: 8), the simple Buddhist explanations of dependent 
arising and the Four Noble Truths of dukkha, its arising, cessation and the means to 
its cessation, do not need to be adopted as views because they are knowable in 
primary experience, that is to say, both the explanation and the explananda become 
evident and lead to 'an attitude free from craving and attachment' (2005: 157-8). 
Because s'finyatd and paratantra are Mahdydna re-expressions of dependent arising, it 
follows that these teachings may also be amenable to experiential verification. These 
explanations imply the possibility of an immediate evaluative awareness of the way 
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things really are, and thus can be characterised in Buddhist terms as 'right view' 
(sammd-Qthi). 
More complicated predictive explanations referring to matters that are not 
ordinarily observable in experience, only observable at second hand or only 
observable over long temporal durations, cannot be confirmed by primary experience 
with the same validity as relatively simple immediately-observables. The interview 
participants make this implication when they place greater reliance on sub ective 
experience than on scientific theory or indirect instrumental observations, but the 
argument cuts both ways, for fine-detailed psychological Abhidharma explanations, 
or propositional statements about Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, are not normally 
observable in primary experience. It cannot be certain that these explanations will be 
confirmed by experience, for they may be inaccurately predicted, imagined or 
described, and may involve the inappropriate metaphorical transference of literal 
qualities from the source-metaphors in the ordinary world, to their targets in 
transcendental worlds. 21 Buddhist doctrines such as those pertaining to rebirth, to the 
detailed operation of karma, to the powers and stages of the path, to Buddhas, 
Bodhisattvas and the location of Pure Lands, are not normally confirmable by 
ordinary experience. None of the interview participants had the benefit of 
experiential confirmation of any of these doctrines, although Wistreich, Jones and 
Pyrn are inclined to accept the ad hominem accounts of those who report 
remembrance of previous lives (Storey 2000). 
The way things really are in the world may be qualitatively different from 
metaphorical descriptions in explanation. Shaw appreciates that explanations are 
inherently fictional, because they are not the thing-in-itself to which they refer. He 
does not think that this is to the detriment of reliance on Buddhist explanation, 
because in the final analysis Buddhist reliance is not on explanation, but on 
experiential realisation. If the resolution of the Buddhist path does not resemble 
indicative explanations at all that is of no consequence to Shaw, so long as the 
explanations (upadeýa) accompanying the path usefully exert their soteniological 
effect, otherwise they are proliferating structures of discriminating delusion 
(prapafica). 22 
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Conclusions 
It is characteristic of the Buddhist practice of the 'Middle Way' between 
asceticism and hedonism (1ýdnamoli 1993 [SN 56.11]) that de re experiences of 
acquaintance with the world are most 'suitable' when they are conducive to 
physiological and psychological homeostasis. The origin of the category of the 
sacred, and of enlightenment, arises from the imperative sentient beings have to 
create conditions that are conducive to approximation to a homeostatic ideal, which is 
reported to consciousness in the form of an affective sense of freedom from physical 
and psychological suffering and often described metaphorically as a sense of 
spaciousness. 
Choices conducive to homeostasis and to enlightenment are intentional and, if 
Hulse, Read and Schroeder (2004) correctly argue for the 'impossibility of conscious 
desire', they are unconscious determinations, rather than conscious decisions. It 
remains fortuitous, or a mystery, why any individual makes an initial choice to follow 
the 'top-down' guidance of Buddhist explanations. The ritual practices they 
undertake are efficient precisely because they are practised, for they are 'bottom-up' 
behavioural techniques conducive to the unconscious abandonment of intentional, 
self-grasping behaviours. 
Such techniques attenuate the notion that the self has objective characteristics, a 
notion that is reinforced by attachment to other objects. Ritual practice opens the way 
to a holistic appreciation of the dependent relationship between mind and world, not 
in terms of relations between substantial or essential objects, but of relations between 
properties. Freedom of choice between objects is notional, for the ascription of 
objectivity to collocations of properties is an imaginative cognitive qualification of 
perception. Object-identification is vitally useful to the mind's speed of prediction, 
which is identified by Llinas (2001) as the main function fulfilled by developed 
neuronal systems. Although choice between notional objects is functionally 
necessary and apparently verified by experience, that verification is by virtue of the 
perceptual apprehension of properties, not of the objects I in themselves', for the 
structural coupling' between brain and world only crosses the 'autopoetic' barrier in 
the form of sensorimotor relationships between properties on either side. Mind can 
be said to emerge from this holistic property relationship in Democritean fashion, as 
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an effect that is only partially similar to its heterogeneous physical and abstract 
causes (is not contained in its ground). 23 The mental ability of consciousness is like 
its cause under some explanations, for it can be described as the exhibition of 
relationships between properties. According to this property-relations perspective, 
which bears comparison with 'externalism' in the western philosophy of mind 
(Putnam 1975, Burge 1979), both mind/brain identity and mind/brain supervenience 
are inadequate as ontological explanations of mind, because they fail to take account 
of the fundamental importance of the de re relation of acquaintance with the external 
world. De re acquaintance is the epistemological signification of the fundamental 
ontology of 'the All' as emptiness (S'U-nyatd) other-dependent aspect (paratantra) or 
dependent origination (prafftya-samutpdda) rather than an essential or substantial 
nature (dhdtu). It is possible to assimilate this relationally-holist or property-relation 
description of the mind to the perplexing notion of being 'without mind' (acitta) 
(Wood 1991: 55-60 [TriMS'ik5 29]). Since the ordinary activity of mind is a dualist 
grasping onto the objective self-other dichotomy, avoidance of grasping is abiding in 
mind-only (vijfiaptimatratva), and is abiding without mind in the conventional sense 
of the word. In Heideggerian terms it is being-in-the-world. 
We have seen that complex conceptual explanations, Buddhist and western, are 
predictions that only approximate imaginatively to the truth. There is therefore, logic 
in Pym's maxim, which he sources in the Kdljma Sutta (Woodward 1989: 179 [AN 
111.7.65]), to 'believe only those things that are helpful to you' (Pym), for the 
criterion of a good explanation or a 'good upadeýa' is as much utility as 
verisimilitude. This pragmatic point of view warrants the utility of freedom of choice 
explanations in the face of causal determinism, and warrants the utility of progressive 
explanations of enlightenment, with the caveat that progression is recurrent 
convergence on an imperturbable ideal of homeostasis. My equation of the notions of 
homeostasis and enlightenment is suggested by the neuroscientific view that 
behavioural modification is a continual rebalancing of affective and cognitive 
systems. It turns out that the long-running western philosophical obsession with the 
cognitive faculty of reason as the ideal functional form of mind (Damasio 1994), is a 
view that is not shared by either Buddhism or neuroscience. A balanced account of 
mind, which allows room alongside logic for affect and imagination in the generation 
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of attitudes and the generation of prediction, can also allow that fiction has a 
significant part to play in experiential and explanatory roads to truth. 
An explanation, which transcends mind/brain identity or supervenience to include 
the external world within a relationally holistic definition, strains the conventional 
usage of 'mind', to the extent that a truly relational mind could be characterised as 
without mind (acitta) in the conventional usage of the term. From this perspective, 
both identity and supervenience explanations are imaginative fictions, veridical to a 
degree. They are only partial understandings, to be believed or disbelieved as a 
matter of utility and metaphysical preference. 
Crook argues that with the relinquishment of explanations 'the universe is given 
to you'. Similarly, Pym's Pure Land practice is guided by a k5an: 
Just as you are, 
really, 
just as you are. 
The implication, which may or may not be wishful thinking, is that relationally- 
constituted minds, like Buddha-nature (tathagata-garbha, Buddha-dhatu) have no 
temporal journey to make in search of an ideal, for the truth of relational dependency 
manifests in immediate subjective consciousness when left to itself without grasping 
at the self-object distinction. It is a dilemma of mind that a good deal of guidance 
from explanation, experience and practice has to be undertaken, before minds can 
transcend the constraints of autopoesis and of self-investment, and transcend concern 
for self-other distinctions in an approximate equation to homeostatic relations. It is a 
dilemma for the understanding of Buddhist teaching in the context of neuroscience, 
that the imperative to organismic homeostasis gave rise to the self-other distinction in 
the first place. 
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Notes to Chapter 8 
1 In Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), structural coupling to an external 
environment appears to be less important than internal neural enactment of a world, 
by virtue of the emphasis in that text on the internal 'closed system' of neural 
networks. But the equal significance of structural coupling is unambiguously 
acknowledged in Varela (1999), when he confirms that his attitude to cognition is 
based on: 
I On the one hand, the ongoing coupling of the cognitive agent, a 
permanent coupling that is fundamentally mediated by sensorimotor 
activities. 
2 On the other hand, autonomous activities based on endogenous 
configurations of neuronal activity (Varela 1999: 116). 
The importance of structural coupling is again apparent in Varela and Thompson 
(2003), where it is suggested that 'processes crucial for consciousness may cut across 
the brain-body-world divisions, rather than being skull-bound neural events' (2003: 
282). It can be argued that the notion of closed neural networks exemplifies the 
'internalist conception of experience' that is criticised by Me and Thompson (2004: 
22), but supported by Grush (2003: 53). Thompson (2007) will re-assert the 
significance of structural coupling for an externalist view of mind (personal 
communication). 
2 According to Pyrn and Jones, the requirement for explicit practice diminishes with 
age and experience, as mindfulness becomes implicit in daily life. 
3 Prasada's list of the omnipresent conditioning factors does not include concentration 
or one-pointedness (samddhi or ekaggatd) and vitality (fi-Vita) (Govinda 1969: 115). 
Prasada (and also Sangharakshita 1998: 72-99) presumably discuss the later five-fold 
list, which appears in the Pahcaskandhaka-prakarana of Vasubandhu (Anacker 
1984). 
4 Prasada explains that by 'direct perception' she means notionally-ideal contact with 
a dharma or 'thing-in-itself, which is not achievable by an ordinary human being, 
who can only perceive a representative form or rupa (personal communication). For 
a similar view see King (1995: 4). Much the same view is retrieved by Hamilton 
from the suttas, when she interprets the inaccessibility of the external world as a form 
of Kantian transcendental idealism (Hamilton 1999: 85,2000: 188-198). 
5 On this homeostatic account, religious phenomena are not necessarily 
counterintuitive, as is suggested by Pyysidinen (2001: 18-23), for it is not unusual for 
cognitive operations to relate to an ideal standard (Duval, Silvia and Lalwani 2001: 
31-40) 
6 Against the equation between homeostasis and Buddhist enlightem-nent, it can be 
argued that the Buddhist path is a progressive development. This difference may be 
nothing more than a difference in spatial modelling. Although the path to 
enlightenment is modelled as a linear trajectory, is not a spatial movement, since it 
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occurs within the time-being of the individual person. Approximation to homeostasis, 
on the other hand, tends to be modelled as metaphorically recurrent or circular, yet 
the requisite balance of physiological and psycho-social forces develops 
progressively over the course of one (or more) lifetimes. Between the linear and the 
circular metaphors, the FWBO notion of 'higher evolution' uses the spatial metaphor 
of a spiral to associate the recurrent homeostatic model of the 'wheel of life' with a 
progressive model of the trajectory towards enlightenment as a destination (Govinda 
1969: 71, Kennedy 1985: 19-21, Sangharakshita 1998: 87, Cooper 2003: 165). That 
such spatial modelling is problematic may be indicated by Bhikkhu Vajiro's cryptic 
remark about the location of liberation, Ratnaprabha's concern that concept of 
nirvd? w might be better kept as a verb rather than a destination, and Jones's trenchant 
critique of the notion of enlightenment as a hypothetically future event. 
7 My woeful misunderstanding of Staal's theory of the meaninglessness of ritual 
(Kennedy 2004: 149) is corrected by Payne's explication that while ritual is 
meaningless as such it provides a context for meaning to be discovered and expressed 
(Payne 2004: 197-199). 
8 From a systems theory perspective, Grush argues against the view that 'the mind is 
not in the brain, or that cognition does not require representation, or both' (2003: 53). 
In effect, he supports the kind of internalism that I detect in VT&R (1991), and 
criticises the relationally holist, extemalist view of the mind that I advocate. 
9 My point is that, on its wide or abstract interpretation, prafftya-samutpada is a 
causal law, which decrees ineluctably that the cause or condition of the existence of 
'this' invariably giving subsequent rise to the existence of 'that' [SN. 2.28]. The 
narrower twelve niddna version, which describes the consequences resulting from 
intentional choices, is a conceptual elaboration of the basic causal law (Brazier 2003: 
179). For further discussion of issues of freedom and determinism in Buddhist 
context see Flanagan (2006: 18-27) and Gier and Kjellberg (2004: 277-304). 
10 Duval and Wicklund are not concerned with the religious implications of their 
theory, and note that attempts to enter into 'subjective self-awareness' can be a sign 
of discomfort or 'falling short of desired standards' (1972: 187-193). 
II The notion that different levels of explanation can co-exist when they answer the 
same questions in different contexts is a justification for the Indian 'Two Truths' 
theory (Basham 1981: 230). 
12 Dennett is of the view that intentionality 'is a feature of concepts used to explain 
the operation of computational or biological systems in contexts. Intentional 
4strategies' fill the gap when explanations based on designed capabilities, or natural 
explanations based on knowledge of physical laws, prove to be inadequate' (1971: 
87-91). 
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13 D6gen's strategy for 'not doing evil', in the Sh5b5genz5, is a striking traditional 
account of the paradoxically choiceless reduction of discriminating intentionality 
(Cleary 1992: 85-94,128-145) 
14 As with Chapter I note 9,1 have previously argued that a turn to Buddhist practice 
by non-ethnic Buddhists is more of a discovery than a free choice (Kennedy 2004: 
145). 
15 This is also a denial that Freudian psychological categories are anything other than 
metaphorical explanations. 
16 Pratyekabuddhas are held to have achieved enlightenment by their own efforts, 
without assistance of the Buddhist Dharma or Sah"gha. This conceptual category is 
obscure, in the sense that it is not clear whether it has ever had any membership. 
17 Lyotard considers that the western Enlightenment view of progress is an inherently 
unstable, systematic introduction of a developmental third term into a dialectic 
(Lyotard 1991: 2,6). This negative assessment is in marked contrast to 
Dharmavidya's wish to combine the insights and the benefits of both eastern and 
western enlightenments (Brazier 2001: 78-79) 
18 The Gelug-pa position is that the proximate or 'substantial' cause of a mental event 
is its antecedent mental event. Physical influences are only 'cooperative' causes 
(Wallace 1999: 162). There is a striking similarity between this account and Varela 
Thompson and Rosch's dynamical- systems-enaction/structural coupling account, 
except that the Gelug-pa ontology is mental, whereas the dynamical systems ontology 
is physical. See Chapter I page 20 of this thesis. 
19 This 'Empedoclean', or 'like cause produces like effect' interpretation is similar to 
the argument that an effect 'is contained within its ground', which has been used by 
Rosch to argue that there is a logical circularity in cognitive scientific explanations of 
consciousness (1994: 50-55,63). 
20 Kochumuttom (1982: 1 nl-4) cites Stcherbatsky (1936), Hamilton (1938) Murti 
(1955), Sharma (1964) and Conze (1967) as earlier scholars who all held that 
Yogdcdra thought was a fon-n of philosophical idealism. 
" Metaphors are not bi-directional: they do not transfer qualities comparatively from 
the target of the metaphor to the source (Arendt 1978: 105), therefore no information 
is conveyed from the 'out of order' transcendental world to the world of appearances. 
22 An explanation has more chance of being an upadeýa if it is orally-transmitted. It 
may be that writing opens the door to prapahca by 'representation of the word 
detached from the voice of the lineage' (Lopez 1995: 40). 
23 The notion of relational holism is first used by Teller in a discussion of quantum 
mechanics (1986). 
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Chapter 9 
The relational model of mind in practice 
Introduction 
In Chapter 8 the conclusion was reached that the term 'mind' most accurately 
reflects 'the way things are in the world' when it is used to denote the whole of 
relations between brain and world as they appear to consciousness. That definition is 
comparable to the Buddhist concept of the 'All' and bears some comparison to 
externalism in the western philosophy of mind. In this chapter it is contended that 
relational holism is a useful and acceptable addition to contemporary Buddhist 
attitudes to the mind, since it provides a counterweight to the excessive individualism 
of modernity, and may provide some philosophical justification for the construction 
of a Buddhist environmental ethic. Attentiveness to relational holism may also 
enable Buddhist organisations enter dialogically into doctrinal argument without fear 
of conflict or schismatic consequences, ' by maintaining connection between those 
who are not persuaded of the value of critical methodology as opposed to those who 
are, and furthermore are unsure about the metaphysical status of other-worldly 
strands of Buddhalogical discourse. 
The arguments advanced in this thesis can be assimilated to prafitya-samutpdda, 
and follow logically from the doctrine of s'i7nyatd, but their interpretation in 
neuroscientific terms is my contribution, not that of the interview participants, 
although similar views are suggested by Crook, and are implicit in some remarks by 
Jones. In a polythetic, ostensibly harmonious religion there is room for more than 
one view of the nature of mind, and relational holism as a general theory allows room 
for a multiplicity of views by emphasising property-relations rather than object- 
relations, irrespective of the metaphysics of the properties that are brought into 
relation. If Buddhism is not an essentialist religion, debate should not be about 
relations as such but about the epistemological (truth-fictional) status of particular 
relational properties. 
Relational holism as a Buddhist view 
Although it is may remain a minority view, relational holism of mind should be 
an acceptable view in a religion that is characteristically polythetic, for five reasons. 
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Firstly, the touchstone for Buddhist teachings is the warrant of experience, rather than 
affirmation of belief that any particular proposition is true. Secondly, the concept of 
skilful means (upaya-kaus'ala) facilitates the assimilation of conflicting views without 
compromising Buddhism's soteriological, psychological and ethical orientation. 
Thirdly, there is no central Buddhist authority responsible for the arbitration of ideas, 
which must depend instead upon the conjoint influences of tradition, context and the 
hermeneutic horizon of personal discovery (Jauss 1989: 199-201). Fourthly, 
Buddhist holism dissolves the western dilemma of association and disassociation 
between an abstract internal self and a concrete external world (Abercrombie 1938: 
87, Zizvek 2001: 555 58-59), by allowing relations between all processes and 
properties to be taken account of in the definition of mind, but with the caveat that 
descriptions of internal mental objects are metaphorical, and objects of belief rather 
than of knowledge. It is only as parts of explanation that they become parts of 
experience, the archetypical Buddhist example being that, although self-descriptions 
characterise self-processes, no phenomenal self can be found. That remark has 
approximately the same meaning with the substitution of the terrn 'self by the term 
'mind'. Fifthly, it is an advantage that relational holism provides no evidence for the 
truth-value of hypothetical relations, the prime example being that of the 
unobservable supervenience of mental events on physical events. As a result, 
relational holism can function as a general theory that accounts for reasonable 
hypotheses with charitable equanimity. 
The touchstone of 'right view' 
The opinion of several of interview participants, most clearly expressed by 
Bhikkhu Vajiro, is that the particularity of a person's beliefs is less important than 
that their beliefs should not contradict the Four Noble Truths. Whatever their 
ontological and metaphysical commitments with respect to this world or another, it 
would be difficult to deny the label of Buddhist identity to a person who could 
transcribe their beliefs into the Noble Truths of life marked by suffering that has 
causes, which become inoperative when the Eight-fold Path is practiced with 
consistency. This nesting of particular beliefs within the terms of a concise 
explanation is not just a matter of conformity to the earliest teachings, but of the 
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unification of types or levels of explanation. Explanations that have limited scope by 
virtue of their complexity and specificity should be amenable to translation without 
reduction into simpler, less specific explanations that have wide applicability 
(Strevens 2004: 155). Without that nesting of the specific in the general the 
unification of explanations into a coherent and consistent world-view would be 
impossible. 
The evaluation of any explanation is quasi-juridical, requiring unbiased attention 
to the assessment of relevant information. Conscious awareness is in receipt of both 
'top-down' infori-nation (explanations of all sorts, whether formulated by cognitive 
self-processes, ad hominem by others, or phylogenetically, by the habitual cognitive 
modification of perception), and 'bottom-up' information (a combination of sensori- 
motor information and emotional response). If information from either source is to 
be equably assessed, presupposition has to be set aside. The most significant point 
made by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (199 1) is that information to consciousness is 
always pre-combined and pre-supposed, because of the heavy load of prior cognition 
involved in the constitution of every percept. 2 This hypothesis, which has 
neuroscientific support (Varela and Singer 1987), reinforces the requirement for 
equable evaluation of 'top-down' religious or scientific explanations that have been 
subject to extensive cognitive modulation by other minds. 
In Buddhism, equable evaluation is characterised as 'right view'. According to 
Fuller (2005), this term does not mean the upholding of an opinion against other 
opinions, nor does it mean the studied avoidance of opinions: it refers to an attitude 
that evaluates opinions without attachment. This 'detached order of seeing' is an 
attitude that is not wilfully intentional (Fuller 2005: 1,157). Rather than a sudden 
leap from one condition to another, the establishment of an attitude of right view may 
be a gradual change of mind, depending upon the diminishment of intentional 
influences (cetasika), particularly the unwholesome dispositions of geed, hatred and 
delusion. Such dispositions, which according to Hulse, Read and Schroeder (2004) 
are not conscious states, find expression in the form of urges to act and emotional 
feelings that overwhelm conscious sensorimotor states of relationship to the world. 
As the diminishment of unwholesome intentional attitudes, right view helps the 
world-relationship to become manifest. The full manifestation of the mind/world 
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relation can be described as an 'altered state of consciousness' in an affective sense, 
felt as freedom from self-induced suffering. This experiential resolution to the 
dilemma of freedom in determinism may not be philosophically satisfactory unless it 
is allowed that the dilemma arises from a presupposition about the existence of a 
metaphorically objective self-in-mind, which is able to act with soul-like freedom 
from causally-dependency. 
Buddhism maintains that action-decisions are adversely affected by desire, and 
desire is grasping after something in ignorance of 'the way things really are' (Yatha- 
Matam), which is obscured by geed, hatred, and delusion. Fuller notes that wrong 
views are particularly motivated by greed (2005: 8); thus the problem of wrong view 
is not of unwarranted belief, but of craving or wanting to believe. Right view does 
not prescribe the acceptance or rejection of belief in any particular doctrine, but does 
indicate that desire for a particular belief to be true is a hindrance, and that desires 
must be relinquished if experience is to become sufficiently detached to warrant 
whether or not a belief accords with the world. 
A belief may be epistemologically wrong, in that it can be empirically 
contradicted, or ethically and soteriologically wrong because it is produced by 
attachment or craving. Both sorts of wrong opinions are misrepresentative of the way 
things are, the former because the world is misunderstood, that latter because the 
relationship between person and world is misunderstood. Fuller notes MacIntyre's 
point that the is/ought (fact/value) distinction is a relatively modem disjunction in the 
West (MacIntyre 1971: 258), and that the distinction was not recognised in ancient 
India Fuller (Fuller 2005: 9). In this context he claims that the achievement of right 
view supports a combination of both factual and evaluative understanding: of the 'is' 
and 'ought' of the way things are, rather than just the evaluative 'ought' (Fuller 2005: 
10). 
There may, however, be some natural degree of 'is/ought' distinction in 
experience, if the 'is-ness' of things is taken to be their immediate apprehension in 
bare attention, whereas their 'ought-ness' is a cognitive prediction by subsequent 
moments of experience. Against that point, the distinction may not be clear-cut if, as 
indicated by the neuroscience of visual perception (Varela and Singer 1987), a 
significant proportion of current perceptual experience is already a cognitive 
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prediction on the basis of past perception. The combination of 'is' and 'ought' in 
perception means that individuals cognitively constitute their view of the world in 
two ways: firstly, partially as it is and partially as it ought to be in the hope that needs 
and desires are to be fulfilled; secondly, partially as it is and partially as it ought not 
to be, in the fear that desires are not to be fulfilled. The first alternative constitutes a 
tendency to escape into eternalism; the latter, as a self-fulfilling prophecy, to escape 
into annihilationism. These two intentional predictabilities are both evaluative 
modalities of world-enaction, whereupon the gap between the expectation of 'ought' 
and the reality of 'is' become causes for suffering, for the external hyletic world does 
not conform to anthropomorphic predictions of how it ought to be. That actions have 
determinate consequences despite human desires is a plain fact, but also an ethical 
assertion about the way that the world ought to be perceived, with a minimum of 
predictive and predicative intentionality, and a maximum of attention, if there is to be 
ham-ionisation between empirical 'is' and evaluative 'ought', and if suffering is to be 
avoided. 
Because Fuller asserts that right view supports not only equable ethical 
evaluations but also understanding of facts about the world (2005: 13), it follows that 
the early Buddhist attitude of 'right view' is universalizable to the contemporary 
context. Appreciation of the simple prescription of the Four Noble Truths, and of 
wholesome, unwholesome or karmically neutral mental events, is primarily a matter 
of predicting, on the basis of attention to context, the way in which consequences 
observed by the individual in the past are likely to be similarly observed in the future. 
Here 'ought' is as much a temporal difference between fact and predicted 
consequence as it is an ethical imperative. Thus, appreciation of the Third and Fourth 
Noble Truths depends on the prediction of future patterns of events in the light of 
observations of the consequences of modifications to previous behaviour. The 
empirical validation of immediate facts by observation, such as the presence in 
awareness of a boat , is relatively uncontroversial. 
Evaluation of events is more 
difficult, for some duration is required to discover why boats ought not to leak or why 
a citta ought to have been wholesome. When observations are being made for the 
first time, verification needs duration. For example: memory, recall and cognitive re- 
combination of events is necessary in order to observe the relatedness of dependent 
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origination, the effects of wholesome and unwholesome Dharma, and the working 
out of the Fourth Noble Truth of the Eight-fold Path. It is only on the basis of the 
foundational 'hinge' of the habitual commonality of observations, on which life turns 
(Wittgenstein 1979: 44 [OC. 341]), that an attitude of right view enables rapid 
experiential confirmation of concise doctrinal formulations, without need for recourse 
to memorisation and recall over the temporal duration that would allow primary 
experience to be contaminated by more cognitive influences than need be the case. 3 
Once time has been taken and attentional observations have been made, the 
verification of subsequent evaluations is a relatively immediate experience. PratTtya- 
samutpdda or s'z7nyatd might, therefore, be apparent almost immediately, 4 but the 
Four Noble Truths as a whole are unlikely to be intuitively certified without an 
extended period of practice. 
As an attitude with respect to most Buddhist doctrines, right view is likely to be a 
gradual transformation of habitual experience, at continual risk of intentional and 
unintentional cognitive regression, slowly creating the circumstances for insight on 
the basis of bare attention to 'the way things really are'. The attitude of right view 
does not appear in an intellectual vacuum; it has to be established against a 
background of traditional doctrines that are liable to become attachments, in the sense 
of 'a kind of involvement with: fascination, obsession' (Prasada). The longer the 
duration that is required to validate a teaching experientially, the greater the 
preceding de dicto propositional assimilation of that teaching, with the corresponding 
risk that the attitude towards the teaching becomes an obsession rather than a right 
view. 
I interpret Fuller's exposition of right view and Prasada's account of Buddhist 
psychology to indicate that conscious attention to the relationality of experience 
naturally gives rise to compassion for self and for others, and consequently the 
'tipping point' where grasping occurs and the self becomes reified is overcome by 
right view alone, without any intentional act of choice whatsoever. Ordinarily the 
self seeks freedom by self-fixation, as a means of escape from suffering in a world 
where objectivity is obvious but relationality is obscure. Without the intentional 
fixation that constitutes the person-as-self, the person as the subject of experience is 
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naturally free, participating as the initial 'horizon' in a relational sequence that is not 
pre-deten-nined, yet could not be otherwise. 
On this account, conscious experience need not be deliberately constrained to 
eradicate intentional states, but needs to be allowed to manifest free of intentional 
influence. This distinction between the deliberate modification and the unintentional 
manifestation of experience does not resolve the philosophical dilemma of the 
possibility of freedom in the midst of determinism, but it does describe a 
soteriological method by which the religious practitioner can cross the divide from 
self-centred choice-making to spontaneously ethical behaviour, on the basis of a 
naturally arising insight and a naturally arising compassionate attitude. 
For the practitioner, the philosophical argument about freedom and determinism 
may be less relevant than Bhikkhu Va iro's cryptic question about liberation: 
effectively he asks an empirical question as to whether, when and where an affective 
sense of freedom-in-determinism might occur. Apart from any motivation to protect 
and preserve the Dharma, this practical attitude guides the interview participants' 
emphasis on experiential issues as an alternative to philosophical debates about 
doctrine. As escape from self-imprisonment, freedom is a qualitative property, a 
feeling arising from a dependent configuration of the mind-world relation as a whole, 
not a particular property pertaining to the mind as particular object. It makes sense in 
these circumstances to use the term 'mind' to refer to the totality of the relations 
between the structural coupling of the embodied brain and the hylic world, but to do 
so is a considerable extension of the socially-agreed meaning of 'mind', which 
normally refers to the so-called 'internal' processes that give rise to conscious 
awareness. The dilemma here is one of definition, of habitual boundaries between the 
meanings of words, rather than of boundaries between objects; it is resolvable by 
extension of the meaning of 'mind' to denote a consistent set of relations between 
properties, and the history of that set of property-relations, rather than considering 
mind to be a metaphysically-essential object, envisaged as enduring without regard 
for the history of its constitutive relations. 
If bare attention to the world under the sway of right view is sufficient to enable 
the change from addictive suffering to affective freedom in a world as it is and ought 
to be, then doctrine, like any other explanation, is no more than an approximate 
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indicator of the path of practice. This seems to be what is suggested by Shaw's talk 
of 'the good upadeýa% which may be 'non-literal' or fictional, but which fallibly 
indicates a truth about experience. This is also suggested by Bhikkhu Gavesako's 
remark that interpretation is 'how we live, what we do practically with our bodies', 
and by Pym's injunction to accept and be accepted 'just as you are'. The Kalama 
Sutta (Woodward 1932: 170 [AN 1117.65]) expresses this intuitional understanding 
that certainty is to be found in practice, not in explanations, and in consequence has 
become a key text for many free-thinking contemporary Buddhists, like Pym, 
although it is also interpreted in defence of the Dhamma by traditionalists. 5 This 
conflict of interpretation is another version of the paradoxical rejection of all views 
yet the assertion of right view, which Burford locates in the, 4tthaka-Vagga (Burford 
1991), but which Fuller resolves with the understanding that right view is not a view 
at all in the sense of an opinion, but is an attitude of 'transcendence' or non- 
attachment to views (2005: 8) .6 In the terms of the 
four-fold mind-model, right view 
is not the prioritising of explanation de dicto or of extended experience occluded by 
self-centred intentions de se, but of the suitability of subjective attention to 
experiential acquaintance de animolde re. Right view eventually allows explanation, 
self-processes, subject and world to become manifest without prior attachment and 
prior thought-coverings, 'just as you are'. This is not the unobtainable goal of direct 
experience but it is primary experience as the most immediate and unmediated 
combination possible between the 'fallible veracity' of 'is' and the 'veridical fiction' 
of 'ought'. 
The arbitration of skilful means 
It is part of the genius of polythetic Buddhism that room can be found for views 
that do not conflict with the Four Noble Truths, or function as 'skilful means' (upaya 
kauS'alya) (Pye 1978). 7 According to Pyrn: 
There's the old saying that religion ought to be a circle that includes 
everybody and not a circle that keeps everybody, or anybody, out 
(Pym)- 
Although Buddhism has spawned plenty of philosophical disputes, its polythetic 
inclusivity stems from an ability to assimilate new cultural practices. Itself a 
heterodox stance with respect to Brahminism, Buddhism has managed to incorporate 
306 
the antinomian otherness of the S'aivite Tantric tradition (Gray 2005: 52-53), and folk 
beliefs and practices along the Silk Road (Yamada 2002: 115), in China and Japan 
(Matsunaga 1969: 16), and in south-east Asia (Harris 2000a: 128-13 1), as 
philosophical beliefs tend to be assimilated together with, and in the same manner as 
cultural practices by an exegetical system of re-categorisation. 8 The economic and 
political status of virtuoso religious activity may, of course, be as important a 
motivation to assimilation as the philosophical imperative to logical and hierarchical 
consistency. 
Contrary to the expectation that 'skilful means' can be used to aid the 
assimilation of western discourses in contemporary globalised contexts, Green (1989) 
argues that under contemporary circumstances the 'essence' of Buddhism has been 
lost by groups that 'unquestioningly accept the cognitive assumptions of modem 
western society' (1989: 286). Her examples are S6ka Gakkai's contention that ritual 
practice leads to direct material benefit, and the Scientific Buddhist Association's 
rejection of the doctrine of rebirth. 9 Green agrees with Willson's view that: 
... rebirth is a virtually inseparable part of Buddhist teaching. It is 
quite impossible to compress the richness of the Buddhist world- 
view ... into the impoverished mental framework of those who deny it. ' (Willson 1984). 
Green considers that even if the result of the Buddhist path is the transcendence 
of views, the path itself requires 'committing oneself to distinctively Buddhist beliefs 
and attitudes', and concludes that Buddhism should not seek to adapt to 'the 
materialistic and logical-empirical bias of the modem world' (Green 1989: 289). 
Green follows Willson in making some sweeping assumptions. They consider it 
reasonable to dictate what is or is not 'essential' to Buddhism as a notionally-unified 
religion; they apply western, Christian standards of belief and commitment to an 
eastern religion, by assuming that a doctrine must be explicitly believed before it can 
be utilised imaginatively and mythologically; they assert that those who deny rebirth 
possess an 'impoverished mental framework'; and they reduce the philosophical 
differential between East and West to a set of 'cognitive assumptions' (Willson in 
Green 1989: 289). 
According to Ruel (2002), belief is a central concept for Christianity. It is a 
promissory bond of trust, confidence and obedience in God; it is both 'belief in' God 
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and 'belief that' certain propositions about God are true. Historically, this juridical 
and epistemological commitment takes the form of publicly expressed assent to 
authoritative creeds that symbolically confer Christian identity (Ruel 2002: 100-103). 
Belief is not such a central or authoritative concept in Buddhism, yet there is still 
'belief in' the traditional Dharma in the sense of faith or confidence (ýraddhd) in a 
general world-view (Hoffinan 1985: 381-383), and 'belief that' certain propositions 
expressing the Dharma are true. For instance, despite absence of direct evidence, 
most of the interview participants believe in the doctrine of rebirth on the basis of the 
ad hominem warrant of accounts of past-life memories and out-of-body experiences 
(Story 2000), or on the counterfactual. inference that, without rebirth, justice is 
unreliable and life has no meaning. 10 In contemporary globalized circumstances it is 
acceptable to express 'belief in' Buddhism as a world-viewl and to 'Go for Refuge', 
without the necessity for a public expression of 'belief that' specific doctrines are true 
in advance of their verification in personal experience. Rather than 'belief that' 
particular propositions are true, it is 'belief in' the Buddha's example, and the 
efficacy of ritual practices and ethical precepts derived from the Four Noble Truths, 
which bestows Buddhist identity. Buddhist identity only becomes prescribed by 
putative authorities in terms of 'belief that' particular propositions are true when 
socio-political or exegetical considerations are in play that have little to do with 
soteriology or epistemology. 
Pointing to the difference between 'belief in' and 'belief that' does not amount to 
an argument for agnosticism (Batchelor 1997: 19), but merely a recognition that 
'beliefs that' are embedded in a social context as part of a world-view, yet have 
provisional epistemological status. Green considers that instead of skilful means, it is 
'cognitive surrender' or 'selling out', to call a traditional belief into question on 
'logical-empirical grounds' (Green 1989: 278,280,289). On the contrary, it is a 
forrn of cognitive surrender not to do so, and not to appreciate that parts of a world- 
view may be predictive and imaginatively fictional. As an alternative to acquiescence 
to the truth-value of an entire world-view, the participant in a 'living' religious 
tradition can reasonably follow the more cognitively meaningful option of 
transitionally accepting beliefs about the mind that are conceptually justified, but 
neither verified or falsified, in the hope and expectation of an eventual resolution to 
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the dilemma they pose when compared to beliefs about the mind in other world-views. 
Equanimity about the eventual resolution to differences of view is a mark that an 
opinion is held without attachment under an attitude of right view, in a manner that is 
conducive to the continuation of dialogue. The Dalai Lama exemplifies this attitude 
of right view by his active encouragement of the Buddhism-neuroscience debate 
about the nature of mind, despite the clear inconsistency between the standard 
scientific view of mind/brain identity and his own opinion that there are some subtle 
levels of consciousness or 'innate mind', which do not correlate with brain activity 
(Gyatso 2003: 43). His commitment to continuing investigation and dialogue without 
rancour, despite the gap between his own view and that of neuroscience , is an 
example of the application of skilful means at the level most appropriate to the 
cultural context. 11 If its leaders were to refuse to engage in discussion of contentious 
'logical-empirical' issues, Buddhism would forfeit the commitment to philosophical 
rigor that has characterised its debates with other faiths over the centuries. 
Philosophical rigor sets Buddhism apart from the doctrinal 'bricolage' of the 'New 
Age' movement (van Hove 1996: 186-187, Philips and Aarons 2005: 217-220), 
despite the suggestion that 'there is a close, entangled and ambiguous relationship' 
between these religious allegiances (Cush 1996: 205-207). 
No central authority 
In Britain today, competition between Buddhist sects is relatively dormant for no 
organisation has expanded beyond 'niche' status, (Smith 1996: 320) to achieve 
significant numerical or 'brand' dominance as the representative of Buddhism to the 
wider community. Rather than competing in a single marketplace, organisations 
may be attracting adherents with different psycho-social preferences, holding 
different metaphysical views, who feel comfortable with different styles of practice 
and teacher-pupil relationship. The majority of organisations cooperate through the 
auspices of the 'Network of Buddhist Organisations'. Aside from issues of personal 
egocentricity and group definition, which in Buddhism ought to be restrained by the 
discourse and practice of compassion and mindful self-examination, the task that all 
organisations have yet to address is how to offer effective services to the public as 
well as to the silent majority of self-confessed Buddhists in Britain who have made 
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no sectarian connection (Bluck 2004), and presumably receive no support in the 
maintenance of their religious practice. If a relational holist view of mind enabled 
some of those isolated Buddhists to make sense of Buddhist practice, it would have 
demonstrated some utility as a 'skilful means'. 
Tradition itself cannot fulfil the role of a central Buddhist authority, because only 
the simpler doctrines having widest explanatory scope are universally accepted. 12 If 
relational holism of mind is not incompatible with the Four Noble Truths it may be 
an impetus to philosophical debate, but not to anathema or schism, otherwise a more 
traditional exegete could be accused of attachment to a particular view. In any event, 
recourse to the authority of textual tradition is an inherently hermeneutic process 
(Lopez 1995,1996ý 1997), and it would be na7fve to assert an unequivocal 
metaphysical consistency among ancient texts that have undergone multiple 
translation and rescension over the centuries. ' 3 For example, the view retrieved by 
Burford from the Ayhaka-Vagga portrays a this-worldly form of Buddhist practice, 
without metaphysical or cosmological concerns, leading only to ethical perfection 
and happiness in this life, not to ontological transformation (199 1: 1 -11). Such 
metaphysical conservatism stands in marked contrast to the insulation of the mind 
from causal conditionality that is implied in other suttas (Hamilton 1999: 85, Conze 
et al 1954: 33 [AN 1.10], Woodward 1948: 97 [Udana 80]). Despite the these 
canonical instances, Hakamaya and Matsumoto assert that the early dualism of 
conditioned co-production became subverted by indigenous Brahmanic, Chinese and 
Japanese forms of grounding in non-dualism, which they call 'dhatuvdda' (Swanson 
1997: 7, Matsumoto 1997: 170). Their view is supported by Dharmavidya (Brazier 
2001: 235 102-103ý 146-148). That such inconsistent metaphysical positions co-exist 
in Buddhist tradition suggests that commitment to psycho-social practice is more 
important than subscription to particular metaphysical beliefs. 14 
Despite occasional metaphysical divergency, Buddhist philosophical discourses 
all have a natural point of reconnection in the circumstances of embodied life. The 
early , 4tthaka-Vagga account may be more ontologically-conservative than 
later 
Buddhalogical accounts, but neither refutes the other with respect to the salient point 
that psychological and ethical change in this life is the means to personal and social 
transformation. Although Buddhism's this-worldly ethical orientation has been 
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neglected by western analyses (Weber 1965, Dumont 1970,1986), there is no 
justification for schism in this world on the basis of metaphysical views about what 
will happen in other worlds, and no central refori-ning authority has the power to 
anathematise or excise any particular view. 
Applied relational modelling 
My interpretation of relational holism of mind prioritises 'structural coupling' 
between embodiment and an external world. It does not negate the role of internal 
4autopoetic' neuronal events, but does assert that the conscious correlates of such 
enactions are homomorphic representations of an external world., 5 Such a realist 
interpretation does not militate against the possibility of other-worldly metaphysical 
relations, but awaits reliable evidence that these relations take place. In the absence 
of that evidence, entailments such as the possibility of mental continuity between 
lifetimes have the status of fictional components of explanation, imagined for the 
purposes of prediction, until some warrant is granted by personal experience. This 
evidential requirement applies as impartially to this-worldly experiences as it does to 
other-worldly experiences, such as personal memories of rebirth, personal powers 
(iddhis), bardo experiences, or nirvd? ia envisaged as a subtly-embodied form of 
existence after death. Minds work predictively by the combination of known facts 
and unknown fictions, and both fact and fiction are essential features of the feedback 
processes of 'top-down' cognitive activity. Beliefs are not denigrated as such by 
location in either epistemological category, because fiction in religious discourse is 
usefully predictive, rather than an 'idle wheel'. Predictive cognitive processes and 
their emotional constraints are observed, not suppressed, by vipas'yand practices and 
are deliberately utilised in Tantric sjdhana practices, and to eliminate the fictional 
activity of the imagination would be to annihilate a necessary part of mental 
functioning. The manipulation of fictional hypotheses in cognitive-emotive 
interaction is the mechanism of predictive explanation in both science and religion. 
Religious predictions and explanations may not be certain, but they ought to be 'good 
upadeýa% or they risk becoming the be all and end all of practice, rather than guides 
to the psychological alteration of habitual behaviour. 
311 
It is significant that psychological change is not envisaged by any of the 
participants to lead to the complete elimination of intentionality, but to a rebalancing 
of emotional-cognitive self-processes. Their clear preference for the warrant of 
subjective experience has motivated the development, in this thesis, of a balanced 
homeostatic model of the relational mind. This model could be applied to all 
possible relations, including relations capable of disjunctive metaphysical change 
from a this-worldly to an other-worldly 'direction of fit'. In the absence of a central 
authority, whether practitioners choose to work with a this-worldly or an other- 
worldly version of the relational model is a matter for them, for the point is not that 
an unknown second world-order cannot exist, but that such a world would also be a 
matter of external relations if the mind is only metaphorically internal, for although 
its (identical or supervenient) neuronal correlates are literally within embodiment, 
they are also literally in the world. The emphasis on property-relations that supports 
an extemalist view of mind must stand on its own arguments, whether or not those 
arguments conflict with tradition. For instance, according to Stcherbatsky, the 
Sautrdntika tradition refers to processes rather than properties, and refutes both 
material and eternal objects by asserting that reality appears instantaneously (1962: 
79-82). This view is refuted by the scientific observation of the duration of neuronal 
events. 
Buddhism clearly distinguishes the objective individuality of continuing 
mindstreams, and, despite the comparisons to idealism by early western 
commentators, even Yogdcdra holds that other minds have independent existence 
(Wood 1991: 93-96). By contrast, the relational holism perspective can be criticised 
as a chaotic and counterintuitive turn away from the plain fact of individual agency. 
Although de-emphasis of individuality may be counterintuitive, relational holism is 
not chaotic; it is a response to the danger inherent in the bestowal of firm categorical 
boundaries around things as objects, including the unreflective ascription of 
individuality to persons. Emphasis on relationality motivates a reassessment of the 
individual with respect to the social collective and the world, and in so doing 
provides theoretical support for compassionate social attitudes that are intrinsic to 
Buddhist practice. 
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Briefly, for the issue is a matter for a further study, relational holism may also 
turn out to provide theoretical support for an environmental ethic that is not so 
intrinsic to Buddhist practice (Harris 2000b), but which is being fashioned 
pragmatically and retrospectively out of Buddhist responses to contemporary 
circumstance. 16 Harris criticises the 'extreme holism' of the Hua-Yen 
interpenetrative causal model of Indra's net (2000b: 124-125), which naturally lends 
itself to an environmentalist interpretation but the holism advocated in this thesis is 
not so extreme, for it depends on empirical neuroscientific evidence for structural 
causal relations, rather than on hypothetically uniform relational ubiquity. But 
relational holism does entail, equably and environmentally, that loss of habitat and 
species bio-diversity has similar relevance to the loss of a limb, a memory, or a story, 
for these are all appearances to the neutral plane of consciousness. 
In a marked contrast to the relational view of mind, which depends upon the 
causal permeability of individual objects, including persons, contemporary Buddhism 
has been portrayed as subverted by the western emphasis on individualism (Mellor 
1989,1991) and criticised for providing individuals with a mythological means of 
escape from the relational ailments attending loss of innocence under modernity 
(ZiZ'ek: 2001: 11-15,63-68). Mellor's arguments, which were mainly directed 
against the FWBO, have met with a detailed but partisan response (Sangharakshita 
1992), although when asked about Mellor's critique, Ratnaprabha, who is a senior 
member of the Western Buddhist Order, remarked that: 'there may be some truth in 
what he says, and in a way I am quite pleased about that'. Contemporary Buddhism 
should pay attention to external assessments like Mellor's and Zi2ek's, for as Jones 
remarks, serious criticism from outsiders is valuable, 'like gold'. 17 
ZiZ'ek characterises humanity's failure to resolve the 'Hegelian' dilemma of the 
material inhabitation of the 'Spirit', and to bridge 'the gap between the inner being 
and its external expression', and suggests that the absent 'proto-ontological' status of 
subjectivity turns into a 'longing to regain the lost object' and a 'split attitude' (Zi2ek 
2001: 57- 68). The 'stuck' inner self or inner voice oscillates between an offering of 
the 'Sublime' and the 'excremental', leading to a contradictory 'compulsion' to 
enjoyment (jouissance) and to truth, to dream and reality, to a transcendental 
contradiction between 'sublime jewel' and 'formless shit', for 'when our innermost 
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self is externalized, the result is disgusting' (Zi2ek 2001: 57- 68). 2i2ek's thinks that 
when the dilemma of mind is irresolvable internally it is projected externally, for 
example into the long standing western obsession with Buddhist Tibet (Z'i2ek 2001: 
63-68). His plain point is that fundamentalism is an obsession with the 'Self 
whereas multiculturalism is obsession with the 'Other', but both are expressions of a 
sense of separation or 'loss' (2001: 68-69). He raises significant psycho-cultural 
issues, but frames them in the Christian psychology of the self, thereby presuming 
and reinforcing his 'split attitude': the dilemma of dualism between the individual the 
world. 
As a prospective Buddhist view, relational holism does not negate the dualism of 
the individual and the world, but the theory diffuses the associated internal/external 
dilemma by exercising hermeneutic suspicion about the resolution of dynamic 
property-processes into selves and others. That does not entail that Buddhists should 
exhaust their individuality or that that unique features of individual personality are 
dissipated by the homeostatic rebalancing of attention and intention. This is because 
the origins of individuality are not internal: they are manifestations of a history of 
external relations with significant others. The problem with individual personality is 
not that it exists, but that it exists in a state of social imbalance, and of self-obsessed 
greed, hatred and delusion. As an example close to home, Crook mentioned that he 
could not disagree with an American visitor who made an unfavourable comparison 
between the Buddhist obsession with self-improvement and the compassionate 
pastoral concern of the Methodist ministry. Western Buddhists have yet to work out 
the most appropriate ways to balance concern for self and others, and to express that 
balance by compassionate activity in multicultural localities with diverse religious 
allegiances. Religions occupying niche status in globalised societies cannot practice 
the compassionate attitudes they preach unless they develop appropriate forms of 
social engagement. 
Theorising the difference between the individual and the world has been a 
western project ever since Augustine reversed the neo-Platonic emphasis on the 
incorporation of the individual within the world and the incorporation of both within 
the deity, by locating deity-communi cation within the mind of the individual (Cary 
2000: 31-44). The result, over the centuries, is that the individual has become as 
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much an epistemological as an ontological concept. Since it has become a prime 
source of western academic discourse, the significance of the non-western individual 
has been undervalued in studies of oriental societies (Dumont 1970,1986), perhaps 
because the intimate and diverse habitus of day to day cultural contact with others has 
been anthropologically misunderstood, and literally overlooked (Harris 1993: 33-36). 
Individuality springs from an accumulating history of the manifestation of 
personal capabilities flourishing in dependence on a social matrix, in the East as in 
the West. Buddhist individuals in Buddhist cultures are embedded in the meanings 
and values of their social matrix, and conversely, globalisation causes progressive 
dis-embedding from traditional social matrices. The interplay between individual 
agency and social structure is an inexact theoretical field (Archer 2000), and there is 
disagreement about the extent to which social structures can be influenced by 
individual agency if they are autonomous emergent properties of the generality of 
individual relations (Kincaid 1985, Tuomela 1990). It may be devastating for the 
aspirations of a religion holding only niche status in a globalised society, if individual 
influence exerts little or no effect at the level of social structure. Yet the socially- 
engaged Buddhism of Dharmavidya and Jones depends on the establishment of a link 
between individual religious practice, socially-engaged religious practice, and the 
possibility of significant social change for the better. The same theoretical 
connection between social levels is implicit in Pym's understanding that Pure Lands 
are ideal states of mind, which can give rise to ideal states of affairs in this world. It 
is part of the distinctive message of the Mahdydna, and according to Dharmavidya 
also of early Buddhism (2001: 29-31,56), that progress on the Buddhist path should 
be as much for the benefit of others and for the world as for oneself If such rhetoric 
is to be more than wishful thinking individual self-concern must be balanced by 
concern for others. That balance of motivation receives theoretical support from the 
externalism of the relational view of mind, for approximation to individual 
homeostasis is unachievable over the long term without approximation to social and 
environmental homeostasis. 
As with the disjunction between conditioned and unconditioned ontologies of 
mind, textual references can be found to lend rhetorical support for any particular 
view, but there are indications in the suttas that egocentric individuality is conducive 
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to a belief that the reffied self is the essential nature of mind (Harvey 1995: 5 1), and 
that such a delusion leads inevitably to suffering. This caution about self-reification 
extends beyond refutation of the Vedic doctrine of a soul-like metaphysical eternal 
entity (atta), and beyond the injunction to abandon attachment to views, to advocacy 
of social concord as an alternative to individual egocentricity: 
So 1, reverend Sir, having surrendered my own mind, am living only 
according to the mind of the venerable ones ... reverend Sir, we have divers bodies, but assuredly only one mind ... that is that we, reverend Sir, are living all together on friendly terms and han-noniously, as milk 
and water blend, regarding one another with the eye of affection. 
(Homer 1959: 201 [MN 3.128]) 
It cannot be gainsaid that there are individual mind-steams or individual lines of 
cause and effect that attract psychological and juridical explanations based on the 
common-sense extrapolation that since bodies are physical objects, minds must be 
abstract objects. In fact minds are relational nexuses engaged in the continual 
integration of interdependent properties of the world into transient forms of 
consciousness. Just as there are orchestras, there are collections of mental events. 
There are no objective minds, just as there no orchestras other than a collocation of 
parts and parts of parts, for at some level of observation all parts are concatenations 
of properties. Thus, what Ratnaprabha calls the 'true individual', may be true in 
some evaluative sense, but is not meaningfully an individual at all levels of 
explanation, where the individual is observed to be constituted from impermanent 
sets of relationships amongst reliable sorts of properties. 
Whether or not a 'this-worldly' interpretation of relational holism is a useful 
hermeneutic addition to Buddhist polythetism or, as Shaw suggests, mind and world 
are manifestations of an 'other-worldly' relation to a transcendental Buddhalogical 
source, there can be agreement that the exigencies of everyday life constitute the only 
arena for change under both psycho-social and soteriological descriptions. To accept 
others is to allow room for other points of view, and to allow room for other points of 
view is to relinquish the misguidance of emotional investment in one's own. Equable 
acceptance of other individuals and other views can be dismissed as utopian, but the 
supposition that the basic bodily imperative to homeostasis can be universalized to 
include society and the world supports both a realistic and a romantic opposition to 
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modernity's ideal of a continual development, which functions irrespective of the 
constraining influence of human experience (Lyotard 1991: 2,7,105). Equanimity is 
entailed by the establishment of trust in the reliable relational encounter between a 
selfless self and an indirect world. It is gradual psycho-social modification to the 
habitual expressions of consciousness that brings about approximation to homeostasis, 
not an escape from the temporal constitution of the mind into an absent, 
hypothetically internal state of consciousness, into another reality, or into another 
world. 
317 
Notes to Chapter 9 
I Gombrich and Obeyesekere remark that : 'the integrity of the Sangha is conceived 
to rest not so much on its orthodoxy as on its orthopraxy' (1988: 446). See page 103 
of this thesis. 
2 Varela and Thompson (2003) argue that the consciousness is constituted as an 
emergent process on the basis of 'reciprocal causation': a combination of 'downward' 
causation by intentional cognition and 'upward causation' by somato-sensorimotor 
systems (2003: 273). For the reasons given in Chapter 8, sourced form Klee (1984) 
and Girill (1976), the notion of 'Democritean' processes instantiating emergent 
properties is persuasive, but the argument for downward causation freed from upward 
causal determinism is not. 
' The notion that 'top-down' cognition can contaminate consciousness suggests that 
contamination (asava) can be as much an inflow as an outflow. The mind defiles the 
world as much as the world defiles the mind (Homer 1993: xxiii) 
' Recall that a moment of consciousness is framed within a measurable duration: 
there is no absolute immediacy of mind (Libet 1999: 49-5 1, Varela 1999: 117). 
'It could be argued that, in the Kdldma Sutta, the rejection of a teaching because it 
'fits becoming' (Woodward 1932: 172 [AN 111.7.65]) is an argument against the 
warrant of experience. Since the sutta warns against acceptance ad hominem 'out of 
respect', the only warrant that is unequivocally advocated is that of ethical intuition. 
For a more traditional interpretation, see Bodhi (1988). 
6 Holding an opinion is 'betting on the truth of a particular formulated sentence' 
(Dennett 1971: 19) 
7 This point, made implicitly by Vajiro, is that if there is agreement about the simple, 
and essentially psychological, four-fold diagnosis of suffering, its cause, the 
possibility of its cessation, and the way to its cessation, then dialogue about the 
meaning and ontological entailments of this formulaic diagnosis should not provide 
sufficient grounds for the characterisation of opposing views as heterodox or 
schismatic. 
8 The Gelug-pa systemize Buddhist philosophy into a 'hierarchy of tenet systems' 
(Klein 1998: 33). Matsunaga describes how, in China, the example of Jdkata tales, 
affinities to Daoism in contrast to Confucianism, the comparable Daoist 'conversion 
of the barbarians' (hua-hu) theory, notions of conventional and ultimate truth, the 
exigencies of translation, and the upaya kaus'alya teaching were all aids to the 
systematic assimilation of non-Buddhist deities and doctrines into Buddhist 
equivalents (Matsunaga 1969: 97-120,285). 
9 Green's remarks about Saka Gakkai were of their time, and may no longer be 
accurate representation (1989: 285). 1 can find no contemporary reference to the 
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Scientific Buddhist Association, which implies that the organisation is now in 
abeyance. 
10 The interview participants had varying degrees of commitment to rebirth: Bhikkhu 
Gavesako prefers Buddhadasa's emphasis on moment-by-moment rebirth (Bucknell 
and Fox 1983: 104-106); Crook does not believe in rebirth; Wistreich and Jones 
believe in rebirth, and cite ad hominem testimony as evidence; Pym and Ratnaprabha 
argue for rebirth on the counterfactual ground that rebirth is a guarantee of existential 
meaning and eventual justice; Pym also remarks that the mechanism of rebirth is not 
understood. It is not 'cognitive surrender' to reach a personal conclusion on the 
available evidence. 
11 See Chapter 5 note 3. 
12 Ratnaprabha's brief summary of specific teachings invites exegesis and 
hen-neneutic interpretation (see Chapter 5 note 7). Despite their simplicity of 
expression, his list does not constitute a simple theory of universal scope into which 
other theories can be 'nested', as do the Four Noble Truths or ýfinyatd. 
13 The suttas were only introduced into Sri Lanka and conunitted to writing in a 
language 'not appreciably different from Pdli' approximately 300 years after the 
death of the Buddha (Norman 1978: 32). No substantial surviving manuscript is 
older than the sixteenth century. 
We are in a similar position to the editor of Homer, i, e. we do not 
know either the author or the exact time from which the text tradition 
started (von Hiniffier 1978: 48-49). 
14 It is instructive that, in the Kalima Sutta, particular beliefs about rebirth 
destinations and the efficiency of kamma are referred to as 'consolations' or solaces', 
and neither debar nor promote acceptance into the Saýgha (Woodward 1932: 175 
[AN 111.7.65]). 
15 Visual images of the Buddha's enlightenment indicate the traditional belief that it 
was a profound experience as well as an explanatory insight. Like Dr. Johnson's 
encounter with a stone, the verificatory earth-touching gesture (bhi7mispars'a mudra) 
is a visual demonstration that the enlightenment experience included some relation to 
an external world. 
16 For example, the Dalai Lama has adopted a negotiating position on the autonomous 
status of Tibet, which calls for environmental and species protection, sustainable 
development and the removal of nuclear sites (Gyatso 1989). 
17 See Chapter 4 pp. 97-100 of this thesis. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
The constraints and limitations encountered in the course of the research are 
briefly discussed, followed by some neuroscientific and sociological suggestions for 
further study, and a suggestion for further study in the traditional Abhidharma texts. 
The thesis then concludes with a summary of the main outcomes. 
In the interviews, detailed discussion of the ontology of mind did not take place, 
by virtue of the interview participant's overriding concern for applied psychological 
issues of subjective experience, but ontological speculations are entertained in the 
course of my hermeneutic interpretation. Using a modified version of Lewis's 
discussion of attitudes (1979), an examination of the relationship between explanation 
and experience, self and subject suggests that experience cannot be entirely separated 
from explanation, but that the subject can be distinguished from the self On one 
hand, self-processes are hypothetical, unconscious, intentional constructs over 
extended time, which can disturb homeostasis unless supplemented by the ethical 
guidance provided by meditative attention to the way things are in the external world. 
On the other hand, the subjectivity of sentient experience is a real relation across brief 
temporal delay, carrying the implication that humans cannot escape their constitution 
as time-beings. I argue that although the mind is epistemologically emergent it is not 
ontologically emergent, for although the mind cannot be causally explained in terms 
of the micro-properties of the physical world, it can be causally explained in ten-ns of 
the entirety of structural relations occurring within the embodied brain and between 
the embodied brain and external world. 
Problems encountered 
The research met with some practical constraints. Firstly, the study could not 
claim to be quantitatively representative, since a methodological decision was taken 
not to over-extend the data-collection component by the inclusion of organisations 
representing populations of ethnic Buddhist origin. The study could only have 
claimed to be broadly representative of major 'convert) organisations if there had 
been input from S6ka Gakkai, from the Karma Kagyu group at Eskdalemuir and Holy 
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Island, from the Order of Buddhist Contemplatives at Throstle Hole, Carrshields, and 
from the New Kadampa Tradition at Ulverston. In addition, Bluck's analysis of the 
2001 census data suggests that 'perhaps even the majority' of British Buddhists are 
not affiliated to organisations, which indicates that even a complete sample of 
organisations would not be representative of 'convert, British Buddhist opinion 
(Bluck 2004). 
Secondly, the multi-disciplinary nature of the study placed practical limitations 
on the communication of information from each discipline. On the neuroscientific 
side of the data, some physiological information relevant to the neuroscience of 
emotion had to be omitted. On the Buddhist side, it was not possible to include 
examples from Abhidharma texts other than those most relevant to the interpretation. 
For example, discussion of the early Buddhist doctrine of elements was included 
because the difference between 'property' and 'brute fact' interpretations illuminates 
the discomforting mixture of property-relations ontology and object-relations 
ontology within the tradition as a whole. The 'omnipresent mental factors' were 
mentioned because they relate to the neuroscientific interest in the sequence of 
perception and cognition, whereas discussion of the important skandha doctrine was 
not included because it is a higher-level psychological theory that is not illuminated 
by neuroscience. Discussion of the Yogdcdra trisvabhava theory is included because 
it illustrates the continuity across the Mahdydna tradition of the fundamentally 
relational theory of dependent origination (prafftya-samutpdda), despite the 
essentialist ontology that seems to underpin much mythological proliferation. 
Thirdly, although the interview sample was not organisationally representative, 
the ten participants provided more qualitative information than could be analysed in a 
single thesis. Some interviews were not fully utilised because they contained 
information that was additional to the main theme. There is more that remains to be 
said about mysticism in Buddhism and other world faiths, which was raised by Pym; 
about the contemporary significance of monastic practice, as exemplified by BhIkkhu 
Vajiro and Bhikkhu Gavesako, but most notably about the consequences of relational 
holism of mind for individuality, and for the socially-engaged Buddhism advocated 
by Dharmavidya and Jones. 
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Fourthly, the participants' unwillingness to engage with the standard scientific 
view of mind/brain identity and their preference for subjective experience prevented a 
study that was solely an analysis of participant's views of the implications of 
neuroscience. This constraint motivated a hen-neneutic interpretation of the 
significance of the research findings, which incorporated relevant scientific 
knowledge and information from the Buddhist tradition to produce the relationally 
holistic hypothesis of the nature and activity of mind. Without necessarily agreeing 
with the thesis conclusions, the participants did not raise objections to a synopsis of 
the thesis that was sent to them at a late stage, which suggests that they find the 
methodological approach reasonably acceptable. 
Fifthly, the participant's willingness to be named rather than given the anonymity 
that is usual in social research placed constraints on the interpretation of their words, 
which were onerous but beneficial. The naming of the interview participants permits 
verification of the probity of the research. Naming also influenced the presentation of 
findings, with interview contributions presented prior to my interpretation in 
subsequent chapters. 
Suggestions for further study 
Neuroscience 
The argument that relational holism leads to increased awareness of the property- 
relations that support object-relations implies that it might be possible to perceive the 
world differently. That seems an unlikely hypothesis, because object-perception is 
phylogenetically and developmentally determined, yet if attention to relations can 
become habitual in the form intuitive awareness of ethical consequences, leading to a 
change in affect or somatic feeling-tone, it might be worth investigating whether such 
ethical and affective rebalancing causes qualitative alterations to the sensory 
perception of objects. 
The Dalai Lama's interest in neuroscience has stimulated scientific study of 
meditative states (Davidson et al 2003, Carter et al 2003, Ritskes et al 2003, Lazar et 
al 2005). In Kennedy (2004: 150), 1 argue that meditation is part of the broader 
category of ritual activity. It follows that neuroscientific research into meditation 
may be addressing only one of the ways in which religious modifications to 
322 
consciousness may be correlated with changes to brain capacity and structure. 
Research should not only involve meditation, but also the practice of other forms of 
ritual, and be controlled against groups who are highly intentionally-preoccupied. It 
might also be worth investigating the differences between brain imaging during 
visualisation meditation, which makes active use of top-down cognitive imagination 
systems, in comparison to insight meditation (vipas'yand), which observes mental 
activity and in comparison to concentration meditation (ýamatha), which reduces 
mental activity. 
Abhidharma 
The relationally holistic view of mind advanced in this thesis would benefit from 
philological research to identify the appearance, within the Abhidharma literature, of 
the theory's underlying ontology of structural property-relations, and a philosophical 
comparison of exegeses that seek to unite the relational ontology with the competing 
ontology of objective entity-relations. Some examples of concepts from either side of 
the ontological divide are given on Page 329. 
Sociology 
This study could be usefully complemented by interviews with representatives 
from organisations that were not included. The larger organisations have already 
been mentioned, but there are numerous smaller groups and lineages, such as Rissho 
Kosei-Kai (Lotus Sdtra), Deshimaru (Zen) Dechen (Sakya-Kagyu), Diamond Way 
(Kagyu), and Longchen (Nyingma). The study also needs to be replicated with the 
involvement of representatives from 'ethnic' Buddhist organisations in Britain, in 
other western jurisdictions and in traditionally Buddhist societies, to determine the 
extent to which the findings are characteristic of the response to neuroscience across 
contemporary Buddhism as a whole. It may also be worth replicating the study after 
some decades have elapsed, when there may be a more detailed scientific 
understanding of the neuronal correlates of consciousness, and more dissemination of 
neuroscientific findings into 'consensual' discourse. Contrary to some of the 
hyperbole that surrounded advances in neuroscience in the late twentieth century, it 
may take a hundred years or more for the overhang of hypotheses to be cleared and 
323 
firm correlations to be drawn between mind and brain events that are sufficient to 
allow the Buddhist-neuroscientific dialogue to emerge from transition. 
Despite the stress laid on subjective experience by the interview participants and 
despite their criticism of the academic approach to Buddhist study, there remains a 
role for academic examination of the philosophical consistency of Buddhist 
explanations of mind, for experiential intuition always stands in need of clear 
expression. Scholarly approaches to religion were considered by some of the 
interview participants to be soteriologically worthless forms of academic bias. 
Against that perception it can be argued that whenever doctrine and practice is not 
challenged intellectually there is scope for subversion. This issue is not of great 
moment when only theoretical hypotheses are under consideration, but it does matter 
when the authority of teachers is grounded in their unchallenged interpretation of 
doctrine. 
The most significant applied research indicated by this study into the Buddhist- 
neuroscientific debate may be into the sociological implications of a relationally 
holistic view of the mind. With respect to organisations, the consequences of serious 
engagement with neuroscientific findings by any Buddhist organisation is worthy of 
investigation, yet despite the Dalai Lama's initiative no organisation has entered into 
formal discussion of the relevant issues thus far. However, the discussion in 
Sangharakshita's (1998a) review of Batchelor (1987: 37) and the article by Lyne 
(2004) in the New Chan Forum suggests that some individuals are interested in 
neuroscience. With respect to sociological theory, relational holism has implications 
for Durkheim's metaphorical model of society as a mind (1974: 1-37), and for 
Minsky's model of minds as societies (1988: 20). It may be possible to bring the two 
models together, to consider them as being as much literal as metaphorical systems 
and to make meaningful comparisons between functional neuronal structures and the 
functional structures of society. On first consideration these systems are not 
particularly similar, yet they have evolved in tandem with some degree of functional 
'fit'. Despite Kincaid's conclusion that the individual/social structural connection 
cannot be reduced to explanations of individual acts (1986: 492), the key issue is how 
psychological changes to the habitual run of individual agential acts might be capable 
of initiating structural change in society. The possibility of such a micro-to-macro 
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connection is vital to socially-engaged Buddhism, for if psychological change cannot 
be cashed out in the form of social change there is little hope for Buddhist 
environmentalism or for the this-worldly kind of Pure Land Buddhism advocated by 
Dharmavidya, Pym and Jones. 
Archer (2000) inveighs against the reductionist 'conflation' of individual agency 
with social structure, which obscures the dialectical interaction between individual 
identity and social identity as a mechanism for social change (2000: 4-6). Persons 
strike a balance between their individual and their social identity (Archer 2000: 293), 
and function at personal, cultural and structural levels by acting variously as 
individual, collective and 'corporate' agents. Persons, cultures and societies all 
exhibit emergent powers (Archer 2000: 307), which interact in complex ways to 
cause social change or 'morphogenesis' (2000: 265-264). The problem, for 
Buddhists, is that all these activities depend on temporally-extended self-processes 
that are liable to gasping and attachment. The depressing conclusion may be that the 
cumulative effect on society of many individuals acting ethically from a state of 
equanimity may be less influential than subversion by individuals in the grip of strong 
self-attachment. Despite a multiplicity of systematic ethical constraints, now joined 
by the sociobiological analysis of altruism, it can at least be supposed that the 
structural functioning of globalised society is relatively impervious to the 
accumulation of individual ethical acts. A contemporary religious studies analysis of 
that hypothesis could benefit from a neuroscientific illumination of Durkheim's 
mind-model of society and Minsky's society-model of mind. 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
The primary aim that motivated the study has been fulfilled, for the conclusion 
that the mind is relationally holistic eliminates the dilemma of inconsistency set up by 
the compartmental i sation of Buddhist and neuroscientific explanations of the same 
world. In the course of reaching the thesis conclusion I abandon the 'standard' 
scientific view that the mind is identical to the brain. That theory impnsons the mind 
within the brain, without adequate explanation of the development of brain and mind 
from external activity in response to the world. Like the Augustinian notion of the 
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soul as an 'inner man', and like the commonsense imagination of an internal self, the 
theory of mind/brain identity and the theory of mental supervenience both depend on 
a metaphorical description the mind as if it were the activity of an objective entity in 
space, rather than an emphasis on the mind as a continuing set of relations over time. 
Subjective attention directed towards relations can act as a counterbalance to selfish 
intentional attitudes towards objects, and can facilitate approximation to 
psychological and social homeostasis. 
The significance of experiencefor tradition 
This study could have included an analysis of the opinions of the interview 
participants with respect to the traditions and the organisations they represent, 
enabling a categorisation of British Buddhist organisations along the usual model of a 
'spectrum of adaptation' (Green 1989 Batchelor 1994: 338-340 Waterhouse 1997: 25- 
27, Bluck 2006: 1-2) to the western context. I have not done so because I consider 
that religion fulfils a multitude of purposes that require separate evaluation, rather 
than characterisation along a single attitudinal spectrum. The individuals interviewed 
for this study advanced their own interpretation of practice undertaken according to 
tradition in the contemporary context. I have based my interpretation on theirs, 
discounting levels of generalisation in between. That dialogic method was 
appropriate because the study was never intended to be an anthropological account of 
British Buddhism as the social manifestation of a tradition undergoing translation into 
another civilisation, but was intended to be a philosophical examination of the 
dilemma set up by the emergence of an alternative, neuroscientific mode of 
explanation. 
The interview evidence indicates the importance of immediate experience in the 
validation of traditional explanation, hence that issue became a significant theme in 
the study. Sharf (1998) questions the veracity and relevance of mystical religious 
experience, but others testify that the experiential processes, including imaginary 
experience, are of primary concern for Buddhism (Gombrich (1997: 7,11, Hamilton 
(2000: 84). Gombrich effectively resolves that discrepancy by noting that Buddhist 
tradition does not attempt to describe mystical experience, but to set it in the context 
of a religious form of intellectual understanding (1997: 17-18). The contested 
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symbiosis between private experience and public explanation, including traditional 
explanation, has been illuminated neuroscientifically in the course of the thesis. 
Immediate experience turns out to be an indirect explanation of the world, for it 
depends upon phylogenetically-ancient correspondences between neuronal 
synchronicity and salient external features of the world. Still, the reliable facticity of 
experience warrants its use in the justification of explanation. 
The attitudinal model of mind 
The initial interview questions were designed to discover the extent to which 
participants thought that the burgeoning hypotheses and findings of neuroscience 
were relevant to their views of the nature of mind. Despite some willingness to 
accept sound empirical evidence, the participants' manifest lack of interest in the 
implications that neuroscientific hypotheses might carry for Buddhist mind-theory 
meant that, in their interviews, discussion of ontological questions was secondary to 
broadly psychological discussion of subjective experience. 
As an aid to understanding the participants' preference for subjective experience 
over ontological explanation, Lewis's (1979) model of the formation of attitudes was 
expanded by the addition of the category of the 'subject' (de animo) of experience, 
and assigned the wider talks of modelling mental activity in general. Despite the 
delay that occurs in the cerebral cortex during the cooperative activation of higher 
cognitive systems involved in consciousness (Libet 1965, Pribram 1999), the main 
distinguishing mark of primary subjective experience is its ability to report 
approximately immediate events. Thus, whether or not it is deluded in other respects, 
the mind takes sufficient time to know itself retrospectively as a subject, by means of 
the end-state of one neuronal ensemble sequence constituting the initial 'horizon' of 
the next (Varela 1999). As a result of this natural continuity, sentient beings are 
'time-beings' (D6gen 1988: 76-83), retrospectively knowing with Augustinian 
certainty that they are the subjects of experience, for even if perception is thought to 
be a mistake, it is self-confirming (si ... 
fallor, sum) (Augustine 1968: 532 [CG 11.26], 
Abercrombie 1938: 62). In addition to the continuity and certainty bestowed by 
subjectivity, humanity has developed the memorial ability to extrapolate the activity 
of a self, which is imagined to represent the individual in past and future scenarios 
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over extended time. Because Lewis assumes that humans are 'hyper-rational' beings 
his model does not incorporate the influence of emotions on the constitution of past 
and future selves, and does not distinguish between processes that maintain the self, 
as opposed to processes that maintain the subject. Damasio (1995) explains the 
emotional constraints that are exerted on cognitive self-processes by somatic limbic 
pathways, so enabling rapid non-habitual and habitual response to the occurrence of 
danger and opportunity in primary subjective experience. This is a valuable 
corrective to the traditional western view of the mind as a rational engine. 
The imaginative ability to model and predict is motivated by desire for greater 
knowledge and control of the future. If all dispositions are unconscious (Hulse, Read 
and Schroeder 2004), then desires are unconscious dispositions, which only become 
conscious as they motivate thoughts, actions or utterances. Desire for a determinate 
future eliminates time by turning conscious attention away from the world towards 
the satisfaction of dispositions in imaginative 'as if feedback processes. Imaginative 
experience appears to consciousness on a par with sensory input from the external 
world, but is capable of preoccupy consciousness to the exclusion of external sensory 
input. Not only is time lost in the metaphorical spaces of the imagination, but also 
the rich texture of sensorimotor experience of the world (Arendt 1978). It seems 
paradoxical that time-beings can become unaware of time, but one possible 
extrapolation, asserted by Shaw and implied by Pym, Jones and Bhikkhu Gavesako, 
is that minds are capable of freedom from time. This metaphysical prediction carries 
the implication that minds are non-material supervenient entities. That might turn out 
to be a 'good upadeýa% but remains a fictional rather than an empirical component of 
explanation until such time as it is verified by immediate experience. 
The discussion of cognitive influences on perception in Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch (1991) suggests that 'top-down' cognitive influence permeates the flow of 
'bottom-up' sensori-motor information, and permeates immediate experience with 
influences from past experience. This view of perceptual cognition implies that direct 
perception is impossible, and casts doubt on the notion of enlightenment as a 
metaphysically disjunctive and instantaneous transformation of consciousness as a 
result of direct perception of 'the way things really are'. 
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Relational holism 
Whether direct or indirect, perception is impossible without sensorimotor 
4structural coupling' de re with some sort of an external world, but along with 
awareness of time, awareness of this coupling can be eliminated from consciousness 
attention on a moment-by-moment basis by the 'self-imprisonment' associated with 
intentional grasping after desired objects (Brazier 2003: 32). The psycho-social 
significance of this fragility of conscious attention is not addressed by theories of 
mind/brain identity or mind/brain supervenience. Neither provides the 'explanation 
extension' (Kitcher 1989: 447) necessary for a complete account of the nature of 
mind, for they only cover the 'autopoetic', metaphorically-intemal component of a 
wider process that inalienably incorporates 'structural coupling' to the properties of 
an external environment (Varela Thompson and Rosch 199 1). 
Neuroscientific evidence of the structurally coupled nature of immediate 
experience, along with Buddhist testimony of the significance of immediate 
experience in the verification of doctrinal explanation, gives rise to the hypothesis 
that the mind is a relational category, not an elemental category. As such, the term 
(mind' is used too restrictively when it refers solely to mind/brain identity, and when 
it is refers to non-material mental supervenience on material brain activity. The 
category of mind is more representative of real circumstances, and less of an 
analytical dilemma, when it is taken to refer to the emergence of consciousness in 
dependence upon the totality of relations between embodied brains and an external 
world. 
If conscious 'minding' emerges on the basis of a structural relationship between 
brain and some sort of world, it is reasonable to suppose that the mind is constituted 
from the totality of relevant property-relations, irrespective of metaphysical beliefs. 
The experience of property-relations is prior to metaphysical extrapolations about 
whether or not the relevant properties include a hyletic substratum (an external 'first- 
world') or a super-stratum of mental supervenience (a hypothetical, metaphorical 
(second-world'). Minding is just the phylogenetically-mediated organisation of 
relevant property-relations into 'appearances' or 'semblances' (Arendt 1978). 
Appearances now differ from those available at the time of the Buddha, in that they 
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include objective explanations from functional brain anatomy and physiology, which 
have been brought to the level of appearances by neuroscientific investigation. 
The experience of object identification is a pre-linguistic form of explanation: a 
commonsense 'top-down' cognitive commentary on sensorimotor structural coupling, 
utilising fairly fixed qualial patterns in the organisation of perception. Object- 
identification usefully enables speed of prediction in complex scenarios; it is a 
prototypical way of observing the world in dependence upon spatial organisation. 
The ubiquity of the prototype obscures the realisation that entities, or objects, are not 
ontological fundamentals, but merely useful designations. They are cognitive events 
that obscure the more fundamental relational ontology of the all the properties that are 
constitutive of consciousness. 
From the objective perspective that cognises sets of relations as if they were 
entities, it is natural to imagine souls, selves, minds, subtle minds, and subtle bodies, 
and to conceive of them interacting in metaphorical spatial containment, after the 
manner of parts, wholes, interpenetrations, and transcendences between different 
worlds. From a more relational perspective, the prototypical cognition of objective 
entities is set aside in favour of a more dynamic ontology of sets of structural 
relations. It is because entities are non-linguistic cognitive explanations of enduring 
patterns of structural relations that relations are conceived to be objects when they 
cohere at a particular location over time. Examples of ambiguity between the entity 
view and the relational view may be found throughout the Buddhist tradition. I 
tentatively subscribe prafitya-samutpdda, paratantra, and s'u-nyatd to the relational 
ontology, and bhavaýga, pabhassara-citta, j1aya-vijhjna, Buddha-dhdtu, tathagata- 
garbha and 'very subtle energy mind' (Tib. shin tu phra ba'i Hung sems) to the entity 
2 
ontology. ' I think that the relational ontology is more fundamental , 
but both are 
fallible explanations derived from prototypical perceptual experience of the same 
reality, and it may be that attention to 'the way things really are' leads eventually to 
the realisation that they represent the same experience. 3 
1 want to stress relational ontology over entity ontology because entities are 
prototypically processes in stasis whereas relations are prototypically processes of 
change. Because the only thing that does not change is the ubiquity of change, 
relationality seems a better characterisation of the way things are in the world. The 
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psychological problem attending the ontological emphasis on objects, touched upon 
in Brazier (2003: 36-37), is that the corresponding lack of attention to relationality 
allows conscious awareness to be overwhelmed by addictive attitudes of geed, hatred 
and delusion. These unconscious intentions reinforce the imaginary inner self by 
motivating the possession or rejection of real and abstract external objects. 
The priority of experience 
Envisaging the mind as the totality of relevant property-relations could be called 
an opinion: the content of a 'belief-that'. It can also be characterised. as an attitude of 
equanimity with respect to the unspecified metaphysical status of appearances to 
consciousness, including the status of doctrinal explanations de dicto, constructions 
of the imagination de se, or philosophically realist or idealist beliefs about 
experiential acquaintances de re. Equanimity arises from the realisation that 
relational experience happens prior to any construction that is put upon it, whether or 
not a particular appearance in experience is the work of memory, the imagination, 
structural connections with the hylic substratum of the 'first' physical world, or 
supervenient connections with a 'second' or overarching transcendental world. 
In everyday experience, Augustinian certainty (si. -fallor, sum) with regard to 
immediate experience is combined with Wittgensteinian certainty about the 
foundational facticity of the external world. The world may be an 'autopoetic' 
enaction or a 'homomorphic' representation, but it is nonetheless certain in the sense 
that it is a suitable de re acquaintance of sufficient reliability to form the 'hinge' 
around which the life of the mind turns (Wittgenstein 1979: 18 [OC. 116], Stroll 1994: 
105-110). The mistake that sets up life as samsdra is not a matter of commonsense 
certainty about the subject of experience or the world of appearances, but of 
attachment to certainty. That mistake is an unconscious desire for the certain 
continuity (eternity) or certain cessation (annihilation) of the duality of self and 
4 world . 
Unconscious desire for certainty motivates attitudes, attitudes motivate 
opinions, and opinions can ossify into beliefs, before any verifying recourse to the 
facticity granted by suitable experiential acquaintance de re, and without any 
subsequent sense of freedom granted by acceptance of the determinism of causal 
relations with equanimity. Given the association between unconscious intentions and 
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beliefs, the proper attitude towards a belief is that of 'right view' (samma-ditthi), 
expressed as equanimity, indifference or poise (upekkha) with respect to the 
verisimilitude of an explanation in advance of its experiential realisation. This 
intimate correlation between right view and equanimity can account, I suggest, for 
Jones's ambiguous approach to doctrine, and for the general reliance placed by the 
interview participants on the warrant of subjective experience, irrespective of their 
degree of attachment to a selection of traditional metaphysical views. 
Internalism and equivocal emergence 
Mind/brain identity, mindibrain supervenience, and Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch's (1991) 'autopoetic enaction' account, are all incomplete explanations by 
virtue of their emphasis on the internal constitution of mind. 5 Activity in embodied 
neuronal systems plays a crucial role in the constitution of consciousness, but always 
in cooperation with external circumstances, for although there are internal states of 
the brain, there are no literally internal states of mind. Augustine's idea of the 'inner' 
mind as a metaphorical residence for an abstract object-self or soul has social and 
juridical utility, yet it is a fiction that depends entirely upon external criteria 
(Wittgenstein 1992: 61-63,84-85,88). Prasada and Dharmavidya reach a similar 
6 
conclusion (Brazier 2003: 47), and Shaw makes an associated point when he 
suggests that Buddhism does not recognise the existence of unconscious mental 
events. To restrict mental events to appearances to consciousness not only carries the 
implication that the mind is not internal, but also that it is a 'Democritean' emergence: 
it is not just identical to, or supervening upon a certain complexity of neuronal events, 
but emerges as a property of the complex holism of brain-world relations. 
The concept of emergence is yet another application of the spatial metaphor. It 
inappropriately transfers concepts, which are prototypically applied in the recognition 
and manipulation of objects, from their source in the external world to their target in 
the explanation of mind. There may be no such abstract or physically objective thing 
as a mind, just a name for integration in the useful, 'qualial' form of consciousness of 
a variety of feedback commentaries on relations between the embodied brain and the 
external world. Most brain processes are non-linear dynamical systems. Their 
complex neo-cortical combinations, in further interaction with limbic emotional 
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systems, appears to exert a qualifying or 'downward' causal influence on the 
relatively more simple, more phylogenetically-ancient, thalamo-cortical sensorimotor 
processes that guide continual approximation to bodily homeostasis. The emergence 
hypothesis is that this downward causal influence is of such complexity in humans 
that is ontologically distinct: it is not detennined by the micro-properties of the brain. 
Taken a step further, the metaphor of emergence suggests, and Ratnaprabha imagines, 
that the mind could become capable of causal separation from, or ontological 
transcendence of, the micro-properties of its neuronal basis (Silberstein and 
McGeever 1999). 
From the relational holism perspective, mind naturally transcends the micro- 
properties of the brain, for it is constituted by structural coupling between the 
properties of two separate systems: 'autopoetic' brain and external world. Mind is a 
cognitive feedback commentary on the entirety of brain/relations, manifesting as 
consciousness when there is sufficient temporal delay for intercommunication across 
the neocortex via reciprocal connections in the claustrum (Crick and Koch 2005). 
Mind is a 'Democritean' rather than an 'Empedoclean' emergence (Girill 1976, Klee 
1984), in that its conscious properties (qualia) are not the same is the micro-properties 
of its causal basis (neuronal activity and sensory contact with salient features of the 
world). But despite the complexity of neocortical feedback processes, mind does not 
escape determination by its dual causal basis. The spatial metaphor of emergence is 
meaningful epistemologically, as a psychological -level explanation, but not 
ontologically, as the way things are in the world. 
Rebalancing the mind 
Following Tsong-khapa, Crook envisages mental re-balancing in terms of the 
Buddhist 'Two Truths' theory, as occurring between the 'conventional entitiveness of 
things' and the 'ultimate emptiness of selfhood in a world of dependent origination' 
(Crook 2002a: 19). He suggests that 'models of mind which examine the co- 
occurrence of these perspectives in human life need a new contemporaneous 
development' (Crook 2002a: 19). His presentation resembles my view of the 
ontological priority of the relational constitution of mind in a causal I y-determinate 
world. The balance he seeks is struck by supplementing the objective attitude, which 
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privileges entities, with the holistic attitude, which privileges property-relations. The 
objective attitude facilitates intentionality; the holistic attitude is facilitated by 
attention. 
Following Brentano, intentionality is considered to be the mark of the mental 
(Dennett 1987: 67); it is separated in the West, and in Buddhism, into basic 
intentionality or 'aboutness' (manasikdra) and discriminating intentionality or 
'volition' (cetand). In Abhidhamma these terms refer to unconscious mental factors 
(cetasika) that condition conscious mental events (citta), a view that is replicated in 
the West by Hulse, Read, and Schroeder's argument that intentional dispositions are 
not conscious processes (2004). In effect, Crook (1992,2002b) re-categorises 
'aboutness' as attention, and reserves intentionality for its prototypical reference to 
the volitional attitude that characterises proactive agency. Volitional intentionality is 
conducive to a conventional view of the world, which apprehends the discrete 
objectivity of an internal self in relation to a multiplicity of external things. Such 
intentionality is conducive to craving and attachment, and underpins the modem 
western discourse on individualism. The attentional attitude, on the other hand, is 
capable of discerning the relations between properties that gives rise to the perception 
of objects, and capable of informing an intentional response that is empathetic, 
compassionate and intuitively ethical. Because attentional states of mind provide 
essential guidance for the unconscious intentional attitudes that initiate activity, they 
facilitate the apprehension of sensorimotor (de re) information by all processes 
engaged in approximation to bodily psychological, and social homeostatic 
rebalancing. Because the intentions underlying expressive acts are unconscious, they 
are determined by a blind teleology of self-preservation. Without suitable attention to 
the constituents of conscious awareness, intentionality gives rise to the kinds of 
physical, psychological, social and environmental destabilisation that civilisation has 
always been heir to, and are self-evident in contemporary circurnstances. 
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Dilemmas of mind 
Although intentional and attentional brain/world relations are complex, they are 
expressed in an integrated form as consciousness, which is the process of minding 
(Damasio 1995). Like Ratnaprabha's verbal approach to nirvd? ia, Damasio's usage is 
a good approximation to the way things really are in the world, for the relational 
dynamism of mental activity lacks the stable objectivity non-nally denoted by a noun. 
It is apparent from the holistic perspective that the notion of a 'dilemma of mind' is 
not just a matter of explaining the ontology of a thing, but a 'dilemma of minding': 
the existential dilemma of how to go on in time. 
That dilemma is attenuated by the realisation that the temporally-extended self is 
not the same as the immediate subject. The self is a hypothetical construct denoting 
the operation of a set of cognitive feedback processes working to combine past and 
present information for the purposes of prediction. The subject inhabits slight 
temporal extension, but has nothing whatsoever to do with the imaginative temporal 
extension involved in prediction. The subject is the 'horizon' of the arising and 
cessation of neuronal synchronicity; as such, the subject is imperturbable and non- 
dual with respect to immediate experience, for experience is only retrospectively 
differentiated into the duality of a subject attending to the awareness of an appearance 
as represented by a particular neuronal ensemble activity. 
Buddhist mindfulness practice aims to pay attention (manasikdra) without 
intention (cetand) to the arising of experience, before bifurcation into subject and 
content, and before the peripheral awareness of subjectivity becomes confused with 
the abstract-object form of a hypothetical self, which is metaphorically sequestered as 
if the mind was an internal correlate of the external world. In contrast to the western 
notion of a timeless nunc stans occurring between the 'nevermore' and the 'not yet' 
(Arendt 1978: 202-207), Buddhist mindfulness is the opposite of an escape from time, 
and offers no escape from responsibility for the intentional, predictive tasks carried 
out by cognitive self-processes over extended time. Mindfulness is just due attention 
to the world, enabling actions based on imaginative prediction to be balanced against 
ftill awareness of consequences: it is therefore a morally necessary way of reporting 
fully on being-in-the-world. Mindfulness illuminates a dilemma of mind, that 
intentional acts are necessary for the homeostatic maintenance of well-being, yet Z__ 
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intentionality is a wholly unconscious process. The general refusal of the interview 
participants to envisage enlightened individuals as being devoid of intentions 
supports the conclusion that mental re-balancing does not go so far as to eliminate 
intentionality. Rebalancing is the reinvigoration of conscious subjective attention, 
allowing suitable acquaintance with the way things are in the world to provide 
corrective guidance for the subliminal, habitual activity of intentionality. 
Awareness of individuality constitutes another dilemma for the mind. Although 
individuals are immediately obvious to themselves and to others by virtue of 
embodiment, individuality is an abstract objective category, which is meaningless 
over time without reference to relational responses to contextual events. Under the 
doctrine of dependent arising (prafftya-samutpdda), individuals are not as they seem, 
but as they become in consequence of their karma: their reactions to the world. The 
temporality of this process reveals that the particular quality of individuality is not a 
timeless essence, but the continual manifestation of a changing nexus of relations. 
The relationally holistic perspective on individuality does not ignore the obvious 
arithmetic of separate human embodiment, but rebalances the significance of 
embodiment as one amongst other relational kinds embedded in the world. The 
collective lifestyle of the monastic Saýgha is an attempt at ritual performance of an 
exemplary balance between individuality and otherness in the world (Bell 1997). 
That option is taken up by a very small minority of contemporary Buddhists, and no 
widespread agreement has emerged about the appropriate contemporary lay 
alternative. Such indecision indicates some lack of clarity about the status of the 
individual in contemporary Buddhism, and perhaps explains why the thrust of 
Mellor's critique of western Buddhist 'Protestant' individualism has yet to be fully 
addressed (1989,199 1). 
Folk-psychological terms like 'self 'mind' and 'individual' ought not to be 
reified into soul-like entities, for they have 'elastic' reference to dynamic states of 
affairs (Wittgenstein 1992: 24). For example, 'mind', is used with reference to the 
unconscious activity of determinate feedback self-processes, as if those processes 
rather than their results become objectively apparent to consciousness. Such object- 
language may be useful in social and juridical attributions of responsibility (Johnston 
1993), but is problematic at all other levels of causal explanation. Firstly, it is 
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catachrestic: an abuse of the spatial metaphor to imply that the individual mind is a 
container for 'folk' psychologi 71 ical contents. On the contrary, self, ntentionality and 
mind depend upon externally-embodied brain-world relationsl and cannot be 
meaningfully described apart from their external causal matrix. Secondly, the notion 
of freedom of choice is inherently contradictory because it depends on consciousness 
of intentions, yet intentional dispositions are only conscious once they find 
expression as utterances. 
The paradox of freedom in the midst of determinism illuminates some tension 
between the doctrine of dependent origination (pratTtya-samutpada) and the doctrine 
that intentional actions have consequences (karma). The tension cannot be resolved 
logically, but may be resolvable in practice by the ritual relinquishment of acts 
dependant upon a mistaken view that the self has the freedom of agency. How to 
modify unconscious, habitual intentionality is the nub of the psychological dilemma 
of how the mind is supposed to go on in the world. It is an ethical dilemma, which is 
illuminated by the experiential realisation that there is no connection between 
imaginary, temporally extended self-processes and the retrospective subjectivity in 
fairly immediate experience. This recognition is crucial to the location, 
differentiation and resolution of real and imaginary causes of existential suffering: 
who is to blame, what is wrong, and what to do about it. It remains to be seen 
whether the separation of self and subject, and some form of homeostatic, 
'Democritean' relational holism of mind, are countenanced as acceptable 
contemporary Buddhist views. Whether or not these explanations are soteri ologi call y 
useful as 'good upadeýa' must be left to another voice in this hermeneutic 
conversation. 
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Notes to Chapter 10 
I See the review of Wallace (1999,200 1) in Chapter 1, pp 18-22 of this thesis. 
2 This hypothesis is reinforced by the 'structural realist' understanding that an 
(object' is a conventional designation for bundles of perceivable property-relations 
(Ladyman 1998, Chakravarty 2003). In Arendt's terms, an object is merely a 
'semblance' (1978: 37-40). The relational task of sentience, throughout evolutionary 
history, has not been to manipulate objects, but to manipulate property relations in 
order to approximate to a state of homeostatic balance. 
3 This is a possible application of the statement in the Heart S17tra that form is not 
other than emptiness, emptiness not other than form' (Lopez 1996: vii), of the 
advocacy of non-dualism in the texts such as the Diamond S17tra and the Hsin Hsin 
Ming, and of the third lemma of Indian four-fold logic, under which a thing can be 
both X and not-X (Hoffman 1992,200 1). 
4 It is exceeds the scope of this thesis to address the topic of duality and non-duality, 
beyond the observation that, broadly speaking, it is the task of the mind to first attend 
without discrimination, then to discriminate on the basis of that attention. Because 
direct perception is impossible, appearances to consciousness must include some 
duality. Discriminations such as like and dislike, which are based on the hypothesis 
of a self against the world, may at least be attenuated. Phylogenetically-encoded 
discriminations such as colour, texture, shape, and aspect recognition are inevitable. 
The subject is a different matter. Crook suggests that the 'attender' is not observable, 
being but a briefly retrospective discrimination (1980: 28), thereby opening the 
possibility that close attention to subjective experience may reveal it to be non-dual. 
Experience is then just so, containing the transient discrimination of subjectivity 
'peripherally' within itself (Varela 1999). 
5 Thompson (2007) is concerned to correct the perception that 'autopoetic enaction' is 
a philosophically internalist view of the mind by stressing that such systems depend 
on coupling to an external environment. See also Chapter I Page 26 and Chapter 8 
Note 1. 
6 Prasada and Dhan-navidya were not influenced by Arendt, Wittgenstem, or Lakoff 
and Johnson's linguistic analyses when they arrived at their doubts about the internal 
metaphor for mind (personal communication). 
7 Black notes 'an ever-present and serious risk that [archetypes] will be used 
metaphysically, so that its consequences will be insulated from empirical disproof 
The more persuasive the archetype, the greater the danger of its becoming a self- 
certifying myth (1962: 242). His remarks is particularly applicable to the metaphor 
of space in mind. 
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